The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for its Division, University Hospital v. Carolyn Todd

Rel: September 26, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2025
_________________________

CL-2025-0234
_________________________

The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for its
Division, University Hospital

v.

Carolyn Todd

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-21-900578)

PER CURIAM.

The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for its Division,

University Hospital ("UAB Hospital"), appeals from a judgment of the

Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") that, among other things,

directed the clerk of the trial court to disburse $7,570 of interpleaded
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money to Carolyn Todd. Todd had interpleaded the money to cover a

hospital lien that UAB Hospital had filed against her for the amount it

had charged her for treatment she had received at its facility for injuries

she said she had suffered in a fall. The trial court also dismissed Todd's

second amended complaint against UAB Hospital in its entirety on the

ground that UAB Hospital was entitled to State immunity from the tort

claims that Todd had asserted against it. This appeal does not involve

the dismissal of the tort claims. For the reasons discussed herein, we

reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further

proceedings.

Background

This matter began in February 2021 when Todd commenced in the

trial court a personal-injury action against a grocery store where she had

fallen in June 2020. In her complaint against the grocery store, Todd

alleged that she had incurred an unspecified amount of medical expenses

when she was treated for injuries that she said she had suffered in the

fall. In October 2020, UAB Hospital filed a hospital lien against Todd in

the amount of $7,570, which it asserted were the reasonable and

necessary charges arising out of the treatment Todd had received at its

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facility. UAB Hospital was not named as a party in Todd's original

complaint.

On April 1, 2024, after receiving leave of court, Todd filed her first

amended complaint adding UAB Hospital as a defendant. In the first

amended complaint, Todd averred that she had reached a settlement of

$30,000 from the grocery store in the underlying personal-injury action.

She claimed that UAB Hospital had a hospital lien in place that attached

to her settlement of that action. She sought an interpleader hearing and

asked the trial court to determine the reasonableness, relatedness, and

necessity of the medical charges secured by the hospital lien. She also

asked the trial court to determine whether the lien was valid or, in the

alternative, to determine the fair and reasonable amount UAB Hospital

was owed for its services and asked permission to interplead the amount

of the hospital lien.

Todd also asked the trial court to declare whether, under § 35-11-

370, Ala. Code 1975, UAB Hospital was a "person, firm, hospital

authority, or corporation" authorized to place liens upon third-party

financial recoveries for injuries. Todd also alleged a claim of unjust

enrichment and claims asserting violations of her constitutional rights to

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equal protection and due process. She also sought to enjoin UAB Hospital

from charging her for what she says are unreasonably high medical bills

and to compel UAB Hospital to amend or withdraw the lien. On April 8,

2024, the trial court entered an order dismissing the grocery store as a

defendant. On May 13, 2024, the UAB formally appeared in the case. On

July 3, 2024, again with leave of the trial court, Todd filed a second

amended complaint adding numerous tort claims against UAB Hospital

and Thomas Elmes, in his official capacity as the manager of patient

financial services for UAB Hospital.

On August 12, 2024, UAB Hospital filed a motion to dismiss Todd's

second amended complaint in its entirety on the ground that, as an agent

of the state, UAB Hospital and its agent, Elmes, were entitled to

sovereign immunity, also known as State immunity, under § 14 of the

Alabama Constitution of 2022, which provides that "the State of Alabama

shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." It also

argued that, in his individual capacity, Elmes was entitled to State-agent

immunity.

In the motion to dismiss, UAB Hospital observed that the lien was

a "net lien" that automatically encumbered any recovery Todd obtained

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and that only liens for attorney fees would take priority over the hospital

lien. It argued that the only claim against it and Elmes that Todd had

alleged in the second amended complaint over which the trial court "could

possibly obtain jurisdiction" was the claim for interpleader relief, adding:

"However, in its current state, the [trial c]ourt does not have jurisdiction

and the claim is due to be dismissed as a matter of law." (Emphasis in

original.) UAB Hospital explained that Todd had "coupled with her

interpleader claim an additional request for the [trial] court to 'determine

the reasonableness, relatedness and necessity of the medical treatment' "

she had received and to order a reduction in the amount of the hospital

lien. That request, UAB hospital said, suggested that Todd was seeking

the trial court's review of the hospital lien, which, it said, is authorized

under § 35-11-373, Ala. Code 1975.

However, citing Roberts v. University of Alabama Hospital, 27 So.

3d 512, 514 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), and Board of Trustees of University

of Alabama v. Richards, 405 So. 3d 267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), UAB

Hospital argued in the motion that, for the trial court to obtain

jurisdiction over the claim for interpleader relief, three things had to

occur: (1) the settlement money had to be interpleaded with the trial

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court, (2) UAB Hospital had to be added as a party to the action, and (3)

the judgment determining the amount of the lien must be entered after

the settlement and dismissal of the underlying tort claims. Because Todd

had not yet interpleaded the settlement money into the trial court, UAB

Hospital argued, the trial court lacked custody, control, and supervision

of that money and thus had not obtained subject-matter jurisdiction, that

is, it had not yet obtained in rem jurisdiction over the settlement money.

Therefore, UAB Hospital concluded, the claim for interpleader relief was

due to be dismissed as a matter of law.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Todd argued that the

contested settlement money had been held in trust by her attorneys and

that she had "already offered the contested funds for deposit." She

asserted that, under Rule 22(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which governs

interpleader procedure, depositing money with the clerk of the court is

permissive rather than mandatory and that, therefore, the trial court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim for interpleader relief. She

further asserted that, out of an abundance of caution, on September 12,

2024, she had filed a motion to interplead the full amount of the hospital

lien -- $7,570 -- which was pending. On September 13, 2024, the trial

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court granted Todd's motion to deposit the money; however, it does not

appear that Todd filed anything in the trial court giving notice of that

deposit.

On November 12, 2024, UAB Hospital filed a supplemental brief in

support of its motion to dismiss, in which, among other things, it noted

that Todd had interpleaded the amount of the hospital lien and clarified

its position that Todd's second amended complaint was due to be

dismissed with the exception of the claim for interpleader relief.

The case-action-summary sheet indicates that, on February 20,

2025, the trial court held a virtual hearing and status conference.1 A

transcript of the hearing is not included in the record on appeal; however,

it is undisputed that the trial court did not take any evidence. That same

day, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the second amended

complaint in its entirety -- including the claim for interpleader relief. In

the judgment, the trial court wrote that, during the February 20 hearing,

UAB Hospital had conceded that the trial court had in rem jurisdiction

1We note that, in its brief, UAB Hospital advises that the trial court

heard oral arguments on its motion to dismiss on November 5, 2024. The
case-action-summary sheet does not indicate that a hearing was held on
that date; instead, it indicates that a virtual hearing was held on
February 20, 2025.
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over the money that Todd had deposited with the trial court on

September 23, 2024. The trial court found the following regarding the

interpleaded money:

"This Court retains in rem jurisdiction of the $7,570
currently held by the Clerk of this Court. Count I of the
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [the claim for
interpleader relief] remains pending in all respects against
[UAB Hospital]. This Court retains jurisdiction as conferred
by The Hospital Lien Statute, Ala. Code [1975, §] 35-11-370
et seq., to fully determine how said funds are to be disbursed
and thereby resolve all claims with respect to the hospital lien
filed by [UAB Hospital] and the settlement funds held by the
Clerk of Court. Accordingly, said funds in the amount of
$7,570 shall be disbursed to [Todd] effective immediately."

The trial court dismissed the remainder of the second amended complaint

on the basis that UAB Hospital was entitled to State immunity.

On February 24, 2025, UAB Hospital filed a "motion to reconsider

order for payment and motion for status conference." In that motion,

UAB Hospital asserted that the trial court had not yet taken evidence

regarding "the reasonableness and relatedness of" the hospital lien and

pointing out that nothing in the record justified the complete denial of

the lien, which, it said, was the effect of ordering the disbursement of the

interpleaded money to Todd. UAB Hospital asked the trial court to

vacate that portion of the judgment directing that the interpleaded

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money be disbursed to Todd and to schedule a hearing on the issue of the

reasonableness and relatedness of the lien. On February 24, 2025, the

trial court amended the judgment to award Todd the interpleaded money,

plus interest. The trial court did not rule on UAB Hospital's "motion to

reconsider"; therefore, that motion was deemed denied by operation of

law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. UAB Hospital timely appealed to this

court.

Analysis

Before proceeding to the merits, first we must decide whether the

trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment disbursing the

interpleaded money to Todd. Section 35-11-373 confers jurisdiction upon

a court to determine any matter relating to a hospital lien, including the

disbursement of the interpleaded funds, when the claim upon which the

lien has attached is before the court and the claim "has been reduced to

judgment." In Roberts v. University of Alabama Hospital, supra, this

court determined that a court overseeing a personal-injury action may

exercise jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a hospital lien when the

personal-injury claim to which the lien had attached had been settled and

dismissed, the settlement funds in dispute had been interpleaded, and

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the hospital had been added as a party. In this case, the trial court had

jurisdiction over the tort claims against the grocery store, to which the

hospital lien had attached. Before the trial court adjudicated the dispute

over the hospital lien, Todd added UAB Hospital as a party by serving it

with the first amended complaint. The trial court entered a judgment

dismissing the grocery store as a defendant, and Todd interpleaded the

funds. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding

the hospital lien when it entered its judgment.

Turning now to the merits of the appeal, UAB Hospital contends

that the trial court erred in sua sponte awarding all interpleaded money

to Todd without explanation or without evidence to support that award.

Todd asserts that the trial court's judgment is essentially a judgment on

the pleadings. Although, in its opening brief, UAB Hospital notes that

Todd did not file a motion for a judgment on the pleadings or argue that

she was entitled to such a judgment, it contends that, even if she had,

such a judgment would be improper under the circumstances. In its reply

brief, UAB Hospital expands on its argument that, even if the judgment

is treated as a judgment on the pleadings, the trial court erred in entering

it.

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Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:

"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
[Ala. R. Civ. P.,] and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56."

In Medlock v. Safeway Insurance Co. of Alabama, 15 So. 3d 501,

507 (Ala. 2009), our supreme court observed that a sua sponte judgment

on the pleadings is unusual. In Lary v. Flasch Business Consulting, 909

So. 2d 194, 197 n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), this court wrote:

"Although Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., envisions the filing of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings by one of the parties to
an action, caselaw and commentary addressing the analogous
Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., indicate[] that a trial court may
properly enter a judgment on the pleadings sua sponte in a
particular case 'if it is clear that one side is assured of victory
as a matter of law and there is no material factual dispute.'
5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1367 & n.25 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Flora v. Home
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 685 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1982), Vickery
v. Jones, 878 F.Supp. 1179 (S.D. Ill. 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1334
(7th Cir. 1996), and Bajenski v. Chivatero, 818 F.Supp. 1083
(N.D. Ohio 1993))."

(Emphasis added.)

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When the trial court entered the judgment in this case, it did not

have before it a motion for a judgment on the pleadings or a motion for a

summary judgment, and it is undisputed that it had no evidence before

it, whether documentary or testimonial. In other words, the trial court

had only the pleadings to consider when it entered the judgment.

Therefore, we will treat the trial court's judgment as having been entered

pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(c), governing judgments on the

pleadings in a case. See Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d 840, 841-42

(Ala. 2000); Medlock, 15 So. 3d at 507.

"A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings disposes of a

case when the material facts are not in dispute." McCullough v. Alabama

By-Prods. Corp., 343 So. 2d 508, 510 (Ala. 1977). In considering a motion

for a judgment on the pleadings, "the trial court reviews the pleadings

filed in the case and, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of

material fact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for the

party entitled to a judgment according to the law." B.K.W. Enters., Inc.

v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989, 991 (Ala. 1992). The trial court

cannot enter a judgment on the pleadings if the pleadings demonstrate

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Universal Underwriters

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Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 85 (Ala. 2000). A judgment on the

pleadings is subject to a de novo review. Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d

1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).

As UAB Hospital explains in its brief, § 35-11-370 ("the hospital-

lien statute") provides for an automatic hospital lien on tort and

insurance recoveries as to " 'all reasonable charges for hospital care,

treatment and maintenance of an injured person.' " Roberts, 27 So. 3d at

514; see also Ex parte University of S. Alabama, 761 So. 2d 240, 244 (Ala.

1999). Whether a hospital is entitled under the hospital-lien statute to a

lien for all the unpaid charges for which it has billed the patient may

properly be deemed a "mixed question" of law and fact. Roberts, 27 So.

3d at 514-15. Additionally, our supreme court has recognized that the

hospital-lien statute is to be construed broadly so as not to defeat a just

hospital claim. Guin v. Carraway Methodist Med. Ctr., 583 So. 2d 1317,

1319 (Ala. 1991).

It is undisputed that, after her fall in the grocery store, Todd sought

treatment at UAB Hospital's facility for the injuries she received in that

fall. In her claim for interpleader relief contained in the second amended

complaint, Todd asked the trial court to determine the reasonable and

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necessary amount UAB Hospital could charge for that treatment; in

other words, she challenged whether UAB Hospital was entitled to

recover the entire $7,570 that was secured by the hospital lien. No

evidence is contained in the record to dispute the reasonableness or

necessity of that amount.

The pleadings also indicate that Todd settled the underlying

personal-injury case she had against the grocery store for $30,000, which

was sufficient to cover the hospital lien. Because the record contains no

evidence from which the trial court could have determined that UAB

Hospital was not entitled to recover the entire amount of the lien, it erred

in ordering trial-court clerk to disburse the interpleaded money to Todd.

In her appellate brief, Todd makes numerous arguments in support

of the judgment. She contends that UAB Hospital waived its right to

present evidence to the trial court on the issue of the reasonableness and

necessity of the amount it charged Todd for her treatment. The record

does not support that contention, however. Nothing in the record

indicates that the hearing on the motion to dismiss, which, according to

the case-action-summary sheet was conducted virtually, was intended to

be an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the record, it does not appear

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that UAB Hospital had an opportunity to present evidence regarding the

reasonableness and necessity of the charges secured by the hospital lien.

By the same token, Todd did not have an opportunity to present evidence

challenging the reasonableness and necessity of those charges.

Therefore, when the trial court entered its judgment disbursing the

interpleaded money to Todd, it did so without having any evidence to

support its decision, and the portion of the judgment releasing the

interpleaded money to Todd cannot stand.

Todd also argues that, under Rule 12(c) and its jurisdiction under §

35-11-373, the trial court had the authority to enter the judgment

awarding Todd the interpleaded money and to determine how to disburse

the interpleaded money. She argues that the judgment was

"procedurally supported and respected due process, even without

evidence." Todd's brief, p. 15. It is well settled that procedural due

process requires "a fair proceeding including an impartial hearing before

a legally constituted court; an opportunity to present evidence and

arguments; information regarding the claims of the opposing party; a

reasonable opportunity to controvert the opposition's claims; and

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representation by counsel if it is desired." Crews v. Houston Cnty. Dep't

of Pensions & Sec., 358 So. 2d 451, 455 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).

There is no question that, when the trial court entered the

judgment, it had the authority and the jurisdiction to consider the issue

of the propriety of the hospital lien and to enter an appropriate judgment.

However, merely having the authority and jurisdiction to enter a

judgment does not relieve the trial court of its responsibility to heed the

requirements of due process. Todd cites no authority for the proposition

that the trial court had unfettered discretion to determine how much, if

anything, UAB Hospital was entitled to for the treatment Todd had

received at its facility.

Neither UAB Hospital nor Todd had the opportunity to present

evidence to support or to challenge the amount of the hospital lien -- that

is, whether the amount UAB Hospital charged for the treatment Todd

received at its facility was reasonable and necessary -- before the trial

court decided the matter and awarded Todd all the interpleaded money.

The trial court, without any evidence, necessarily determined that UAB

Hospital was not entitled to recover any of the amount it charged for the

treatment Todd had received at its facility. In doing so, the trial court

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thwarted the purpose of the hospital lien, and it denied UAB Hospital its

right to due process. If, under the same circumstances, the trial court

had awarded UAB Hospital the entire amount of the interpleaded money

without allowing Todd an opportunity to present evidence challenging

that amount, the result would be the same. Todd's defense of the

judgment on this ground is without merit.

Todd also contends that it would be fundamentally unfair for UAB

Hospital to have all the claims against it dismissed and still attempt to

enforce the hospital lien. Specifically, Todd argues, once the trial court

determined that UAB Hospital was entitled to State immunity and

dismissed the claims she had asserted against it in the second amended

complaint, UAB Hospital could not avoid the ramifications of that ruling.

In other words, she argues, it cannot now seek to enforce the hospital lien

without affording Todd an opportunity to have the hospital lien judicially

reviewed because the claim seeking that review has been dismissed.

Todd's argument misrepresents the context in which UAB Hospital

sought the dismissal of the interpleader claim. When it initially sought

to have the second amended complaint dismissed, UAB Hospital made

clear that the reason the interpleader claim was due to be dismissed was

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because Todd had failed to interplead into court the amount of the

hospital lien she challenged, as required by Roberts to invoke the

jurisdiction of the court over the hospital lien pursuant to § 35-11-373.

After Todd interpleaded the disputed funds, UAB Hospital withdrew its

motion to dismiss the interpleader claim. The trial court did not dismiss

that claim, which specifically requested judicial review of the hospital

lien before disbursement of the interpleaded money. We therefore reject

the premise of Todd's argument.

Todd also contends that UAB Hospital cannot operate as a state

agency and as a corporate entity at the same time, and, therefore, she

says, it could not have been an "authorized statutory hospital lienholder

under [the hospital-lien statute]," which allows "[a]ny person, firm,

hospital authority, or corporation operating a hospital in this state" to

obtain a hospital lien. The court may affirm a judgment on any valid

legal ground. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama

Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003) (holding

that, subject to due-process constraints, appellate courts "will affirm the

trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless

of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the

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trial court"). However, we find no legal basis for removing UAB Hospital

from the protection of the hospital-lien-statute on the ground that it is a

state agency and a corporate entity. UAB Hospital is clearly within the

scope of the phrase " '[a]ny person, firm, hospital authority, or corporation

operating a hospital in this state,' " which, we note, must be construed in

favor of preserving the lien. See Guin, 583 So. 2d at 1319 (quoting § 35-

11-370).

Finally, Todd contends that UAB Hospital argued for the first time

in its postjudgment motion that, to decide the merits of Todd's request

for judicial review of the lien as set forth in her interpleader claim, the

trial court needed to take evidence outside the pleadings. In the same

sentence, Todd also contends that UAB Hospital makes no argument to

show that outside evidence must be considered.

The pleadings indicate that, when the trial court entered the

judgment dismissing all the claims in the second amended complaint and

ordering the disbursal of the interpleaded money to Todd, UAB Hospital

had essentially withdrawn its request to have Todd's interpleader claim

dismissed. UAB Hospital had no reason to believe that, when the trial

court entered a judgment dismissing all the claims, it would also award

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the interpleaded money to Todd. It follows, then, that the first time UAB

could challenge the trial court's decision to award the interpleaded money

to Todd would be in a postjudgment motion.

Moreover, to determine whether the amount of the hospital lien was

reasonable and necessary, the trial court would necessarily have to

consider information outside the pleadings, which would necessarily

require the consideration of evidence, whether presented in conjunction

with a motion for a summary judgment or during a trial. We have

already rejected the other reasons Todd says support the judgment;

therefore, the only remaining reason the trial court could have denied

UAB Hospital at least a portion of the interpleaded money would be

because it had determined the cost of Todd's treatment was

unreasonable, unrelated, or unnecessary, and that could not be done

without evidence. Consequently, we find that this issue also fails to

provide a basis for affirming the judgment.

Conclusion

Reviewing the trial court's judgment on the pleadings de novo, as

we must, we conclude that there remains a factual dispute, unresolved

by the pleadings themselves, concerning the reasonableness, relatedness,

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and necessity of the amount of the charges secured by the hospital lien.

Therefore, the trial court's judgment is reversed, and the cause is

remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All the judges concur.

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