Cassandra Armento v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 458
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
NO. CV-24-225

CASSANDRA ARMENTO Opinion Delivered September 25, 2024

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTH
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60JV-22-279]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE TJUANA BYRD MANNING,
CHILDREN JUDGE

APPELLEES
AFFIRMED

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

Appellant Cassandra Armento appeals after the Pulaski County Circuit Court filed

an order terminating her parental rights to her children, Minor Child 1 (MC1) (DOB 08-27-

18); Minor Child 2 (MC2) (DOB 08-07-10); and Minor Child 3 (MC3) (DOB 10-09-13).1

Appellant generally argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the

statutory grounds for termination. More specifically, she argues that (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the Arkansas Department of

Human Services (DHS) offered either the meaningful efforts or appropriate family services

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Allen Conaway is the father of MC1 and MC2, and Wendell Ferguson is the father
of MC3. Neither father is a party to this appeal. This case also involved a fourth child,
Minor Child 4 (MC4), but MC4’s goal was set as a guardianship. Accordingly, the
termination-of-parental-rights petition did not seek to terminate MC4’s parents’ rights, and
appellant’s parental rights were not terminated as to this child.
required for the failure-to-remedy and other-subsequent-factors grounds, respectively; and (2)

there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that appellant willfully

failed to provide significant material support or to maintain meaningful contact. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

On May 2, 2022, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect.

In the affidavit attached to the petition, DHS explained that it had previously opened a

protective-services case for this family in which it offered appellant referrals to 100 Families

and Triple P, an in-home service. On April 28, 2022, a friend of the family told DHS that

appellant had left her children with people who could not care for them after she was

arrested. A family-service worker visited the home and met with the caregivers. Appellant

had been incarcerated for six days at that point, and the caregivers were no longer able to

take care of the children due to lack of money and transportation and because they had prior

obligations. Additionally, the caregivers admitted using THC but declined to submit to a

drug screen. During an interview at the county jail, appellant stated that she had paid her

friends $300 to care for the children while she was incarcerated and explained that “all I did

wrong was sold drugs.” DHS removed the children from the home, and after exercising a

hold, the children told the DHS worker they were hungry and had not eaten in a while.

The circuit court granted the petition for emergency custody, finding that probable

cause existed for the removal. A probable-cause order was filed on June 21, 2022.

An adjudication hearing was held on June 21, 2022, and an adjudication order was

filed on August 2, 2022. The circuit court found the children to be dependent-neglected on

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the basis of appellant’s parental unfitness and accepted appellant’s stipulation that she had

been arrested and left the children with individuals who were incapable of meeting her

children’s needs. After their removal, the children had hair-shaft drug screens, which

showed that MC1 tested positive for methamphetamine, and MC2 and MC3 tested positive

for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The circuit court found that appellant had been

arrested four times since the beginning of 2022 for drug-related offenses and once since the

children came into DHS’s custody; appellant’s home was not appropriate for the children;

and appellant needed to complete services to address the substance-abuse issues and

supervision issues that led to the children’s removal. The court ordered that the case goal

be custody with a fit parent with a concurrent goal of guardianship with a fit and willing

relative. Additionally, it ordered appellant to comply with the case plan and court orders

and cooperate with DHS.

On September 20, 2022, the circuit court held a review hearing, and a review order

was filed on October 24, 2022. The circuit court ordered that the case plan goal remain

reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship with a fit and willing relative and that

the children remain in DHS’s custody. The court found that appellant had only minimally

complied because she had attended three visits with the children but had not otherwise

participated in services. Due to appellant’s inconsistency in visitation, the circuit court

reduced the visitation order to once a week from twice a week until appellant consistently

attended a minimum of six visits. Additionally, the circuit court found DHS had made

reasonable efforts to provide family services.

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On December 27, 2022, the circuit court held another review hearing, and an order

was filed on January 27, 2023. The circuit court ordered that the case plan goal remain

reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship with a fit and willing relative and that

the children remain in DHS’s custody. The circuit court found that the conditions that

caused the children’s removal had not been remedied. Regarding appellant’s compliance,

the circuit court stated that “[t]here is no evidence Ms. Armento has made any progress

toward remedying the causes of removal, has been minimally compliant with the case plan

and court orders, is causing trauma to her children by not showing up for visits, and has not

appeared for the last two court hearings.” The court ordered that appellant appear at the

DHS office before the children would be transported for visitation. Further, the circuit court

found DHS had substantially complied with the case plan and orders of the court and that

it had made reasonable efforts to provide family services.

A permanency-planning hearing was eventually held on February 21, 2023, and a

permanency-planning order was filed on March 7, 2023. Regarding compliance with the

case plan, the circuit court found the following:

4. The Court finds that the juveniles are in need of the services of the
Department and shall remain in the custody of the Department because it is contrary
to their welfare to return them to any parent. Ms. Armento is in jail and has not
remedied the conditions that caused removal. . . . The juveniles are all in placements
that meet their special needs and best interests, and it is in the children’s best interests
to remain in the custody of the Department.

5. The Department has complied with the case plan and court orders and has
made reasonable efforts to provide family services toward the case plan goal.
Specifically, the department has offered medical services, PACE evaluations,
counseling, foster homes, transportation assistance, clothing vouchers, worker visits,

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transitional youth services, sibling visits, provisional placement requests, drug screens,
drug and alcohol assessment, inpatient drug and alcohol treatment referrals,
parenting classes, and home visits.

6. Ms. Armento has not complied with the case plan and court orders.
Specifically, she only attended seven (7) of sixty-five (65) possible visits and had an
inappropriate conversation with her children that had to be redirected. The
Department has not been able to determine if her home is appropriate because she
has not made her home available for home visits and told the Department at one
point that her water had been shut off. The Court is unsure if she has adequate
income to support herself and her children, she has not submitted to drug screens,
or participated in substance abuse treatment or mental health counseling.
Additionally, the Court notes that Ms. Armento has not attended any hearing since
Adjudication.

It was at this hearing that the circuit court changed the goal to adoption. The circuit court

further suspended appellant’s visitation with the children since she had “not consistently

visited her children, and the behaviors that have been exhibited by the children after missed

and inconsistent visitation are extreme and harmful.”

Thereafter, DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental rights on June 13,

2023, and an amended petition for the termination of parental rights on August 9, 2023.

In the amended petition, DHS alleged the failure-to-remedy, other-subsequent-factors, and

failure-to-provide-material-support or maintain-meaningful-contact grounds for termination

of appellant’s parental rights under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)

(Supp. 2023). A termination hearing was held on September 12, 2023.

At the termination hearing, the circuit court admitted DHS’s exhibit, including

certified copies of the circuit court’s previous orders, into evidence without objection.

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Alexandrea Arnold-Wiley, the DHS caseworker assigned to the case, testified as to the

case history as already outlined. Ms. Arnold-Wiley explained that appellant had failed to

comply with the case plan. Appellant completed a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and it was

recommended that appellant attend intensive outpatient services for severe

methamphetamine-use disorder. She was supposed to attend nine individual sessions and

twenty-one group-therapy sessions. However, appellant failed to attend any of the sessions.

Appellant further attended only four of twelve parenting classes and was inconsistent in

visitation. Because of appellant’s inconsistency in visitation and the harm it caused the

children when appellant failed to attend, the visitations had to be suspended. Even after the

visitations were suspended, appellant made no attempt to restart visitation. Ms. Arnold-

Wiley stated that appellant had refused to allow her into the home for home visits or drugs

screens. Even though appellant had not communicated with her since the permanency-

planning hearing, Ms. Arnold-Wiley testified that she kept all appellant’s referrals current

and updated, even though appellant failed to comply. Additionally, either she or the clerical

administrator would text appellant to “let her know to still partake in services as it’s Court-

ordered for her to do and that the encumbrance was up to date.” Moreover, Ms. Arnold-

Wiley had offered transportation to services. She agreed that appellant could not complete

services during the few times she was incarcerated.

Ms. Arnold-Wiley testified that the children were doing well in their placements and

that their foster parents are willing to adopt them. She did not think that appellant had

made any significant progress toward reunification and explained that appellant rarely

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showed any initiative to get her children back. She did not think appellant had provided

any material support or maintained meaningful contact with her children. Further, she was

concerned about the danger and potential risk of harm if the children were returned to

appellant. Accordingly, Ms. Arnold-Wiley stated that she thought termination was in the

children’s best interest.

Rachel Mitchel, a DHS adoptions specialist, testified that there were twenty-two

matches found as potential adoptive resources for the three children together and that the

current foster parents were interested in adoption as well. She stated that there were no

barriers and that the children are highly adoptable.

Appellant testified that she had not moved during the case and that she recently paid

for her utilities to be turned back on. She acknowledged that DHS informed her of

appointments that she failed to attend or complete. She offered as an excuse that she had

car trouble at one point during the pendency of the case. Appellant further acknowledged

that she had not had any contact with Ms. Arnold-Wiley since her visitations were stopped

in February 2023. When asked why she had not reached out, appellant responded with the

following:

Because what is – My visits were discontinued. What is the point of contacting her
and asking about a visit for my kids when I can’t get a visit anyway, because the Judge
determines that? To me, it was pointless. I was setting myself up for failure.

Appellant testified that she refused to allow Ms. Arnold-Wiley in her home because she “had

no water or lights on to clean [her] home.” She claimed that the utilities had been restored

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for the last two months but that Ms. Arnold-Wiley had not made any attempts to visit her

since then.

Appellant stated that she had started drug treatment at Phoenix House. However,

she later clarified that she had not attended any counseling sessions but had just completed

the paperwork. Appellant alleged that DHS had failed to assist her and expected her “to do

everything on my own.” She admitted that she had pending felony charges and had been

incarcerated three times during the case for eighteen, fifteen, and fourteen days, respectively.

Appellant denied that DHS had made meaningful efforts to rehabilitate her. She testified

that her children would not be at risk of harm with her and that it is not in their best interest

to have her parental rights terminated.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, DHS requested that appellant’s

parental rights be terminated, and the attorney ad litem agreed. Both argued that the

evidence was sufficient to support all three statutory grounds alleged against appellant and

that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate appellant’s parental rights.

Regardless of appellant’s attempt to place blame on the caseworker, DHS argued that it had

provided services and that appellant’s contention was a “red herring.” The attorney ad litem

asked the circuit court to find Ms. Arnold-Wiley’s testimony that she had offered services

throughout the case credible.

Appellant’s counsel argued that the petition should be denied because there was

insufficient evidence. Counsel argued that there was no evidence that appellant used drugs

or posed potential harm to the children. He argued that DHS failed to give appellant the

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opportunity to prove that she could parent the children and that DHS failed to make a

meaningful effort to rehabilitate appellant. He maintained that appellant had not willfully

failed to provide significant material support or maintain meaningful contact and that there

was insufficient evidence to support the other-subsequent-factors ground.

The circuit court orally ruled from the bench that it was granting the petition for

termination of parental rights as to MC1, MC2, and MC3. The circuit court filed a written

order terminating appellant’s parental rights on January 3, 2024. The circuit court

specifically found by clear and convincing evidence that all three grounds alleged in the

petition against appellant supported termination and that it is in the best interests of the

children to terminate appellant’s parental rights. In relevant part to our disposition of

appellant’s points on appeal, the circuit court made the following specific findings:

11. After considering the evidence, the Court finds that the evidence proves
grounds pled in paragraphs A, B, C, D and E of the Amended Petition by clear and
convincing evidence as follows:

a. That termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
juveniles, taking into consideration the likelihood that the juvenile will
be adopted if the termination petition is granted and that there is
potential harm to the health and safety of the juvenile caused by placing
the children in the custody of either parent. ACA 9-27-341 (b)(3)(A)(i)
& (ii). This ground is proven by clear and convincing evidence as to
both Armento and Conaway [MC1 and MC2’s father]. The Court
finds that the evidence proves the termination of parental rights is in
the best interest of the juvenile. In making this finding, the circuit
court considered all relevant factors, including the likelihood that the
juvenile would be adopted if the parental rights were terminated, and
the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and
safety of the juvenile, that could be caused by returning the juvenile to
the parents. As to the juveniles’ adoptability, the Court finds that the
juveniles are adoptable because of the adoption resources from data

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matching and the current interest of their foster parents. As to
potential harm, the Court finds that the juveniles would be subjected
to substantial risk of potential harm of further abuse or neglect
(physical and mental) if placed with Mr. Conaway and at substantial
risk of harm including instability, drug exposure, environmental issues
and mental health issues if returned to Ms. Armento.

b. That the juveniles have been adjudicated by the court to be dependent
neglected on June 21, 2022, and have continued to be out of the
custody of the parent for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful
effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the
conditions that caused removal, these conditions have not been
remedied by the parent. ACA 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(i)(a). This ground is
proven by clear and convincing evidence as to the mother, Cassandra
Armento. The Court finds that the children were removed from the
mother’s custody on April 28, 2022, and have been out of the home
for nearly 17 months, that the department made reasonable efforts to
provide services to her and she failed to comply or benefit from those
services to remedy the conditions that caused removal.

....

d. The juveniles have lived outside the home of the parents for a period
of twelve (12) months and the parents have willfully failed to provide
significant material support in accordance with their means or to
maintain meaningful contact with the juveniles. ACA 9-27-341
(b)(3)(B)(ii)(a). This ground is proven by clear and convincing evidence
as to both Ms. Armento and Mr. Conaway. The court finds that Ms.
Armento missed 60 visits with her children before it was suspended
and neither she nor any other party ever requested the visits be
reinstated. The children have not seen their mother in months, and
she has failed to maintain meaningful contact with them when she had
the opportunity to do so. . . . Both Ms. Armento and Mr. Conaway
failed to have meaningful contact with the children or to provide
meaningful support for them.

e. That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original
petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the
juvenile in the custody of either parent is contrary to the juvenile’s
health, safety or welfare and that despite the offer of appropriate family
services, the parents have manifested the incapacity or indifference to

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remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parents’
circumstances which prevent the placement of the juvenile in the
custody of either parent. ACA 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). This ground
is proven by clear and convincing evidence as to both Ms. Armento and
Mr. Conaway. . . . Subsequent to the filing of the DIN petition, Ms.
Armento was offered but failed to complete drug treatment or drug
screens to prove her sobriety which was needed given the children
tested positive for methamphetamines due to exposure and she
admitted drug use in her assessment. She failed to complete parenting
classes, individual therapy, homemaker services or allow home visits to
prove parental fitness. Ms. Armento failed to obtain and maintain safe
and stable housing, admitting her utilities were off for months and she
that refused DHS access. New harm was caused by the parents’ failure
to visit the children during the case causing them serious distress. The
court finds DHS worker Arnold-Wiley credible in her attempts to
provide services to the family. The Court finds that the mother’s
assertions that her deficiencies are Ms. Arnold-Wiley's fault are
misguided and misdirected.

This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved

by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). Clear and convincing

evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm

conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews

termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling

unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a

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finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the

circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing

evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)

the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and

(2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,

caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing

of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground must be proved to support

termination. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.

The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency

in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is

contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative;

the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her

child. Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 85, 512 S.W.3d 694. Moreover, a

child’s need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for additional time

to improve the parent’s circumstances. Id. Finally, a parent’s past behavior is often a good

indicator of future behavior. Id.

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III. Statutory Grounds

The circuit court granted the termination petition on the basis of the failure-to-

remedy, other-subsequent-factors, and failure-to-provide-material-support or maintain-

meaningful-contact grounds for termination under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-

341(b)(3)(B). Although the circuit court found multiple statutory grounds for termination,

only one ground is necessary to support the termination. See Reid, supra. Appellant argues

that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights because there was insufficient

evidence to support any of the grounds alleged in the petition to terminate parental rights.

We cannot agree and hold that there was sufficient evidence to support at least the other-

subsequent-factors ground.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) defines the other-subsequent-

factors ground as follows:

(vii)(a) That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original
petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in
the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and
that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the
incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate
the parent’s circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody
of the parent.

(Emphasis added.) A parent’s failure to comply with court orders can serve as a subsequent

factor upon which termination can be based. Gonzalez v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark.

App. 425, 555 S.W.3d 915; Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 104, 542

S.W.3d 899; Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 396, 525 S.W.3d 48.

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Following the filing of the original petition, the circuit court ordered appellant to

comply with the case plan and court orders and cooperate with DHS. In its termination

order, the circuit court found that the following evidence supported this ground:

Ms. Armento was offered but failed to complete drug treatment or drug screens to
prove her sobriety which was needed given the children tested positive for
methamphetamines due to exposure and she admitted drug use in her assessment.
She failed to complete parenting classes, individual therapy, homemaker services or
allow home visits to prove parental fitness. Ms. Armento failed to obtain and
maintain safe and stable housing, admitting her utilities were off for months and she
that refused DHS access. New harm was caused by the parents’ failure to visit the
children during the case causing them serious distress.

The circuit court’s findings were supported by Ms. Arnold-Wiley’s testimony. Ms. Arnold-

Wiley testified that appellant failed to attend individual counseling, submit to drug screens,

allow home visits, complete parenting classes, or maintain consistent visitation with the

children. In fact, because of appellant’s inconsistency in visitation and the harm it caused

the children when appellant failed to attend, the visitations had to be suspended.

On appeal, appellant argues that because DHS failed an “offer of appropriate family

services,” it was erroneous for the court to rely on the other-subsequent-factors ground to

terminate her parental rights. She claims as she did below that DHS “completely ignored

her for the last seven months of the case.” She further claims that the circuit “court’s findings

under this ground that [Ms. Arnold-Wiley] was credible in her attempts to offer services to

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remedy this subsequent factor, and that [appellant’s] complaints that DHS did nothing for

her were misdirected and misguided, are belied by the record.” We disagree.2

Although appellant argues that DHS completely ignored her after the permanency-

planning hearing and failed to offer appropriate services, Ms. Arnold-Wiley testified

otherwise. She testified that she made referrals for appellant multiple times throughout the

case, ensured that they were still active and available to appellant, and additionally offered

transportation to appellant when she was having difficulties with her car. However, due to

appellant’s failure to attend even a single session, appellant was dropped from services with

Recovery Centers of Arkansas (“RCA”) where she was to complete intensive outpatient

treatment. Ms. Arnold-Wiley testified that she believed appellant knew her service referrals

were still active because appellant did complete three of the parenting classes after the

February 2023 permanency-planning hearing. Additionally, Ms. Arnold-Wiley testified that

either she or the clerical administrator would text appellant to “let her know to still partake

in services as it’s Court-ordered for her to do and that the encumbrance was up to date.”

Despite Ms. Arnold-Wiley’s testimony that she offered appellant appropriate services during

2
Appellees argue that appellant’s argument is not preserved for appeal because she
failed to appeal from the circuit court’s previous orders finding that DHS had made
reasonable efforts. However, appellant specifically raised her services argument at the
termination hearing. See Threadgill v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 426, at 6, 526
S.W.3d 891, 895 (holding that a reasonable-efforts argument was not waived where none of
the prior reasonable-efforts findings were in orders containing a Rule 54(b) certificate and
appellant raised the argument at the termination hearing); see also Spears v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 494, 678 S.W.3d 86; Long v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App.
372, 675 S.W.3d 158. Accordingly, appellant has not waived her specific argument on
appeal.

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the entirety of the case, appellant failed to take advantage of and complete those services.

Appellant admitted that she did not reach out to Ms. Arnold-Wiley after her visitation was

suspended because she thought “it was pointless” and that she was “setting [herself] up for

failure.” Appellant further admitted during the hearing that she refused to allow Ms. Arnold-

Wiley in her home.

The credibility of any witness’s testimony is to be assessed by the trier of fact—and the

trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of it. Long, supra; Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2022 Ark. App. 146, 643 S.W.3d 794. Here, the circuit court credited Ms. Arnold-Wiley’s

testimony over that of the appellant’s. On the basis of these facts, we cannot hold that the

circuit court clearly erred in its findings and affirm that there was sufficient evidence to

support the other-subsequent-factors ground. Because we conclude that DHS adequately

proved the other-subsequent-factors ground, we need not discuss the remaining grounds

found by the circuit court. See Kohlman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 164, 544

S.W.3d 595. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating appellant’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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