Ladonna Huddleston v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 24
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-19-680

Opinion Delivered January 15, 2020
LADONNA HUDDLESTON
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 72JV-17-699]
V.
HONORABLE STACEY ZIMMERMAN,
JUDGE
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR AFFIRMED
CHILDREN

APPELLEES

LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge

Ladonna Huddleston appeals the order entered by the Washington County Circuit

Court terminating her parental rights to AH (born August 9, 2015) and ID (born September

29, 2010). On appeal, Huddleston argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding

grounds supported the termination decision and erred in finding that termination was in the

best interest of AH and ID. We affirm.

On September 8, 2017, ID disclosed to law enforcement that Huddleston’s boyfriend,

Will Hadley, had sexually abused her. Huddleston told representatives of the Arkansas

Department of Human Services (DHS) that she was unaware of the abuse and that she

would protect her children. On September 11, during a follow-up check, it was discovered

that ID had a red mark on her face. ID reported that Huddleston had struck her as
punishment for reporting the abuse. ID further reported that Hadley had been in

Huddleston’s home that morning. DHS removed ID, AH, and JD1 from Huddleston’s

custody and placed them in foster care. On September 13, DHS filed a petition for

emergency custody and dependency-neglect of all three children, and the circuit court

entered an order granting the petition that day. On October 25, the circuit court ordered

DHS to place JD in inpatient residential treatment after finding that he had been running

away from school and had disrupted two foster-care placements.

After an adjudication hearing, the court entered an order on November 2, finding that

the children were dependent-neglected and at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of

abuse, sexual abuse, and parental unfitness. The court ordered Huddleston to, among other

things, cooperate with DHS, participate in individual counseling, refrain from illegal drug

use, submit to random drug screens, obtain and maintain stable housing and employment,

demonstrate the ability to protect her children, follow the case plan and court orders, and

“not let people stay at her home—Mother needs to show that she can make GOOD choices

about what people she has around her and her kids!!” The goal of the case was reunification.

On February 21, 2018, the circuit court held a review hearing wherein it found

Huddleston had maintained contact with DHS, participated in counseling, submitted to drug

screens, tested negative for illegal substances, secured housing and (disability) income, and

was in parenting classes. The court ordered Huddleston to continue to comply with the case

plan and “keep other people out of the home!!” The court found that Huddleston “is

1JD (born November 20, 2008) is also Huddleston’s child.

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continuing to develop her parenting skills and is working, but not yet shown, she will

adequately protect the juveniles from harm.”

On March 8, the circuit court entered a review order that discharged JD from his

treatment facility and ordered a trial home placement with Huddleston to begin on March 9.

The order provided that “[n]o one other than the Mother and [JD] shall spend the night in

the home!”

After an emergency hearing on April 11, the circuit court entered an order ending JD’s

trial home placement. The court’s order described a “meltdown” JD had in court along with

multiple behavioral issues he had at school.2 The order also set forth Huddleston’s testimony

at the emergency hearing that she allowed a man named Christian in her home during the

trial placement. The court found that JD was a danger to himself and others and ordered

that he be placed in an acute treatment facility.

In a July 26 review order, the circuit court found Huddleston in partial compliance

with the case plan and court orders; however, the court also found that she failed to

demonstrate the ability to keep her children safe and that she failed to complete parenting

classes and counseling. The circuit court also found that it was in the best interest of AH and

ID to be placed separately from JD due to his severe mental-health issues. The court

continued the goal of reunification.

After permanency-planning hearings on September 5 and October 4, the court found

that Huddleston had partially complied with the case plan but had not demonstrated an

2JD had been running away from school, hiding inside school, pulling the fire alarm,

getting into fights, and displaying aggressive and violent behavior toward the students and
staff. He had also been suspended from school.
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ability to protect the children and keep them safe from harm. The court found that JD’s trial

home placement had ended because Huddleston failed to keep men out of her home, which

was the cause of removal. The court again found that it was not in AH and ID’s best interest

to be placed with JD. The court changed the goal to adoption for all three children.

On December 3, the circuit court entered an agreed order wherein it found that ID

had disrupted the placement with her foster family. The court authorized DHS to move her

to an inpatient treatment facility.

On February 4, 2019, DHS filed a petition to terminate Huddleston’s parental rights

alleging that termination was in the best interest of AH, ID, and JD. DHS also alleged that

the failure-to-remedy ground, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), and

the subsequent-factors ground, section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii), supported termination.

At the May 17 termination hearing, DHS caseworker Chris Hamby testified that all

three children were doing well in their respective placements. He said that ID and JD were

receiving inpatient treatment at different facilities for their behavioral issues and that AH

was placed in a nonadoptive foster home. Hamby opined that all three children are

adoptable despite ID’s and JD’s behavioral issues. Hamby further testified that Huddleston

maintained weekly contact with DHS, participated in counseling, submitted to some random

drug screens, completed parenting classes, maintained stable housing and income, and

visited her children. However, Hamby stated that Huddleston tested positive for

methamphetamine, amphetamines, and alcohol in November 2018. Hamby said that

Huddleston had been called in for drug screens since February 2019 but had not appeared

for testing.

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Hamby acknowledged that Huddleston loves her children, that she made efforts to

comply with the case plan, and that she had shown improvement, but he recommended

termination of her parental rights because she had not demonstrated an ability to protect her

children. Hamby pointed to “critical mistakes,” like the positive drug screen six months prior

to the termination hearing and JD’s failed trial home placement caused by Huddleston’s

having Cecil Turner, who has true findings of sexual-abuse allegations against him, in the

home. Hamby said DHS’s termination recommendation was also based on Huddleston’s

family’s extensive history with DHS.3

Alison Overton, the DHS supervisor on Huddleston’s case, testified that DHS has

been involved in multiple protective-services cases with Huddleston’s family since 2007.

Overton testified that DHS has provided services “over and over” to Huddleston but that

the children still cannot be safely returned to her.

Huddleston testified that she wants her children to come home because she has a

bond with them, their visits are good, they call her all the time, and she can care for them.

She stated that she has been trying to prove that she is responsible and able to protect them

from harm. She introduced a letter from her boss at the Arkansas Veterans Home where she

had volunteered the past several weeks. The letter stated that she is a person of good

3The record reflects that Huddleston’s family has had twenty-four referrals for DHS

investigations of multiple allegations, including environmental neglect, inadequate
supervision, poison/noxious substance exposure, striking a child in the face or with a closed
fist, failure to protect, cuts/welts/bruises, inadequate food, sexual abuse, educational neglect,
threat of harm, throwing a child, abuse with a deadly weapon, and indecent exposure. As a
result, DHS has opened multiple protective-services and differential-response cases on
Huddleston’s family over the years.
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character, she is compassionate and kind with the residents, and while she had made some

bad decisions in the past, she is remorseful and able to be a wonderful mother.

Huddleston explained that her positive drug screen was the result of her being

depressed and “hanging out with the wrong crowd.” She stated that she had appeared for all

drug screens since February except one, which she missed due to a tornado warning.

Court appointed special advocate (CASA) Susan Hantz acknowledged the love

between Huddleston and her children and that Huddleston’s efforts in this case were

“impressive.” Hantz testified that Huddleston completed the treatment plans, parenting

classes, and counseling and that she attended visits, maintained housing, and contacted DHS

weekly.

Hantz recommended that JD be returned to his mother’s care because JD had been in

residential care for fifteen months, and Huddleston was his only source of love and support.

Hantz said that JD would be significantly harmed if he were to lose his mother. Hantz’s

recommendations regarding AH and ID were not as clear. Hantz initially recommended that

Huddleston’s parental rights be terminated to AH and ID because Huddleston had not

accepted her role in and responsibility for protecting her family from sexual predators, and

she has not demonstrated the capacity to protect her daughters from potential threats.

However, later in her testimony, Hantz stated that in light of Huddleston’s progress, she

would recommend keeping the case open. Thereafter, Hantz testified that she was

concerned that DHS had been involved with Huddleston’s family since 2007 and that

Huddleston had tested positive for drugs.

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Alicia, the foster mother for AH and ID, testified that she had custody of both

children from January 2018 to December 2018, when ID was placed in an inpatient

treatment facility. Alicia stated that AH has made a lot of progress and that her progress

intensified when ID left the home. Alicia testified that she is not an adoptive home but that

she is willing to continue to foster AH. Alicia stated that ID requires a lot of therapeutic and

medical treatment that she can only get in a residential facility and that ID is just starting to

“scratch the surface of her trauma.” Alicia said that she is willing to continue to visit and

support ID.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court orally found DHS had proved that

the failure-to-remedy and subsequent-factors grounds supported termination of

Huddleston’s parental rights to all three children. The court also found that termination was

in the best interest of AH and ID. Accordingly, the court granted DHS’s petition as to AH

and ID. Regarding JD, the court found that termination would be detrimental to his mental

health and was not in his best interest. Accordingly, the court denied DHS’s petition with

respect to JD. On June 14, 2019, the circuit court entered an order memorializing its oral

findings. Huddleston appeals the order.4

A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved

by clear and convincing evidence. Bolden v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 218, at

7, 547 S.W.3d 129, 133 (citing Krecker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 537, at

10, 530 S.W.3d 393, 400; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2015)). Clear and

convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a

4This order also terminated the parental rights of Jimmy Davis, the father of ID.

Davis is not a party to this appeal.
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firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Bolden, 2018 Ark. App. 218, at 7,

547 S.W.3d at 133. On appeal, the appellate court reviews termination-of-parental-rights

cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly

erroneous. Id., 547 S.W.3d at 133. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id., 547 S.W.3d at 133. In determining

whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the

opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id., 547 S.W.3d at 133.

The appellate court is not to act as a “super factfinder,” substituting its own judgment or

second-guessing the credibility determinations of the circuit court; we reverse only in those

cases in which a definite mistake has occurred. Id., 547 S.W.3d at 133–34.

An order terminating parental rights must be based on a showing of clear and

convincing evidence of grounds for termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp.

2017). Huddleston argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that DHS proved the

two grounds alleged in its petition. One of those grounds is the failure-to-remedy ground,

which provides that parental rights may be terminated when a juvenile has been adjudicated

by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued to be out of the custody of the

parent for twelve months, and despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate

the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been

remedied by the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a).

We hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Huddleston failed to

remedy the conditions that caused removal. The court found that the children had been out

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of Huddleston’s custody for twelve months and that DHS had made reasonable and

meaningful efforts to provide family services to Huddleston, yet she failed to demonstrate

the ability to protect her children and keep them safe from harm. This case began after it

was discovered that Huddleston’s boyfriend had sexually abused ID, and Huddleston failed

to protect her. All through these proceedings, Huddleston was specifically ordered to not let

people stay in her home and to make good choices about the people around her and her

kids. Despite these court-ordered directives, Huddleston allowed two men into her home

during JD’s trial home placement: Turner, who has a child-maltreatment history, and a man

named Christian. A year into her case, Huddleston admitted “hanging out with the wrong

crowd” with whom she consumed methamphetamine, amphetamines, and alcohol. Hamby

and Overton testified that Huddleston had not remedied the conditions that caused removal.

Finally, the circuit court found that DHS had been involved with Huddleston’s family since

2007 and that DHS had been providing services to the family in this case and in a “plethora”

of protective-services cases. A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future

behavior. Wright v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 503, at 12, 560 S.W.3d 827,

834.

Huddleston argues that the circuit court erred in giving too much weight to the failed

trial home placement because it occurred a year before the termination hearing and that the

court erred in not giving enough weight to the testimony of the CASA worker and the foster

mother along with the letter from her boss—all of whom were impressed with Huddleston’s

efforts. However, the circuit court’s weighing the evidence differently than the parent

wanted it weighed is not reversible error. Allen v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App.

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136, at 20, 540 S.W.3d 742, 754 (citing Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 202,

462 S.W.3d 670). To reverse on these arguments would require this court to act as a super

fact-finder or second-guess the circuit court’s credibility determinations, which is not our

function. Id., 540 S.W.3d at 754.

Huddleston next contends that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that she will

continue the pattern of prioritizing her inappropriate romantic relationships over the safety

of her children because there is no evidence in this case that she has been in a romantic

relationship with anyone since the case began. Whether Huddleston has been in a romantic

relationship during this case is not relevant. The cause for removal was Huddleston’s failure

to protect her children from inappropriate individuals, and the evidence supports the court’s

finding that Huddleston has failed to remedy this problem. Hernandez v. Ark. Dep’t of Human

Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 250, 492 S.W.3d 119 (affirming a failure-to-remedy finding where the

children, victims of physical and sexual abuse, were removed from the appellant’s custody in

part because she permitted unfamiliar adults and minors to live in the home and care for the

children, and the evidence showed that she continued to do so during the case).

We acknowledge that the circuit court found that Huddleston did not complete

parenting classes and counseling despite evidence from Hamby and Hantz that she did.

Assuming arguendo that Huddleston did complete these directives, the circuit court also

found that Huddleston did not achieve the intended goal of parenting classes and counseling

because she continued to make poor decisions to the detriment of her children. “What

matters is whether completion of the case plan achieved the intended result of making the

parent capable of caring for the child—mere compliance with directives of the court and

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DHS is not sufficient if the root cause of the problem is not dealt with.” Cole v. Ark. Dep’t of

Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 203, at 7–8, 394 S.W.3d 318, 322 (affirming failure-to-remedy

finding on the basis of evidence that the appellant showed no progress in the single most

crucial component of her case—demonstrating that she could protect and care for her son,

who had suffered severe physical abuse at the hands of her boyfriend).

In light of the evidence in this case, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred

in finding the failure-to-remedy ground supported the court’s termination decision. Because

only one ground must be proved to support termination, Hernandez, 2016 Ark. App. 250, at

6, 492 S.W.3d at 123, we need not address Huddleston’s arguments regarding the

subsequent-factors ground.

In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must also find by clear and

convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child, taking into

consideration (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is

granted and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety

of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-

27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The circuit court is not required to find that actual harm would

result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Hernandez, 2016 Ark. App. 250, at 9–10,

492 S.W.3d at 125. The circuit court must consider a parent’s compliance and behavior

during the entire dependency-neglect case as well as the evidence presented at

the termination hearing to decide whether the termination is in the children’s best interest.

Allen-Grace v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 286, at 8, 577 S.W.3d 397, 401

(citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 2017)).

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Huddleston argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that terminating her

parental rights was in the best interest of AH and ID. She does not challenge the adoptability

finding, but she does challenge the potential-harm finding, contending that she was in full

compliance of the case plan. We disagree.

The evidence in this case demonstrates that Huddleston did not comply with the case

plan and court orders. She allowed Turner and Christian in her home during JD’s trial home

placement; she spent time with inappropriate people, which, according to her, led to her

testing positive for illegal drugs and alcohol; and she has refused to appear for drug screens

since February 2019. Hamby and Overton testified that because of these failures, AH and ID

would be at risk of harm if returned to Huddleston’s custody, and Hantz testified that

Huddleston has not demonstrated the capacity to protect her daughters from potential

threats.

These failures are fundamental in that her children were removed from her custody

because she allowed inappropriate people to be around her children, which led to the sexual

abuse of ID. In addition, there is evidence that Huddleston has not acknowledged the abuse

suffered by ID and has not accepted her role in the abuse ID suffered. In Cole, we held that

this failure alone supported a finding that returning the child to the parent presented a

substantial risk of serious harm and is therefore not in the child’s best interest. 2012 Ark.

App. 203, at 7, 394 S.W.3d at 322.

Huddleston next argues that the circuit court’s best-interest finding must be reversed

because the court failed to consider the impact termination will have on the relationships

between AH, ID, and JD. Keeping siblings together is an important consideration but is not

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outcome determinative, as the best interest of each child is the polestar consideration. Brown

v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 370, at 10–11, 584 S.W.3d 276, 282.

The circuit court in its order did not make express findings on the impact termination

will have on the sibling relationships between AH, ID, and JD, but reversal is not required

on this basis alone. Brown, 2019 Ark. App. 370, at 10–12, 584 S.W.3d at 282–83. Throughout

this case, the circuit court entered orders finding that it was in the best interest of AH and

ID to be separated from JD due to his volatile behavior. A report from JD’s current

treatment facility provides that in the six months JD resided there, he was involved in

nineteen incidents wherein he was physically abusive to himself or others. Although the

CASA report provides that AH had missed seeing JD, this same report nevertheless

recommends termination of Huddleston’s parental rights to AH and ID. Further, the

evidence demonstrates that despite the fact that AH and ID had not seen JD in six months,

they were both improving in their separate placements. Therefore, the facts in this case do

not support Huddleston’s argument that terminating Huddleston’s parental rights to AH and

ID will negatively affect their relationship with JD.

As between AH and ID, Huddleston argues that if ID’s treatment fails to progress,

her ability to be adopted could be impacted, which could put AH and ID at risk of not being

adopted together. The evidence directly contradicts this argument. Hamby testified that ID,

despite her behavioral issues, is “very much” adoptable. He said that she is a “terrific girl”

and that she is “very fun to be around.” For all these reasons, we hold that the circuit

court did not clearly err in finding that it was in the best interest of AH and ID to terminate

Huddleston’s parental rights. Therefore, we affirm.

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Affirmed.

VIRDEN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

Tabitha McNulty, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Ellan K. Howard, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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