World Class Tattoos LLC v. City of Milwaukee Common Council

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 2, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP108 Cir. Ct. No. 2024CV3206

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. WORLD CLASS TATTOOS LLC AND STATE OF
WISCONSIN EX REL. FRANCISCO V. FLORES, JR.,

PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS,

V.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE COMMON COUNCIL AND CITY OF MILWAUKEE,

RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
THOMAS J. McADAMS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Donald, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2025AP108

¶1 PER CURIAM. World Class Tattoos LLC and its licensing agent,
Francisco V. Flores, Jr. (collectively World Class), appeal the order of the circuit
court affirming the decision of the City of Milwaukee Common Council, which
denied the renewal of World Class’s business license. We reject World Class’s
arguments, and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On June 30, 2023, World Class’s business license expired; however,
the business continued operating. On October 12, 2023, after being contacted by
the Milwaukee Health Department, World Class applied for a renewal of the
license to the Common Council. Flores asserted that the license had expired due
to an oversight.

¶3 A hearing was scheduled and noticed before the Licenses Committee
of the Common Council. Attached to the notice was a police report regarding the
execution of a search warrant in April 2023 at the building where World Class
operated. According to the police report, Flores, who had a prior felony
conviction, was found to be in possession of six firearms along with an assortment
of firearm accessories.1 One of the firearms had a silencer/suppressor attached.
Police also recovered a substance that tested positive for THC, in an amount
believed to be for distribution.

¶4 At the hearing before the Licenses Committee, the police raid was
discussed. Flores stated that his main residence was in Green Bay and he was not
present during the raid. Flores denied that the firearms were his and indicated that

1
We note that the firearms were not found on Flores’s person, but in the building.

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No. 2025AP108

multiple people had access to the building. Flores also noted that the THC was
found in a car not belonging to Flores, and not in the building. Two neighboring
businesses spoke in support of World Class and Flores. The Licenses Committee
recommended renewing the license with a 45-day suspension.

¶5 World Class, by counsel, wrote a letter to the Common Council
objecting to the recommendation. Alderman Scott Spiker requested that the
application be sent back to the Licensing Committee to respond to discrepancies in
the police report and have the relevant officers present. The Common Council
agreed. A second hearing was scheduled and noticed before the Licensing
Committee.

¶6 At the second hearing, it was noted that criminal charges had been
filed against Flores.2 The Licensing Committee decided to hold the application
until Flores’s criminal case was resolved.

¶7 World Class requested a third hearing to avoid the license
application being held indefinitely. A third hearing was scheduled and noticed.
At the third hearing, the Licenses Committee heard testimony from the police
officers who were present during the execution of the search warrant. The police
captain explained that they had received information that World Class was
involved in narcotics trafficking and that the business had firearms. A violent
crimes team investigated the claims and found enough evidence to obtain a search
warrant. During the execution of the warrant, firearms were found in the upper

2
Flores was charged with four counts of felon in possession of a firearm.

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No. 2025AP108

half of the building.3 According to the police, based on body camera footage and
a previous report of burglary at the building, they believed Flores resided in the
building.

¶8 The Licenses Committee recommended outright non-renewal of
World Class’s business license because the evidence “demonstrate[d] the
operation results in a threat to health, safety and welfare of the public.” Following
this recommendation, over the objection of World Class’s counsel, the Common
Council affirmatively voted to not renew the business license of World Class.

¶9 World Class filed a petition for certiorari review with the circuit
court seeking to reverse the Common Council’s decision to not renew the license.
After briefing, the circuit court issued a decision denying the petition. This appeal
follows.

DISCUSSION

¶10 On certiorari review, we review de novo the Common Council’s
decision, not the decision of the circuit court. See State ex rel. Bruskewitz v. City
of Madison, 2001 WI App 233, ¶11, 248 Wis. 2d 297, 635 N.W.2d 797. As such,
this court’s review is “limited to the record” and addresses only whether the
municipality’s actions were: “(1) within its jurisdiction; (2) according to law;
(3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its
judgment; and (4) supported by evidence such that the [municipality] might
reasonably make the order or determination in question.” See State ex rel. City of

3
One of the officers noted that the upper half of the building was divided into a tattoo
parlor and a residence with a kitchen and bedrooms. The firearms were found on both sides.

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No. 2025AP108

Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶19, 399 Wis. 2d 696,
967 N.W.2d 460; Bruskewitz, 248 Wis. 2d 297, ¶11.

¶11 On certiorari review, Wisconsin courts “have repeatedly stated
that … there is a presumption of correctness and validity to a municipality’s
decision.” Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶48, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796
N.W.2d 411. A court “may not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the
municipality” and “the petitioner bears the burden to overcome the presumption of
correctness.” Id., ¶¶50, 53.

¶12 On appeal, World Class raises three primary arguments. We address
each argument in turn.

¶13 First, according to World Class, the Common Council violated the
notice requirements under the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances (MCO) and the due
process requirements of the United States Constitution. According to World
Class, the notice issued prior to the third hearing “failed to adequately state the
precise reasons for potential nonrenewal.” World Class asserts that the notice is
“no more than a regurgitation of all possible grounds for revocation, suspension,
or nonrenewal rather than a ‘statement of specific reasons’ for revocation,
suspension, or nonrenewal,” and did not include a standard of proof.

¶14 Under MCO § 85-3 (2003), the Licenses Committee and the
Common Council must provide written notice of the possibility for nonrenewal,
suspension, or revocation, including “a statement of the specific reasons for
revocation, suspension or nonrenewal.” MCO § 85-3.1.b-3.

¶15 Here, contrary to World Class’s argument, the notices were
sufficiently specific. For example, the notice for the third hearing indicated that

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No. 2025AP108

the license application could be denied for reasons including “pending charges
against or the conviction of any felony, misdemeanor, municipal offense or other
offense … by the applicant or by any employee or other agent of the applicant.”
The notice further indicated that the testimony from the two previous hearings
“may also be considered” and also stated “[s]ee attached police report or
correspondence.”

¶16 World Class argues that the notices in this case were the same as the
licensing notices in Family Dollar Stores v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2021AP1432,
unpublished slip op. (WI App Oct. 11, 2022), which were held to be defective.4
We do not find Family Dollar persuasive as it is fact-specific and distinguishable.

¶17 In Family Dollar, the first notice at issue did not have any police
reports attached and only had an email to an alderperson. Id., ¶28. The second
notice had the same email, a letter designating the store as a nuisance which listed
four incidents to which the Milwaukee Police Department had responded, and a
copy of a letter notifying Family Dollar that its abatement plan to address the
nuisance issues had been accepted by the Milwaukee Police Department. Id. In
its decision, this court observed that the attachments to the notices were related to
issues that had already been addressed by the store and there were no further
citations issued in the time frame between the approval of the abatement plan and
the hearings. Id., ¶29. Moreover, there were no other details specific to Family
Dollar’s conduct or activities that were of concern. Id. Thus, this court concluded

4
See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b) (2023-24) (stating that an unpublished authored
opinion issued on or after July 1, 2009 may be cited for its persuasive value).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2025AP108

that there was not sufficient notice of the evidence that the Licenses Committee
was going to consider at the hearing. Id., ¶30.

¶18 In contrast to Family Dollar, here, the notices referenced a detailed
police report about the search warrant and described the seized items. Unlike in
Family Dollar, there was no indication or inference that this concern was abated
prior to the hearing dates. Accordingly, there was sufficient notice of the evidence
to be considered and we are not persuaded that the notices in this case violated the
MCO or due process.

¶19 Second, World Class argues that there was “unlawful discrimination
based upon pending criminal charges.” In support, World Class argues that its
license was denied based on Flores’s arrest record in violation of the Wisconsin
Fair Employment Act (WFEA). Even if we assume we have the ability to review
this claim,5 this claim fails because it involves an alleged claim of discrimination
against a business, not an individual. The WFEA protects individuals against
discrimination, not businesses. See WIS. STAT. § 111.31(1).

¶20 Lastly, World Class argues that the decision for non-renewal was
arbitrary.

¶21 Here, World Class had three separate hearings. During the hearings,
World Class was given an opportunity to rebut the police report, explain how the
business would operate going forward, and explain whether the business posed a
risk to the health and safety of the community. In particular, in regard to the third

5
Discrimination based on arrest or conviction records falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Workforce Development. See WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31, 32(4), 39.

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No. 2025AP108

hearing, the Licenses Committee issued a report with findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its non-renewal recommendation. The record
reflects that the Common Council members present read the report and
recommendation and voted to approve the non-renewal.6

¶22 Based on the record, we are not persuaded that the Common
Council’s decision was arbitrary. A decision “need only contain enough
information for the reviewing court to discern the basis” of the decision, and a
“detailed or explicit explanation of the … reasoning is not necessary.” Oneida
Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 WI 50, ¶49, 362 Wis. 2d
290, 865 N.W.2d 162. Here, the Common Council’s decision was reasonable in
response to the particular circumstances presented.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

6
We note that World Class asserts that the police testimony at the third hearing was
“incomplete” and “selective.” World Class, however, does not specify what inquiries were
prohibited and why such inquires would have been material. We do not address undeveloped
arguments. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

8