CODIANNA HUTSON FRY v. JAMES LAIRE, JR.

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 470
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-24-445

Opinion Delivered October 8, 2025

CODIANNA HUTSON FRY APPEAL FROM THE POINSETT
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 56DR-18-130]
V.

JAMES LAIRE, JR. HONORABLE KIMBERLY BOLING
APPELLEE BIBB, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge

Codianna Hutson Fry appeals the March 26, 2024 final order that denied her petition

for modification of custody and held that James Laire, Jr., would retain custody of their

minor child (MC). She argues that the court erred in not finding a material change in

circumstances. We affirm.

On May 11, 2018, Laire, a resident of Truman, Arkansas, filed a complaint seeking a

declaration of paternity and custody of MC, who was born on March 27, 2018. Fry filed an

answer and counterclaim seeking custody and child support. The parties stipulated that Laire

is the legal and natural father of MC. A final hearing was held on August 27, 2018, and an

order was entered on September 14 (“Initial Order”). The relevant sections of the Initial

Order are:
4. Joint custody was considered by the court but was found
inappropriate for this case.

5. The Court finds that [Laire] spent more time in the home due to his
physical disability; he is not required to work outside of the home, and he has
a support system where he lives to help care for the child. [Laire] has
additionally lived at the same location his entire life.

6. [Fry] is much younger, has moved around from state to state, and
will have to work outside of the home to provide for herself and the minor
child.

7. Therefore, [Laire] is hereby awarded sole custody of the minor child
. . . subject to [Fry]’s visitation. . . .

....

9. The minor child reaching the age of four years old or beginning Pre-
K, whichever is later, shall be considered a material change in circumstances
warranting a change in custody for the purposes of this case. The parties may
either agree to a new visitation schedule or petition the Court for a
modification of custody or visitation at the time.

On May 8, 2023, Fry filed a petition to modify custody, arguing that MC had reached

the age of four and was about to begin kindergarten, thereby constituting a material change

in circumstances under paragraph 9 of the Initial Order. Fry further argued that it was in

MC’s best interest that she be awarded sole custody, subject to Laire’s visitation, due to MC’s

regular attendance at daycare and extracurricular activities while in Fry’s care. Laire

responded to the petition, denying that a material change of circumstance had occurred and

denying that custody should be modified.

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The court held a temporary hearing on August 16. The court denied a temporary

change of custody because no emergency had been alleged.1 The court ordered that Fry

return MC to Laire’s custody immediately. Laire, as legal custodian, had the right to

determine where MC attended school. He enrolled her in kindergarten in Truman.

On March 18, 2024, the court held a final hearing. At the beginning of the hearing,

the court stated that the ruling in paragraph 9 of the Initial Order—that MC’s turning four

or attending pre-K, whichever is later, would constitute a material change in circumstances—

was not binding for purposes of determining whether there had been a material change in

circumstances warranting a change in custody.

Bobby Johnson, a private investigator hired by Fry, testified about his observations

and methods, including placing a tracking device on Laire’s vehicle to monitor his activities

without Laire’s knowledge. Johnson testified that he followed Laire and observed his

interactions with MC. Johnson tracked him from February 27 to March 7, 2024, during

which time he noted that Laire frequently dropped MC off at his parents’ house and did not

spend significant time with her.

Fry testified that she had been living in a three-bedroom house in Tennessee along

with her other child, MC2, who was three years old. She testified the house was big enough

for MC to have her own bedroom. She testified that MC is sweet and smart and that MC

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Laire retained custody of MC subject to Fry’s visitation: the first, third, and fourth
weekends of the month, MC would be in Fry’s custody. To the extent there was a three-day
weekend per the school schedule, Fry’s visitation would include the extra day.

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earns As and Bs in school at Truman. She admitted she had never attended any parent-

teacher conferences or sent any school supplies or clothing for MC.

Fry testified that during the summer of 2023, while MC was in her care, MC attended

the daycare where Fry worked and had graduated from its pre-K program. Fry stated that she

began the process of enrolling MC in kindergarten in Tennessee and requested MC’s

vaccination records, which she said were difficult to obtain because of Laire. She

acknowledged, however, that once she received the records, she learned that Laire had kept

MC up to date on her vaccinations. Fry also admitted that she kept MC past her usual

summer visitation period, and until the August 2023 order requiring her to return MC to

Laire’s custody, she had intended to keep MC in her own care.

She further testified that Laire was not a good communicator and was inflexible as a

co-parent. She claimed she was denied some telephone visits with MC when Laire would say

that MC was “with [his] mom and dad” or “cranky.” Fry added that Laire often complained

about transportation costs, even though she offered to share those expenses. She stated that

during custody exchanges, Laire would curse at MC and tell her to quit crying and that, until

recently, MC would arrive at the exchanges dirty and in a pull-up (sometimes soiled). On

cross-examination, she admitted that she had no photos showing that MC was dirty at the

exchanges. She testified that until August 2023, the agreed-on visitation schedule was a bit

unique but that she ended up having MC from the first Friday to the third Wednesday every

month, and Laire would have custody from the third Wednesday until the first Friday every

month.

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Fry recounted an incident in which allegations were made against her then boyfriend.

Laire filed a petition for order of protection on behalf of MC against Fry’s ex-boyfriend,

which ultimately was denied by the court. However, due to the allegations of abuse, she is

no longer dating her ex-boyfriend.

Fry currently was working as a teacher’s assistant, but she recently had been accepted

into the integrated pre-K through third-grade teaching program at Lipscomb University,

which she planned to start that summer. Fry emphasized her commitment to fostering a

relationship with MC. Her support system included her adoptive mother, Barbara Fry, with

whom she enjoyed a close relationship.

Laire testified about his living situation, disability, and financial status. He lives in

the same two-bedroom home he lived in when the Initial Order was entered. Laire, a high

school graduate, has a limited work history due to his disability. He currently receives $914

a month in Social Security disability benefits. At trial, Laire stated he was separated from

his wife, Jamie Laire Luckett, who was jailed in October 2023, and planned to obtain a

divorce.

Laire has had custody of MC since she was five months old. MC often stays with

Laire’s retired parents—50 to 60 percent of the time—because of convenience and her

preference to stay there with her cousins who often stayed there. A home health nurse

currently assists Laire with housekeeping and laundry due to issues with his left leg. Laire

admitted that MC had last stayed overnight at his home about one week before the hearing

and recently had spent more time with his parents because of his marital situation. He stated

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that he is involved in MC’s schooling, attends parent-teacher conferences, and stays in

contact with her teachers. Even though MC may not stay with Laire at his home every night,

Laire takes her to school and picks her up every day. He cooks for MC when she is with him.

He takes her to all her doctors’ appointments. She is surrounded by family and loves playing

with her cousins. He also said he is going to become a better dad and take care of her on his

own.

Laire testified that Fry has access to all of MC’s records. Laire described regular

exchanges of MC with Fry and mentioned recent changes in MC’s behavior, citing the

circumstances that caused him to file for a petition for an order of protection. As a result,

MC had begun therapy with Families, Inc., to address her recent behavioral issues, but he

said she is a healthy child.

Jamie Laire Luckett, who is currently married to—but separated from—Laire, testified

about her previous residence with Laire. She described her role in caring for MC, including

feeding and preparing her for bed. Jamie recounted instances when Laire disciplined MC

with a paddle and a belt but stated that it had never gone too far “at all.”

Charles Laire, Sr., Laire’s father, testified about the family’s living arrangements and

support system. MC spends significant time at Laire’s parents home where she has her own

room and plays with her cousins. Charles confirmed that Laire participates in MC’s care,

including taking her to school and medical appointments. During cross-examination,

Charles confirmed that MC wears pull-ups at night and sometimes during travel. He also

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testified about the involvement of other family members in MC’s care and the practical

challenges of coordinating her exchanges between parents.

By order dated March 24, 2024, the court found that there had not been a material

change in circumstances since the Initial Order. Specifically, the court found the following:

3. The Court has considered the age of the child as well as all relevant
factors presented during the hearing on March 18, 2024. The proof before the
Court is that the child has remained in the legal custody of [Laire] since
September 14, 2018, and the age of five months old. [Fry] has exercised
visitation pursuant to the September 14, 2018, order as well as the Temporary
Order filed on September 5, 2023. The child is enrolled in kindergarten in
Poinsett County, Arkansas. At the time of the final order in Page 1 of 5 2018,
[Laire] was living in Poinsett County, Arkansas. [Fry] was living in Tennessee.
There has been no material change with regard to the physical distance of the
parties.

4. The Court finds, and the parties agree, that the child is doing well
in school, is healthy and is a happy child by nature.

....

7. The Court finds that [Laire] is disabled, was disabled at the time of
the original award of custody to him and has had no major change with regard
to his income or ability to provide for the minor child.

....

9. The Court finds that both parties must rely on their respective
families for assistance with living expenses from time to time. There is no
material change with regard to either party’s ability to provide for the minor
child. The Court notes that the prior order of the Court does not require
either party to pay support due to the amount of travel and visitation involved.
The Court finds no material change with regard to the issue of child support.

10. The Court finds that the minor child spends a significant amount
of time with her paternal grandparents when not visiting with[Laire]. The
minor child enjoys spending time with her cousins and other members of her
family while at her grandparents’ home. [Laire] also spends time at his parents’

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home on a daily basis. [Laire] admittedly relies on his parents for assistance
with the child, but the Court finds no material change in this arrangement
from the initial award of custody to [Laire]. The minor child has had a close
relationship with her grandparents and has been spending a significant
amount of time with them since she was 5 months old.

11. The Verified Petition to Modify Custody filed by [Fry] on May 8,
2023, is hereby denied. [Fry] has not sustained the burden of proof to justify a
modification of the Court’s order of custody filed September 14, 2018.[2]

I. Points on Appeal

Fry raised two issues on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred when it found that no

material change in circumstances was present; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining

that the best interest of the minor child was served by Laire’s maintaining custody.

Child-custody cases are reviewed de novo on appeal, but we will not reverse a circuit

court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Carrillo v. Morales Ibarra, 2019 Ark.

App. 189, 575 S.W.3d 151. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing all the

evidence, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made. Id. Whether a circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous turns largely on the

credibility of the witnesses; therefore, we give special deference to the circuit court’s superior

position to evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the child’s best interest. Id. The

primary consideration in child-custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the child; all

other considerations are secondary. Emis v. Emis, 2025 Ark. App. 232.

Generally, courts impose more stringent standards for modifications than they
do for initial determinations of custody. The reason for requiring more

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The court also included parenting provisions and a revised visitation schedule, which
is not challenged on appeal.

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stringent standards for modifications than for initial custody determinations
is to promote stability and continuity in the life of the child and to discourage
repeated litigation of the same issues.

Riddick v. Harris, 2016 Ark. App. 426, at 3-4, 501 S.W.3d 859, 864. The party seeking

modification has the burden of proving a material change in circumstances. Id. If

that threshold is met, the circuit court must determine who should have custody, with

the sole consideration being the best interest of the child. Id.

On appeal, Fry first argues that the circuit court clearly erred when it declined to

follow paragraph 9 of the Initial Order that states when the child reaches four years old or

pre-K, whichever is later, that event constitutes a material change in circumstances. Arkansas

uses a present-based analysis when analyzing custody issues, and circuit courts must examine

the changes and best interest of children presented as evidence to the court at the time of

the final hearing, not changes that may occur weeks, months, or years down the road. See

Bell v. Bell, 2022 Ark. App. 279, 646 S.W.3d 678. Paragraph 9 of the Initial Order dictated

that a future event would trigger an automatic finding of a material change in circumstances—

not based on evidence presented at the time. We find that such a provision is against

Arkansas law, and the court did not clearly err in declining to enforce this provision of the

Initial Order.

Fry next argues the circuit court’s finding of no material change in circumstances was

clearly erroneous. Determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances

requires full consideration of the circumstances that existed when the first custody order was

entered in comparison to the circumstances when the change of custody is considered.

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Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2024 Ark. App. 229, 687 S.W.3d 584. Accordingly, we look at whether

there has been a material change in circumstances since issuance of the last order of custody

which was the Initial Order in this case. To establish a material change, it is essential to

demonstrate that the changed circumstances are substantial and directly affect the child’s

welfare. Emis, supra.

On appeal, Fry argues that the circuit court’s finding of no material change in

circumstances was clearly erroneous because there was evidence that MC’s living conditions

would be better in Tennessee and that Fry had made significant improvements in her

stability. Further, she argues that her adoptive mother, who resides nearby, provides

additional support, which is a change since the original order was entered. Fry contends that

Laire is inflexible and lacks communication, often preventing her from telephone visits with

MC. While she claimed MC would arrive at the exchanges dirty, she failed to provide any

photographic evidence. The court was free to believe or disbelieve her testimony. Credibility

determinations are left to the circuit court. Glisson v. Glisson, 2018 Ark. App. 21, at 11, 538

S.W.3d 864, 870.

Fry contrasts her changes with Laire’s changes since the Initial Order. The circuit

court considered all of Fry’s allegations that she claimed supported a material change in

circumstances and concluded that she did not meet her burden of proof. The court gave a

thorough analysis in its order finding no material change in circumstances, including that

Laire lives in the same home; his parents continue to provide the same level of support; and

while he remains disabled, there had been no change in his income or his ability to support

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MC. We find no clear error in its finding that Laire’s situation had not changed since the

Initial Order.

To the extent Fry argues that the material change is the improvement in her life, this

court has consistently held that a noncustodial parent’s voluntarily choosing a better life—

standing alone—is insufficient to support a material change in circumstances under our long-

standing appellate precedent. Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 491, 931 S.W.2d 767, 772 (1996).

II. Conclusion

Because we affirm the circuit court’s finding that no material change in circumstances

occurred to support a modification of custody, we do not reach Fry’s best-interest argument.

Reynolds, supra.

Affirmed.

HARRISON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Troutt Law Firm, by: R. Scott Troutt, for appellant.

One brief only.

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