State v. Cooper

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JAVON COLEON COOPER, Appellant.

Nos. 1 CA-CR 24-0350 and 1 CA-CR 24-0351
(Consolidated)
FILED 05-01-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. CR2019-001403-001, CR2021-001972-001
The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Deborah Celeste Kinney
Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Randal B. McDonald, Phoenix
By Randal Boyd McDonald
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. COOPER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Javon Cooper appeals his convictions of first-degree
premeditated murder and misconduct involving weapons (prohibited
possessor) and the resulting sentences. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 One evening in June 2018, the victim purchased beer from a
convenience store in north Phoenix and then walked south down the road.
Cooper drove north past the victim on his way to meet an acquaintance at
a restaurant across the road. Cooper parked and told his acquaintance to
wait for him, then walked across the road, leaving his car running. Cooper
came up behind the victim and shot him once. The victim fell onto the road
and, after a few seconds, Cooper shot him again.

¶3 Cooper ran back to his car and drove away. The victim
hobbled across the street as several passersby called 911 and stopped to
render aid. The victim told them that “Coop” had shot him, described
Cooper’s car, and gave an approximate location where he might be found.
Video and limited audio of the incident and aftermath were recorded on a
city bus’s surveillance system.

¶4 The victim died at the hospital later that evening. An autopsy
showed two gunshot wounds, one entering the victim’s left buttock and the
other his left thigh. Each bullet’s pathway was directed back to front, left
to right, and slightly downward through the victim’s body, with the State
arguing at trial that the victim was shot from behind unaware. Either
wound could have caused enough blood loss to be fatal.

¶5 The State charged Cooper with first-degree premeditated
murder and, in a separate case, misconduct involving weapons (prohibited
possessor). At Cooper’s request, the two charges were consolidated for
trial.

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¶6 Cooper testified at trial, acknowledging that he shot the
victim but claiming self-defense. He also admitted that he was not legally
permitted to carry a gun because of a prior felony conviction. Cooper
testified that he knew the victim for about a year before the shooting but
cut ties after witnessing the victim commit several violent acts and being
threatened by the victim.

¶7 Cooper testified that, when he saw the victim on the day of
the shooting, he thought it could be an opportunity to clear the air. He
exchanged nods with the victim while driving past, then called the victim’s
name to get his attention while walking toward him on the sidewalk.
Although the victim did not turn around, he was responding over his
shoulder. Cooper further testified that the victim threatened him and began
to turn toward him with a small black revolver in his left hand. Fearing for
his life, Cooper pulled a gun from his pocket and shot the victim, then shot
him again after the victim fell but still held his gun. Cooper testified that,
once the victim (who was still alive and mobile) dropped his gun, Cooper
ran.

¶8 The jury found Cooper guilty as charged. The superior court
sentenced him to concurrent terms of natural life in prison for first-degree
murder and 2.5 years for misconduct involving weapons. Cooper timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Cooper alleges an array of errors that, he asserts, individually
and collectively require reversal. We conclude otherwise.

I. Vindictive Prosecution.

¶10 Cooper argues the superior court erred by denying his motion
to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, asserting that the State improperly
increased the charge against him from second- to first-degree murder in
retaliation for his rejection of a plea offer. We review this ruling for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Dansdill, 246 Ariz. 593, 597, ¶ 6 (App. 2019).

¶11 The State originally charged Cooper with second-degree
murder. A different prosecutor was assigned to the case several months
later and, after an independent review, determined the evidence supported
a finding of premeditation and thus warranted a first-degree murder charge
instead. The prosecutor emailed defense counsel to inform him of the
charging decision and concurrently extended an offer for Cooper to plead
to second-degree murder with a 20-year prison sentence “if [Cooper] would

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like to accept early responsibility.” Cooper declined the plea offer, and the
State reindicted him on one count of first-degree murder, dismissing the
second-degree charge.

¶12 Cooper moved to dismiss the new indictment with prejudice,
asserting that the increased charge was imposed as punishment for his
decision to exercise his right to go to trial rather than accept the proffered
plea deal. The superior court denied the motion as well as Cooper’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

¶13 A prosecutor has broad discretion over charging decisions
but may not use that authority to “punish[] defendants for exercising their
protected legal rights by subsequently subjecting them to more severe
charges.” State v. Mieg, 225 Ariz. 445, 447, ¶ 10 (App. 2010) (citing United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982)). Absent objective proof of actual
vindictiveness, “a defendant may rely on a presumption of vindictiveness
if the circumstances establish a ‘realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.’” Id.
at 448, ¶ 11 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)). Triggering
this presumption requires something more than just increased charges
following exercise of a legal right. Dansdill, 246 Ariz. at 598, ¶ 8. The
defendant must point to additional facts or circumstances that, in
combination with the timing of the new charges, support the conclusion
that the charging decision “is more likely than not explainable only as an
effort to penalize defendant for asserting his legal right.” Id.; Mieg, 225 Ariz.
at 448–50, ¶¶ 15, 21.

¶14 Cooper made no such showing here. The record reflects that
the decision to charge Cooper with first-degree murder was made before
the plea offer was extended, not because Cooper rejected it. Cooper asserts
that new charges must be based on new evidence, which was absent here.
But increased charges at a pretrial stage may also be based on further
evaluation of existing evidence, like the prosecutor’s reassessment of
whether the bus surveillance video would support a finding of
premeditation. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381; see also United States v. Raymer,
941 F.2d 1031, 1042 (10th Cir. 1991). Although Cooper frames the
prosecutor’s actions as threatening increased charges only if he rejected the
plea offer, the prosecutor’s email permissibly reflected a preexisting
decision to reindict on first-degree murder accompanied by a plea offer to
a lesser charge should Cooper “accept early responsibility.” See Dansdill,
246 Ariz. at 598, ¶ 9 n.3 (“[J]ust as a prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges
already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a
prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a

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defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded.”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380).

¶15 For the first time on appeal, Cooper suggests that the State’s
failure to present evidence of justification to the grand jury supports a
finding of prosecutorial vindictiveness. But any such challenge to the grand
jury proceedings must be presented in a pretrial motion to remand for a
redetermination of probable cause and, if denied, reviewed by special
action before trial. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 439–40, ¶ 31 (2004); see
also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9(a). Cooper also offers no basis to show the State
had notice that self-defense was in play (or access to any evidence of
justification) when it presented the case to the grand jury.

¶16 Cooper has not shown that the superior court erred by
denying this motion to dismiss.

II. Admission and Preclusion of Evidence.

A. Victim’s Prior Violent Acts.

¶17 Cooper argues the superior court erred by unduly limiting
evidence of the victim’s prior acts of violence of which he was aware, which
was relevant to his self-defense claim. We review this evidentiary ruling
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 114, ¶ 8 (App. 2009).

¶18 Before trial, the court ruled Cooper could present evidence of
several specific prior acts of violence by the victim, acts that Cooper either
witnessed personally or to which he was himself subjected. Cooper
ultimately testified to all of these acts: the victim brandishing a black
revolver at Cooper after beating up the victim’s girlfriend and locking her
in the bathroom; the victim attacking Cooper with a knife and later pointing
a rifle or shotgun at his head and pulling the trigger during a dispute over
$10; and the victim brandishing a black revolver threateningly when
Cooper ran into him at a convenience store a couple of months later.

¶19 The court precluded evidence of other specific acts that
Cooper did not witness (and related propensity allegations), including (1)
the victim’s domestic violence against two former girlfriends, (2) the
victim’s altercation with a cousin involving a knife, for which both were
arrested but never charged, (3) the victim’s girlfriend’s mother’s statement
that the victim was physically abusive to her daughter, (4) the victim’s
girlfriend’s mother’s allegation that the victim threatened her over the
phone, (5) the victim’s propensity for violence when intoxicated, and (6) the
victim’s propensity to carry a gun.

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¶20 Other-acts evidence is generally inadmissible “to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But, if a defendant claiming self-defense knew of
specific acts of violence by the victim, such evidence may be admitted to
prove the defendant’s state of mind—that he “reasonably feared for his
safety and used a reasonable degree of force in light of that fear.” Fish, 222
Ariz. at 121, ¶ 37; see also State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 559, ¶ 14 (App. 2007)
(noting that the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s violent disposition
“may have affected the defendant’s thinking about the need to respond
with deadly physical force”); Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)(2). Evidence of specific
acts of violence may also be admissible to prove motive, opportunity,
intent, or other non-propensity purposes. Fish, 222 Ariz. at 122–23, ¶ 42;
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

¶21 Even if otherwise admissible for a permissible purpose,
evidence of the victim’s other acts may be precluded under Rule 403 if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. See State v. Gentry, 247 Ariz. 381, 386, ¶ 17 (App. 2019). The court
may consider “the strength of the evidence of the prior violent act, the
degree of similarity between the prior violent act and the event at issue, the
need for the evidence, whether alternative proof would be effective,
whether the prior violent act was recent or remote, and the degree to which
the evidence would likely engender hostility in the jury.” State v. Zaid, 249
Ariz. 154, 158, ¶ 13 (App. 2020).

¶22 Here, the superior court reasonably assessed the proffered
evidence and permitted Cooper to testify about the most compelling, most
similar incidents. All involved the victim using a firearm, and at least two
involved the victim using a gun to threaten Cooper directly. As to the
precluded evidence, even if Cooper had heard about the victim’s domestic
violence or his altercation with his cousin, see State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117,
120–21 (1963) (noting that the defendant’s knowledge of the other acts is
sufficient, even without personal observation), the evidence of those acts
was comparatively weak (based on multiple layers of hearsay and with
limited detail) and the acts themselves were markedly different than
Cooper’s interaction with the victim. At the evidentiary hearing on this
issue, Cooper never mentioned the victim’s girlfriend’s mother’s
allegations about the victim’s violence, suggesting either that he did not
know of them or that they did not affect his state of mind. And Cooper
testified that, when he crossed the street toward the victim before the first
shot, he noticed that the victim “wasn’t yet intoxicated,” negating the
relevance of the victim’s reputation for violence when intoxicated. Finally,

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despite the preclusion ruling, Cooper in fact testified at trial about the
frequency with which the victim carried a weapon.

¶23 In short, Cooper has not shown reversible error related to the
court’s ruling on evidence of the victim’s other violent acts.

B. Cooper’s Prior Convictions.

¶24 Cooper asserts that the superior court erred by admitting
evidence of his prior felony convictions at trial. Our supreme court has
emphasized the potential prejudicial effect of evidence of a defendant’s
prior felony convictions, cautioning against joining charges that require
proof of a prior felony conviction with other charges for trial. State v. Burns,
237 Ariz. 1, 14–15, ¶¶ 34–37, 39 (2015). Here, the State charged Cooper with
misconduct involving weapons as a prohibited possessor, a charge that
required proof of at least one prior felony conviction. See A.R.S. §§ 13-
3102(A)(4), -3101(A)(7)(b); see also Burns, 237 Ariz. at 14, ¶ 34. But it did so
in a case separate from the murder charge.

¶25 It was Cooper who affirmatively asked that the two charges
be consolidated for trial, his counsel stating that Cooper was “100 percent
certain[]” to testify (and be subject to impeachment with his prior
convictions, see Ariz. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B)) and that it would be “less
prejudicial” if the State presented the prior felony conviction information
in its case in chief. Consistent with that request, Cooper (through counsel)
expressly “waive[d] any argument against the presentation of [his] criminal
history reference prior felony convictions that pre-date or post-date the date
of offense for the current charges and/or for the consolidation of these
matters for trial.” The State thus presented a redacted document showing
Cooper’s felony convictions from Ohio during its case in chief.

¶26 The invited error doctrine prevents the source of an alleged
error—a party that “engaged in affirmative, independent action to create
the error or argue in favor of it”—from obtaining appellate relief based on
that basis. State v. Robertson, 249 Ariz. 256, 260, ¶¶ 15–16, 18 (2020). To the
extent Cooper now argues that admission of the prior felony convictions
was improper, he invited any such error and is thus precluded from relief.
See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 145, ¶ 38 (2018). Moreover, Cooper
offers no argument that the prior convictions would not have been
independently admissible as impeachment evidence under Rule 609, given
his decision to testify at trial. And although Cooper suggests in his reply
brief on appeal that the admitted prior felony convictions information was
objectionable notwithstanding joinder of the charges and notwithstanding

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his decision to testify, he offers no argument delineating what extraneous
information was erroneously admitted or how that information was
unfairly prejudicial. Cooper has not shown reversible error.

C. Cooper’s Statement to Law Enforcement.

¶27 Cooper argues the superior court erred by denying his
request to suppress his statement to detectives, asserting that the statement
was elicited after he invoked his right to counsel. We review this ruling for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46, 49, ¶ 9 (2016).

¶28 After the shooting, Cooper moved to Ohio, where he was later
arrested on unrelated charges. Phoenix police detectives interviewed him
while he was in custody there. After a few minutes of introductions and
discussion about Cooper’s background information, Cooper asked, “May I
ask what is this about. I don’t feel comfortable asking questions with you
guys. I’d rather speak to a lawyer. You guys keep asking me questions and
I don’t know what’s going on.” The detectives answered that they would
tell him what was going on: that they were there about an incident in
Phoenix and wanted Cooper’s perspective, whether it was self-defense or
someone else was involved or he was not involved. Cooper asked, “self-
defense of what,” and the detectives responded that there had been a
shooting and Cooper’s “name [was] put into something,” but that Cooper
could stop the interview at any time. Cooper asked, “my name was put
into what,” and the detectives responded that it was an incident in Phoenix,
but noted that to talk they needed to read his Miranda rights and reiterated
that Cooper could stop at any time. Cooper responded, “I wasn’t
involved.” A detective then asked if he wanted to know anything about
what happened, and Cooper responded, “No, I care not to because I wasn’t
involved in anything.” The detectives then read Cooper his Miranda
warnings, and the interview proceeded.

¶29 Four days before trial, Cooper moved to suppress his
statements during that interview. The State clarified that it only intended
to introduce Cooper’s statement denying involvement in an incident in
Phoenix. The superior court reviewed and summarized the interview on
the record, then denied Cooper’s motion to suppress. First, the court found
that the interaction was a custodial interrogation. The court further found,
however, that Cooper’s reference to a lawyer was not a clear and
unequivocal request for an attorney, noting that Cooper continued to ask
questions and engage the detectives, who continued to repeat that Cooper
was free to end the conversation. Cooper’s statement that he was not
involved in anything was volunteered in response to the detectives’

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explanatory statements and their offer to provide more information, not in
response to questioning designed to elicit an incriminating response.

¶30 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
includes a right to counsel during custodial interrogation. See U.S. Const.
Amend. V; State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 126, ¶ 26 (2006). If the individual
subject to interrogation invokes the right to counsel, “all questioning must
cease until an attorney is present or the defendant reinitiates
communication.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 397, ¶ 24 (2006). But any
such invocation must be unambiguous and unequivocal; “[i]f a reasonable
officer in the circumstances would have understood only that the defendant
might want an attorney, then questioning need not cease.” Id. at ¶ 25 (citing
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). Statements such as “maybe
I should talk to a lawyer,” Davis, 512 U.S. at 462, “I think I might want an
attorney,” Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 127, ¶ 29, or “I think I better talk to a lawyer
first,” State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 250 (1994), have been found insufficient
to invoke the right to counsel.

¶31 Cooper asserts that he unequivocally invoked his right to
counsel by saying “I’d rather speak to a lawyer.” But the comment was
sandwiched between Cooper’s affirmative request for more information
(“May I ask what this is about. I don’t feel comfortable asking questions
with you guys.”) and his statement that he did not understand what was
happening (“You guys keep asking me questions and I don’t know what’s
going on.”). In the context of his affirmative request for further explanation,
Cooper’s reference to a lawyer was not a clear and unambiguous invocation
of his right to counsel. Cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (noting that
“the circumstances leading up to the request [may] render it ambiguous”).
The superior court did not err by denying suppression on this basis.

D. Autopsy Photographs.

¶32 Cooper argues the superior court erred by admitting overly
gruesome autopsy photos of the victim, which he asserts had only minimal
relevance and posed a significant danger of unfairly inflaming the jury. We
review this evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cota, 229
Ariz. 136, 147, ¶ 45 (2012).

¶33 The superior court admitted seven autopsy photographs of
the victim: one of the victim’s face to show identity, two of the exit wound
on the victim’s left thigh (one wide shot and one close-up showing the
bullet’s exit point as distinguished from the incision made during surgical
intervention), one of the victim’s left groin (post-surgical intervention)

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showing where a bullet came to rest, and three showing the two entry
wounds on the victim’s back side (one overall shot and one close up of each
wound). The court acknowledged that a few of these photos—particularly
those of the exit wound and one bullet’s resting place, which showed
surgical incisions—could be considered “gruesome” and “fairly graphic,”
but found them to be probative and not unfairly prejudicial.

¶34 Admissibility of such photographs turns on “(1) the
photograph’s relevance, (2) its tendency to inflame the jury, and (3) its
probative value compared to its potential to cause unfair prejudice.” Id. at
¶ 46. Photos of the decedent’s injuries are relevant because “the fact and
cause of death are always relevant in a murder prosecution,” even if those
issues are not contested. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 288 (1983); State v.
Rushing, 243 Ariz. 212, 219, ¶ 27 (2017). And such photos may be relevant
for other purposes, such as “to identify the victim, to show the nature and
location of the fatal injury, . . . and to corroborate the state’s theory of how
and why the homicide was committed.” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 339,
¶ 70 (2007) (quoting Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 288). If the photos are relevant to
only uncontested issues or otherwise have merely “technical relevance,”
however, they may “have little use or purpose except to inflame” and thus
be inadmissible. Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 288.

¶35 Here, the handful of photographs admitted were relevant to
identifying the victim and his fatal wounds. In conjunction with the
medical examiner’s testimony, they also illustrated the pathways the bullets
took through the victim’s body. This evidence—the location of the entry
wounds and the directionality of the bullets’ paths—was directly relevant
both to the State’s theory of how the shooting occurred (shot from behind
unaware) and to Cooper’s opposing theory of self-defense (positing that the
victim had been turning toward Cooper with a gun). And by asking only
to “exclude anything that isn’t entrance wound, exit wound,” Cooper
arguably conceded that the most graphic photos (those of the exit wound
and the other bullet’s resting place, which showed surgical incisions) had
more than marginal relevance. Given the photos’ relevance to a contested
issue, the court did not err by admitting them.

III. Jury Instructions.

A. Willits Instruction.

¶36 Cooper argues the superior court erred by denying his
request for an instruction under State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964), urging
that the police lost or failed to preserve evidence (specifically, the victim’s

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alleged gun) by failing to promptly secure the crime scene. We review this
ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 33 (1995).

¶37 A Willits instruction permits jurors to draw an adverse
inference if the State lost, destroyed, or failed to preserve evidence that was
potentially helpful to the defendant. Id. “To be entitled to a Willits
instruction, a defendant must prove that (1) the state failed to preserve
material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency
to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice.” State v.
Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, 150, ¶ 8 (2014) (citation omitted).

¶38 Here, Cooper failed to prove that delay by the police in
securing the crime scene led to loss of evidence. To be sure, Cooper asserted
that the victim had a gun when Cooper shot him. But Cooper offers no
more than speculation about what happened to any such gun after he fled
the scene. Witnesses reported seeing nothing in the victim’s hands in the
immediate aftermath of the shooting, and responding police officers, who
arrived within three minutes after the shooting, reported no weapon near
the victim and no witness accounts of firearms other than Cooper’s.

¶39 The bus surveillance video showed individuals standing in or
near the site of the shooting (across the street from where the victim was
receiving medical aid) for more than ten minutes, including an individual
bending toward the ground and “persons unknown” moving the victim’s
beer and sandals onto a nearby wall. Cooper was able to—and did—use
this evidence to argue to the jury that someone had removed a gun the
victim had during that time. But the record falls short of the proof necessary
to show that existing evidence was lost due to the State’s inaction as
necessary to warrant a Willits instruction. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 250
Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 16 (2020) (limiting preservation obligation under Willits to
evidence that “is ‘obviously material’ when, at the time the state encounters
the evidence during its investigation, the state relies on the evidence or
knows the defendant will use the evidence for his or her defense”).

B. Crime Prevention Justification.

¶40 Cooper asserts that the superior court erred by failing to sua
sponte instruct the jury on use of force in crime prevention as a justification
defense. Cooper did not request such an instruction or object to its
omission, so we review only for fundamental, prejudicial error. Escalante,
245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21.

¶41 Cooper disclosed only self-defense (and, for a time, necessity)
as his theory of justification. And he never requested instruction on any

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justification other than self-defense. Although the superior court is
obligated to “properly instruct the jury on the elements of the charged
offenses and on reasonable doubt, there is no sua sponte duty to instruct
the jury on justifications that the defendant does not request.” State v.
Brown, 258 Ariz. 270, 275, ¶ 21 (App. 2024); see also id. at 275–77, ¶¶ 25–30.
Cooper has not shown error.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

¶42 Cooper argues that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence of premeditation, suggesting that the evidence instead showed a
verbal altercation, the victim holding a gun and turning toward Cooper,
and Cooper not aiming to kill. We review sufficiency of the evidence de
novo, assessing whether the evidence (both direct and circumstantial) was
such that a rational factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶¶ 15–16 (2011).

¶43 Premeditated first-degree murder, as charged here, requires
proof that, “[i]ntending or knowing that the person’s conduct will cause
death, the person causes the death of another person . . . with
premeditation.” A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1). “‘Premeditation’ means that the
defendant acts with either the intention or the knowledge that he will kill
another human being, when such intention or knowledge precedes the
killing by any length of time to permit reflection.” A.R.S. § 13-1101(1); State
v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 479–80, ¶ 32 (2003); see also State v. Boyston, 231
Ariz. 539, 551, ¶ 60 (requiring “actual reflection and more than mere
passage of time”).

¶44 Here, Cooper testified that he did not intend to kill the victim
and “just reacted” when he saw the victim turning with a gun, believing his
life to be in danger. But other evidence permitted the jurors to draw a
different conclusion. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212, ¶ 87 (2007).
Although Cooper described it differently, the video evidence showed
Cooper crossing the street behind the victim, increasing his speed to catch
up without any apparent reaction from the victim, then shooting the victim
from behind. After the victim fell into the street, Cooper stepped toward
him and, after several seconds, shot him from behind again. Although the
jury was not compelled to reach that conclusion, it could permissibly infer
intent and sufficient reflection showing premeditation. See State v.
VanWinkle, 230 Ariz. 387, 392, ¶ 16 (2012).

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V. Post-Judgment Ruling on Alleged Juror Misconduct.

¶45 Cooper asserts the superior court erred by denying his post-
judgment request for relief alleging juror misconduct. The prosecutor
reported overhearing one of the trial jurors, who was in or near the
courtroom just after sentencing, telling the victim’s family of her confidence
in the guilty verdict, stating that “they looked [Cooper] up” and that she
knew “he had done ‘this’ before in Ohio.” Cooper filed a motion to vacate
judgment asking the court to release the juror’s name and contact
information to permit investigation into potential juror misconduct. The
court released the juror information to the parties but declined to vacate
judgment at that time. Cooper then timely appealed from verdicts and
resulting sentences.

¶46 Almost eight months later, Cooper filed a self-represented
post-judgment motion seeking a new trial and raising (among other issues)
potential juror misconduct. Cooper’s appellate attorney later filed a
supplement seeking an evidentiary hearing, asserting that new evidence
suggested the jurors may have impermissibly looked up Cooper’s criminal
history and engaged in an improper reenactment during deliberations. The
superior court denied the post-judgment motion as supplemented,
concluding that new evidence did not establish juror misconduct. Cooper
did not separately appeal from that ruling.

¶47 Cooper now argues that the superior court erred by failing to
vacate the conviction, or at least hold an evidentiary hearing, based on what
he claims is evidence of serial juror misconduct. We lack jurisdiction to
consider this argument, however, because Cooper appealed only from the
judgment and sentence, not from the later ruling on his post-judgment
motion.

¶48 The superior court’s ruling on a post-judgment request to
vacate judgment is separately appealable. See State v. Wynn, 114 Ariz. 561,
563 (App. 1977); see also A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3). By rule, a notice of appeal
from that ruling is due “no later than 20 days after entry of the decision.”
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.2(d). Timely appeal from the judgment of conviction
and sentence vests this court with jurisdiction to review “all pre-judgment
rulings or orders necessarily affecting that judgment” because such rulings
are “interlocutory and non-final, . . . interwoven with, and indispensable to,
the ultimate judgment of conviction.” See State v. Sanchez, CR 23-0270-PR,
2024 WL 938080, at *1 (Ariz. Mar. 5, 2024) (emphasis added). The ruling on
a post-judgment request to vacate judgment, in contrast, is necessarily
separate from and does not become a part of the preexisting and already-

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final judgment. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.2(b); State v. Hickle, 129 Ariz. 330,
332 (1981). Appeal from the judgment itself thus does not provide this court
with appellate jurisdiction to review the court’s separately appealable post-
judgment ruling.

¶49 We lack jurisdiction to consider Cooper’s challenge to the
post-judgment ruling regarding alleged juror misconduct. Accordingly, we
do not address it.

CONCLUSION

¶50 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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