KEVIN NEWTON HOULTON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 436
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-24-600

KEVIN NEWTON HOULTON Opinion Delivered September 24, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 26CR-23-445]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE RALPH C. OHM,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

A Garland County jury convicted appellant Kevin Newton Houlton of failing to

register as a sex offender. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty years’

imprisonment and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. On appeal, he argues that the trial court

erred in denying his directed-verdict motion because there was insufficient evidence that he

was no longer residing at the Days Inn in Hot Springs and that the trial court erred in

admitting hearsay testimony about whether he was still residing at the Days Inn. We affirm.

I. Trial Testimony

Nicole Pugh, the administrator for the sex offender community notification

assessment (SOCNA) program at the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC), testified that

she oversees the assessment of sex offenders who live, work, or attend school in Arkansas.

Pugh said that SOCNA typically receives a referral from the Arkansas Crime Information
Center (ACIC) to begin the assessment process. Pugh said that records are collected and

reviewed; the offender sits for an interview; a psychologist reviews the information; and a

community-notification level is then assigned to the sex offender. Pugh further testified that

Houlton was assessed and assigned a level 2, meaning that notification outside the home was

necessary for the protection of the public. She said that Houlton’s “index offense” requiring

registration as a sex offender consisted of two counts of lewd molestation in Oklahoma. Pugh

said that, once completed by the offender, verification-of-residency forms are sent to ACIC

and that SOCNA does not handle matters of registration—only assessment.

Justin Stewart testified that he was tasked with rehabilitating Houlton and

reintegrating him into society and that he had been meeting with Houlton monthly since

September 2022.1 Stewart said that Houlton’s information would be updated during those

visits and that his next visit would be scheduled. Stewart testified that on January 17, 2023,

Houlton reported in person and listed his address as a room at the Days Inn on Central

Avenue in Hot Springs. He said that Houlton’s next visit was to be February 15 and that

when Houlton did not show up, Stewart began calling around looking for him. Stewart

testified that he went to the Days Inn on February 16 and encountered a couple who was

not related to Houlton staying in the room that Houlton had listed as his last known address.

The record indicates that Stewart said the couple told him that Houlton had already

checked out of the hotel. It is not clear whether the trial court and defense counsel heard

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The trial court had granted a motion in limine to prevent mention of the fact that
Stewart was Houlton’s parole officer.

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this, but defense counsel objected to what Stewart was about to say, and the trial court ruled

that what Stewart had tried to “squeeze in” was hearsay. Nevertheless, the prosecutor offered

to rephrase the question; the trial court agreed with that suggestion; and there was no further

objection by defense counsel. Stewart then testified that he went to the room where Houlton

had been staying, that he did not find Houlton there, and that he did not find Houlton

anywhere on the hotel’s property.

Detective Shawn Woodall with the Hot Springs Police Department testified that he

is charged with the responsibility of making sure that sex offenders understand the rules and

regulations concerning registration. He said that sex offenders must sign an acknowledgment

form indicating their understanding of those rules and that they are given a copy of the form.

Woodall said that Houlton, as a level 2 sex offender, was generally required to report every

six months. Woodall identified a change-of-information form from ACIC dated November

16, 2022, showing that Houlton had come in to update his information and an

acknowledgment form signed by Houlton verifying that his information was correct.

Woodall identified a second ACIC change-of-information form dated January 17, 2023,

showing Houlton’s Central Avenue address. He said that Houlton had signed an a form

acknowledging that he was scheduled to return in person to the police department to verify

his address on July 8, 2023. Woodall said that a sex offender must come into the police

department within five days when there is any change of information.

Woodall further testified that Stewart notified him that Houlton had a change of

address to report. He said that he went to the Days Inn where Houlton claimed he had been

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staying and asked “management” about the last day that Houlton had been there. This drew

an anticipatory hearsay objection from defense counsel. The prosecutor said that she was

going to approach the question as she did with Stewart, to which defense counsel said “okay,”

and the trial court said “sounds good.” Woodall then testified that he went to the room

where Houlton had been staying and verified that Houlton was not there and that he was

not anywhere on the property. Woodall said that he had an arrest warrant issued on that day

in mid-February but that Houlton was not arrested until May 19. The following colloquy

occurred during cross-examination:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So, the only knowledge that you have with regard
to Mr. Houlton’s residency is that you went to his motel
room in the afternoon, knocked on the door, he wasn’t
there?

[WOODALL]: Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s it?

[WOODALL]: Based off what Justin Stewart said, yes, and I confirmed
with management saying he checked out. That—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You don’t have personal knowledge of that. You spoke
to somebody and you clearly know that’s hearsay, correct?

[WOODALL]: I spoke with management, yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You—you don’t even know the name of the manager you
spoke with; do you?

[WOODALL]: I do not.

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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You didn’t get any business records from the motel
showing when he checked in or when he checked out;
did you?

[WOODALL]: I did not.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, you don’t have any personal knowledge other than
you knocked on this door and no one answered?

[WOODALL]: Yep.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

Woodall testified that, when Houlton was arrested, he filled out a bail-bond

determination listing an address in Fort Smith that he had maintained for the last three

months. Woodall stated that Houlton had never reported living in Fort Smith. He further

testified that, while there are exceptions to the reporting requirements, Houlton’s situation

did not fall within any of those exceptions.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Houlton of failing to register as a sex

offender. Houlton now brings this appeal.

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A person who fails to report in person a change of address, employment, education,

or training as required under this subchapter is guilty of a Class C felony. Ark. Code Ann.

§ 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2021). Section 12-12-909 provides that, before a change of

address within the state, a sex offender shall report the change of address to the local law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction in person no later than five calendar days before the sex

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offender establishes residency or is temporarily domiciled at the new address. Ark. Code

Ann. § 12-12-909(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2021). Subdivision (B) states that the sex offender shall

report to the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction of the new address in person

within five calendar days after relocating to the new address. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-

909(b)(1)(B). It is an affirmative defense to prosecution if the person delayed reporting a

change in address because of an eviction, a natural disaster, or any other unforeseen

circumstance and provided the new address to the local law enforcement agency having

jurisdiction in person no later than five business days after the person establishes residency.

Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-904(a)(2). The failure to register is a strict-liability offense. Hicks v.

State, 2024 Ark. App. 35.

On appeal, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence. McDaniels v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 213, 711 S.W.3d 164. In reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, considering only evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm

the verdict if substantial evidence supports it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient

force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion without

resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id.

Houlton argues that there was insufficient evidence that he no longer lived at the

Days Inn and that, even if he no longer lived there, there was insufficient evidence of when

he vacated the residence. Houlton argues that the only evidence that he no longer lived at

the Days Inn consisted of Stewart’s testimony that he knocked on a hotel-room door on that

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day in mid-February during daytime working hours and his being told that Houlton had

checked out. Houlton argues that, although Woodall testified that he discovered Houlton’s

address on a bail-bond determination at the time of his arrest on May 19, 2023, the form

was not admitted into evidence and had no relevance to the charge concerning registration

and reporting requirements given that the State’s information stated that the offense

occurred on or about January 17, 2023. Moreover, Houlton points out that the State did not

move to amend the documents to conform to the evidence even though its amended

information listed an offense date of January 17, whereas the affidavit for an arrest warrant

was prepared in mid-February. Houlton argues that, without knowing the date he moved out

of the Days Inn, the jury could not determine whether he waited longer than five days to

notify law enforcement of his new address.

Considering only the evidence that supports the verdict, Stewart went to Houlton’s

last known address when he failed to show up for their monthly scheduled meeting and

encountered a couple—unrelated to Houlton—in the room at the Days Inn where Houlton

had been staying. Woodall went to the Days Inn the following day to look for Houlton.

Woodall testified on cross-examination by defense counsel that he was told by

“management” that Houlton had checked out of the hotel. Hearsay evidence admitted

without objection may constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction. Moseby v.

State, 2010 Ark. App. 5. Moreover, Woodall testified without objection that he discovered a

bail-bond determination in mid-May 2023 that showed Houlton had been living at an

address in Fort Smith for the past three months. According to Woodall, Houlton did not

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ever report a move to Fort Smith. Regardless of which day in mid-February Houlton moved

from the Days Inn in Hot Springs to an address in Fort Smith, he did not notify law

enforcement of that change. Notably, Houlton is not even arguing on appeal that he did

report a change of address to law enforcement, which is what section 12-12-904(a)(i)(A)

requires.2

As for the State’s failure to amend the information to change the date of the offense

from on or about January 17, 2023, to a date in mid-February, Houlton waived any objection

to the State’s failure by not objecting below. See, e.g., Whitley v. State, 140 Ark. 425, 428, 427,

215 S.W. 703, 703 (1919) (holding that it was “too late” to argue that an information charged

separate offenses when the appellant raised no objection to the testimony “on the ground of

variance” and noting that “[t]he information could have been amended or treated as

amended to conform to the proof”). Moreover, Houlton’s directed-verdict motion made no

mention of any deficiency related to the offense date. We hold that there is substantial

evidence to support Houlton’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender.

B. Admissibility of Hearsay Testimony

We review the admission of evidence by the trial court using an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Gladden v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 78, 706 S.W.3d 741. The decision to admit or

exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse

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Houlton incorrectly asserts that the State was “required to prove that the Appellant
had a change of residence, and that the Appellant had failed to report the change within five
days thereafter.” (Emphasis added.)

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that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold

that does not simply require error in the trial court’s decision but also requires that the trial

court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id.

1. What “the couple” told Stewart

Houlton points to Stewart’s testimony that the couple told him that Houlton had

already moved out, to which defense counsel objected on the basis of hearsay. Houlton

contends that the trial court acknowledged that the statement was hearsay but then “failed

to exclude the testimony or admonish the jury.”

The trial court essentially sustained defense counsel’s objection to hearsay, but the

trial court agreed to the prosecutor’s offer to rephrase the question. Defense counsel had no

objection to that course of action and did not ask the trial court to strike the testimony or

to admonish the jury to disregard the testimony. When an objection is sustained and the

defendant has received all of the relief requested, there is no basis to raise the issue on appeal.

Miller v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 352.

2. Detective Woodall’s testimony about “management”

Houlton points to Woodall’s testimony that he was told by “management” that

Houlton had checked out of the Days Inn, to which defense counsel objected on the basis

of hearsay and asked the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the statement. Houlton

contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying that request and asserts that his

conviction cannot stand absent the hearsay testimony.

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When pressed on cross-examination, Woodall said that he confirmed with

management that Houlton had checked out of the Days Inn. Instead of raising a

contemporaneous objection to the hearsay—which he had elicited—defense counsel

continued with his cross-examination of Woodall, trying to call into question Woodall’s

“confirmation” of Houlton’s residency given that Woodall did not know the manager’s name

and had not gotten any paperwork documenting Houlton’s departure from the hotel.

Defense counsel requested that the trial court strike Woodall’s testimony only after his cross-

examination was complete and, indeed, after he had sat back down at the defense table. A

contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for review on appeal. Gadsden v.

State, 2019 Ark. App. 153, 570 S.W.3d 527. Houlton’s argument is thus not preserved for

our review. Moreover, under the invited-error rule, one who is responsible for error cannot

be heard to complain later. Britton v. State, 2014 Ark. 192, 433 S.W.3d 856.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and WOOD, J., agree.

Knutson Law Firm, by: Gregg A. Knutson, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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