Geraldo Jarzavian Jackson v. State of Alabama

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CR-2023-0170
_________________________

Geraldo Jarzavian Jackson

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CC-18-1152)

On Return to Remand1

COLE, Judge.

1OnJuly 10, 2024, this Court issued an order remanding this
matter, in accordance with Rule 10(g), Ala. R. App. P., because the record
on appeal did not include a transcript of Geraldo Jarzavian Jackson's
sentencing hearing. The record, however, has not been supplemented
because the court reporter who transcribed that hearing was deceased
and the records were not located.
CR-2023-0170

Geraldo Jarzavian Jackson appeals his convictions for first-degree

rape, a violation of § 13A-6-61(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, first-degree sodomy,

a violation of § 13A-6-63(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and first-degree

kidnapping, a violation of § 13A-6-43, Ala. Code 1975, and his resulting

consecutive sentences of life imprisonment.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 23, 2017, C.A.,2 the victim of all three offenses, worked all

day at a McDonald's restaurant and came home to the extended-stay

motel she was living in with her family. Her friend, Richard Griffin,

called and asked her to take a ride with him. Griffin arrived around 11:00

p.m. in a black Lincoln automobile. A woman C.A. knew, Alexandria

Hancock, who was Griffin's girlfriend, was in the front seat, and there

was a man C.A. did not know, who would later be identified as Robert

Wiley, in the back seat with C.A. When they left the motel parking lot,

they turned toward an area where, at the time, there were no other

buildings. Wiley started flirting with C.A. and "rubbing up on her." (R.

109.) C.A. kept moving away from him and was clinging to the door.

2Due to the nature of the offenses, initials are used to protect the

victim's anonymity. See Rule 52, Ala. R. App. P.
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Approximately a quarter mile from the motel, the car stopped, C.A. felt

the door open, and she began to fall backward out of the car. There was

suddenly another man present that would later be identified as Jackson.

C.A. was pushed back into the back seat with Wiley and Jackson. C.A.

then saw that all three men had guns and noted that Griffin's gun was a

revolver and that Jackson's gun was all black. At trial, C.A. identified

Jackson as one of the men from that night.

At first, Griffin wanted C.A. to contact a friend of hers, but the

phone call did not "go through," and Griffin kept asking where C.A.'s

friend was. C.A. told him she did not know. Wiley became angry and

began yelling at C.A. and accusing her of lying. C.A.'s cellular telephone

was taken from her and given to Griffin. Griffin handed the cellular

telephone to Hancock to throw out of the window. They began driving on

the interstate, and Griffin gave the men explicit instructions to rape C.A.

Wiley also ordered C.A. to perform oral sex on him. Wiley told C.A. that

he had a gun pressed up against her side. Wiley, Griffin, and Jackson

were all wearing blue latex medical gloves. Jackson could not get C.A.'s

shirt off, but he and Wiley were able to pull her pants and underwear

down around her ankles, and they also "duct taped" her feet. C.A.
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described her position at this point as being "restrained to the point

where they could do what they wanted to orally and sexually to [her],

[and] that's what they began to do." (R. 126-27.) Wiley was apparently

first, but at some point, Jackson announced that it was his turn. C.A.

tried to slide around in the seat and put her hand out the open window,

hoping that she could gain someone's attention and flag down help. When

her assailants noticed, they pulled C.A. further into the car, and Wiley

hit her with a gun twice. Wiley and Jackson took turns penetrating C.A.

orally, vaginally, and anally. When each was done, they would flip her

over so the other could take his turn. C.A.'s feet were still taped together,

and they also taped her hands together in front of her.

As she was being assaulted, C.A. kept asking Griffin and Hancock

why this was happening and why Griffin would let this happen to her.

Hancock told her to be quiet and that she "ought to be glad I'm not putting

this on Facebook." 3

3At trial, Hancock testified that she did not say anything or try to

get help because she was "fearful." Hancock said that she was afraid
because she had just seen C.A. "attacked over something that had
nothing to do with most of the people involved." (R. 193.) Hancock
testified that C.A. and Griffin had "a business deal going on" and that

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Eventually, the car stopped. It was completely dark outside, and

they appeared to be in the "middle of nowhere." (R. 117.) Griffin said

that C.A. was talking too much, and Jackson put tape around her entire

face. C.A. was ordered to get out of the car. Griffin told her to run, so

she began running, and the assailants gave chase. Hancock testified that

C.A. ran until she got to the side of a building and was cornered. C.A.

then stopped and stepped down into a hole. C.A. heard a gunshot, and

she stayed lying still like she was dead. C.A. then heard them fire three

or four more gunshots as they ran back to the car in a celebratory

manner. When she could no longer see the car's taillights, C.A. took off

running in the opposite direction she had seen the car drive off in. C.A.

then walked an unknown distance to a Citgo gas station. When she got

to the gas station, it was early in the morning, and she told people there

that she had been kidnapped and assaulted. C.A. made a 911 call, which

according to 911 records, occurred at 2:24 a.m. on May 24, 2017. C.A.

Griffin was upset about money. (R. 193.) However, Hancock eventually
admitted that she told law-enforcement officers that the incident related
to a bill that a friend of C.A.'s was supposed to "get fixed" for Hancock's
mother, that C.A. was given money to "fix" the bill, but that the bill was
never "fixed."

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went to the police station, the hospital, and a rape-crisis center where

she had a rape kit done. C.A. testified that she had bruises on her body,

that she was "split" anally and vaginally, that she had lacerations on her

feet from walking barefoot to the gas station, that she had a mild

concussion, and that she was still suffering emotionally from the assault

at the time of trial.

On May 24, 2017, employees of One Place Family Justice Center

performed a rape kit on C.A. She was sobbing, tearful, and trembling

intensely. She reported having been penetrated vaginally and anally.

Small gritty dirt and pebbles were found around C.A.'s anal verge. There

were tape marks on her left wrist. There were also dried secretions on

her face, neck, and legs. Nurse Crystal Jamith testified that what she

observed during C.A.'s examination was consistent with C.A.'s report.

C.A. recalled talking to Detective Jeremy Jones of the Montgomery

Police Department Special Victims Unit at some point that morning. She

admitted that the statement she first gave him was not the same as her

testimony at trial. C.A. initially told Det. Jones that it was her brother

who had called and asked her to ride with him and that he had some guys

with him who did these things to her. C.A. explained that she lied
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initially because she was afraid what her assailants would do to her and

her family.

Det. Jones recalled that during his first interview with C.A. she was

scared, trembling, and appeared dirty. He could still see the sticky

residue from the tape on her arms. In C.A.'s first statement to Det. Jones,

she accused her brother of being the one who picked her up and instigated

the kidnapping. Her statement included the details about being hit with

a gun, her hands and feet being taped, everyone having guns and wearing

latex gloves, and being orally, anally, and vaginally penetrated in the car.

Det. Jones initially tried to make contact with C.A.'s brother, and, after

being unable to locate him, he returned to C.A. for further questioning.

That subsequent interview occurred approximately one to two days after

the assault. C.A. remained extremely emotional and displayed difficulty

in talking to him. Det. Jones described her behavior as that of a "typical

sexual assault victim." (R. 273-74.)

C.A. was then honest and told Det. Jones that everything she had

described was true except for naming her brother as leading the assault.

Det. Jones testified that she then disclosed that she knew Griffin and

Hancock and that she had ridden with Griffin to purchase marijuana in
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the past. After some investigation, Det. Jones was able to present C.A.

with a photo lineup, and she positively identified Hancock and Griffin. A

"BOLO" was placed for both Hancock and Griffin, and, after they were

arrested, Hancock consented to a search of her residence and her cellular

telephone. Blue latex gloves, as described by C.A., were found during the

search of Hancock's residence. Outside of Hancock's residence, law-

enforcement officers found a black Lincoln automobile. A search warrant

was secured for the Lincoln. Gloves similar to the ones described by C.A.

were found in the car. A cap mask, a knife, a .38 revolver-style handgun,

and duct tape were also found in the vehicle.

After Griffin was detained, Det. Jones then sought to identify the

remaining two assailants. C.A. did not know their names, but a separate

source identified the other two assailants as Wiley and Jackson. Jackson

was subsequently apprehended by the United States Marshals in

Florida. C.A. was able to quickly identify both Wiley and Jackson in a

photo lineup. Det. Jones was subsequently able to obtain a search

warrant for a DNA swab from Jackson. DNA swabs and C.A.'s rape kit

were submitted to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences

("ADFS"). Employees of the ADFS examined C.A.'s rape kit, including
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swabs taken from her orally, rectally, and vaginally, as well as her

underwear and clothes. They found DNA matches for C.A., Wiley, and

Jackson. A major component of the DNA taken from C.A.'s rape kit

included Jackson's DNA.

Det. Jones testified that, at the conclusion of his investigation,

Wiley, Jackson, and Griffin were all charged with offenses related to the

sexual assault and abduction of C.A. Hancock was later charged relating

to those events.

On March 8, 2022, this matter went to trial. Before proceedings

began, the State moved in limine for the trial court to prohibit any

mention of C.A.'s prior conviction for possession of a forged instrument.

The trial court found that her conviction, which occurred more than 10

years before trial, was too remote to be used to challenge C.A.'s credibility

as a witness. After the State rested, Jackson moved for a judgment of

acquittal, arguing that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof on

all four charges. That motion was denied. Jackson rested and renewed

his motion for a judgment of acquittal, which was again denied. On

March 10, 2022, the jury found Jackson guilty of first-degree rape, first-

degree sodomy, and first-degree kidnapping, but not guilty of first-degree
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CR-2023-0170

robbery. On April 28, 2022, Jackson was sentenced to life imprisonment

for each conviction, and those sentences were ordered to run

consecutively. The sentencing order noted that Jackson was present with

his attorney and that Jackson was given an opportunity to allocute before

his sentences were pronounced.

Discussion

Jackson raises the following five issues on appeal: (1) whether the

trial court erred by excluding evidence that C.A. had a prior conviction

for possession of a forged instrument, (2) whether Jackson's sentences

were excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering

restitution over Jackson's objection, (4) whether Jackson is entitled to a

new trial because of juror misconduct, and (5) whether the verdicts are

"palpably wrong" and against the weight of the evidence. We affirm

Jackson's convictions and sentences, but we reverse and remand the case

for a new restitution hearing.

I.

Jackson argues that his convictions are due to be reversed based

upon the trial court's decision to preclude Jackson from cross-examining
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the victim, C.A., about her prior conviction for possession of a forged

instrument. Jackson correctly asserts that one of our evidentiary rules

provides, in pertinent part:

"For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,

"(1)(A) evidence that a witness other than an
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403, [Ala. R. Evid.,] if the
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under law under which the
witness was convicted, and

"…

"(2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment."

Rule 609(a), Ala. R. Evid. Yet, the admissibility of a witness's prior

conviction, for impeachment purposes, is subject to the limitation that

"[e]vidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of
the conviction or the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the
later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported
by the specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect."

Rule 609(b). Furthermore,

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" ' "[t]he admission or exclusion of evidence is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148, 1191 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000), aff’d, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala.
2001). "The question of admissibility of evidence is
generally left to the discretion of the trial court,
and the trial court's determination on that
question will not be reversed except upon a clear
showing of abuse of discretion." Ex parte Loggins,
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. 2000). …'

"Windsor v. State, 110 So. 3d 876, 880 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012)."

White v. State, 179 So. 3d 170, 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).

The question regarding the admissibility of C.A.'s prior felony

conviction was brought to the trial court's attention in the State's motion

in limine seeking to preclude Jackson from asking C.A. about the

conviction in the jury's presence. After hearing from the parties at a

pretrial hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion and informed

defense counsel that he was "not to ask [the witness] questions about the

prior conviction." (R. 102.) When Jackson sought further explanation

from the State regarding its motion, the trial court replied: "That's not

necessary. I'm ruling against you." (Id.) Although "[t]he general rule is

that an adverse ruling on a motion in limine does not preserve the issue

for appellate review unless an objection is made at the time the evidence

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is introduced," Moody v. State, 888 So. 2d 532, 582 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003),

an adverse ruling on such a motion can be sufficient to preserve an issue

for appellate review if " ' "the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine

is absolute or unconditional." ' " Webster v. State, [Ms. CR-2023-0721,

Mar. 28, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, (Ala. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Lucas v.

State, 204 So. 3d 929, 941-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016), quoting in turn

Perry v. Brakefield, 534 So. 2d 602, 606 (Ala. 1988)). Accordingly,

Jackson's objection was preserved. However, although the trial court's

ruling was absolute and sufficient to preserve this issue for appellate

review, the trial court did not err in prohibiting Jackson from asking

about C.A.'s prior conviction at trial.

Jackson concedes on appeal that C.A.'s prior conviction for

possession of a forged instrument occurred in 2008; therefore, "fourteen

years had passed since C.A.'s conviction by the time Jackson's case was

tried." (Jackson's brief, p. 32.)

" 'If the conviction is more than ten years old then a
presumption arises that it is too remote and should not be
usable for impeachment. Some refer to this presumption as a
rebuttable one. It casts upon the offering party the burden of
convincing the court that the probative value of the conviction
substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact. … This means

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that convictions more than … ten years old will rarely be
admitted.' "

Moore v. State, 878 So. 2d 328, 338 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting 1

Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 145.01(19) (5th ed.

1996)). Rule 609(b) expressly states that, to overcome this presumption,

the proponent of the evidence, in this case Jackson, must give "specific

facts and circumstances" to meet his burden to establish that the

"probative value" of using the prior conviction for impeachment purposes

"substantially outweighs" the prejudicial effect. Jackson's failure to

inform the trial court of anything other than the type of C.A.'s previous

offense and the date of her conviction did not meet his burden of proof.

The admissibility of evidence is " 'left to the discretion of the trial court,

and the trial court's determination on that question will not be reversed

except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins,

771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. 2000)." Arnold v. State, 278 So. 3d 1, 7 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2017). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in granting the State's motion in limine and precluding Jackson from

questioning C.A. regarding her conviction that occurred 14 years before

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she was called to testify in this case. Thus, Jackson is not entitled to

relief based on this argument.

II.

Jackson next argues that his three consecutive sentences of life

imprisonment, which include eligibility for parole, "are excessive and

grossly disproportionate to the crimes charged, constituting an Eighth

Amendment violation." (Jackson's brief, p.39.) The Eighth Amendment

to the United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted." Jackson was convicted of three Class A felonies;

therefore, his sentences of life in prison are within the statutory range

for a Class A felony of "life or not more than 99 years or less than 10

years" as outlined in § 13A-5- 6(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.

" 'At the outset, we acknowledge that determinations
regarding the punishments to be imposed for different crimes
are purely legislative,' and this Court therefore 'generally will
not review sentences imposed within statutorily prescribed
limits.' Wilson [v. State], 830 So. 2d [765,] 771 [(Ala. Crim.
App. 2001)]. … Nevertheless, ' "[t]he Eighth Amendment …
contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to
noncapital sentences.' " ' Lane v. State, 66 So. 3d 830, 831
(Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 17, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003), quoting in
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turn Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97, 111 S. Ct.
2680,115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991)).That narrow proportionality
principle authorizes an appellate court to review a sentence
that is within the statutorily prescribed limits to ensure that
the sentence is constitutional. See Adams v. State, 815 So. 2d
583, 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (' " '[A]ppellate courts may
review a sentence, which, although within the prescribed
limitations, is so disproportionate to the offense charged that
it constitutes a violation of a defendant's Eighth Amendment
rights.' " ' (quoting Brown v. State, 611 So. 2d 1194, 1198 n. 6
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992), quoting in turn Ex parte Maddox, 502
So. 2d 786 (Ala. 1986)))."

Crayton v. State, 392 So. 3d 104, 118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023).

In determining whether Jackson's sentences are unconstitutionally

"disproportionate" to the offenses he committed,

" 'we must consider the gravity of the offense[s] and the
harshness of the punishment. Solem [v. Helm,] 463 U.S. [277]
at 290-91, 103 S. Ct. 3001 [(1983)]. The United States
Supreme Court noted in Solem that no single factor
determines when a sentence is grossly disproportionate, and
it offered a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered when
a court is assessing the severity of a crime. These factors
include consideration of the circumstances of the crime, the
harm caused to the victim or to society, the culpability of the
offender, and the offender's motive in committing the crime.
Id. at 290-94, 103 S. Ct. 3001.' "

Lane v. State, 66 So. 3d 830, 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Wilson

v. State, 830 So. 2d 765, 778 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)).

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Jackson's crimes were calculated, heinous, and cruel. Griffin,

Hancock, and Wiley picked up C.A., and Jackson entered the car soon

thereafter. Griffin instructed Wiley and Jackson to rape C.A. At gun

point, Wiley forced C.A. to perform oral sex on him. Jackson and Wiley,

who were wearing latex medical gloves, forced down C.A.'s pants and

underwear, "duct taped" her feet, and then took turns forcefully

penetrating her orally, vaginally, and anally. Then, after also taping her

hands together, they stopped the car in the dark "in the middle of

nowhere." To stop her from talking, Jackson put tape around her entire

face, and Griffin told C.A. to run. They pursued C.A. until she stepped

in a hole and heard shots being fired. C.A. then lay on the ground as if

she was dead, and her assailants continued to fire shots in her direction

as they ran back to the car in a celebratory manner. They left her for

dead, but C.A. survived the attack and was able to get to a gas station,

call emergency 911, and obtain medical assistance. C.A. was "split"

anally and vaginally, had a concussion, and suffered emotionally for

years. It appears that the only motive for the crimes was that Hancock

was angry about some money paid to C.A. to "fix a bill" for Hancock's

mother.
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Based upon the facts presented at trial, it is clear that all factors

that should be considered in determining the severity of the crimes weigh

heavily against Jackson. Furthermore, although the imposition of

consecutive life sentences was severe, Jackson is eligible for parole under

the sentences imposed. It is clear that " '[t]he imposition of consecutive

life sentences [involving a rape and first-degree sexual offense], standing

alone, does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.' " State v.

Freeman, 93 N. C. App. 380, 392, 378 S.E.2d 545, 553 (1989) (quoting

State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983)).

Weighing the relevant factors, we hold that Jackson's sentences are not

unconstitutional.

Furthermore, Jackson's attempt to compare this case to Wilson v.

State, 830 So. 2d 765 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), is to no avail. In Wilson,

this Court found that Wilson's mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-

parole sentence for trafficking in morphine, which was Wilson's first

offense, was unconstitutional. Clearly, the facts in Jackson's case are far

more egregious than those considered in Wilson. The acts committed by

Jackson warrant the severe sentences imposed by the trial court, and

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there was no error in the trial court's decision to impose three consecutive

sentences of life imprisonment.

III.

Jackson next argues that the trial court erred in ordering

restitution, over his objection, without requiring proof in support of the

State's request for restitution. The State has also asked that this case be

remanded for the trial court to make specific findings on the issue of

restitution so that the order, and Jackson's argument, may be properly

reviewed on appeal.

After Jackson was convicted, the State filed a motion requesting

$2,085 in restitution "for the expenses that [C.A.] incurred as a result of

the crime that was inflicted upon her by the defendant." (C. 317.)

Jackson filed a written objection to the motion and requested a hearing.

At the restitution hearing, which C.A. did not attend, the State requested

$2,134, based upon C.A.'s court-related travel expenses and the work

wages she lost because of the case. Jackson objected and argued that any

order of restitution based upon a "sheet of paper" that was unsupported

by any evidence was inappropriate. The trial court orally granted the

State's request for $2,134 in restitution. The final order of restitution
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stated as follows: "ON THE OBJECTION TO RESTITUTION REQUEST

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SET A RESTITUTION HEARING, the

Court received the work sheet prepared by the Montgomery County

District Attorney's Office and heard arguments from counsel. After

careful consideration, the Court awards restitution in this case in the

amount of $2,085.00." (C. 407 (capitalization in original).)

Jackson accurately points out that he had a statutory right to be

heard on the issue of restitution. § 15-18-67, Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"When a defendant is convicted of a criminal activity or
conduct which has resulted in pecuniary damages or loss to a
victim, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount
or type of restitution due the victim or victims of such
defendant's criminal acts. Such restitution hearings shall be
held as a matter of course and in addition to any other
sentence which it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution or otherwise compensate such
victim for any pecuniary damages. The defendant, the victim
or victims, or their representatives or the administrator of any
victim's estate as well as the district attorney shall have the
right to be present and be heard upon the issue of restitution
at any such hearings."

Furthermore, Rule 26.11(b)(5), Ala. R. Crim. P., states that the "amount

of gain derived by the defendant or loss sustained by the victim as a result

of defendant's commission of the offense … shall be determined by the

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court from evidence presented at the sentence hearing if not stipulated

by the parties." (Emphasis added.) This Court has consistently held:

"[A]ny imposition of restitution must be by the trial court after
a hearing, as mandated by § 15-18-67, Ala. Code 1975. See
also Jolly v. State, 689 So. 2d 986 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996);
Williams v. State, 624 So. 2d 659 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Also,
a defendant is entitled to a hearing at which evidence is
introduced to determine a precise amount of restitution.
Alford v. State, 651 So. 2d 1109 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)."

Walker v. State, 827 So. 2d 863, 869 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).

As Jackson notes in his brief on appeal, this Court has addressed

similar situations on numerous occasions. In Arnold v. State, 278 So. 3d

1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017), Arnold argued on appeal that the circuit court

erred in ordering restitution without taking evidence at a restitution

hearing. Finding that the circuit court did not hold a restitution hearing

and that it had "based restitution solely on a victim information sheet

submitted by Arnold as evidence to impeach [the victim]," id. at 12, this

Court reversed the circuit court's order of restitution because Arnold was

"denied the opportunity to argue the appropriate amount of restitution."

Id. Likewise, in Henry v. State, 468 So. 2d 896, 901 (Ala. Crim. App.

1985), "the victim testified [at trial] that the value of the stolen property

was 'just a little under $3,000,' " and at the sentencing hearing the trial
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court was presented a " 'Restitution Form' on which it itemized the

victim's losses and valued them at $2,356." Over Henry's objection, the

trial court ordered restitution as outlined in the "Restitution Form." In

reversing the trial court's restitution order, this Court held that Henry

"was entitled to a hearing, at which legal evidence was introduced" and

that "the 'Restitution Form' as presented to the court was not legal

evidence without accompanying testimony regarding the manner in

which the values were determined." Id. at 901. As in Arnold and Henry,

Jackson was denied his right to a hearing on the issue of restitution;

therefore, the award of restitution must be reversed and the case

remanded for the trial court to hold a restitution hearing.

The State agrees that a remand is necessary, but for a different

reason. The State notes that, after holding a restitution hearing, "[t]he

[trial] court shall thereafter enter its order upon the record stating its

findings and the underlying facts and circumstances thereof." § 15-18-

69, Ala. Code 1975. The State argues that, in order to allow appropriate

appellate review, this Court

" 'must have, on the record, the trial court's specific findings
and the specific underlying facts and circumstances thereof
that led the trial court to grant restitution … facts deduced
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from legal evidence that support the trial court's finding that
each amount awarded is for (1) damages recoverable under
the Alabama Restitution to Victims of Crimes Act and (2) that
were proximately caused [by the defendant's] criminal
activity.' "

(State's brief, p. 33 (quoting Moore v. State, 706 So. 2d 265, 268-69 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1996))). The State concedes that the trial court's order lacks

"specific findings regarding the underlying facts and circumstances that

led the trial court to grant restitution and its reasons for the amount of

restitution that it directs Jackson to pay." (State's brief, p. 34.) Thus, on

remand, if the trial court enters an order for restitution, that order should

meet the specificity requirements outlined in § 15-18-69.

IV.

Jackson also argues that the "circuit court erred to reversal when

it allowed Jackson's motion for new trial based on alleged juror

misconduct to be denied by operation of law. Alternatively, the circuit

court erred to reversal when it determined, on the merits, that Jackson

was not entitled to a new trial." (Jackson's brief, p. 47.) Before

addressing this issue, a summary of the procedural history of the case is

necessary.

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On March 10, 2022, the jury found Jackson guilty of first-degree

rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree kidnapping. On April 28,

2022, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment

for each conviction. On May 31, 2022, Jackson filed a motion for a new

trial, which alleged, in part, that there had been juror misconduct

because one of the jurors failed to reveal his close relationship with

Jackson and Jackson's father. 4 The motion for a new trial did not include

an affidavit from the juror or an affidavit from any other individuals to

support the allegations included in the motion. Also on May 31, 2022,

4Rule 24.1(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., states that "[a] motion for new trial

must be filed no later than thirty (30) days after sentence is pronounced."
But § 1-1-4, Ala. Code 1975, governs the computation of this time
limitation and states that the

"[t]ime within which any act is provided by law to be
done must be computed by excluding the first day and
including the last. However, if the last day is Sunday, or a
legal holiday as defined by Section 1-3-8, [Ala. Code 1975,] or
a day on which the office in which the act must be done shall
close as permitted by any law of this state, the last day also
must be excluded, and the next succeeding secular or working
day shall be counted as the last day within which the act may
be done."

Because the 30th day after Jackson's sentencing fell on a Saturday and
the Memorial Day Holiday was on the following Monday, Jackson's
motion for a new trial was timely filed on Tuesday, May 31, 2022.
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Jackson filed a motion to reconsider his sentences. On June 6, 2022,

Jackson filed his first, timely, notice of appeal. A hearing was held on

June 9, 2022, at which the trial court denied Jackson's objections to the

presentence-investigation report. Jackson's pending motion for a new

trial was discussed at this hearing, and on the same date the trial court

set the case for an "Evidentiary Hearing and Restitution Hearing on

Thursday, August 11, 2022." (C. 374.)

After multiple continuances, Jackson's motion for a new trial and

other pending motions were heard on February 2, 2023. Although

neither party objected to any of the continuances, Jackson concedes on

appeal that there had not been an "express agreement on the record" to

continue the hearing to a "date certain." (Jackson's brief, p. 10.) The

trial court heard witnesses on Jackson's motion for a new trial on

February 2, 2023, but also heard arguments on whether the motion had

been denied by operation of law. The trial court denied Jackson's motion

for a new trial, without explanation, at this hearing and subsequently

entered an order denying the motion, in part, because "no grounds exist

that would warrant the granting of a [new trial]." (C. 407.) On February

23, 2023, the trial court entered an order stating that its previous ruling
25
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denying Jackson's motion for a new trial was "based on Rule 24.4, Ala.

R. Crim. P.," and expressly held that Jackson's "Motion for New Trial is

hereby DENIED by operation of law" because the motion had "been

pending for more than 60 days, and there has been no express consent

of the parties in the record." (C. 436 (capitalization in original).) On

March 1, 2023, Jackson filed a renewed notice of appeal.

This Court must first determine whether Jackson's motion for a

new trial was denied by operation of law and, if so, the effect of any

proceedings that occurred after that denial. Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P.,

provides that

"[n]o motion for new trial or motion in arrest of
judgment shall remain pending in the trial court for more
than sixty (60) days after pronouncement of sentence, except
as provided in this section. A failure by the trial court to rule
on such a motion within the sixty (60) days allowed by this
section shall constitute a denial of the motion as of the sixtieth
day; provided, however, that with the express consent of the
prosecutor and the defendant or the defendant's attorney,
which consent shall appear in the record, the motion may be
carried past the sixtieth day to a date certain.…"

Jackson seems to concede on appeal that because his motion for a new

trial was not "continued to a date certain with the express consent of all

parties, on the record, before June 26, 2022," the motion was denied by

26
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operation of law. (Jackson's brief, p. 7. n.1.) We agree that the motion

was denied by operation of law. Furthermore, "if a motion for new trial

is filed within the 30-day period, the trial court retains jurisdiction until

the motion is ruled on or the motion is deemed denied by operation of

law, 60 days after sentence is pronounced. Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P."

Ex parte City of Montgomery, 721 So. 2d 261, 264 n. 4 (Ala. 1998). Once

the motion for a new trial was denied by operation of law, any subsequent

proceeding or "order [related to the motion] was void and without legal

consequence." Snell v. State, 723 So. 2d 105, 107 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).

Although Jackson's motion for a new trial was denied by operation

of law, he asserts that he is entitled to have this case remanded for a

hearing on his motion. Jackson correctly asserts on appeal that when

" 'a criminal defendant's motion for a new trial is denied under
the provisions of Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., without an
affirmative statement by the trial judge giving the ruling a
presumption of correctness and the defendant supports his
new trial motion by evidence that was not presented at trial,
and that evidence, if not controverted by the State, will entitle
him to a new trial, the denial by operation of law should be
reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to conduct
a hearing on his motion for new trial and then enter an order
either granting or denying the motion.' "

27
CR-2023-0170

(Jackson's brief, p. 48 (quoting Edgar v. State, 646 So. 2d 683, 687 (Ala.

1984)) (emphasis added)). However, Jackson did not support his motion

for a new trial with any affidavits or other supporting evidence. Thus,

the trial court did not err by denying Jackson an evidentiary hearing on

his motion for a new trial based on unverified, unsupported bare

allegations of juror misconduct.

As this Court explained in Washington v. State, 922 So. 2d 145, 176-

77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005):

" ' "A defendant is not entitled to a hearing on a motion for new
trial without a special basis therefor." ' Clark v. State, 621 So.
2d 309, 327 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), quoting Smelcher v. State,
520 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). See also Arrington
v. State, 757 So. 2d 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). ' "[B]are
allegations that the trial court had erred" ' are not sufficient
to warrant an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial.
Meeks v. State, 697 So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
Moreover, unless the grounds are sufficiently specific and
supported by facts contained in the record, a motion for a new
trial must be verified and supported by affidavit. See, e.g., Ex
parte Jefferson, 749 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1999); Jones v. State, 727
So. 2d 866 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); and Hill v. State, 675 So.
2d 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). ' "Assertions of counsel in an
unverified motion for new trial are bare allegations and
cannot be considered as evidence or proof of the facts
alleged." ' Smith v. State, 364 So. 2d 1, 14 (Ala. Crim. App.
1978). ' " 'Error may not be predicated upon the overruling of
a motion for new trial where there was no evidence offered in
28
CR-2023-0170

support of the motion.' " ' Britain v. State, 518 So. 2d 198, 203
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987), quoting Tucker v. State, 454 So. 2d
541, 547-48 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
454 So. 2d 552 (Ala. 1984). See also Arnold v. State, 601 So.
2d 145, 154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ('There is no error in a trial
court's denial of a motion for new trial where no evidence is
offered in support of that motion.')."
Cf. Henderson v. State, 60 So. 3d 948, 950 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)

(remanding case for an evidentiary hearing because "Henderson did not

assert bare allegations; rather, he made specific assertions in his motion

for a new trial and supported those allegations with affidavits and other

documentary evidence" (emphasis added)). As in Washington, "[b]ecause

[Jackson's] motion for a new trial was not verified, because no affidavits

were submitted in support of the motion, and because the motion

contained only general and conclusory allegations, [Jackson] was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the motion." 922 So. 2d at 177.

Furthermore,

" '[t]here is no error in a trial court's denial of a motion for new
trial where no evidence is offered in support of that motion.'
Arnold [v. State], 601 So. 2d [145,] 154 [(Ala. Crim. App.
1992)]. … [A]lthough the motion was denied by operation of
law, since the motion for a new trial is not supported by an
affidavit or any other evidence and the grounds relied on in
the motion are not shown by the record, 'it is unnecessary for
this court to reverse and remand this case to the trial court
for a hearing on the appellant's allegations … contained in the
29
CR-2023-0170

motion for new trial.' Similton [v. State], 672 So. 2d [1363,]
1366 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1995)]; see Hill v. State, 675 So. 2d 484
(Ala. Cr. App. 1995). The denial of the motion for a new trial
is due to be upheld."

Smith v. State, 675 So. 2d 100, 101 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).

Although the trial court did hear testimony on Jackson's motion for

a new trial, at the time that testimony was given the motion had been

denied by operation of law months before the hearing. The proceedings

after the motion was denied by operation of law were "void" and cannot

be considered by this Court in support of the motion or the appeal.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Jackson's motion for a

new trial, albeit by operation of law, and Jackson is not due any relief

based upon this argument.

V.

Jackson's final argument is that all three of the jury's guilty

verdicts are "palpably wrong or contrary to the great weight of the

evidence." (Jackson's brief, p. 61.) " 'The issue of the weight of the

evidence is preserved by a motion for a new trial stating "that the verdict

is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence." ' Zumbado v. State, 615

So. 2d 1223, 1241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); see also Rule 24.1(c), Ala. R.

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Crim. P." Rudolph v. State, 200 So. 3d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).

Thus, this issue was preserved for appellate review in Jackson's motion

for a new trial, which asserted that "the verdict of the jury is contrary to

the great weight of the evidence in this case." (C. 320.)

As this Court stated in Thompson v. State, 97 So. 3d 800 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2011):

" 'Once a prima facie case has been submitted to the
[fact-finder], this Court will not upset the [fact-finder's]
verdict except in extreme situations in which it is clear from
the record that the evidence against the accused was so
lacking as to make the verdict wrong and unjust. Deutcsh v.
State, 610 So. 2d 1212, 1234-35 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). This
Court will not substitute itself for the [fact-finder] in
determining the weight and probative force of the evidence.
Benton v. State, 536 So. 2d 162, 165 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).' "

97 So. 3d at 810 (quoting May v. State, 710 So. 2d 1362, 1372 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1997)).

The State clearly established a prima facie case that Jackson had

raped, sodomized, and kidnapped C.A. To prove that Jackson committed

a first-degree rape, the State had to prove that Jackson "engage[d] in

sexual intercourse with [C.A.] by forcible compulsion." § 13A-6-61(a)(1),

Ala. Code 1975. The elements of first-degree sodomy are established if
31
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evidence is presented that a person "engage[d] in sodomy with another

person by forcible compulsion." § 13A-6-63(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.

"Sodomy" is defined as "[a]ny sexual act involving the genitals of one

person and the mouth or anus of another person." § 13A-6-60(5), Ala.

Code 1975. Finally, a person commits the crime of first-degree

kidnapping if "he abducts another person with intent to … [i]nflict

physical injury upon [her], or to violate or abuse [her] sexually." § 13A-

6-43(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975.

C.A. testified in detail that Jackson and Wiley, at Griffin's

direction, held C.A. at gunpoint and took her in a vehicle to a deserted

and remote location. During that time, they bound her with duct tape

and forcefully took turns penetrating her orally, vaginally, and anally.

"It is well established that ' "the victim's testimony alone is sufficient to

establish a prima facie case of either rape or sexual abuse." ' Shouldis v.

State, 953 So. 2d 1275, 1285 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Jones v.

State, 719 So. 2d 249, 255 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996))." Black v. State, 295

So. 3d 1120, 1136 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). Jackson argues that C.A.'s

testimony was "problematic" and that her testimony conflicted with

several pretrial statements that she gave to authorities. Yet,
32
CR-2023-0170

inconsistencies between testimony and pretrial statements cannot be

grounds for an appellate court to overturn the verdict of a jury.

This Court has held that
" ' "[a]ny inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence
[are] for the jury to resolve. This court is not a finder of
fact and will not second-guess juries in their conclusions as
to the facts of a case. ' "[V]erdicts rendered [on conflicting
evidence] are conclusive upon appeal." Johnson v. State,
555 So. 2d 818, 820 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).' Dailey v. State,
604 So. 2d 436 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). See also Woods v.
State, 592 So. 2d 631 (Ala. Crim. App.), writ quashed, 592
So. 2d 636 (Ala. 1991)." ' "

Jones, 719 So. 2d at 255 (quoting Rowe v. State, 662 So. 2d 1227, 1229

(Ala. Crim. App. 1995)).

In sum, a prima facie case was made to support each verdict, and

the jury was free to resolve any inconsistencies, conflicts, and credibility

questions presented by the evidence. C.A.'s testimony was sufficient to

support the jury's verdicts, even without the additional eyewitness

testimony of Hancock and the forensic evidence that implicated Jackson

in C.A.'s rape, sodomy, and kidnapping. Contrary to Jackson's

arguments on appeal, "this is not one of the 'limited category of cases' or

'extreme situations in which it is clear from the record that the evidence

against the accused was so lacking as to make the verdict wrong and
33
CR-2023-0170

unjust.' " Scott v. State, 334 So. 3d 245, 248 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020)

(quoting Thompson v. State, 97 So. 3d 800, 810 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011)).

There was overwhelming evidence to support the jury's verdicts, and,

contrary to Jackson's arguments, all three of his convictions are due to

be affirmed.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Jackson's convictions and

consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. However, we reverse the

trial court's award of restitution and remand the case to the trial court

for that court to conduct a restitution hearing in accordance with this

opinion. Following the hearing, the trial court shall enter an order

stating the findings of fact that the court relied upon in determining

restitution. The trial court shall take all necessary action to ensure that

the record on return to remand is certified and transmitted to this Court

within 42 days of the date of this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.

34