CHRISTOPHER v. v. ERICA O.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CHRISTOPHER V., Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

ERICA O., Respondent/Appellant.1

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0655 FC
FILED 04-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-092397
The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Bishop Del Vecchio & Beeks Law Office, PC, Phoenix
By Daniel P. Beeks
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Tempe
By Keith Berkshire, Alexandra Sandlin
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

1 To safeguard the identities of minor children, it is ordered that the clerk of

this court shall amend the caption (and the short caption) of this appeal as
shown. It is further ordered that the amended caption shall be used on all
future documents filed in this matter.
CHRISTOPHER V. v. ERICA O.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which Acting
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 This appeal challenges the adequacy of the superior court’s
findings supporting its orders on legal decision-making authority and
parenting time. Because the court failed to make specific findings on
domestic violence and drug use as required by Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) §§ 25-403, 25-403.03, and 25-403.04, we vacate the legal-decision-
making and parenting-time orders and remand for reconsideration and
appropriate findings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Erica O. (“Mother”) and Christopher V. (“Father”) were in a
relationship from 2009 to 2012, and had two children: Daughter, born in
early 2010, and Son, born in late 2012. By informal agreement, Mother and
Father shared substantially equal parenting time and responsibilities for
many years after their breakup.

¶3 In mid-2024, after Mother unilaterally changed the children’s
schools, Father initiated a paternity action asking the court to formally
order joint legal decision-making authority and equal parenting time.
Mother responded and asked for sole legal decision-making authority and
majority parenting time, alleging that Father committed domestic violence
against both her and the children.

¶4 The matter proceeded to trial in early 2025. At trial, Mother
testified that when she was pregnant with Daughter fifteen years earlier,
Father (1) set a gun on a table in front of her to prevent her from leaving
during an argument; (2) months later, forcibly slapped her face; and (3) on
a different occasion, threatened suicide, choked her, and dragged her. She
further testified that Father choked her not long after Son’s birth, when she
was holding Son. Mother’s former employer testified that he saw cuts and
bruises on Mother’s body and face at least three separate times in 2009, and
Mother’s sister testified that she saw scrapes and redness on Mother’s body
and face in 2010.

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¶5 Mother also testified that Father attacked her after their
breakup. She testified that at a late-2016 child exchange, Father pushed her,
pinned her to the ground, and tried to choke her, and then punched her car
door when she left with the children. Although Father’s neighbor
characterized Mother as the sole aggressor in the incident, Mother reported
that she fought back only after being attacked and Daughter told the court-
appointed advisor (“CAA”) that she saw Father choke Mother.

¶6 Mother also presented evidence that Father assaulted
Daughter. First, Daughter’s maternal grandmother testified that in late
2018, she saw marks on Daughter’s neck and Daughter disclosed Father had
strangled her. Second, Mother testified that in mid-2021, she saw an injury
on Daughter’s lip and Daughter said Father had slapped her. Third, Mother
testified that in late 2023, she saw marks on Daughter’s neck and Daughter
said Father had threatened her pets and then choked her. Daughter
eventually told her therapist and the CAA about the 2023 incident, and the
Department of Child Safety investigated but could not substantiate the
report.

¶7 Father denied the domestic-violence allegations both at his
interview with the CAA and at trial. He acknowledged that he and Mother
had a high-conflict past, but he asserted that he never choked anyone, never
hit the children in their faces, never threatened Daughter’s pets, and had
only grabbed the front of Daughter’s shirt. At trial, he also provided a
recording of a phone call where Mother threatened to report him for child
abuse once he said he was going to talk to her family about why she
changed the children’s schools. Father acknowledged that he used
marijuana, which drug tests confirmed, but he provided medical marijuana
cards authorizing him to use the drug from 2022 onward.

¶8 The superior court concluded that Father “has engaged in acts
of domestic violence against [Mother],” but “those acts in the spectrum of
domestic violence do not constitute significant as contemplated by statute,”
and that Father rebutted the statutory presumption against a domestic-
violence perpetrator receiving legal decision-making authority. The court
further concluded that Father rebutted the statutory presumption against a
drug user receiving legal decision-making authority. The court awarded
the parties joint legal decision-making authority and equal parenting time
but ordered Father to complete a batterer’s intervention program.

¶9 Mother moved to alter or amend the judgment under Arizona
Rule of Family Law Procedure 83. She then filed a lengthy amended motion
accompanied by a motion to exceed the page limit. The superior court
denied all three motions.

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CHRISTOPHER V. v. ERICA O.
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¶10 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Mother contends that the superior court failed to make
adequate findings to support its rulings on legal decision-making authority
and parenting time. We agree.

¶12 A.R.S. § 25-403 requires the superior court to determine legal
decision-making authority and parenting time in accord with the child’s
best interests, considering enumerated and other relevant factors. In a
contested case, the court must “make specific findings on the record about
all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best
interests of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B). Failure to make the findings
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App.
2009).

¶13 Specific findings enable effective appellate review, guide the
best-interests analysis, and provide a baseline against which future best-
interests inquiries are measured. Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, 209, ¶ 18 (App.
2009). The requirement for specific best-interests findings cannot be
waived.2 Olesen v. Daniel, 251 Ariz. 25, 29, ¶ 17 (App. 2021); see also Nold v.
Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 272-73, ¶¶ 7-10 (App. 2013). Nor can it be satisfied by
inference. Olesen, 251 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 17. Cursory findings that fail to explain
how the court weighed the evidence are insufficient. Reid, 222 Ariz. at 207,
¶ 13; see also Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 474, ¶ 18 (App. 2018) (“The
court must . . . make specific findings explaining its reasoning and
conclusions.”). As a general principle, findings of fact must be “pertinent
to the issues and comprehensive enough to provide a basis for the
decision.” Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pinal Cnty., 175 Ariz. 296, 299 (1993)
(citation omitted). In other words, the findings must be “sufficiently
specific” to allow an appellate court to accurately assess the ruling’s validity
by reviewing, without speculation, “how the trial court actually arrived at
its conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz.
418, 420-21, ¶¶ 8-9, 12 (App. 2003) (holding in the relocation context that
the court’s failure to “elaborate or explain how it weighed any factor” in
assessing the child’s best interests was an abuse of discretion because

2 We therefore reject Father’s contention that Mother waived her ability to

challenge the findings by raising it for the first time in an amended post-
judgment motion that was denied along with an accompanying request to
exceed the page limit.

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“[w]ithout further explanation from the trial court regarding its
consideration of the applicable factors, we cannot say that the trial court did
not focus too much attention on” one factor to the exclusion of others).

¶14 One of the factors that the court must consider and make
specific findings on is “[w]hether there has been domestic violence or child
abuse pursuant to § 25-403.03.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(8); see Olesen, 251 Ariz.
at 29, ¶ 17 (holding that the court must make specific findings under § 25-
403.03); Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 474, ¶ 18 (same). The § 25-403.03 inquiry
requires the court to determine not only whether domestic violence
occurred, but also the character of the acts.

¶15 Under § 25-403.03(A), joint legal decision-making authority is
precluded “if the court makes a finding of the existence of significant
domestic violence pursuant to § 13-3601 [which includes, inter alia, assault
under § 13-1203(A) by intentionally causing physical injury or reasonable
apprehension of imminent physical injury] or if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a significant history of
domestic violence.” The statute does not define “significant.” See A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03; DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 424, ¶ 15 n.6 (App. 2019). But
whether a particular act of domestic violence under § 13-3601 is
“significant” or part of a “significant history” reasonably may be
determined by considering factors such as the seriousness of the incident,
the frequency or pervasiveness of the violence, and the passage of time and
its impact. DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 424, ¶ 15 n.6.

¶16 If the court finds no “significant” acts or “significant history”
of domestic violence under § 25-403.03(A), the inquiry does not end. Id. at
423, ¶ 12. Under § 25-403.03(B), any domestic violence must be considered
as contrary to the child’s best interests. The court must consider the
perpetrator’s history of causing or threatening to cause physical harm and
must give “primary importance” to the safety and well-being of children
and victims. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(B); see also Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233
Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 16 (App. 2013). Accordingly, the court must determine not
only what acts occurred, but also their impact on the child. See Christopher
K., 233 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 23. With respect to parenting time, if a parent has
committed “an act of domestic violence,” he or she “has the burden of
proving to the court’s satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the
child or significantly impair the child’s emotional development,” and if this
burden is met, “the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best
protect the child and the other parent from further harm.” A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(F). And with respect to legal decision-making authority, a parent’s
commission of non-“significant” domestic violence may in some
circumstances prevent the wrongdoer from receiving sole or joint authority.

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See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). Specifically, there is a rebuttable presumption
against awarding any legal decision-making authority to a parent who
engages in domestic violence against the other parent (who does not do the
same) by either causing serious physical injury to the other parent, placing
the other parent in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious physical
injury to any person, or engaging in a pattern of behavior for which a court
may issue an ex parte protective order for the other parent, the child, or the
child’s siblings. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). To determine whether the
presumption is rebutted, the court must consider enumerated factors.
A.R.S. § 25-403.03(E).

¶17 Here, in conducting its best-interests analysis, the superior
court stated Mother “alleged that Father has committed acts of domestic
violence by slapping and choking her” and “testified about acts of domestic
violence that [F]ather has committed against her and [Daughter].” The
court further stated that “[Daughter] also expressed being choked by
Father” and “[o]ther information was provided about Father’s acts against
[Daughter] . . . in the CAA report.” But those statements were not findings
of fact as to the alleged domestic violence—they merely cataloged the
evidence presented. And the court discredited the evidence regarding
Father’s alleged abuse of Daughter because it found only that “[Father] has
engaged in acts of domestic violence against [Mother].”3

¶18 After finding that Father committed domestic violence
against Mother, the superior court addressed § 25-403.03(A). First, the
court misquoted the statute by repeating the phrase “significant domestic
violence” where the latter part of the statute refers to “a significant history
of domestic violence.” See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A) (emphasis added). Next,
the court stated that it would assess significance based on the seriousness
of the incident, the frequency or pervasiveness of the violence, and the
passage of time and its impact. That was reasonable. See DeLuna, 247 Ariz.
at 424, ¶ 15 n.6. But the court did not then expressly engage in that or any
other analysis to assess whether the domestic violence was “significant” or
part of a “significant history.” In fact, the court failed to identify which of
the several alleged acts of domestic violence against Mother it found
proven. Without specific findings of fact articulating what acts Father
perpetrated and why they were not significant either individually or
cumulatively, we cannot discern the court’s reasoning for its determination

3 Mother’s contention that the court found Father committed domestic
violence against Daughter is unsupported. And we will not re-weigh the
evidence or second-guess the court’s credibility determinations on the
issue. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16.

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that § 25-403.03(A) did not apply. See Miller, 175 Ariz. at 299. Additionally,
the determination was incomplete because after the court found the
domestic violence was not “significant,” it did not then address whether it
was nonetheless part of a “significant history” of domestic violence as
required under § 25-403.03(A).

¶19 The superior court’s findings on the effect of Father’s
domestic violence under § 25-403.03(D), (E), and (F) were similarly deficient
because, again, the court failed to identify the acts it found proven. Without
specific findings of fact identifying and evaluating the relevant acts,
conclusions under any subsection of § 25-403.03 cannot be adequately
evaluated for error. See Miller, 175 Ariz. at 299. The superior court erred by
failing to make sufficient findings. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 51, ¶ 11.

¶20 On this record, we must vacate the legal-decision-making and
parenting-time orders and remand for reconsideration. On remand, the
court must make specific findings that identify the acts of domestic violence
Father committed against Mother and assess those acts under the standards
of each applicable subsection of § 25-403.03.

¶21 On remand, the superior court must also make specific
findings under § 25-403.04. Section 25-403.04 creates a rebuttable
presumption against awarding any legal decision-making authority to a
parent who has abused drugs or been convicted of a drug offense within
the twelve months preceding the petition. By its terms, the statute requires
specific findings: it provides that the court “shall state its . . . 1. Findings of
fact that support its determination that the parent abused drugs or . . . was
convicted of the offense . . . [and] 2. Findings that the legal decision-making
or parenting time arrangement ordered by the court appropriately protects
the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403.04(A). The statute also requires the court to
consider enumerated rebuttal factors if the presumption applies, including,
under subsection (B)(1), whether the parent has been convicted of any other
drug offense within the previous five years. A.R.S. § 25-403.04(B).

¶22 Here, the court concluded that the statutory presumption
arose and was rebutted based on findings that “Father’s test results show
he is using marijuana,” “he maintains a medical marijuana card,” and he
“also has a prior conviction for narcotics.” Those findings did not, however,
support the court’s conclusions. To start, the findings were inadequate to
show that the presumption arose.4 Although the court found that Father

4 Mother argues that we should assess the adequacy of the findings only
on the rebuttal factors because Father did not appeal the application of the

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was using marijuana and had a medical use card, it made no finding that
his use amounted to “abuse[]” under § 25-403.04(A). And while the court
found that Father had a prior drug conviction, the evidence showed he had
only one such conviction and it occurred almost four years before the
petition, well outside the timeframe contemplated by § 25-403.04(A).

¶23 Further, the court failed to make a finding under § 25-
403.04(A)(2) that the legal decision-making and parenting-time awards
appropriately protected the children. Additionally, the court made
conflicting findings on the § 25-403.04(B) rebuttal factor. Although the
court found a prior conviction that necessarily qualified for consideration
under § 25-403.04(B)(1), the court nonetheless separately found that there
was “[n]o credible evidence presented” regarding that subsection.5

CONCLUSION

¶24 In determining legal decision-making authority and
parenting time, the superior court failed to make sufficient findings under
A.R.S. §§ 25-403.03 and -403.04. We vacate the legal-decision-making and
parenting-time orders, and remand for reconsideration and appropriate
findings. We express no opinion on the merits. We deny the parties’
competing requests for discretionary attorneys’ fees and costs.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

presumption. We disagree. See Olesen, 251 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 17 (holding that
the requirement for best-interests findings supersedes waiver principles).

5 We note that § 25-403.04 defines the relevancy of a parent’s criminal
history in terms of the timing of the conviction—not the underlying
conduct—for purposes of determining both whether the presumption
arises and whether it is rebutted. See A.R.S. § 25-403.04(A), (B)(1).

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