Rebecca Cappelli-Mayfield v. Martinsburg Family Diner, LLC and Scott A. Adkins, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of WorkForce West Virginia

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

REBECCA CAPPELLI-MAYFIELD,
Claimant Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 24-ICA-400 (Workforce W. Va. Bd. of Rev. Case No. R-2024-1514)

MARTINSBURG FAMILY DINER, LLC, FILED
Employer Below, Respondent June 6, 2025
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
and OF WEST VIRGINIA

SCOTT A. ADKINS, in his capacity as
Acting Commissioner of WorkForce West Virginia,
Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Rebecca Cappelli-Mayfield appeals the WorkForce West Virginia Board
of Review’s (“Board”) September 6, 2024, decision affirming the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) determination that she left work voluntarily without good cause and was,
therefore, disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Respondents Martinsburg
Family Diner, LLC (“Martinsburg Diner”) and Scott A. Adkins, in his capacity as Acting
Commissioner of WorkForce West Virginia (“WorkForce”) did not participate in this
appeal.1

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the Board’s decision is appropriate under
Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

According to the record, Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield was employed by Martinsburg
Diner as a hostess from March 7, 2024, to April 14, 2024. Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield took an
approved leave of absence beginning April 15, 2024, to complete a court-ordered
rehabilitation program. The parties agreed that Ms. Mayfield would contact Martinsburg
Diner about returning to work after she completed the rehabilitation program.

On May 7, 2024, Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield sent Martinsburg Diner’s general manager
a text message, advising that she had returned from rehab and was available to start work
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Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield is self-represented.
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on May 16, 2024. Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield did not receive a response from the general
manager following the May 7, 2024, text. At that time, Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield did not try
to contact him, or any other manager, by telephone or by going to the restaurant in person.
Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield texted the general manager again on May 17, 2024, and on May 20,
2024. In her May 20, 2024, text, Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield advised the general manager that
she would be filing for unemployment compensation benefits. The two then engaged in a
text exchange regarding her unavailability to work that weekend and why she had not come
to or called the restaurant to discuss her return to work.

On May 26, 2024, Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield filed a claim for unemployment benefits
contending that she was constructively terminated from her employment when her manager
did not respond to text messages when she returned from leave. The WorkForce deputy
claims commissioner determined that Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield “did not do what any
reasonably prudent person would do to remain employed,” and thus, was disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without
good cause involving fault on the part of her employer. Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield appealed
the deputy’s decision, and a hearing was held by the ALJ on July 17, 2024.

In its July 17, 2024, decision, the ALJ affirmed the deputy’s decision and concluded,
in relevant part:

In the present case, the claimant quit her employment when she failed to
return to work from her leave of absence. The claimant texted the employer’s
general manager Dan when she returned from her rehabilitation on May 7,
2024, but did not follow up by calling or going to the restaurant when she
did not hear back from her text message. . . .The claimant may have
communicated with the general manager via text message during her six
weeks of employment, but the claimant did not obtain the job via text
message and knew of other ways to contact the employer. The claimant did
not act as a reasonable person who wanted to return to work when, after
receiving no response to her May 7, 2024, text message, she did not follow
up by contacting the employer in some other way – such as in person or by
phone – about a date and time certain to return to work.
...

It is, therefore, held that the claimant quit her job when she failed to take
reasonable steps to return to work following her leave of absence.

Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield appealed the ALJ’s decision and on September 6, 2024, the
Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision in its entirety. It is from the Board’s decision that Ms.
Cappelli-Mayfield appeals.

Our standard of review in appeals from the Board is as follows:

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The findings of fact of the Board of Review of [WorkForce West Virginia]
are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court believes the
findings are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no
deference is given and the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.

Taylor v. WorkForce W. Va., 249 W. Va. 381, 386, 895 S.E.2d 236, 241 (Ct. App. 2023)
(quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W. Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994)). Further,
the “legal conclusion that [an employee] quit her job ‘voluntarily without good cause
involving fault on the part of the employer’ within the meaning of West Virginia Code §
21A-6-3(1) [2005] is subject to a de novo standard of review.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v.
Epling, 230 W. Va. 439, 443, 739 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2013) (quoting May v. Chair and
Members, Bd. of Review, 222 W. Va. 373, 376, 664 S.E.2d 714, 717 (2008)).

On appeal, Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield asserts that she did not voluntarily leave her
employment with Martinsburg Diner. Instead, she contends that Martinsburg Diner
constructively terminated her by failing to respond to contact attempts when she returned
from her leave of absence.2

West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3 (2020) provides, in relevant part: “Upon the
determination of the facts by the commissioner, an individual is disqualified for benefits:
(1) For the week in which he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without
good cause involving fault on the part of the employer. . . .”

When determining whether an employee “voluntarily quit” his or her employment,
the SCAWV has explained: “[f]rom our reading of the [Unemployment Compensation]
Act, we believe the obligation of employees under the Act is to do whatever is reasonable
and necessary to remain employed.” Childress v. Muzzle, 222 W. Va. 129, 133, 663 S.E.2d
583, 587 (2008). In this case, the Board cited Childress and found that Ms. Cappelli-
Mayfield did not take the necessary steps a reasonable person in her position would take to
return to work. According to the Board, a reasonable person in Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield’s
shoes who desired to return to work would have taken additional action—such as
contacting her employer by telephone or in person—to ensure she remained employed,
after not receiving responses to her May 7th and May 17th text messages. Ms. Cappelli-
Mayfield testified at the ALJ hearing that she did not talk to her manager or anyone else at
Martinsburg Diner by telephone or go to the restaurant in person to discuss her job status.

2
Neither Martinsburg Diner nor WorkForce responded in opposition to Ms.
Cappelli-Mayfield’s arguments or in support of the order on appeal. We remind the parties
that pursuant to Rule 10(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, when a respondent fails
to participate, we have discretion to find that said respondent agrees with the petitioner’s
arguments. In this case, however, we decline to impose that finding upon the
nonparticipating parties, because Ms. Cappelli-Mayfield has not shown reversible error
even if the negative inference of Rule 10(d) was imposed.
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Because reasonable and necessary steps by the employee are required, and Ms. Cappelli-
Mayfield did not take those steps, we find no error in the Board disqualifying Ms. Cappelli-
Mayfield from receiving unemployment benefits for voluntarily leaving her employment
without good cause involving fault by her employer.

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s September 6, 2024, decision.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 6, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

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