Oak Truck Lines, LLC v. Arcap Environmental, LLC

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 572
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-24-561

OAK TRUCK LINES, LLC Opinion Delivered December 3, 2025

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60CV-23-7454]
ARCAP ENVIRONMENTAL, LLC
APPELLEE HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX,
JUDGE

REVERSED AND DISMISSED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Appellant Oak Truck Lines, LLC (Oak Truck), appeals from two orders of the Pulaski

County Circuit Court that denied Oak Truck’s motion to set aside the default judgment and

its motion to dismiss. On appeal, Oak Truck argues that the circuit court erred in denying

its motions. Specifically, Oak Truck argues that service was not perfected by ARCAP

Environmental, LLC (ARCAP). We reverse and dismiss.

I. Background

On September 29, 2023, ARCAP filed a complaint alleging a single claim of unjust

enrichment against Oak Truck. It is undisputed that ARCAP served three copies of the

process on the secretary of state, notified the secretary of the state that service was being

effectuated pursuant to Arkansas’s long-arm statute, and paid the required sum of twenty-
five dollars as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-58-120(b)(2)(A) (Repl. 2005).

ARCAP directed the summons to “OAK TRUCK LINES JOSE A. LOPEZ, RA.” The

secretary of state provided a letter confirming to ARCAP that service on Oak Truck was

“considered served with the enclosed documents” on October 5, 2023.

On November 20, 2023, ARCAP moved for default judgment against Oak Truck,

arguing that Oak Truck did not answer ARCAP’s complaint in a timely manner. A hearing

on this motion was held on January 8, 2024. At the hearing, Charles Tankersley, the

president and owner of ARCAP, testified that Oak Truck had failed to pay ARCAP

$92,565.96. Additionally, counsel for ARCAP requested $6,300 for attorneys’ fees on the

case. On January 9, 2024, the circuit court granted ARCAP’s motion for a default judgment

and entered an order finding Oak Truck liable to ARCAP for damages, costs, and attorneys’

fees.

On March 26, 2024, Oak Truck moved to set aside the default judgment, alleging

that service was not perfected. Specifically, Oak Truck argued that ARCAP had failed to send

Oak Truck a notice of the service and a copy of the process by certified mail and had failed

to file proof of mailing service with the clerk of the court as required by Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-58-120(b)(2)(B). Oak Truck also argued that service was defective

because the summons in question was directed to “OAK TRUCK LINES JOSE A. LOPEZ,

RA” instead of “Oak Truck Lines, LLC.” On the same day, Oak Truck also filed a motion

to dismiss arguing that the original service was defective, more than 120 days had passed

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since the complaint was filed, and ARCAP did not request an extension before the

expiration of the 120 days.

On April 3, 2024, ARCAP responded to both motions, arguing that service was

perfected. Specifically, ARCAP argued that the service requirements in Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-58-120(b)(2)(B) applied only to defendants who were former residents,

and not defendants, like Oak Truck, that never resided in Arkansas. Accordingly, ARCAP

asserted it was not required to send notice to Oak Truck by certified mail nor provide proof

that such was sent. Absent this requirement, ARCAP alleges that service was not defective,

and the circuit court did not err when it granted ARCAP’s motion for default judgment.

On May 8, 2024, the circuit court denied both of Oak Truck’s motions. On June 6,

2024, Oak Truck timely filed the instant appeal.

II. Standard of Review

Arkansas law is long settled that service of valid process is necessary to give a court

jurisdiction over a defendant. Smith v. Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 353 Ark. 701,

120 S.W.3d 525 (2003). Our case law is equally well settled that statutory service

requirements, being in derogation of common-law rights, must be strictly construed, and

compliance with them must be exact. Id. The supreme court has held that the same reasoning

applies to service requirements imposed by court rules. Carruth v. Design Interiors, Inc., 324

Ark. 373, 921 S.W.2d 944 (1996). More particularly, the technical requirements of a

summons set out in Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b) must be construed strictly, and compliance with

those requirements must be exact. Thompson v. Potlatch Corp., 326 Ark. 244, 930 S.W.2d 355

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(1996). Our service rules place an extremely heavy burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate

that compliance with our rules has been had. Williams v. Stant U.S.A. Corp., 2015 Ark. App.

180, 458 S.W.3d 755.

III. Service

The main point of contention on appeal is whether service on Oak Truck was

perfected. Oak Truck alleges that service was not perfected because ARCAP did not send

notice of service and a copy of process by certified mail to Oak Truck as required by Arkansas

Code Annotated section 16-58-120(b)(2)(B).

As a preliminary note, ARCAP alleges that Oak Truck failed to preserve for appeal

its arguments regarding service by obtaining specific rulings below. On March 26, 2024, Oak

Truck filed two motions that presented the same arguments that it has brought on appeal.

On May 8, 2024, the circuit court entered two blanket denial orders of Oak Truck’s motions.

ARCAP is mistaken. This court has held that “if the circuit court’s order is more in the

nature of a “blanket” decision and does not articulate a particular basis for its ruling, then

the order encompasses all of the issues presented to the circuit court in the parties’ briefs

and arguments.” Sloop v. Kiker, 2016 Ark. App. 125, at 4, 484 S.W.3d 696, 699; see generally

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ft. Smith Sch. Dist., 2015 Ark. 81, 455 S.W.3d 294; Asset Acceptance,

LLC v. Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, 437 S.W.3d 119 (citing Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430

S.W.3d 49). Accordingly, Oak Truck has preserved its arguments for appeal.

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As for whether service was perfected on Oak Truck, Arkansas’s long-arm statute,

codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-58-120, requires the following to perfect

service:

(b)(2)(A) Service of the process shall be made by:

(i) Serving three (3) copies of the process on the Secretary of State;

(ii) Notifying the Secretary of State that service is being effected pursuant
to this subsection; and

(iii) Paying the Secretary of State the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00).

(B) Such service shall be sufficient service upon the nonresident person or
any resident person who has subsequently absented himself or herself
physically from the state or upon the executor, administrator, or other legal
representative of his or her estate, in case he or she has since died, if notice of
the service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by certified mail by the
plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address
or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate in
case the person has died, and the defendant's return receipt or the return
receipt of the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the
estate of the deceased person is attached to the writ of process and entered and
filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which such cases are brought.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-58-120(b)(2). This court has previously held that “appellant’s reliance

on the Secretary of State to send service by certified mail is sufficient only if notice of the

service and a copy of the process are sent by certified mail by the plaintiff or his attorney to

the defendant at his last known address.” Eliasnik v. Y&S Pine Bluff, LLC, 2018 Ark. App.

138, at 16, 546 S.W.3d 497, 506 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-58-120(b)(2)(B)).

ARCAP concedes that it did not adhere to section 16-58-120(b)(2)(B) when it served

Oak Truck. Rather, ARCAP argues that subdivision (b)(2)(B) applies only to “any resident

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person who has subsequently absented himself or herself physically from the state.” As

support, ARCAP argues that words following the disjunctive “or” cannot apply to the

“resident person” that exists prior to the “or.” ARCAP further argues that if the drafters

wanted subdivision (b)(2)(B) to apply to “any resident person who has subsequently absented

himself or herself physically from the state” the drafters would have changed the “or” to an

“and.”

In order to resolve this issue, we must employ the rules of statutory construction. The

basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Dachs v.

Hendrix, 2009 Ark. 542, 354 S.W.3d 95. When the language of a statute is plain and

unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language

used. Id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the

words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. We review

issues involving statutory interpretation de novo on appeal. Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105,

486 S.W.3d 766. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a

clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction.

Andreasen v. S. Mountain Ests. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2018 Ark. App. 530, at 7, 564 S.W.3d 262,

266. We strive to reconcile statutory provisions relating to the same subject to make them

sensible, consistent, and harmonious. Weisenbach v. Kirk, 104 Ark. App. 245, 251, 290

S.W.3d 614, 618.

The plain reading of section 16-58-120(b)(2)(B) shows that the disjunctive “or” was

meant to separate “nonresident person” and “any resident person who has subsequently

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absented himself or herself physically from the state.” One cannot be both a “nonresident

person” and “any resident person who has subsequently absented himself or herself

physically from the state.” Accordingly, these two entities could only be separated by an “or.”

Therefore, the plain reading of the statute required ARCAP to send to Oak Truck, by

certified mail, notice of service and a copy of the process to perfect service. ARCAP does not

dispute that this did not occur. Thus, ARCAP failed to perfect service against Oak Truck. 1

IV. Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment & Motion to Dismiss

Our standard of review for an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment

depends on which grounds the appellant claims the default judgment should be set aside.

Steward v. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, 450 S.W.3d 672. When an appellant claims that the default

judgment is void, we conduct a de novo review and give no deference to the circuit court’s

ruling because the matter on appeal is a question of law. Glover v. Glover, 2020 Ark. App. 89,

595 S.W.3d 54. In all other challenges to the denial of a motion to set aside a default

judgment, we do not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Oak Truck argues that the

default judgment is void; therefore, our review is de novo.

As discussed, service was not properly perfected on Oak Truck. Service was the only

ground that ARCAP relied on to justify its motion for default judgment. Pursuant to Ark.

R. Civ. P. 4(i), it is mandatory for the circuit court to dismiss the action without prejudice if

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Because we determine that service was not proper, we do not address whether
ARCAP’s issuing the summons to “OAK TRUCK LINES LLC, JOSE A LOPEZ, RA”
rendered the summons invalid.

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service is not made within 120 days of filing the complaint and no motion to extend is timely

made. Wine v. Chandler, 2020 Ark. App. 412, at 9–10, 607 S.W.3d 522, 528. As previously

held, service was not perfected, and 120 days have passed since the filing of the complaint.

The circuit court abused its discretion when it denied Oak Truck’s motion to dismiss and

its motion to set aside default judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss without

prejudice. Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1); see also Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, at 7–8, 489 S.W.3d

648, 653.

Reversed and dismissed.

THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Gill Ragon Owen, P.A., by: Aaron M. Heffington and Matthew B. Finch, for appellant.

James, House, Swann & Downing, P.A., by: Zachary D. Wilson, Jr., Brandon C. Cathey, and

Richard C. Downing, for appellee.

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