State v. McQueen

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

NOAH JACOB MCQUEEN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0263
FILED 05-20-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-123702-001
The Honorable Monica Edelstein, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael O’Toole
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua Messick
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MCQUEEN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Noah Jacob McQueen appeals his convictions and sentences
for aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and false reporting to law
enforcement. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdicts. See State v. Reaves, 252 Ariz. 553, 558, ¶ 2 (App. 2022).

¶3 On May 16, 2024, patrolling officers saw McQueen in “a little
section . . . behind the dumpsters” in a CVS parking lot. The officers
approached McQueen, who initially provided a false name. When the
officers could not identify him, they told McQueen they would detain him
and he “started to run.” The officers quickly grabbed McQueen, who
struggled against their attempts to restrain and handcuff him. McQueen
“was able to get his elbow up and hit [one officer] across the nose,” and the
officer responded by striking McQueen in the face. During the struggle,
McQueen was told “numerous times” to stop resisting arrest. Once
McQueen was handcuffed, the fire department arrived and performed a
preliminary medical evaluation, after which McQueen chose to be
transported by ambulance to the hospital. An officer who accompanied
McQueen in the ambulance alleged McQueen threatened him in the
ambulance and again at the hospital. McQueen later kicked an officer in
the neck while handcuffed to a hospital bed.

¶4 McQueen was charged with two counts of aggravated assault,
one count of resisting arrest, one count of false reporting to law
enforcement, and one count of threatening or intimidating. The superior
court found McQueen indigent and appointed counsel. However, in
November 2024 the court permitted the appointed counsel to withdraw
based on communication problems. McQueen then waived his right to
counsel and asked to represent himself. The superior court found
McQueen’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary;

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granted his request to self-represent; and appointed advisory counsel.
Before trial, the superior court granted McQueen’s request to assign an
investigator to his case.

¶5 At his February 2025 jury trial, McQueen chose to defer his
opening statement until after the State presented its evidence. During the
State’s case, McQueen provided a supplemental disclosure noticing the
court-appointed investigator as a witness. The superior court found this
disclosure was untimely and precluded the investigator from testifying.
After the State rested, the superior court asked McQueen whether he would
present any evidence. He told the court he did not want to testify and
would offer no other evidence. When he requested to present his deferred
opening statement, the superior court denied his request, reasoning that an
opening statement previews the evidence and McQueen had presented
none.

¶6 The trial proceeded with jury instructions and then both
parties presented closing arguments. The jury acquitted McQueen on one
count of aggravated assault and the threatening or intimidating count but
found him guilty on the remaining three charges. The court sentenced him
to five years’ imprisonment.

¶7 McQueen timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Opening Statement

¶8 McQueen argues the superior court erred in precluding him
from making an opening statement. We review the superior court’s ruling
on the scope of an opening statement for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. 114, 116, ¶ 8 (2016). Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure (“Rule”) 19.1 governs criminal trial conduct in Arizona. Rule
19.1(b)(3) states that a defendant “may make or defer an opening
statement,” and Rule 19.1(b)(5) grants a second opportunity to “make an
opening statement if it was deferred.” Even so, the order of proceedings at
trial may be altered if “the court directs otherwise,” and this phrase grants
the court discretion over the order of conduct of the trial. Ariz. R. Crim. P.
19.1(b); State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 457 (App. 1996).

¶9 McQueen asserts the superior court abused its discretion
when it precluded him from making an opening statement. An improper

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restriction on the scope of an opening statement does not “deprive [the
defendant] of the basic protections of a criminal trial” and is therefore non-
structural error. See Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. at 117, ¶¶ 15-16. We review a
claim of non-structural error for harmless error when the defendant, as
McQueen did here, objects at trial and thereby preserves the issue for
appeal. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 17-18 (2005). Error is
harmless if the State can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to or affect the verdict. State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582,
585, ¶ 11 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245
Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 15 (2018).

¶10 Here, we need not decide whether the superior court erred
because any such error was harmless. “The purpose of an opening
statement is to advise the jury of the facts relied upon and of the questions
and issues involved, which the jury will have to determine, and to give
them a general picture of the facts and the situations, so that they will be
able to understand the evidence.” State v. Burruell, 98 Ariz. 37, 40 (1965)
(citation omitted). Once McQueen elected not to testify or present evidence,
he had no facts to present to the jury. And shortly after the superior court
denied McQueen the opportunity to make an opening statement, he made
a closing argument to the jury. His very brief closing argument neither
recounted the evidence nor presented an argument explaining why the jury
should find him not guilty. McQueen instead told the jury that “[w]e’re
here for whatever reason God has brought us here for. You’re not going to
make any decision today that God hasn’t already made for you.”

¶11 Even so, the State’s evidence was straightforward and did not
require an introduction by McQueen for the jury to understand it. The State
presented testimony of the two officers involved in the incident and played
video from their body-worn cameras. The jury needed no other
information or context to understand what they heard or how it related to
the charged crimes. The jury also considered McQueen’s cross-examination
of the two officers, which highlighted alleged factual inconsistencies in their
testimonies. In addition, the jury acquitted McQueen on two of the five
charges against him, demonstrating that they understood the facts
presented in his favor even without an opening statement. Cf. State v.
Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993) (holding that the defendant’s acquittal on
some charges against him weighed against a finding of prejudice).

¶12 The State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the
denial of McQueen’s opening statement did not affect the verdicts. Thus,
we hold that any potential error from this denial was harmless and decline
to reverse on this ground.

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STATE v. MCQUEEN
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II. Witness Preclusion

¶13 McQueen next argues the superior court erred in precluding
his late-disclosed witness from testifying. To prove the exclusion of
evidence is error, a defendant must show that the exclusion affects the
defendant’s substantial rights and must make an offer of proof as to what
the witness’s testimony would have been. Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). But an
offer of proof is not required if it is obvious what the proof will be or if the
relevance and materiality of the excluded evidence is apparent. Id.; State v.
Hernandez, 232 Ariz. 313, 322, ¶ 43 (2013).

¶14 Here, the relevance of the investigator’s testimony is not
obvious. McQueen sought to introduce photos of the arrest scene through
the investigator’s testimony. In the State’s case-in-chief, McQueen tried to
use the photos to cross-examine the State’s witness about the lack of no-
trespassing signs on the property where he was arrested. Whether signs
were present is irrelevant to McQueen’s case, as he was not charged with
trespassing and his lawful right to be on CVS property was not an element
of the charged offenses. See State v. Jurden, 239 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 18 (2016)
(holding that resisting arrest remains illegal even if the underlying arrest is
not legal). The excluded testimony is not obviously relevant or material,
and thus McQueen needed to make an offer of proof to warrant its
admission. Because he did not, the court did not err by precluding the
witness.

III. Self-Representation

¶15 McQueen further argues that the superior court should have
denied his request for self-representation. The right to self-representation
is guaranteed by both the United States and Arizona Constitutions. State v.
Underwood, 255 Ariz. 86, 88, ¶ 10 (App. 2023). This right is balanced against
the right to a fair, orderly trial. State v. Dunbar, 257 Ariz. 421, 428, ¶ 24
(2024). The request to self-represent must be timely and is subject to a
finding that the waiver of counsel is made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 322 (1994).

¶16 The superior court found that McQueen’s waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. However, McQueen contends that
given his mental-health concerns, he was not competent to self-represent
and the court should have denied his request. Self-representation at trial
requires that a defendant have “sufficient mental capacity to understand
the nature of the dispute; formulate a defense strategy; and engage with the

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STATE v. MCQUEEN
Decision of the Court

court, counsel, witnesses and, in some cases, the jury.” State v. Ibeabuchi,
248 Ariz. 412, 416, ¶ 16 (App. 2020).

¶17 The record reflects that McQueen had sufficient mental
capacity. The court’s colloquy with McQueen shows that he understood
the charged offenses and was able to formulate a defense strategy based on
the officers’ conduct and whether his arrest was legally justified. While this
strategy only partially persuaded the jury, it was logically coherent and
displayed McQueen’s ability to defend against the charges. The record
shows that McQueen appropriately engaged with the court, participated in
voir dire, and cross-examined the State’s witnesses. McQueen may not
have shown the same legal expertise as an attorney, but that does not
indicate he was not competent to self-represent. “[A] defendant need not
himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and
intelligently to choose self-representation.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 835 (1975).

¶18 McQueen also argues that before trial, the superior court
expressed concern that he was having a “mental health crisis” during a
preliminary court appearance and considered referring him for Rule 11
competency proceedings. But McQueen omits that at two later hearings the
same superior court judge expressed no concern about his mental health.
Even so, having a mental health condition alone does not suffice to render
a defendant incapable of self-representation. See State v. Evans, 125 Ariz.
401, 403 (1980) (holding that a defendant who underwent Rule 11
examination and was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic could still
understand the nature of his court proceedings and was therefore capable
of self-representation). The superior court did not err in granting
McQueen’s request for self-representation.

IV. Access to Courts

¶19 Finally, McQueen argues he was denied meaningful access to
the court and was thus denied a fair trial. McQueen, who was incarcerated
while he awaited trial, contends that Inmate Legal Services did not file the
motions he prepared, resulting in those motions being denied as untimely.

¶20 The United States Constitution requires that an inmate be
provided meaningful access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350
(1996); State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 540, ¶ 47 (App. 1999). To succeed on a
claim of denied access, a defendant must establish both a denial of
meaningful access and that the denial actually injured the defendant’s

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ability to present a meritorious argument to the court. Lewis, 518 U.S. at
351; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 540, ¶ 47.

¶21 The record does not support McQueen’s contention that he
was denied meaningful access to the court. McQueen asserted that he
repeatedly tried to file documents through Inmate Legal Services, only to
have the documents returned to him without being filed. However,
McQueen did not allege that those documents were wrongly returned, but
that they were rejected because they contained errors. Nothing in the
record suggests that Inmate Legal Services wrongfully rejected the filings.
And the superior court warned McQueen before he chose to self-represent
that he would face difficulties because he was incarcerated and later offered
to assist McQueen with filing documents once he raised the issue. Based on
this record, we cannot conclude that McQueen was denied meaningful
access to the court.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm McQueen’s convictions and sentences.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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