MacHandy Mason v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 26
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-159

MACHANDY MASON Opinion Delivered January 14, 2026

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V. WESTERN DISTRICT
[NO. 16JJV-23-336]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE KIMBERLY BOLING
CHILDREN BIBB, JUDGE

APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Counsel for Machandy Mason brings this no-merit appeal from the Craighead

County Circuit Court’s order terminating her parental rights to two of her minor children.

Mason has three minor children: MC1 (DOB 04/04/13), MC2 (DOB 11/28/18), and MC3

(DOB 11/06/20); her rights to MC2 and MC3 were terminated. Following the dictates of

Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 6-9(j) (2022) and Linker-Flores v.

Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), Mason’s

attorney has filed a motion to be relieved as counsel and a no-merit brief asserting that there

are no issues of arguable merit to support an appeal. The clerk of this court sent a copy of

the brief and the motion to withdraw to Mason, informing her of her right to file pro se

points for reversal pursuant to Rule 6-9(j)(3), which she has chosen to do. Having reviewed
the brief and the record, we agree that an appeal would be wholly without merit. Therefore,

we affirm the order terminating Mason’s parental rights and grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw from representation.

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) has been involved with the

family since May 10, 2018. On July 17, 2023, DHS was contacted by the Craighead County

Health Unit regarding MC1, who had missed a follow-up appointment for the treatment of

tuberculosis. A DHS caseworker eventually made contact with the family after a month of

multiple attempts and learned that they were staying in a home where a child had recently

died from fentanyl exposure. Mason acknowledged having received a phone call from the

Health Unit the previous month and that she did not take MC1 for follow-up care. She did

not have an explanation for her failure to do so.

On August 15, 2023, DHS exercised an emergency hold on the children for medical

neglect and exposure to illegal substances. The following day, DHS held a team decision-

making meeting, and according to the caseworker, Mason failed to appear and refused to

answer the phone after hanging up on the caseworker. This prompted DHS to continue the

emergency hold and file a petition for custody and dependency-neglect.

The circuit court entered an emergency order finding that reasonable efforts had been

made by DHS to prevent removal and that the children’s placement in foster care was

necessary. A probable-cause hearing on August 25, 2023, resulted in the circuit court’s

finding that an emergency existed that necessitated the removal of the children from Mason’s

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custody and that probable cause continued to warrant the children’s placement in DHS’s

custody pending an adjudication hearing.

Over the course of three days during a two-month period, the court held a hearing

on the petition to determine whether the children were dependent-neglected. On November

30, 2023, the court entered an order adjudicating the children dependent-neglected based

on parental unfitness due to medical neglect. The court ordered Mason to complete standard

services and to obtain and maintain stability.

On March 5, 2024, during the first review period, the court held a hearing and

entered an order finding that Mason had partially complied with the case plan. The court

noted that MC1 had been placed out of state (with her father’s relatives) but that the goal

remained reunification with a fit parent.

On June 27, 2024, during the second review period, the court held a hearing and

entered an order finding that Mason had not complied with the orders of the court. The

court noted specifically that Mason’s drug screens were positive for illegal substances

including fentanyl, that she often refused drug screens, and she failed to attend her

outpatient treatment program at Harbor Behavioral Health. Although the court continued

a goal of reunification, it set the case for a dual permanency-planning/termination hearing

for August 15, 2024.

In response, on July 12, 2024, DHS filed a petition for termination of Mason’s

parental rights. DHS alleged that Mason continued to use illegal substances and failed to

engage in services that could have assisted her in reunification. Primarily on the basis of these

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factors, DHS alleged that Mason remained unfit and that aggravated circumstances existed

because there was little likelihood that services would result in reunification. It also alleged

that termination was in the children’s best interest because they could find permanency

through adoption, and they would be subject to potential harm if returned to Mason’s

custody.

The following month, the court held the permanency-planning hearing and

implemented a goal of guardianship for MC1 and adoption or guardianship for MC2 and

MC3. The court found Mason noncompliant with the case plan and court’s orders. The

court granted DHS’s motion to move the termination hearing to December 3, 2024.

On December 3, the court held a hearing on the termination petition. The petition

pertained only to MC2 and MC3. Mason and the DHS county supervisor were the only

witnesses. At the time of trial, Mason was in jail, having been arrested on a failure-to-appear

warrant. She admitted she was not able to take the children at that time. Mason had not

been able to visit with the children in person in sixteen months because she kept testing

positive for drugs. Mason testified that DHS had offered her a variety of services, including

drug rehabilitation, but she did not participate in the services because she “felt like [she]

could stop” the drug usage on her own.

The supervisor explained that the children had been removed from Mason’s care due

to medical neglect, but since then, Mason’s drug use had become an issue. Specifically, she

testified that Mason had not made substantial progress in the case considering her continued

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drug use; her inability throughout the case to address DHS’s concerns; her lack of income

and means to provide for the children; and her failure to address her mental-health issues.

At the close of testimony, the court orally ruled that it was terminating Mason’s

parental rights. In addition to finding that termination of parental rights was in the best

interest of MC2 and MC3, the circuit court based its order of termination on two grounds:

subsequent factors, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) (Supp. 2023), and aggravated

circumstances, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A). The court memorialized its

findings in a formal, written order, and Mason filed a timely notice of appeal. Her attorney

has now filed a no-merit brief and motion to be relieved as counsel.

Upon review of the record, the only adverse ruling was the circuit court’s termination

decision. After reviewing the record, we conclude that counsel has adequately explained why

this adverse ruling does not constitute meritorious grounds for reversal.

This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Lloyd v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 461, at 7, 655 S.W.3d 534, 540. Termination requires a finding

of at least one statutory ground and a finding that termination is in a child’s best interest.

Id. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3) requires a circuit court’s order

terminating parental rights to be based on clear and convincing evidence. Lloyd, 2022 Ark.

App. 461, at 8, 655 S.W.3d at 540. When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear

and convincing evidence, the question that must be answered on appeal is whether the

circuit court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Barnett v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark.

App. 481. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the

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reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made. Id. This court gives a high level of deference to the circuit court

because it is in a far superior position to observe the parties before it and to judge the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Id.

Only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Albright v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 97 Ark. App. 277, 248 S.W.3d 498 (2007). One of the grounds the court relied

on is aggravated circumstances, which provides that a court of competent jurisdiction may

terminate parental rights when the parent is found to have subjected any juvenile to

aggravated circumstances, and there is little likelihood that continued services would result

in successful reunification. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27 341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A). This court has

noted that the aggravated circumstance of little likelihood that continued services would

result in successful reunification is proved when “a parent is not following through with

offers of assistance, is not meeting basic goals of the case plan and there is a lack of significant

progress on the parent’s part.” Aday v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 677, at 4.

Here, we agree with Mason’s counsel that this ground was clearly proved at the

termination hearing. The court found that, in light of Mason’s lack of progress in the case,

the continuation of services would not result in any likelihood of reunification. Mason had

not complied with the case plan, and she was not willing to seek drug-abuse treatment

because she did not think she had a drug problem. The court did not find Mason’s belief

credible. See Yancy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 35 (affirming termination in

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a no-merit appeal where the mother failed to consistently comply with the circuit court’s

orders, continued to use drugs, and had not yet completed drug treatment).

Regarding best interest, there was uncontroverted evidence that MC2 and MC3 are

likely to achieve permanency through adoption. DHS’s county supervisor testified that the

potential for adoption as a permanency plan is “very good” and that there are no barriers to

adoption. The likelihood that the children would achieve permanency through adoption was

not challenged. A caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an

adoptability finding. Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 239, at 8, 492 S.W.3d

113, 118.

Likewise, in regard to potential harm, the circuit court had sufficient evidence to find

that MC2 and MC3 would be subjected to potential harm if returned to Mason’s custody.

Potential harm must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and in broad terms. Dowdy v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, 314 S.W.3d 722. The court is not required to

find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Lee v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277 (2008).

The same evidence supporting the statutory ground, specifically Mason’s continued

drug use and failure to provide a stable home, supports the potential-harm finding. See

Tillman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119 (continued drug use demonstrates

potential harm sufficient to support the circuit court’s best-interest finding); Friend v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 606, 344 S.W.3d 670 (failure to obtain stable income

or housing is relevant to the best-interest analysis).

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Mason has filed her own points, arguing that the court’s decision should be reversed.

She appears to highlight the progress she has made since the termination order was entered.

However, we cannot consider her posttermination achievements on appeal. See Watts v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 334, at 9, 669 S.W.3d 915, 920. Additionally, her

argument is essentially a request to reweigh the evidence, which cannot be used to reverse

the circuit court’s decision. See id.

Counsel has complied with the dictates of Linker-Flores and the rules of this court.

Accordingly, we affirm the termination order and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw from

representation.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

WOOD and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Marc D. Tave, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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