Winnebago County v. L. J. F. G.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 8, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP2645-FT Cir. Ct. No. 2021GN19

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND PLACEMENT OF L.J.F.G.:

WINNEBAGO COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

L.J.F.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
DANIEL J. BISSETT, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2025AP2645-FT

¶1 GROGAN, J.1 L.J.F.G., hereinafter referred to as “Emily,”2 appeals
from a WIS. STAT. ch. 55 (“ch. 55”) order authorizing the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication (Involuntary Medication Order). Emily
contends that Winnebago County failed to introduce clear and convincing
evidence that supports the circuit court’s conclusion that she is dangerous pursuant
to WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e) and WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e, and that the court
therefore erred in entering the Involuntary Medication Order. This court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 Emily has a lengthy history of mental illness and has been diagnosed
with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder. In January 2021,
the County petitioned for permanent guardianship due to incompetency and for
protective placement, and the circuit court entered orders granting both petitions in
March 2021. Just over one year later, in May 2022, the court granted the County’s
subsequent request for an involuntary medication order, which it stayed pending
appeal, and we affirmed that order in an April 2023 opinion. See Winnebago
County DHS v. L.J.F.G., No. 2022AP1589, unpublished slip op. (WI App
Apr. 12, 2023). In September 2023, our supreme court denied Emily’s petition for
review in that matter and the circuit court thereafter lifted its stay of the May 2022
involuntary medication order.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24).
This is an expedited appeal under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.17. All references to the Wisconsin
Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
This court uses a pseudonym to protect L.J.F.G.’s privacy. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.86(4). Like the parties, as well as the appellate court in her prior appeal, Winnebago
County DHS v. L.J.F.G., No. 2022AP1589, unpublished slip op. (WI App Apr. 12, 2023), this
court refers to L.J.F.G. as Emily.

2
No. 2025AP2645-FT

¶3 In February 2025, the County filed a petition for an involuntary
medication order as part of Emily’s annual Watts3 due process review. In
conjunction with that petition, the circuit court appointed Dr. Jagadeeswana
Musunuru to conduct an independent evaluation and a related psychotropic
medication evaluation. The court held a hearing on the petition in May 2025.
Dr. Musunuru testified at the hearing, and the court admitted two of his reports—
the “Examining Physician’s or Psychologist’s Report (Adult Guardianship)”
(hereinafter the Guardianship Report) and the psychotropic medication report
(hereinafter the Involuntary Medication Report)—into evidence.4

¶4 At the hearing, Dr. Musunuru testified he is a licensed physician in
Wisconsin, that he has “been practicing psychiatry since 1980[,]” that he has been
“the head program director and clinical director for Fond du Lac County Human
Services for 42 years[,]” and that he “do[es] a lot of court evaluations.”
Dr. Musunuru explained he had evaluated Emily via Zoom and that as part of his
evaluation, he reviewed prior court evaluations and treatment records. He also
confirmed he had briefly spoken with Emily’s social worker in Trempealeau
County. According to Dr. Musunuru, it was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, that Emily is incapacitated and that her incapacitation is “likely
to be permanent.” He then went on to explain that Emily has had a “chronic
mental illness” for approximately “34 years or even longer[,]” that because of her
mental illness and “noncomplian[ce] with the treatment[,]” “she developed a lot of

3
See State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd. of Milwaukee Cnty., 122
Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985).
4
A third report—entitled “Report of Examination § 51.20, WIS. STATS.”—was filed
alongside the two reports admitted into evidence at the May 2025 hearing. That report, which is
in the Record, was briefly referenced at the hearing but was not moved into evidence.

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cognitive problems” and was “getting a lot more forgetful, not able to care for
herself[,]” and that Emily does not take her medication as necessary.

¶5 In regard to Emily’s “chronic mental illness,” Dr. Musunuru testified
that at present, Emily’s diagnosis “is more of a schizophrenia/schizoaffective
disorder” that had “started as a bipolar disorder and gradually turned worse” and
that she was now “showing more symptoms of schizoaffective disorder.” When
asked whether Emily currently “require[s] placement in a licensed, certified, or
registered setting[,]” Dr. Musunuru responded affirmatively. Further elaborating,
he went on to explain that Emily “gets … mood changes from time to time and …
can be aggressive[ and] violent” and that she “need[s] to be watched very
careful[ly] because she gets--frequently talks about hurting herself or hurting
others.” He also testified that as “part of her illness,” and in addition to her mood
changes, Emily is “irritab[le], angry, and unable to care for herself” and that this
requires “24-hour supervision.” The County also asked Dr. Musunuru about the
“types of harm or dangers” he would be “concerned about” if Emily “were not
placed in a licensed, certified, or residential setting,” and he testified that Emily is
“not able to care for day-to-day needs[,]” that “she gets delusional thinking,
thoughts of hurting people, killing people[,]” and that Emily had been “talking
about killing a lot of people when [he] was evaluating her.”

¶6 Specifically in regard to the requested involuntary medication order,
Dr. Musunuru confirmed he had evaluated Emily and that the information
provided in that report was also accurate to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. He went on to describe Emily’s prescribed medications, explaining the
medications had been prescribed to treat her mental illness because she “needs
psychotropic medication to control her mood and other symptoms.”
Dr. Musunuru described the advantages of medication as including greater

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stability of Emily’s symptoms, improving her ability to function, and improving
her ability to “communicate and also not get into any trouble.” As to the
medications’ disadvantages, Dr. Musunuru testified the medications can lead to
“dryness of the mouth, constipation, blurring, dizziness, and drowsiness.”
According to Dr. Musunuru, there are no alternatives to these medications because
“there’s nothing that’s going to help her and she doesn’t think she’s in need of the
medications[,]” and he confirmed that although he had described these advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives to Emily, she was not capable of understanding
them. Dr. Musunuru explained Emily was not capable of doing so “[b]ecause of
her mental illness and her poor judgment chronic mental illness.”

¶7 Emily’s counsel briefly questioned Dr. Musunuru on
cross-examination. Dr. Musunuru reiterated that the least restrictive placement for
Emily would depend upon whether she continued to take her medications as
prescribed, noting that if she continued to take her medications “there is a
possibility she can be moved to a less restrictive place like a halfway house.” He
also confirmed he was requesting that Emily be ordered to continue the medication
and that the reference to the WIS. STAT. § 51.20 dangerousness standards in his
report—the “Report of Examination § 51.20, WIS. STATS.” that neither party
moved into evidence at the hearing—specifically “denoted the a and b standards.”

¶8 Dr. Musunuru’s reports support his testimony. The Guardianship
Report, for example, describes Emily’s lengthy history of mental illness, noting it
goes back to at least 1995 and that “[s]he refuses to take medications orally.” The
report also makes multiple references to Emily having threatened to kill people:
(1) “She is talking about killing [a] few people[,]” including “her husband, and her
psychiatrist”; (2) at the time of the evaluation, Emily was “making verbal threats
of killing” her husband, whom she “insists at this time she is separated from”;

5
No. 2025AP2645-FT

(3) “She has been talking about killing and suing [a] lot of the people”; and
(4) “She [has] verbalized attacking, suing and wish of killing.” Similarly, the
Involuntary Medication Report states that Emily’s “behavior[] is unpredictable
and dangerous” and that her “[p]ersistent delusions induced behavior can lead to
unanticipated dangerousness to her or others.”5

¶9 Randall Herman, a professional counselor and social worker who
has worked with Emily at the Trempealeau County Health Care Center, also
testified at the hearing. Mr. Herman testified that Emily resided “on a medium
security unit” at the time of the hearing and that “she has almost full privileges at
this time[,]” and he further explained that Emily is “fairly independent with her
personal cares” and that she “sees a psychiatrist … to manage her medications for
her diagnosed mental illness.” When asked whether he had “observe[d] any
behaviors within the last year that would be considered dangerous, harmful to
[Emily] or harmful to others[,]” Mr. Herman stated he had “not personally
witnessed any acts, physical aggression toward other people, nor … any
self-injury.” He explained, however, that Emily can be “verbally abusive to peers
and to staff” and confirmed he had “been on the receiving end of that a few times”
as well. Mr. Herman further testified that Emily’s “interactions could be
considered threatening towards the staff[,]” though he suggested that may “not
simply [be] because she’s targeting them but is frustrated with her situation and
having to be in a facility.” He later elaborated that he was “not sure … the verbal
abuse” was directed at him or any other specific party but rather may have been
due to “her illness and personality[.]”

5
Dr. Musunuru’s third report—the WIS. STAT. § 51.20 report—not admitted into
evidence contains similar information.

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

¶10 The County thereafter sought to introduce the annual protective
placement review and requested that the circuit court take judicial notice of it.
Emily objected and asked the court to take testimony prior to admitting the annual
review into evidence, and the court agreed to do so. Ultimately, however, the
court did not allow the witness—who had drafted the annual review—to testify
due to a sequestration issue wherein the witness had been present in the courtroom
during prior witnesses’ testimony. The court also indicated that although it could
review the report absent supporting testimony because it was in the Record, it
“would put very little, if any, credibility to that report” due to the lack of
testimony and authentication.

¶11 Following the witnesses’ testimony, the parties made final
arguments to the circuit court. The County argued that continuation of Emily’s
protective placement was appropriate based on both Dr. Musunuru’s and
Mr. Herman’s testimony regarding Emily’s mental illness and her needs for
addressing her mental illness. It likewise argued the involuntary medication order
was appropriate based on Dr. Musunuru’s testimony that medication was
necessary to treat her condition and that Emily had made threatening comments,
including references to killing people, and that she could be “impulsive” and/or
“angry.” The GAL largely asserted the same arguments and pointed specifically
to the testimony that Emily had threatened to harm others and that “there are
threats about harming other people” and “threats of killing people.”

¶12 Emily, to the contrary, asserted the County had failed to meet its
burden as to the involuntary medication request. Specifically, she argued the
testimony failed to offer “any specific instances that would support a [WIS. STAT.
§] 51.20 finding” that would satisfy the WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e) requirements for
involuntary medication because Dr. Musunuru had offered only “very vague and

7
No. 2025AP2645-FT

kind of loose testimony about there being threats, there being violence” and that
“it was really unclear if he had actually witnessed any of these things or if they
were anything that he wasn’t just hearing or reviewing in other records.”
Mr. Herman’s testimony, she argued, was similarly “very loose,” and she said his
statements regarding verbal abuse were “general” and that he “went as far to say
that there’s nothing physical going on and that when the verbal abuse is
happening, it’s not because she’s targeting people, it’s not because she has issues
with people, but she’s frustrated with her placement[.]” Emily also asserted the
County failed to establish the protective placement was appropriate given that the
testimony indicated she could take care of her daily needs.

¶13 The circuit court ultimately granted the County’s protective
placement and involuntary medication petitions. In doing so, it relied largely on
Dr. Musunuru’s testimony, pointing out he had testified as to Emily’s incapacities
stemming from a permanent “chronic and persistent mental illness[,]” that she
required “some form of 24-hour supervision,” and that medication provided the
best treatment option. The court also specifically recounted Dr. Musunuru’s
testimony regarding Emily’s threats to others, stating:

He did testify that she does or has made threats of harm
to others. He does reference in his report a number of
times about her talking about killing other people. And I
believe, although I don’t have the specific quote in my
notes, but I do have it in my notes that she did indicate
some threats of killing others to the doctor during the
evaluation and that they are also contained in the reports.
So I do think that there is that type of dangerousness with
regards to those threats of harm.

(Emphasis added.) Later in its ruling, when addressing Emily’s need for
medication more specifically, the court further noted that despite some
disadvantages and side effects, “[p]sychotropic medication has advantages and …

8
No. 2025AP2645-FT

it helps with regards to [Emily’s] mood and stabilizes that mood and tries to not
have her act on some of those thoughts that she may be having and verbalizing to
staff” and that “[t]here really, in the doctor’s testimony, aren’t alternatives” to
medication and that “[s]he needs medication.” It also determined Emily was
incapable “of expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of
the psychotropic medication [so] as to make an informed decision as to whether to
take” it.

¶14 The circuit court also noted Mr. Herman’s testimony about Emily’s
verbal abusiveness, contrasting it somewhat with Dr. Musunuru’s, before returning
to Dr. Musunuru’s testimony:

Although the social worker did testify that he feels that
her verbally abusive statements-- And, frankly, when
somebody says verbally abusive, I think there’s a wide
spectrum of what can be categorized as verbally abusive. I
don’t necessarily think that that rises to the level of threats
of harm to self or others.

It can be loud. It can be boisterous, maybe profane at
times, you know, those laundry list definitions that we use
for disorderly conduct. But as [Emily’s counsel] has
referenced, I think that can be fairly vague. And I think the
social worker here didn’t provide us much beyond saying
verbally abusive. And to me that doesn’t mean much, to be
honest, in this case here. But the doctor did testify as to I
think what some of those specifics were. When she’s
threatening harm to kill others, that’s pretty direct, pretty
threatening, and pretty consistent with the statutory factors
associated with a Chapter 51 proceeding when we talk
about danger to self or others. In this case I don’t know
that there’s a lot of threat to harm to self but certainly those
threats to others that the doctor had testified regarding.

(Emphases added.) Accordingly, the court found, specifically noting the clear and
convincing evidence standard, that Emily “has a chronic and persistent mental
illness[] that … is permanent or likely to be permanent,” that there was “potential
substantial harm to others” regarding the threats she had made, “and that if she

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

was not protectively placed, [Emily] would present a substantial risk of harm to
others.” Emily appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 The clear and convincing evidence standard applies to an order
granting a ch. 55 petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication. See WIS. STAT. § 55.14(8). Whether the County met its burden of
proof presents a mixed question of law and fact. See Waukesha County v. J.W.J.,
2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. This court “will uphold a
circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous[,]” Langlade
County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶24, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, and this
court “‘accept[s] reasonable inferences from the facts available to the circuit
court[,]’” Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1,
878 N.W.2d 109 (quoted source omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.” D.J.W.,
391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶24. However, “whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard”
is a question of law this court reviews independently. Id., ¶¶25, 47; see also
Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶39, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833
N.W.2d 607.

III. DISCUSSION

¶16 Emily does not challenge the circuit court’s protective placement
order; thus, the sole issue presented on appeal is whether clear and convincing
evidence in the Record supports the court’s factual findings upon which it
concluded Emily is a proper subject for the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication.

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

¶17 On appeal, Emily contends the County failed to establish she “will
incur a substantial probability of physical harm, impairment, injury, or debilitation
or will present a substantial probability of physical harm to others” under either
WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e)1 or 55.14(3)(e)2. See § 55.14(3)(e)1-2. First, she says,
the County did not introduce any evidence establishing she had a “history of at
least 2 episodes, one of which has occurred within the previous 24 months, that
indicate a pattern” of dangerous activity resulting from her “failure to participate
in treatment[,]” see § 55.14(3)(e)1, and that “even if it could possibly be argued
that any of the evidence presented at” the hearing “satisfied the ‘pattern’ of
dangerous behavior requirement, the record is devoid of any evidence that any
such episode resulted in a finding of probable cause to commit [her] under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20.”

¶18 Second, she says the County likewise failed to establish
dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e. See WIS. STAT.
§ 55.14(3)(e)2. According to Emily, “the record is not at all clear which specific
standard of dangerousness the county sought to prove or upon which standard the
circuit court’s order is based” and that Dr. Musunuru’s testimony that she “can be
aggressive, violent” and that she has made “threats” was “vague” given that he did
not testify about any “specific impact that not taking psychotropic medication has
had on [her].” Thus, she says, while the “circuit court’s order for involuntary
medication may[,]” “[i]n theory,” “be based on a conclusion that … [she] is
dangerous under either the first or second standard of dangerousness” set forth in
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a-b, “the county presented no evidence that [she] is a danger to
herself” under the first standard. As for the second standard, § 51.20(1)(a)2.b,
Emily asserts “[t]he only evidence that even arguably satisfies [that] standard is
evidence that [she] sometimes ‘talks’ about hurting or killing others and is

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

verbally abusive around staff at the facility where she is protectively placed.” She
argues such evidence is insufficient because the referenced “threats” are “vague,
generic, and unspecified” whereas § 51.20(1)(a)2.b “requires evidence of a
‘substantial probability of physical harm to others,’ not simply harsh or ‘verbally
abusive’ language by an individual [who] is extremely frustrated to be protectively
placed.”

¶19 In response, the County argues “[t]he circuit court found that
Emily’s behavior met the criteria set forth under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b[,]”
which it suggests is clear from the court’s reference to Dr. Musunuru’s “testimony
that Emily talked about killing other people” and the court’s conclusion that
Emily’s “threatening harm to kill others[ is] pretty direct, pretty threatening, and
pretty consistent with the statutory factors associated with a Chapter 51
proceeding[] when we talk about danger to self or others.” Citing Melanie L, 349
Wis. 2d 148, ¶97, the County posits that even though the court “did not recite”
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b’s statutory language, it is clear the court’s factual findings are
“sufficiently linked back to the” statutory language such that “the parties and any
reviewing courts [can] understand exactly what facts were found and their
relationship to the court’s ultimate order.”

¶20 The County further contends it presented ample evidence at the due
process hearing to support the circuit court’s findings. For example, it points to
Dr. Musunuru’s testimony that Emily has frequent mood changes and that “during
those times, she can be aggressive, violent[,]” that Emily “need[s] to be watched
very careful[ly] because she gets -- frequently talks about hurting herself or
hurting others[,]” and that Emily has talked about “killing a lot of people when
[he] was evaluating her.” This was also sufficient, it says, to establish
Dr. Musunuru was placed in reasonable fear of safety for others. See WIS. STAT.

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§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b; Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶42, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937
N.W.2d 901. Additionally, the County also identifies Dr. Musunuru’s
Guardianship Report and Involuntary Medication Report as supporting the court’s
findings, as those reports include notations that Emily made threats about killing
her husband, psychiatrist, and others.6 In its appellate brief, the County does not
argue that sufficient evidence in the Record supports a finding of dangerousness
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a as an alternate means of satisfying WIS. STAT.
§ 55.14(3)(e).

¶21 WISCONSIN STAT. § 55.14 governs the Involuntary Medication Order
at issue in this matter. As relevant here, § 55.14(3) identifies certain information
that must be alleged in a petition seeking a ch. 55 involuntary medication order,
and § 55.14(8) provides that such allegations must be established by clear and
convincing evidence before a circuit court may enter an involuntary medication
order. On appeal, Emily argues only that the County failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that she “will incur a substantial probability of physical
harm, impairment, injury, or debilitation or will present a substantial probability of
physical harm to others” under § 55.14(3)(e), thus rendering the Involuntary
Medication Order invalid. It is therefore unnecessary to address § 55.14(3)’s other
requirements.

6
The County also points to the Annual Protective Placement Review the circuit court
precluded it from entering into evidence at the hearing. Because this court is satisfied the
evidence presented at the hearing, particularly Dr. Musunuru’s testimony and his corresponding
reports, sufficiently supports the circuit court’s findings, it is unnecessary to rely on the Annual
Protective Placement Review. It is therefore also unnecessary to address the parties’ respective
arguments as to whether or not this court can do so in the first instance.

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¶22 WISCONSIN STAT. § 55.14(3)(e) requires that a petition for
involuntary psychotropic medication allege that:

(e) Unless psychotropic medication is administered
involuntarily, the individual will incur a substantial
probability of physical harm, impairment, injury, or
debilitation or will present a substantial probability of
physical harm to others. The substantial probability of
physical harm, impairment, injury, or debilitation shall be
evidenced by one of the following:

1. The individual’s history of at least 2 episodes, one of
which has occurred within the previous 24 months, that
indicate a pattern of overt activity, attempts, threats to act,
or omissions that resulted from the individual’s failure to
participate in treatment, including psychotropic medication,
and that resulted in a finding of probable cause for
commitment under s. 51.20(7), a settlement agreement
approved by a court under s. 51.20(8)(bg), or commitment
ordered under s. 51.20(13).

2. Evidence that the individual meets one of the
dangerousness criteria set forth in s. 51.20(1)(a)2.a. to e.

Sec. 55.14(3)(e)1-2. Establishing such “substantial probability of physical harm,
impairment, injury, or debilitation or … substantial probability of physical harm to
others[,]” see § 55.14(3)(e), requires that the petitioning party provide clear and
convincing evidence, see § 55.14(8). In its appellate brief, the County fails to
respond to Emily’s contention that there is no clear and convincing evidence in the
Record upon which the circuit court could have concluded § 55.14(3)(e)1 applies;
accordingly, the County is deemed to have conceded she is correct and this court
will not address whether that subdivision applies. See Charolais Breeding
Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Sec. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App.
1979) (holding that a party’s failure to refute an argument constitutes a
concession); United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304
Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578. This court’s review is therefore limited to
determining whether the County submitted clear and convincing evidence that

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

supports the court’s finding that Emily “meets one of the dangerousness criteria
set forth in s. 51.20(a)2.a. to e.” See § 55.14(3)(e)2.

¶23 At the outset, this court notes the circuit court did not specifically
cite WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e during the course of the hearing, and the
Involuntary Medication Order likewise does not specifically identify or recite that
statute. However, this court has reviewed the Record and it is clear from the
hearing transcript that the circuit court determined the County carried its burden of
establishing dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b, which pertains to threat of
harm to others.7 See § 51.20(1)(a)2.b (“substantial probability of physical harm to
other individuals” may be established “by evidence that others are placed in
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as
evidenced by a recent … threat to do serious physical harm”). Specifically, the
court referenced Dr. Musunuru’s testimony “that [Emily] does or has made threats
of harm to others” and the multiple “reference[s] in his report … about her talking
about killing other people[,]” which led it to believe “there is that type of
dangerousness with regards to those threats of harm.” (Emphases added.) Emily
acknowledges as much—stating that Dr. Musunuru’s confirmation that the report
he submitted to the court “denoted the a and b standards as far as 51.20
dangerousness”—despite also arguing “the record is not at all clear which specific

7
Although it is clear from the transcript as a whole that the circuit court relied on WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b for the purpose of WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e)2, the parties and court are
reminded of the importance of specifically referencing and identifying the statute relied upon in
order to assist appellate courts on review. See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391
Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277 (“circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific
factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2 on
which the recommitment is based”).

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

standard of dangerousness the county sought to prove or upon which standard the
circuit court’s order is based.”

¶24 Turning to the issue here, WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e)2 incorporates by
reference WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b, which provides the following avenues by
which a party may establish dangerousness: (1) by submitting evidence there is “a
substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested by
evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior”; or (2) through “evidence
that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical
harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious
physical harm.” Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Having reviewed the Record, this court is
satisfied the County presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support
the circuit court’s conclusion that Emily is dangerous within the meaning of
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b for the purpose of satisfying § 55.14(3)(e)2.

¶25 At the due process hearing, Dr. Musunuru testified that not only does
Emily “get[] delusional thinking” and have “thoughts of hurting people, killing
people[,]” but also that she “talk[ed] about killing a lot of people” during the
evaluation itself. Dr. Musunuru also indicated in one of the reports entered into
evidence that Emily had made “verbal threats of killing [her husband]” and also
“talk[ed] about killing [a] few people[,]” including “her husband, and her
psychiatrist.” Although it is not clear whether she ever made these threats directly
to her husband or the referenced psychiatrist, for the purpose of satisfying WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b, it is sufficient that “others are placed in a fearsome
position by a disturbed person’s actions even if the person placed in that position
has no subjective awareness of it.” See R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d
516, 522-23, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988). It is certainly reasonable to infer
from Dr. Musunuru’s testimony and reports that he had valid concerns for others’

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No. 2025AP2645-FT

safety. Taken as a whole, threatening to kill people, particularly where certain
individuals have been identified, certainly qualifies as a threat to do harm to
others, and it is clear the circuit court relied upon Dr. Musunuru’s testimony
regarding these statements in concluding Emily is dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Having established dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b, the
County therefore also satisfied the requisites of WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e)2 for the
purpose of the Involuntary Medication Order.

¶26 Based on the totality of the evidence provided at the hearing, and
particularly Dr. Musunuru’s testimony and his corresponding reports, this court is
satisfied that the circuit court’s findings, which it clearly tied to the testimony
presented at the hearing, were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, it did not err in
concluding Emily is dangerous within the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b
for the purpose of establishing Emily “will incur a substantial probability of
physical harm, impairment, injury, or debilitation or will present a substantial
probability of physical harm to others.” See WIS. STAT. § 55.14(3)(e)2. The State
met its burden.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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