State v. Rodney D. Robbins

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 31, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2470-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF2310

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

RODNEY D. ROBBINS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: J.D. WATTS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Donald, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2470-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Rodney D. Robbins appeals the judgment
convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide with the use of a dangerous
weapon. See WIS. STAT. §§940.01(1)(a) & 939.63(1)(b) (2023-24).1 He argues
that the trial court erred in excluding: (1) evidence that Robbins thought the victim
and members of his gang thought he was a “snitch” and wanted to kill him;
(2) expert testimony on the impact past trauma has on the reactions people have to
later violent situations; and (3) testimony of the victim’s reputation in the
community from a police officer who had investigated numerous incidents
involving the victim and his gang. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Robbins was charged with first-degree intentional homicide with the
use of a dangerous weapon following the death of L.Z. Jolly. According to the
complaint, security video footage of the front entrance to Warren’s Lounge on
North Hopkins Street in Milwaukee showed Jolly confronting Robbins as Robbins
attempted to enter Warren’s Lounge. The video showed Jolly “leaning forward in
an aggressive manner and at various different times putting his hands on [Robbins]
or pushing him.” As the confrontation continued, Robbins pulled “something
from his waist,” which caused Jolly and other bystanders to put their hands in the
air. The security video then showed Robbins shooting Jolly in the back, causing
him to fall face first. It later showed Robbins standing over Jolly and shooting
him multiple times.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version. For ease of
reference, we cite to the current version because there have been no changes to the relevant
language from the 2019-20 version in effect at the time of the crime.

2
No. 2024AP2470-CR

¶3 Robbins pled not guilty, and the case went to trial. Robbins
admitted that he shot Jolly but claimed that he did so in self-defense. Robbins
testified that he knew Jolly since childhood and that Jolly was not only a high-
ranking member of the Brothers of Struggle (“BOS”) street gang but also had a
reputation for violence. According to Robbins, on the night of the shooting, Jolly
pushed him and said, “You dead down here on Hopkins.” Jolly then flashed gang
signs, which Robbins testified meant Jolly was going to kill him, and said, “You
know you really dead,” after which Robbins pulled out his gun. Robbins testified
that he was scared of Jolly and, even after Jolly fell after the first shot, he
continued to fire the gun in a “panic moment” because he knew that if Jolly got
up, Jolly would “get” him.

¶4 In support of his defense, Robbins filed a motion to introduce
McMorris2 and other acts evidence. As relevant here, Robbins sought to introduce
evidence that he was aware that Jolly was a high-ranking member of the BOS
gang and that Robbins was “aware that, for years, Mr. Jolly and other BOS
members under his rank were going to kill him because they believed that Mr.
Robbins was a ‘snitch.’”

¶5 The trial court allowed Robbins to testify that he knew Jolly was a
member of BOS, but excluded the proffered testimony about whether Jolly and his
fellow gang members wanted to kill Robbins. The court determined:

2
See McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973) (discussing that
when a defendant has a factual basis to support a claim of self defense “the defendant may, in
support of the defense, establish what the defendant believed to be the turbulent and violent
character of the victim by proving prior specific instances of violence within his knowledge at the
time of the incident”).

3
No. 2024AP2470-CR

THE COURT: The Court has listened to the discussion.
The Court agrees [that] the State is not objecting to the first
piece of evidence that the defendant knew the victim was a
member of Brothers of Struggle … and if it was sufficiently
raised, the Court would allow it.

Regarding the second item of evidence or the
categorization of the information, I agree strongly with the
State. First of all, this information is beliefs of others. And
this immediately takes it out of the direct definition of
McMorris because we’re primarily dealing with what the
defendant knew. But even if one were to say these beliefs
of others might constitute McMorris, it’s still speculation.
That is, it’s not sufficiently defined or raised. And even if
it were McMorris evidence and sufficiently raised, the
Court agrees with the State again that [WIS. STAT.
§] 904.03 would keep it out because it doesn’t meet the
balancing test of its probative value against the unfair
prejudice and confusion of the issues.

And the State argues correctly that the unfair prejudice here
is to have the jury take this piece of evidence and evaluate
it in a way that gives it probative value that it doesn’t have
to start with and that it’s unfair in that it creates this
emotion or emotional kind of situation and that the jurors
would place improper weight and decide the case on an
improper basis. Then the State’s argument that this is a
confusion of issues and the trial within a trial, the Court
agrees with that.

So the second piece is not allowed and the first piece is.

¶6 In addition, Robbins sought to introduce the testimony of retired
criminology professor John M. Hagedorn, Ph.D. Dr. Hagedorn would have
testified about the reactive behaviors of victims of past gang violence when
confronted by a known gang member. Dr. Hagedorn would have testified
that: Robbins, having been a victim of past gang violence, acted impulsively, not
intentionally, when he shot Jolly; his violent reaction was precipitated by Jolly;
and Robbins shot Jolly seven more times after the first shot because he panicked.

4
No. 2024AP2470-CR

¶7 The trial court excluded Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony because
Wisconsin law prohibits an expert from rendering an opinion as to the defendant’s
state of mind when he committed the crime.

THE COURT: To resolve the defense request and the State
objection to Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony the Court will
review the Daubert3 checklist that’s been so helpful to the
Court.

….

So the first question is, is the testimony relevant? Does it
go to a proposition of consequence in the action? And then
if it does, is it probative? Does it make that proposition
more probable or less probable?

And here as the Court discussed at length previously and as
the State argued strongly today that this testimony cannot
begin to satisfy relevance because the law defines much of
it as legally impermissible. And legally impermissible
evidence is irrelevant.

So the State argues, and … the Court agrees that some of
the proposed testimony of Dr. Hagedorn is [Robbins’] state
of mind. This idea that based on social science Dr.
Hagedorn can define certain reactions of victims of gang
violence. And then looking at what he was told happened
here he can define the defendant’s behavior as expressive
versus intentional. And of course this is all impermissible
state of mind evidence[.]

¶8 The trial court also determined that Dr. Hagedorn was not qualified
to render an opinion as to why Robbins reacted the way he did, and his testimony
would not have assisted the jury in reaching its verdict.

So a lot of what Dr. Hagedorn was or had in his report has
been excluded for obvious reasons. It isn’t relevant legally.

3
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (“Faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony … the trial judge must determine at the outset … whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue.”).

5
No. 2024AP2470-CR

There is an argument that the Court entertained that Dr.
Hagedorn might be able to testify expositionally regarding
certain bits of evidence. And expositional testimony is
evidence that’s helpful to a jury and is explained in a
lecture format as a professor might explain to a class[.]

However, even if the Court were to allow expositional
testimony, the Court has severe difficulties with Dr.
Hagedorn’s proposed testimony and here’s why. The
second question in the Daubert checklist is, and of course
this now assumes that the exposition testimony of Dr.
Hagedorn would be relevant, and I’ll just assume that for
the sake of argument.

But the second argument is, is the testimony within the
jury’s ken? That is, does the jury know it or not? Often
this question has been presented by proponents of
exposition testimony that jurors may have an erroneous
belief that would harm the proponent’s case, and that the
testimony is to correct an erroneous belief about something
that’s important in the case. And the very simple way of
asking this question is, is it helpful to the jury? And when I
listened to Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony last time and he
explained that he did from a social science point of view in
an expositional way would be able to testify about reactive
behaviors of individuals exposed to gang violence. And his
answer was consistent with this Court’s general knowledge
of trauma victims.

However, specific testimony was not helpful and is in this
Court’s view something every juror would have common
sense about. For example, he said not all people react in
the same way. And he was talking about Carl Bell’s work
… into PTSD reactions when individuals Carl Bell was
studying had been exposed to gang violence. And Dr.
Hagedorn’s first point was people react differently. Not
everyone reacts the same way. And even said not one
specific way. But he said victims of gang violence often
had this trauma response. They had fear of location. They
had fear of people. And he indicated that victims of gang
violence might fearful based on their earlier experience.
That this response is an emotional one, not rational. And
that he even said that he had seen victims of gang violence
who were able to recall specific details of homicides or
murders that they had witnessed as sort of proof that this
was a traumatic experience and that it enhanced their
memory.

But none of this expositional testimony is really very
helpful. As I said, the Court was familiar with it. When I

6
No. 2024AP2470-CR

heard it last time, I expected Dr. Hagedorn today to become
very specific and say that this had been refined in some
way or that there were additional conclusions that were
there. But I didn’t hear any of that today. And I don’t
believe he offered it.

So the second checklist question isn’t answered by defense
because it’s not helpful to the jury. It’s already something
they know in their common sense knowledge. That is,
people who have been traumatized run away as he said
today. Sometimes they’re aggressive. And that’s pretty
generalized stuff that I think most people could figure out
even without social science assistance. So it’s not helpful
to the jury.

¶9 Robbins also sought to introduce the testimony of Detective Erik
Villareal regarding Jolly’s reputation for violence in the community. Detective
Villareal, who served with the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) for 27 years,
would have testified that: he had knowledge, from his experience as an MPD
officer and detective, about the community to which Jolly belonged; Jolly had a
reputation for violence; and he knew of Jolly’s reputation.

¶10 The trial court excluded the evidence for numerous reasons. The
court determined that: Robbins failed to establish a proper foundation; the
testimony would have been cumulative to the reputation evidence already
allowed;4 and its limited probative value would be outweighed by the potential to
prejudice the jury with propensity evidence.

¶11 A jury found Robbins guilty. He appeals.

4
Robbins introduced the testimony of Terrance Thomas to establish that Jolly had a
reputation in the community for violence. Robbins himself also testified about Jolly’s reputation
for violence.

7
No. 2024AP2470-CR

DISCUSSION

¶12 Robbins presents three arguments on appeal. He argues that the trial
court erred in excluding: (1) evidence that Robbins thought the victim and
members of his gang thought he was a “snitch” and wanted to kill him;
(2) Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony on the impact past trauma has on the kinds of
reactions people have to later violent situations; and (3) Detective Villareal’s
testimony regarding Jolly’s reputation in the community.

¶13 Our standard of review for each of these issues is the same. We will
not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the trial
court erroneously exercised its discretion. Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶41,
341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191. Likewise, we review the trial court’s decision
to admit or exclude expert testimony for an erroneous exercise of discretion. State
v. Giese, 2014 WI App 92, ¶16, 356 Wis. 2d 796, 854 N.W.2d 687. Also, the trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence of a victim’s reputation for violence
or specific violent acts is discretionary. See State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶¶41,
43, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791.

¶14 Under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard, we will not
overturn the trial court’s exercise of discretion if the decision had a reasonable
basis and was made in accordance with the proper legal standard and the facts in
the record. State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, ¶32, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609.
“This standard is highly deferential: we will search the record for reasons
supporting the trial court’s decision, and we will sustain a ruling even where we
disagree with it, so long as appropriate discretion was exercised.” State v. Hogan,
2021 WI App 24, ¶26, 397 Wis. 2d 171, 959 N.W.2d 658.

8
No. 2024AP2470-CR

¶15 Turning to Robbins’ first argument, we conclude that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion when it excluded evidence that Robbins thought
Jolly and members of his gang thought he was a “snitch” and wanted to kill him.
Robbins claims that he knew prior to the shooting that Jolly “believed he was a
snitch” and that he should have been allowed to testify about this belief, but he
offers no evidence explaining how he knew this or when he came to have that
understanding. In other words, no foundation has been laid. Therefore, the trial
court did not err in determining, as detailed above, the proffered testimony was
speculative and “not sufficiently defined or raised.” Moreover, the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in determining “that [WIS. STAT. §] 904.03 would
keep it out because it doesn’t meet the balancing test of its probative value against
the unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.” Because the trial court properly
exercised its discretion, we sustain the ruling.

¶16 Turning next to Robbins’ second argument, we conclude that the
trial court properly exercised its discretion by prohibiting Dr. Hagedorn from
testifying. Robbins disagrees with the trial court’s determination that
Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony was impermissible “state of mind” testimony, claiming
that his testimony would have instead helped the jury understand the
reasonableness of his belief that “he was in grave danger when he shot and killed
Mr. Jolly.” Robbins also argues that, contrary to the trial court’s determination,
Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony would have been helpful to the jury on multiple levels.
But while Robbins disagrees with the trial court’s ruling, he does not dispute that
there was in fact a reasonable basis for the trial court’s decision, nor does he argue
that the trial court failed to act “in accordance with the proper legal standard and
the facts in the record.” See Dobbs, 392 Wis. 2d 505, ¶32. As set forth in detail
above, the trial court carefully applied the Daubert factors in reaching its well-

9
No. 2024AP2470-CR

reasoned decision to exclude Dr. Hagedorn’s testimony. Therefore, we will
sustain its ruling.

¶17 Finally, we turn to Robbins’ argument that the trial court erred in
excluding Detective Villareal’s testimony about Jolly’s reputation in the
community. As noted, the trial court excluded the testimony because: Robbins
failed to establish a proper foundation; the testimony would be cumulative to the
reputation evidence already allowed; and its limited probative value would be
outweighed by the potential to prejudice the jury with propensity evidence.
Robbins argues that the testimony was not cumulative because only two other
witnesses testified regarding Jolly’s reputation for violence. He also argues the
testimony would not have been unfairly prejudicial because having a detective
“who had investigated numerous incidents involving Mr. Jolly and BOS would
have lent credibility to [his] claim of self-defense.”

¶18 We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
with regard to Detective Villareal’s testimony. First, Terrance Thomas, who went
to the same school as Jolly and who knew him through the community and
personal interactions, testified regarding Jolly’s reputation for violence in the
community. Second, Robbins himself not only testified about Jolly’s reputation,
but was also permitted to testify at length about specific acts that the court
allowed. As the State notes, Robbins testified to the following without objection:
his sister was murdered by the BOS gang years earlier; Robbins knew that Jolly
was a member of the BOS gang at the time of the shooting; Jolly had a reputation
for violence; Robbins knew that Jolly was involved in a 1999 shooting at
Maxine’s Lounge; Robbins saw Jolly shoot at Trenton Gray and “Blue” in 1998,
and he saw Jolly shoot at Kevin Taylor; Hasani Gant told Robbins that Jolly shot
Gant in the back; Robbins was aware that Jolly shot and killed Lonnie Crowder

10
No. 2024AP2470-CR

during a robbery; Robbins was aware that Jolly murdered Anthony Blackmon in
2004; and he knew that Jolly opened fire on Terrance Thomas in 1992 or 1994,
missing Thomas but hitting several of Thomas’s friends. Given this testimony, we
cannot conclude that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in
determining that Detective Villareal’s testimony would have been cumulative and
that the unfair prejudice of this testimony would have outweighed its probative
value.

CONCLUSION

¶19 As detailed above, the trial court properly exercised its discretion
when it excluded evidence related to Jolly’s prior violent conduct, Dr. Hagedorn’s
expert testimony, and Detective Villareal’s testimony about Jolly’s reputation for
violence.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

11