Jason Lawson v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 329
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-25-749

JASON LAWSON
APPELLANT Opinion Delivered: May 20, 2026

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 72CR-24-1251]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Jason Lawson (“Lawson”) appeals his conviction from the Washington County

Circuit Court following a three-day jury trial finding him guilty of first-degree murder, a

Class Y felony, and tampering with physical evidence, a Class D felony. Lawson was

sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder and twelve years’

imprisonment for tampering with physical evidence to be served consecutively in the

Arkansas Division of Correction. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

Rule 4-3(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, Lawson’s counsel has

filed a no-merit brief and a motion to withdraw as Lawson’s counsel asserting there is no

issue of arguable merit to raise on appeal. The clerk of this court provided Lawson with a

copy of his counsel’s brief and notified him of his right to file a pro se statement of points
for reversal, which he has done. We affirm Lawson’s conviction and grant counsel’s motion

to withdraw.

On June 27, 2024, Lawson was charged by felony information with one count of first-

degree murder, a Class Y felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-

102(a)(2) (Supp. 2025) and one count of tampering with physical evidence, a Class D felony,

in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-53-111(b)(1) (Repl. 2024). The felony

information listed Benjamin Martin, Lawson’s roommate, as the victim.

On August 29, 2025, Lawson filed a notice of intent to rely on the affirmative defense

of self-defense. On September 2, 2025, the three-day jury trial began. During voir dire, the

circuit court asked the prospective jurors if any of them were acquainted with the attorneys

representing either party. Josie Mates, who ultimately became the jury’s foreperson, stated

she was married to a woman in the prosecutor’s office and, through her wife, knew the

prosecutors representing the State. She further stated she attended law school with Lawson’s

counsel. Mates confirmed her acquaintance with these attorneys would not affect her ability

to fairly and impartially hear the evidence. Neither party objected to Mates sitting on the

jury.

Following voir dire, the parties proceeded to opening statements. During the State’s

opening, the prosecutor provided a roadmap of the evidence the State intended to present

to the jury. That evidence included the testimony of the officer who arrested Lawson. During

the State’s opening, the prosecutor stated the arresting officer came into contact with Lawson

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while he was attempting to steal a car. No objection was made to this comment during the

prosecutor’s opening.

The State began its case-in-chief by calling Fayetteville Police Officer Keenan

Robinson. Officer Robinson testified he was working in his capacity as a patrol officer on

June 12, 2024, when he was dispatched to an apartment complex located at 261 North Lapis

Lane for a welfare concern. Officer Robinson stated that the request for a welfare concern

came from Matt Reardon, whom he made contact with at the apartment complex. Upon

entering the apartment, Officer Robinson conducted a protective sweep and saw a deceased

individual lying on the floor inside of the apartment. Officer Robinson testified the body

smelled of gasoline. After discovering the body, Officer Robinson contacted the Criminal

Investigation Division (“CID”), after which investigators arrived and assumed control of the

scene. The next day, Officer Robinson was dispatched to Arkansas State Police Troop L in

Lowell, Arkansas, where Lawson had been taken into custody following his arrest in Rogers,

Arkansas. Officer Robinson testified he participated in a standard transfer of custody and

personally transported Lawson to the Fayetteville Police Department.

Next, the State called Jennifer Reardon, Lawson’s cousin. Jennifer testified she has

known Lawson her entire life, and his mother, Shammie, is her aunt. Jennifer stated she

speaks with Shammie at least once a month and often assists Shammie with her errands and

grocery shopping. Jennifer recalled a time in June 2024 when Shammie came to her

residence visibly upset and described events involving Lawson that had occurred over the last

few days. Jennifer testified that following that conversation, she relayed this information to

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other family members, including her husband, Matt Reardon, which ultimately led to the

request for a welfare check.

Next, the State called Matt Reardon. Matt testified that Jennifer told him that Lawson

might be in distress or that a serious situation may have occurred, which prompted him to

make the welfare-concern call to the police. Matt stated he made contact with the police at

The Cliffs apartment complex in Fayetteville, and his involvement ended there.

Next, the State called Deborah Green, a resident of the apartment directly across from

Lawson’s. Green testified she came into contact with officers in June 2024 because she had

a visible Ring doorbell camera. Green stated she provided Ring footage to the police officers

that showed activity in the common area outside the apartments during the early-morning

hours of June 9, 2024. This footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

Next, the State called Shammie Lawson, Lawson’s mother. Shammie testified that

during the relevant period, she was living with Lawson and Martin at The Cliffs apartment

complex. She recalled that on the night of the stabbing, Lawson requested she sleep in his

bedroom, which was not typical. She testified Lawson and Martin had been on the patio,

and she could not hear them from Lawson’s room. Not long after Shammie heard “grunting”

noises,” Lawson came into the room and told her they needed to leave the apartment. When

Shammie entered the living room, she saw Martin lying on the floor, still breathing. She

testified she was scared and afraid for her life and began cleaning the apartment when

Lawson told her to do so. She stated Lawson did some cleaning, but at some point, he left

the apartment and came back with a gas can. Lawson had moved Martin’s body into the

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kitchen, and that is where Lawson poured the gasoline on his body. She further testified

Lawson threw his cigarette on Martin’s body but picked it back up. She recalled Lawson

stating, “I just killed my best friend.” She testified she saw Lawson with a black pocketknife

that night but had never seen him carry it before. She further recalled Lawson had a hammer

in his hand, which he claimed Martin had tried to use against him. Shammie said she never

saw Martin with a hammer. Shammie hid the hammer in the couch cushions because she

was afraid Lawson would use it on her. Shammie stated after the murder, she and Lawson

walked all over Fayetteville for a few days with her dog, who Lawson made her abandon at

another apartment complex.

Next, the State called Michelle Hicks, Shammie’s sister and Lawson’s aunt. Hicks

testified that Lawson lived with her for extended periods during his childhood, and she was

heavily involved in his upbringing. Hicks stated Shammie had long-standing health issues

that impacted her ability to live independently. She recalled that in June 2024, she received

two messages from Lawson, stating, “Incinerator now,” and “He murdered Superman.” She

stated that family members later alerted her to concerns involving Lawson.

Next, the State called Bobbye Oronoa, a crime-scene technician and digital forensics

analyst for the Fayetteville Police Department. Oronoa testified she worked the scene of

Martin’s stabbing and documented it through photographs. Oronoa testified to her

observations, including extensive blood pooling and blood evidence. In observing Martin’s

body, Oronoa testified, “There was nothing . . . consistent with a defensive wound.” She

recalled returning to the apartment on a later date during which she collected additional

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evidence, including a hammer located inside a couch cushion and blood-contaminated

carpet. Oronoa testified that she collected four cell phones during her involvement in the

case. She stated she performed extractions on each phone and provided the results to

Detective Jesus Magana.

Next, the State called Detective Magana with the Fayetteville Police Department.

Detective Magana testified that on June 12, 2024, he was assigned to investigate a suspected

homicide at The Cliffs apartments in Fayetteville. He recalled that when he arrived on the

scene, patrol officers were already there, and he obtained the information that had been

learned at that point. Detective Magana did not process the scene or make contact with

civilians during his initial response to the scene. During Detective Magana’s investigation,

Cellebrite data extractions were performed on the cell phones collected by Oronoa. The

results demonstrated that the user of one of the cell phones conducted a search on June 12,

2024, referencing “warrants” and the “Washington County Sheriff’s Office” along with

Lawson’s name. Detective Magana testified that on June 12, he made contact with Lawson

at the Arkansas State Police Troop L facility in Lowell after Lawson had been arrested by

another law enforcement agency in Rogers. Detective Magana confirmed Lawson’s identity

during the encounter but did not transport him or interview him at that time.

The State later recalled Detective Magana to the stand, and he testified to his

interview of Lawson. Detective Magana testified Lawson discussed his relationship with

Martin, the events leading up to the incident at the apartment, and admitted stabbing

Martin. However, according to Lawson, an argument ensued between the pair; Martin was

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threatening to harm Lawson with a hammer; and Lawson acted in self-defense. Detective

Magana recalled that Lawson told him he didn’t turn himself in after the stabbing because

he was afraid to go to jail since he was currently on probation. During cross-examination,

Detective Magana stated the hammer recovered from Lawson’s apartment was not submitted

to the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory for testing, and that the murder weapon was never

recovered.

Next, the State called Dr. Teddi Tubre, a forensic pathologist with the Arkansas State

Crime Laboratory, to testify. Dr. Tubre performed Martin’s autopsy and testified that he

sustained a single sharp-force injury to the left side of his chest that penetrated his chest wall

and entered his chest cavity. Dr. Tubre stated the injury was fatal and classified Martin’s

manner of death as homicide. However, she stated she could not identify the specific weapon

used to cause the injury nor could she determine the amount of force used beyond stating

that sufficient force was applied to cause this type of injury. Dr. Tubre also testified that

Martin’s clothing tested positive for gasoline. During cross-examination, Dr. Tubre further

clarified she could not determine whether the stabbing occurred during a struggle, and she

could not determine whether Martin was intoxicated at the time of his death.

Next, the State called Corporal Jesse Brusherd with the Rogers Police Department.

Corporal Brusherd testified he was dispatched to investigate suspicious activity when he

located Lawson, who matched the description he had been given. Lawson confirmed his

identity and date of birth for Corporal Brusherd. After confirming Lawson’s identity,

Corporal Brusherd placed Lawson under arrest and transported him to the Arkansas State

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Police Troop L facility for transfer to Fayetteville law enforcement. This concluded Corporal

Brusherd’s involvement in the case.

Once the State rested its case, Lawson moved for a directed verdict on both counts.

He argued that as to first-degree murder, the State failed to make a prima facie showing that

he acted with the purpose to cause the death of Martin. As for the tampering-with-evidence

charge, he argued the State’s proof was insufficient to establish that he purposely impaired

the availability of evidence. The circuit court denied Lawson’s motions.

The defense began its case-in-chief by calling Lawson to testify in his own defense.

Lawson testified that during June 2024, he was living at The Cliffs apartments, and both

Martin and Shammie were living in the apartment. He described Martin as his best friend

but admitted the relationship with Martin was strained at times. He stated that on the

morning of the incident, Martin became angry and aggressive during an argument the pair

were having. Lawson stated Martin threated him with a hammer, and he was afraid Martin

would strike him with it and believed he was in imminent danger. Lawson testified he

retrieved a knife while Martin continued to advance toward him and that he stabbed Martin

once in the chest. He stated he did not intend to kill Martin and that he was scared Martin

was going to hurt him. Lawson testified he “panicked” after Martin fell to the ground, and

he did not know what to do. He admitted he did not call 911 and that he left the apartment

and traveled to various locations over the next several days.

At the conclusion of Lawson’s testimony, the defense rested its case and renewed its

motions for directed verdict, which were denied by the circuit court. After deliberations, the

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jury returned verdicts finding Lawson guilty of first-degree murder and tampering with

physical evidence. Following a sentencing phase, the jury recommended thirty-five years’

imprisonment for murder and twelve years’ imprisonment for tampering with physical

evidence. The jury recommended, and the court ordered, that the sentences run

consecutively, for an aggregative of forty-seven years’ imprisonment.

Counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders and Rule 4-3(b)(1) and states

there is no meritorious ground for reversal. Counsel has briefed six adverse rulings, each of

which is addressed below.

Although it is not the first adverse ruling addressed by Lawson’s counsel, we address

the sufficiency of the evidence first because if the judgment of conviction is not supported

by substantial evidence, an appellant may not be tried again under the principle of double

jeopardy. Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001). We treat a motion for a

directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark.

309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we assess the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We

will affirm a judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial

evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable

certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or

conjecture. Id. The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the trier of

fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of

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conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Burns v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 309, 668

S.W.3d 566.

First-degree murder, defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-102(a)(2),

provides that a person commits murder in the first degree if, with a purpose of causing the

death of another person, the person causes the death of another person. A person acts

purposely with respect to his or her conduct or a result or his or her conduct when it is the

person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result. Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-2-202(a) (Repl. 2024). A criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is

seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the

circumstances of the crimes. Green v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 145, 544 S.W.3d 574. Our

supreme court has recognized that the intent necessary for first-degree murder may be

inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and

location of the wounds. Id.

The State presented ample evidence to support Lawson’s first-degree-murder

conviction. The medical examiner, Dr. Tubre, testified Martin died from a fatal stab wound

to his heart. She testified that considering the position Martin was stabbed from, a large

amount of force would have been necessary to penetrate his bone and reach his heart. She

further testified that Martin’s clothing tested positive for gasoline residue. This line of

testimony further supported the testimony provided by Lawson’s mother, Shammie, who

testified that Lawson covered Martin’s body in gasoline. Shammie further testified that when

she entered the room, Martin was still breathing. Despite this, Lawson covered his body with

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a sheet and began cleaning the apartment, eventually fleeing the scene and disposing of the

murder weapon. Considering the evidence as a whole, there is no meritorious argument for

reversal of Lawson’s first-degree-murder conviction.

As for the tampering charge, a person commits the act of tampering with physical

evidence if he alters, destroys, suppresses, removes, or conceals any record, document, or

thing with the purpose of impairing its verity, legibility, or availability in an official

proceeding or investigation. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-111(a). Tampering with physical

evidence is a Class D felony if the person impairs or obstructs the prosecution or defense of

a felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-111(b)(1).

Testimony demonstrated that following the stabbing, Lawson moved Martin’s body,

poured gasoline on his body, and disposed of the murder weapon, which was never

recovered. Each of these acts alone would be sufficient for a tampering charge. Taken

together, it certainly shows there is no meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting this conviction.

The next adverse ruling addressed by Lawson’s counsel concerns the introduction of

photographic evidence at trial. We have held the admission of photographs is a matter left

to the circuit court’s sound discretion, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that

discretion. Airsman v. State, 2014 Ark. 500, 451 S.W.3d 565. When photographs are helpful

to explain testimony, they are ordinarily admissible. Id. The mere fact that a photograph is

inflammatory or cumulative is not, standing alone, sufficient reason to exclude it. Breeden v.

State, 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5. Even when the cause of death is undisputed, a defendant

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may not prevent the admission of photographs merely by conceding the facts portrayed

therein. E.g., Smart, 352 Ark. 522, 104 S.W.3d 386.

Here, Lawson’s counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State from

introducing autopsy photographs of the victim’s body. Specifically, the defense argued that

because they had stipulated to the medical examiner’s findings, the images lacked probative

value and should be excluded. However, this argument is contrary to Arkansas case law. Our

supreme court has stated,

[P]hotographs illustrating the victims’ manner of death are central to the State’s
murder prosecution, adding weight to the crime and eliminating adverse inferences.
Generally, the State is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, and a
defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the
case as the State chooses to present it.

Collins v. State, 2020 Ark. 371, at 7, 610 S.W.3d 653, 657 (citing to Old Chief v. United States,

519 U.S. 172 (1997)). Further, the images were used to aid in the testimony of the medical

examiner, which helped the jury understand the nature and degree of the injury Martin

sustained, and corroborated witness testimony. The circuit court found the photographs

served a valid purpose and that the probative value outweighed any unfair prejudice. Given

the discretion afforded the State in presenting its case and to the circuit court in the

admission of evidence, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the

autopsy photographs for these purposes.

The next adverse ruling addressed by counsel ties into the previous adverse ruling.

The defense requested that if the photographs were to be admitted, they should be admitted

in black and white rather than color. Whether the pictures were admitted in color or black

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and white does not change the analysis the circuit court would have to apply. We adopt the

same reasoning here and affirm.

The next adverse ruling addressed by counsel concerns a defense objection to

testimony regarding the absence of defensive wounds on Martin’s body. Arkansas Rules of

Evidence 701 and 702 govern opinion testimony. Lay witnesses may provide opinion

testimony when the opinion is “rationally based on the perception of the witness; and the

opinion is helpful to a clear understanding of his [or her] testimony or the determination of

a fact in issue.” Ark. R. Evid 701. Expert witnesses may provide opinion testimony “if

scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Ark. R. Evid. 702.

Here, the circuit court allowed the crime-scene technician and digital forensic analyst,

Bobbye Oronoa, to testify about her observations of Martin’s body—including whether she

noted any injuries to Martin consistent with defensive wounds. A circuit court has broad

discretion when making evidentiary rulings, and this court will not reverse the circuit court’s

ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. Humphry v. State, 2023 Ark. 16, at 5, 659 S.W.3d

691, 695. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the

circuit court’s decision but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly,

or without due consideration. Id. During trial, counsel for Lawson argued this line of

questioning called for opinion testimony requiring medical or forensic expertise that Oronoa

was not qualified to give. However, our courts have consistently ruled that an officer’s

opinion testimony based on his or her work experience and observations is admissible. E.g.,

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Flowers v. State, 373 Ark. 127, 132, 282 S.W.3d 767, 771 (2008) (testimony of an officer that

a truck’s window had been broken on the outside did not require expert testimony because

the officer’s testimony was rationally based on his experience, forensic training, and personal

observation); Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 383, 108 S.W.3d 622, 629 (2003) (opinion

testimony by an investigator on the amount of blood lost by a victim was rationally based on

perception and was admissible); Gruzen v. State, 276 Ark. 149, 155, 634 S.W.2d 92, 95 (1982)

(opinion testimony by an officer on how long a person had been dead was admissible because

it was based on the officer’s experience and observations).

Oronoa testified “there was nothing . . . consistent with a defensive wound.” Lawson

had the chance to cross-examine Oronoa, and the jury was presented with Oronoa’s

credentials. Our courts have been clear that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks v. State, 2016 Ark. 305, at 7, 498

S.W.3d 292, 296. The jury was free to determine how much weight to give to Oronoa’s

testimony. Id. Under these standards, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion.

Therefore, counsel for Lawson is correct that there is no meritorious argument for reversal

on the basis of this adverse ruling.

The next adverse ruling, the admission of autopsy photographs during the medical

examiner’s testimony, directly ties into the analysis provided above in adverse rulings 2 and

3. As mentioned above, our courts have repeatedly stated that when photographs are helpful

to explain testimony, they are ordinarily admissible. Smart, 352 Ark. 522, 104 S.W.3d 386.

Although at trial Lawson argued the admission of the photographs would be cumulative, the

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mere fact that a photograph is inflammatory or cumulative is not, standing alone, sufficient

evidence to exclude it. Smart, supra. Even the most gruesome photographs may be admissible

if they assist the trier of fact by shedding light on some issue, providing a necessary element

of the case, enabling a witness to testify more effectively, corroborating testimony, or

enabling jurors to better under the testimony. Id. With these standards in mind, coupled

with the standards and analysis set forth in adverse rulings 2 and 3, we cannot say the circuit

court abused its discretion in making this adverse ruling.

The final adverse ruling addressed by Lawson’s counsel concerns the circuit court’s

order that his sentences run consecutively. The question of whether sentences should run

consecutively or concurrently lies within the sole province of the circuit court. Teague v. State,

328 Ark. 724, 946 S.W.2d 670 (1997). The appellant assumes a heavy burden of

demonstrating that the circuit court failed to give due consideration to the exercise of its

discretion in the matter of consecutive sentences. Id. We will remand for resentencing when

it is apparent the circuit court did not exercise its discretion. Id.

Here, it was within the circuit court’s discretion to decide whether Lawson’s sentences

should run consecutively or concurrently. The record demonstrates that the circuit court

instructed the jury that if it recommended Lawson’s sentences run concurrently, that

recommendation was not binding on the court. Further, the record shows the circuit court

chose to adopt the jury’s recommendation of consecutive sentences, and it is evident the

court exercised its discretion in that regard because it stated on the record that it was the

court’s intention for Lawson’s sentences to run consecutively. Additionally, to further

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support the circuit court’s decision, each sentence Lawson received was within the statutory

range for the class of felony charged. Because the circuit court exercised its discretion, there

could be no meritorious argument with respect to its sentencing decision. See Teague, supra.

Next, we turn to appellant’s pro se points. Lawson first argues the evidence supporting

his first-degree-murder conviction is insufficient because it does not disprove his self-defense

claim. He further argues his actions following the stabbing were a result of some type of

temporary insanity and therefore should not be considered in determining his guilt for a

tampering-with-evidence conviction. However, Lawson’s directed-verdict motion did not

make these challenges but instead was a general motion regarding the State’s failure to make

a prima facie case, which does not satisfy the requirements of Arkansas Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33.1.

Rule 33.1(a) provides that “[i]n a jury trial, if a motion for directed verdict is to be

made, it shall be made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close

of all of the evidence. A motion for directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.”

Subsection (c) of the same rule provides that

[t]he failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times
and in the manner required in subsection[] (a) . . . above will constitute a waiver of
any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or
judgment. A motion for directed verdict or for dismissal based on insufficiency of the
evidence must specify the respect in which the evidence is deficient. A motion merely
stating that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve for appeal issues relating to
a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense.

It is well settled that Rule 33.1 is strictly construed. Richardson v. State, 2020 Ark. App.

25, 595 S.W.3d 1. A general motion does not satisfy the requirements of specificity

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mandated in Rule 33.1. Daniels v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 334, 551 S.W.3d 428. The reason

underlying this rule is that when specific grounds are stated and the proof is pinpointed, the

circuit court can either grant the motion or allow the State to reopen its case and supply the

missing proof. Scott v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 504, 471 S.W.3d 236. Our courts have been

steadfast in holding that we will not address the merits of an appellant’s insufficiency

argument when the directed-verdict motion is not specific. Daniels, supra. Further, a party

cannot enlarge or change the grounds for an objection or motion on appeal but is bound by

the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial. Burns v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 309, 668

S.W.3d 566. Therefore, Lawson’s argument is not preserved for appellate review.

Lawson next argues that because the judge who ultimately presided over his case had

not been involved from the beginning, his trial was unfair. A review of the record shows that

an objection to a substitute judge was never made. This argument is not preserved for

appellate review because it is being made for the first time on appeal. This court will not

address arguments made for the first time on appeal; a party is bound by the scope and

nature of the arguments made at trial. Lewis v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 442, 528 S.W.3d 312.

Even if this argument were preserved, a review of our caselaw demonstrates that generally a

substitute judge is not grounds for reversal absent a showing of actual prejudice or procedural

error. See Woods v. State, 278 Ark. 271, 644 S.W.2d 937 (1983). There is no indication in

this record of actual prejudice or that procedural error took place.

Next, Lawson argues that juror Josie Mates should not have been allowed to sit on

the jury. Specifically, he notes that Mates is married to a prosecutor and was familiar with

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the prosecutors trying his case. Once again, this argument is not preserved for appellate

review because it is being made for the first time on appeal. This court will not address

arguments made for the first time on appeal; a party is bound by the scope and nature of the

arguments made at trial. Lewis, supra. Even if Lawson’s argument were preserved, it would

still be without merit. The juror also stated she attended law school with defense counsel

and would not feel obligated to explain her position to either party after reviewing all the

evidence. There is no substance to Lawson’s argument that could be interpreted as a

meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

Next, Lawson argues the prosecutor made a “false and unsubstantiated claim” that he

was arrested for attempting to steal a car in Rogers, Arkansas. He argues this statement added

an “untrue circumstance” for the jury to consider, defamed his character, and created undue

prejudice against him. Again, this argument is not preserved for appellate review because it

is being made for the first time on appeal. Our court will not address arguments made for

the first time on appeal; a party is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at

trial. Lewis, 2017 Ark. App. 442, 528 S.W.3d 312.

Next, Lawson argues the circuit court erred when it overruled his objection to the

admission of autopsy photographs during the medical examiner’s testimony. This issue has

been addressed in the previous section regarding adverse rulings briefed by Lawson’s counsel.

We adopt that same analysis here.

Finally, Lawson argues that during closing arguments, the prosecutor made an

unsubstantiated claim that the manner in which Martin was stabbed differed from Lawson’s

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testimony. Again, this argument is not preserved for appellate review because it is being made

for the first time on appeal. This court will not address arguments made for the first time on

appeal; a party is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial. Lewis, supra.

Even if this argument were preserved, it is without merit. In reviewing the prosecutor’s

closing arguments, the State did not mention anything specific about Martin’s stabbing. The

State simply provided its version of events, and Lawson doesn’t like that version. The jury is

free to believe or disbelieve whomever they want.

We conclude there has been compliance with Rule 4-3(b) and that this appeal is

without merit. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to be relieved is granted, and Lawson’s

conviction is affirmed.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

HARRISON and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Mothershed Law, PLLC, by: La’Donnia M. Mothershed, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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