Rosse Family Revocable Living Trust, Karen Siegel, Trustee; Samuel Siegel; And Samson Siegel v. City of Jonesboro

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 121
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-24-790

ROSSE FAMILY REVOCABLE LIVING Opinion Delivered February 25, 2026

TRUST, KAREN SIEGEL, TRUSTEE;
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
SAMUEL SIEGEL; AND SAMSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SIEGEL
WESTERN DISTRICT
APPELLANTS
[NO. 16JCV-23-1726]

V.
HONORABLE MELISSA BRISTOW
RICHARDSON, JUDGE
CITY OF JONESBORO
APPELLEE AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

The Rosse Family Revocable Living Trust (the “Trust”), Karen Siegel, trustee; Samuel

Siegel; and Samson Siegel appeal the August 8, 2024 order of the Craighead County Circuit

Court. This case arises from a 2015 nuisance-abatement action and the subsequent lien

foreclosure involving two parcels of property, specifically lots 5 and 6, block 1 of Morse’s

Addition to Jonesboro, Arkansas, parcel number 01-144184-29500; and lots 7, 8, and 9,

block 1 of Morse’s Addition to Jonesboro, Arkansas, parcel number 01-144184-29600

(collectively, the “Property”) in Craighead County, Arkansas. When the nuisance

proceedings began in 2015, both parcels were owned by the Trust.

On August 18, 2015, the Jonesboro City Council adopted a resolution condemning

the Property. The original condemnation resolution had simply identified the property as
“700 Cate, owner Samuel A. Rosse III.” The condemnation was administratively and

judicially challenged and remained in litigation for several years. There is one related case to

this appeal: Rosse v. City of Jonesboro, 2016 Ark. App. 580.

In January 2020, Karen, as trustee, executed and recorded a deed transferring one

parcel—lots 7, 8, and 9—to her sons and beneficiaries of the Trust, Samson Siegel, Samuel

Siegel, and William Siegel individually (collectively, the “Siegel brothers”), while the Trust

retained ownership of the remaining parcel, lots 5 and 6. County tax records reflected this

transfer and showed Samson, Samuel, and William as the record owners of lots 7, 8, and 9.

Counsel for the City of Jonesboro ( the “City”) confirmed that the deed of record was filed

on January 16, 2020.

Beginning in June 2020, after the owners of the Property failed to remedy the

nuisance conditions, the City undertook abatement and clean-up work at its own expense.

The structure on the Property was demolished on October 25, 2020. Testimony from

Michael Tyner, a Jonesboro code enforcement officer, at the final hearing in this case

established that debris removal and related cleanup continued until October 27, with a final

walk-through occurring on October 29.

On November 4, the City, by Mr. Tyner, served a thirty-day notice of collection and

demand for payment of clean-up costs to the address of record for the Property. The notice

was addressed to “Rosse Family Trust c/o Karen Siegel” at Karen’s address, 623 Cate Street,

Jonesboro, AR 72401. According to Mr. Tyner’s testimony, the exhibits submitted by the

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City, and the lien affidavit, no notices were mailed or directed to Samuel, Samson, or

William.

Because the costs remained unpaid, the Jonesboro City Council adopted a resolution

on February 2, 2021, authorizing a lien for the clean-up costs related to the Property

described as “700 Cate, Parcels 01-144184-29500 & 01-144184-29600, Jonesboro, Arkansas

72401, owned by Rosse Family Trust LEGAL DESCRIPTION: Lots 5-6, 7-8 PT 9, Block 1

of Morse’s Addition to Jonesboro, AR” pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-

54-903 (Supp. 2023). As part of the lien resolution, the city council made findings in support

of the lien, including the following:

WHEREAS, the demolition of the structure was completed on October 25, 2020
using city funds in an amount of $124,836.50;

WHEREAS, the City of Jonesboro seeks to perfect a lien against the affected property
to cover the cost of the work pursuant to A.C.A. 14-15-903;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY
OF JONESBORO, ARKANSAS, THAT:

1. The city should proceed with placing a lien on the property located at 700
Cate, Jonesboro, AR 72401

Additionally, the affidavit of statutory lien filed by the City also stated that “the structure

was condemned” and that “demolition of the structure was completed on October 25,

2020.” The City filed its affidavit of statutory lien with the Craighead County Clerk on

February 23, 2021.

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On October 10, 2023, the City filed a complaint in circuit court to enforce the clean-

up lien by foreclosure. At that time, lots 5 and 6 remained owned by the Trust, and lots 7,

8, and 9 remained owned individually by Samuel, Samson, and William.

On February 20, 2024, Karen, on behalf of the Trust, filed a timely answer and

motion to dismiss. The City alleges that Samson and William were personally served in

January 2024 because they resided with Karen at that time; Samuel was served by warning

order published in the Jonesboro Sun newspaper on March 14 and March 21, 2024, after

unsuccessful attempts at personal service. None of the Siegel brothers filed responsive

pleadings. On March 4, 2024, the City responded to the Trust’s motion to dismiss.

A hearing was held on June 28. Karen appeared through counsel; Samson and Samuel

appeared pro se; and William did not appear. At the outset and again at the close of evidence,

the City made oral motions for default judgment against the Siegel brothers based on their

failure to answer the complaint. The circuit court ultimately entered default judgment as to

William but denied default as to Samson and Samuel.

Appellants disputed whether the lien had been filed within the relevant 120-day

statutory period and whether proper statutory notice had been provided to the owners of

lots 7, 8, and 9. Evidence established that only the Trust “c/o Karen Siegel” received mailed

notice of the lien and related proceedings; no notices were directed to Samson, Samuel, or

William by name.

On August 8, 2024, the circuit court entered an order, judgment, and decree of

foreclosure. The court found that William was in default, that the lien had been timely filed

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within 120 days of completion of cleanup, and that statutory notice was sufficient because it

had been mailed to the address of record and addressed to Karen, whom the court found

served as fiduciary and trustee for Samson, Samuel, and William. The court granted the City

a judgment for the lien amount of $124,836.50, declared the lien a first-priority lien on the

Property, and ordered foreclosure and sale of both of the parcels that constitute the Property.

Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 2024, and this appeal

followed.

II. Standard of Review

Following a bench trial, our standard of review is whether the circuit court’s findings

were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Agrifund, LLC v.

Regions Bank, 2020 Ark. 246, 602 S.W.3d 726. We view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the appellee. Id. Disputed facts

and determinations of witness credibility are within the province of the trier of fact. Id. A

finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Laura Taylor

Living Tr. v. David L. Littrell Rev. Tr., 2025 Ark. App. 604, __ S.W.3d __. As to issues of law

presented, our review is de novo, which means that the entire case is open for review. Brayfield

v. Gould, 2025 Ark. App. 555, __ S.W.3d __. Likewise, questions of statutory interpretation

are reviewed de novo. Id.

III. Discussion

A. Default Judgment and Finality

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Appellants first argue that the circuit court’s entry of default judgment as to William

was improper and rendered the order nonfinal. To preserve an argument for appellate

review, a party must raise the argument below and obtain a ruling. Lucas v. Wilson, 2011 Ark.

App. 584, 385 S.W.3d 891. The preservation requirement also applies to challenges to

default judgments. Rennels v. Four Seasons HVAC Distribs., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 274. A party

seeking relief from a default judgment must first seek relief in the circuit court under

Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 55 (2025), at a minimum, before asking an appellate court

for relief. Sutton v. Falci, 2024 Ark. App. 46, 683 S.W.3d 593.

Here, no motion to set aside the default judgment was filed on William’s behalf, nor

was any ruling obtained from the circuit court on the alleged deficiencies in the default

procedure. Because appellants failed to obtain a ruling on their Rule 55 arguments, those

arguments are not preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Lockard & Williams Ins. Servs., Inc.

v. Waldrip, 2020 Ark. App. 274, 600 S.W.3d 662.

To the extent appellants attempt to frame their challenge as one of subject-matter

jurisdiction or finality, their argument is likewise unavailing. Circuit courts have original

jurisdiction over actions to enforce liens on real property and to foreclose such liens. Ark.

Code Ann. §§ 16-13-201(a) (Supp. 2025) & 14-54-904 (Supp. 2025); see also River Bar Farms,

L.L.C. v. Moore, 83 Ark. App. 130, 118 S.W.3d 145 (2003). The circuit court therefore

possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Any alleged irregularity in the default

procedure did not divest the court of jurisdiction.

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Finally, we hold that a written motion for default was not required. Rule 55 requires

only that a party entitled to default judgment “apply to the court therefore” and further states

that written notice of the application for default judgment is required only if the party against

whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

Additionally, an application to a circuit court for an order made during a hearing or trial is

not required to be in writing. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (2025).

Appellants’ reliance on Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Teague, 2014 Ark. App. 382,

439 S.W.3d 74, is misplaced because Teague does not require that all motions for default

judgment be in writing. In Teague, the plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment to

determine a lien amount. The defendant participated in the case—filing an answer and a

motion to dismiss and appearing at trial. See id. During the trial, the plaintiff made an oral

motion to declare the defendant’s pleadings a nullity and thereafter requested a default

judgment as part of a posttrial brief, which the circuit court ultimately granted. Id. On appeal,

we reversed the default judgment, determining that no motion for default judgment, either

written or oral, had been made by the plaintiff since her request for an order of default

judgment was made only in a posttrial brief. Id.

Teague is distinguishable from the instant case and not controlling for two reasons.

First, the City made permissible oral requests for default judgment during the hearing before

the circuit court. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). In the initial exchange with the circuit court,

counsel for the City stated that “[the Siegel brothers] have not filed an answer and are in

default today, and we’re asking for a judgment against them to that effect.” Likewise, in

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closing arguments, counsel for the City asserted that “our first position is still that the

parties—that the Siegel sons are in default,” and later reiterated that “it’s our position that

they are in default[.]” Second, a written application for the default judgment was not required

because William made no appearance in this action. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Pursuant to

Rule 7(b)(1) and Rule 55, no written motion or application for default was required.

Accordingly, we affirm on appellants’ first point.

B. Timeliness of the Lien Filing

Appellants next contend that the City failed to file its lien within the 120-day period

required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-54-903(c)(2) and therefore had no

enforceable right to foreclose. Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo, and we construe

a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in

common language. See Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. Salter Constr., Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 423, 439

S.W.3d 699. When the language is plain and unambiguous, we give effect to the statute’s

plain meaning. Hammerhead Contracting & Dev., LLC v. Ladd, 2016 Ark. 162, 489 S.W.3d

654.

Section 14-54-903 requires that a lien be filed “no later than one hundred twenty

(120) days after the town or city completes the clean-up work on the property.” Ark. Code

Ann. § 14-54-903(b)(2). The plain language of the statute makes completion of the clean-up

work—rather than the date of demolition or the date the lien amount is determined—the

triggering event for the 120-day filing period.

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Whether the clean-up work was completed within the meaning of the statute is a

question of fact. We will not reverse the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. Crews v. Crews, 2022 Ark. App. 68, 640 S.W.3d 700.

The circuit court found that the clean-up work was completed on October 27, 2020,

on the basis of testimony by both Mr. Tyner that debris removal continued beyond October

25 and by Angela Sparks, the Craighead County Solid Waste Disposal Authority chief

financial officer, that the final loads were transported from 700 Cate Street to the landfill

on October 27. This testimony was corroborated by landfill records and was not contradicted

by any evidence presented by appellants. The circuit court, as fact-finder, was entitled to

credit this testimony. See id.

The lien was filed on February 23, 2021—within 120 days of October 27, 2020. On

this record, we cannot say that the circuit court’s finding regarding the completion date of

the clean-up work was clearly erroneous. Because the lien was filed within the statutory

period, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the lien was timely and enforceable.

We therefore affirm on appellants’ second point.

C. Statutory Notice

Appellants’ final argument is that the circuit court erred in finding that the City

complied with the statutory notice requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-

54-903 as to lots 7, 8, and 9, which were owned by Samuel, Samson, and William. On this

point, we reverse.

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The lien at issue is a statutory lien created by Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-

54-903. Statutory lien provisions are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly

construed. TEMCO Constr., LLC v. Gann, 2013 Ark. 202, 427 S.W.3d 651. Our appellate

courts have repeatedly held that notice provisions in lien statutes are to be strictly construed,

thus requiring strict compliance, and cannot be satisfied by substantial compliance. See

Ground Zero Constr., Inc. v. Walnut Creek, LLC, 2012 Ark. 243, 410 S.W.3d 579; Cannon

Remodeling & Painting, Inc. v. Mktg. Co., Inc., 79 Ark. App. 432, 90 S.W.3d 5 (2002); Books-A-

Million, Inc. v. Ark. Painting & Specialties Co., 340 Ark. 467, 10 S.W.3d 857 (2000).

Section 14-54-903(f) provides that the amount of a clean-up lien may be determined

at a public hearing held after thirty days’ written notice by mail, return receipt requested, “to

the owner of the property if the name and address of the owner are known.” The statute

further requires that, after completion of the work, the City provide a second notice to the

owner of the total amount of the lien. These provisions expressly require notice to “the

owner” of the property.

When statutory notice requirements as to service are not strictly complied with, a

judgment or decree affecting or divesting property rights of one not served has been called

absolutely null and void. See Davis v. Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 482 S.W.2d 785 (1972).

The record demonstrates that lots 7, 8, and 9 were owned individually by Samuel,

Samson, and William when the required notices were sent. County records reflected this

ownership, and the transfer had been recorded months before the City’s clean-up work

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began. It is undisputed that the City sent notice only to the Trust “c/o” Karen and did not

send any notice addressed to Samuel, Samson, or William by name.

The circuit court nevertheless found the notice sufficient because it was mailed to the

address of record and addressed to Karen, whom the circuit court deemed a fiduciary and

trustee for Samuel, Samson, and William. We hold that this finding is clearly erroneous.

First, the statute requires notice to “the owner” when the owner’s name and address

are known. Here, the owners’ identities were readily ascertainable from county records. The

City’s code-enforcement officer, Mr. Tyner, specifically testified that he did not review those

records and instead relied on “historical knowledge” in sending notice only to the Trust. The

statute does not permit a municipality to rely on historical familiarity in lieu of determining

current ownership where ownership is readily ascertainable as it was here.

Second, there was no evidence that Karen was authorized to accept notice on behalf

of Samuel, Samson, or William with respect to lots 7, 8, and 9. Those lots were no longer

held in trust, and there was no evidence of any agency relationship or designation authorizing

Karen to receive statutory lien notices for the individual owners. The circuit court’s

conclusion that Karen functioned as a fiduciary or agent for purposes of statutory notice

conflates distinct legal concepts and finds no support in the record or the statute.

Third, the statutory requirement of notice to “the owner” cannot be satisfied by

sending notice solely to a different legal entity, even if related to the owners, when the statute

expressly requires notice to the owner and the owners are known. Because lien statutes must

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be strictly construed and strictly complied with, substantial compliance is insufficient.

Ground Zero Constr., Inc., supra; Books-A-Million, supra.

The record before us indicates that the City failed to strictly comply with the statutory

notice requirements of section 14-54-903 as to lots 7, 8, and 9. Without proper statutory

notice to the record owners of those parcels, the lien cannot be enforced against them.

We emphasize, however, that the Trust, which did receive notice through its trustee,

Karen, did not challenge notice on this basis. Accordingly, the defect in notice pertains only

to lots 7, 8, and 9 owned individually by Samuel, Samson, and William.

We affirm the circuit court’s rulings on appellants’ first and second points. We reverse

the circuit court’s finding that statutory notice was sufficient as to lots 7, 8, and 9 and remand

for entry of an order consistent with this opinion, limiting enforcement of the lien and

foreclosure to those parcels for which statutory notice was properly given.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

WOOD and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellants.

Carol Duncan and Heather Owens, Jonesboro City Attorney’s Office, for appellee.

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