Frandsen v. Frandsen

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MARK E. FRANDSEN, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

VERONICA FRANDSEN, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0577 FC
FILED 04-13-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400DO202400790
The Honorable Nathaniel T. Sorenson, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Veronica Perea Frandsen, Somerton
Respondent/Appellant

The Law Offices of Amanda Taylor, PLLC, Yuma
By Amanda Taylor
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
FRANDSEN v. FRANDSEN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Veronica Perea Frandsen (Mother) appeals from a decree of
dissolution ending her marriage to Mark Evan Frandsen (Father). Mother
argues the decree erred in awarding Father the marital house and a
business, failed to hold Father accountable for allowing a Jeep to be
repossessed, and erred in awarding spousal maintenance. Mother has
shown no error in the award of the house. However, the decree was
deficient in awarding Father the business and did not discuss the Jeep
repossession. Accordingly, the portion of the decree awarding Father the
business is vacated and the matter is remanded for further consideration of
the business as well as the Jeep repossession. Recognizing remand on those
issues also could alter the spousal maintenance award, it also is vacated and
remanded. The decree is otherwise affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father married in August 2010 and have one
minor son. In August 2024, Father filed and served Mother with a
dissolution petition. The petition alleged the couple did not acquire any
community property during the marriage. The petition listed the marital
house as separate property, which Father claimed he brought to the
marriage. The petition alleged that Mother should be responsible for
$35,000 in debt incurred during the marriage for a Jeep. Father sought sole
legal decision-making, alleging Mother had committed domestic violence
against Father during the marriage.

¶3 Mother’s September 2024 response countered that
community property had been acquired during the marriage and should be
divided equitably. Mother asserted that the community incurred significant
debt and that Father wasted and concealed community assets. Mother
requested sole legal decision-making, denying she committed domestic
violence and asserting that Father had committed domestic violence against
her.

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¶4 Father filed an amended petition, alleging an April 2024
domestic violence incident where Mother hit him. Father also alleged he
had obtained an order of protection against Mother. Father asserted no
spousal maintenance was appropriate and that Mother wasted, and may
have concealed, community assets. Mother’s response to the amended
petition largely tracked her response to the original petition.

¶5 In November 2024, the court set a May 1, 2025 trial. After
evidentiary hearings in December 2024, the court issued temporary orders
awarding equal parenting time but awarding Father sole legal decision-
making, ordering Father to maintain all community assets and pay all
community debts, and to pay $312 in monthly child support.

¶6 In April 2025, Mother moved for contempt, alleging Father
failed to comply with the court’s orders and that his failure to pay
community debts caused the Jeep to be repossessed. At the May 2025 trial,
the court heard testimony and argument from Father and Mother, received
exhibits, and took the matter under advisement. Later in May 2025, the
court entered the decree. Along with dissolving the marriage, the decree
awarded Father sole legal decision-making authority, awarded equal
parenting time and awarded Father the house as his sole and separate
property. The decree also awarded Father a business called “Just Ride,”
apparently a recreational vehicle business, which Father started before the
marriage. The decree did not mention the Jeep. The decree required Father
to pay Mother an equalization payment of $7,776.83, spousal maintenance
of $350 for 24 months and $83 in monthly child support.

¶7 This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1) (2026).1

DISCUSSION

¶8 Trial evidence is considered in the light most favorable to
upholding the decree, and all factual findings will be sustained unless
clearly erroneous. Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 113 ¶ 9 (App. 2016);
Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 107 ¶ 2 (App. 2005); see also In re Marriage of
Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, 410 ¶ 18 (App. 2011) (“The presence of contrary facts
does not render a [superior] court’s factual determinations clearly

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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erroneous.”). Mother’s opening brief fails to comply with ARCAP 13,
including failing to cite authority, facts in the record and where in the
record arguments on appeal were raised in superior court. See ARCAP
13(a)(5) & (7)(A). Such deficiencies typically constitute waiver. See, e.g.,
Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 523 ¶¶ 10-11 (App. 2022). However, given
the issues involved (including the best interests of a child), this court
addresses the merits of Mother’s arguments raised in her opening brief.2

I. The Decree Properly Awarded Father the House but Not the
Business.

¶9 Mother challenges the decree awarding Father the house and
the business. This court reviews de novo whether property should be
classified as community or separate. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz.
521, 523 ¶ 4 (App. 2007) (citing cases). This court views the evidence in a
light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling and will affirm
if reasonable evidence supports it. Kohler, 211 Ariz. at 107 ¶ 2 (citing cases).

¶10 Starting with the house, Mother states the couple jointly
occupied the house during the marriage and that it was placed into the
Executive Edge Trust in April 2023, “with both spouses as co-trustees.” She
argues the court improperly awarded Father the house “based on hearsay
about a parental deed, without title or trust accounting,” adding “[n]o
competent evidence supported” the “title findings,” which she claims is
error. Recognizing hearsay is admissible and can be relied upon in findings
of fact, see Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 2(b), and that being named a trustee does not
mean the trustee owns trust assets, see A.R.S. § 14-10810, the trial record
supports the award of the house to Father.

¶11 Trial evidence shows that, in February 2006, a recorded
warranty deed from Father’s parents “as Trustees of the Frandsen Family
Trust dated January 9, 1992” conveyed the house to Father as “a married
man, as his sole and separate property.”3 Father then held the house as his

2 Mother’s reply brief attempts to raise, for the first time on appeal,
additional issues, including compliance with parenting education
requirements, fraud and misconduct, findings awarding Father sole legal
decision-making, and domestic violence and substance abuse allegations.
By failing to raise these issues until her reply, Mother has waived those
issues. See State v. Guytan, 192 Ariz. 514, 520 ¶ 15 (App. 1998) (citing cases).
3 At that time, Father was married to someone other than Mother. The

record includes a February 2006 disclaimer by that person of any ownership
interest in the house.

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sole and separate property under that warranty deed until 2023, when it
was transferred to the Executive Edge Trust discussed below. Accordingly,
before the marriage and for almost all of the marriage between Father and
Mother, Father held the house in his own name as his sole and separate
property.

¶12 Father testified that his parents lived in the house and he
bought it from them, apparently in 2006. He financed it before the marriage,
both with assistance from his parents and “later on, I got a loan from the
bank and paid them out.” He paid off the loan with money he inherited
from his parents. On this record, the superior court properly could conclude
that the house was Father’s sole and separate property.

¶13 As Mother notes, in April 2023, Father conveyed title to the
house to Executive Edge Trust, a revokable trust. The warranty deed doing
so states that Father, “a married man,” “hereby conveys and warrants all
his interest to” trustees of the trust. Father testified that he “put into the
trust the house that was deeded solely in [his] name.” The Trust has an
express provision stating that any property transferred to the Trust as
separate properly will be held by the Trust as separate property. Father also
testified to his understanding that, when the trust was revoked, the
property would be returned to the person who gave it to be put in the trust.

¶14 The decree found that the house was held by Father as his sole
and separate property, that it was paid off by funds Father inherited (not
community income or property) and awarded the house to Father as his
sole and separate property. Mother argues that was error, claiming the
transfer to the trust “proved joint ownership of the home.” But the property
was transferred to the trust as sole and separate property and Mother
offered no evidence that Father converted the house to community
property or used community funds to pay for the house. See Saba v. Khoury,
253 Ariz. 587, 592 ¶ 15 (2022) (citing cases) (“When a marital community
contributes its money or labor to a spouse’s separate property, it ‘is entitled
to share in the enhanced value of [that] property.’”). Indeed, at the end of
trial (and although doing so to seek additional trial time), Mother admitted
she “never addressed how much [she] contributed to the home.”

¶15 To convert sole and separate real property into community
property, a written conveyance must “indicat[e] an intention that the
grantee/spouse should have the property.” Bender v. Bender, 123 Ariz. 90,
93 (App. 1979) (citation omitted). Here, the April 2023 warranty deed
transferring the house to the Trust reflects no such intention. That evidence,
coupled with Father’s testimony and Mother’s admission that she provided

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no contrary evidence, shows that the decree did not err in awarding Father
the house as his sole and separate property.

¶16 Turning to the business, the decree summarily states, “The
Court finds [Father] should be awarded the business along with all its assets
and debts.” Although the parties appear to view this as awarding the
business to Father as his sole and separate property, unlike the house,
nowhere does the decree state that the business was awarded to Father
because it was his sole and separate property.

¶17 From the record, the business may have been awarded to
Father as his sole and separate property. On the other hand, it also may
have been a community asset that the court then awarded to Father,
particularly given the conflicting evidence about how the business was
handled during the marriage, Mother’s involvement in the business and
whether the business had value at the time of the trial. The basis for such
an award, including the findings leading up to such an award, must be
adequate for this court to determine the basis for the award. See, e.g., Meister
v. Meister, 252 Ariz. 391, 394 ¶ 1 (App. 2021) (finding remand appropriate
when the court could not discern whether the division of assets was fair
and equitable). Here, the decree does not provide that information,
including whether the business was awarded to Father because it was his
sole and separate property or, instead, whether it was community property
and awarded to Father, and the basis for such an award. Accordingly, that
portion of the decree awarding Father the business is vacated and
remanded for further proceedings.4

II. The Decree Failed to Address the Repossession of the Jeep.

¶18 The December 2024 temporary orders required Father to
maintain all community assets and make payments on community debts.
That included debt owed on a Jeep, apparently owned by the community
but used daily by Mother. Mother argues that Father failed to make
payments on the Jeep loan, resulting in it being repossessed. The decree
does not mention the issue, and Mother reasons that the court improperly
“accepted counsel’s false claim that payments were current” at the May
2025 trial.

4 As a result, this court need not (and expressly does not) address Mother’s

arguments regarding valuing the business, her interest in the business and
whether she has any equitable claim to a portion of the business, leaving
those issues for resolution (if necessary) on remand.

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¶19 The record includes an October 18, 2024 repossession notice,
addressed to Father, for the 2023 Jeep. The records indicate the Jeep was
purchased during the marriage, presumptively making it community
property. See A.R.S. § 25-211(A). There was no indication that presumption
was rebutted at trial.

¶20 Conceding the decree does not address the Jeep, Father
argues that silence is an “implicit determination that [Father] acted in good
faith, that [Mother] had an opportunity to preserve the asset but failed to
do so, and that the decree’s omission of the Jeep was within the court’s
discretion under A.R.S. § 25-318(A).” But, recognizing the division of
community assets and debts are the dispositive issues in this appeal, this
court will not guess what determination might be implicit in the decree on
this disputed issue. Because the record does not show how the Jeep issue
was resolved, the superior court should address it on remand.

III. Mother Has Not Shown Improper Bias by the Superior Court.

¶21 Mother argues there was “clear imbalance” from the superior
court relating to an affidavit because opposing counsel’s “unsworn
statements were adopted verbatim in the Decree” and her “verified exhibits
. . . were disregarded.” Mother contends these actions were “contrary to
Canon 2.2 and equal-treatment requirements.” A judge is presumed to be
“free of bias and prejudice.” Simon v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 63 ¶
29 (App. 2010) (citation omitted). A party challenging the impartiality of a
judge must present a specific basis for an assertion of bias and prove bias
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The bias must arise from an
extrajudicial source and not from the judge’s participation in the case; a
judge’s rulings do not themselves demonstrate bias. Id. Mother has offered
no evidence to rebut the principle that a “judge is presumed to be free of
bias and prejudice.” Cook v. Losnegard, 228 Ariz. 202, 206 ¶ 22 (App. 2011).
For these reasons, Mother’s judicial bias claim fails.

IV. Other Issues and Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

¶22 Mother challenges the spousal maintenance award. On
remand, resolving the asset allocation issues addressed above may impact
the spousal maintenance award. See A.R.S. § 25-319. For that reason, the
spousal maintenance award is vacated for further consideration on remand.
Given the generality of her other arguments, Mother has shown no
reversible error regarding disclosure, discovery and findings and
conclusions, not otherwise accounted for in the partial reversal and
remand.

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¶23 Mother requests attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under
A.R.S. § 25-324. Father requests attorneys’ fees and costs under ARCAP 21
and A.R.S. § 25-324. To the extent the parties rely on A.R.S. § 25-324(B),
those requests are denied. In the exercise of this court’s discretion, the
requests for fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A) are denied. Mother is, however,
awarded her taxable costs incurred on appeal contingent on her compliance
with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶24 That portion of the decree allocating the business is vacated
and the matter is remanded for further consideration of the business as well
as the Jeep issue. Because remand on those issues also could alter the
spousal maintenance award, that award also is vacated and remanded. In
all other respects, the decree is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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