CJEO Expedited Opinion No. 2021-040 — Acceptance of Campaign Contributions Donated by a Court Employee PAC to a Judicial PAC

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CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS OPINIONS
350 McAllister Street, Room 1144
San Francisco, CA 94102
(855) 854-5366
www.JudicialEthicsOpinions.ca.gov
CJEO Expedited Opinion1 2021-040
[Posted February 23, 2021]
ACCEPTANCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS DONATED BY A
COURT EMPLOYEE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE TO A
JUDICIAL POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE
1 	The California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions (CJEO) issues
Expedited Opinions, formerly known as Oral Advice Summaries, pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 9.80(i)(1) [eff. Jan. 1, 2021]. Expedited Opinions are issued to requesting
judicial officers following a discretionary decision by CJEO to address the ethical issues raised
in an expedited process that does not include posting draft opinions for public comment, as
required for CJEO Formal Opinions. The CJEO Expedited Opinions are published in full,
without identifying information regarding the requesting judicial officer, to provide information
and analysis to the bench and public regarding judicial ethics.

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I. 	Question
Court reporters, clerks and other employees of a superior court have formed a political
action committee (Employee PAC) that collects voluntary contributions from court employees.
The Employee PAC has offered to donate funds to a political action committee that supports the
campaigns of active superior court judges facing an election challenge (Judicial PAC). The
individual judges are not made aware of the identity of employees who contributed to the
Employee PAC or the amount of the individual’s donation. A judge has asked whether the
judge may accept a donation from the Judicial PAC, which includes funds originating from the
Employee PAC.
II. 	Advice Provided
A judge may accept a donation of funds from a Judicial PAC that accepted Employee PAC
donations, provided that (1) the initial contributions from court employees to the Employee PAC
as well as the subsequent contribution from the Employee PAC to the Judicial PAC were each
unsolicited; and (2) there was no judicial coercion of court employees.
III. 	Discussion
a. 	Soliciting contributions
Although the canons 2 generally allow judges to solicit and accept campaign contributions
under specified circumstances, the one categorical exception to this general rule is the
prohibition on soliciting judicial campaign contributions from California state court personnel.
(Canon 5B(4); Rothman et al., Cal. Judicial Conduct Handbook (2020 supp.) § 11.60, p. 116.)
This prohibition includes both direct solicitations by a judge to court employees as well as
indirect solicitations of court employees made by or to third parties. (CJEO Oral Advice
Summary No. 2018-026, Soliciting Endorsements from Trial Court Judges for Other Appellate
Court Justices Subject to Retention Elections, Cal. Supreme Ct. Com. Jud. Ethics Opns., p. 4
(CJEO Oral Advice Summary No. 2018-026) [applying solicitation rules to requests for
2 	All further references to canons, the code, and to advisory committee commentary are to
the California Code of Judicial Ethics unless otherwise indicated.

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endorsement made indirectly].) For that reason, judges as well as entities affiliated with judges
such as a Judicial PAC are prohibited from soliciting both court employees and entities affiliated
with court employees such as an Employee PAC. As a result, judges cannot accept
contributions from a Judicial PAC if the Judicial PAC or any judge solicited either the court
employees who contributed to the Employee PAC or the Employee PAC itself. Conversely, a
judge may accept a contribution from a Judicial PAC if there was no solicitation of court
employees either directly or through the Employee PAC, provided that there was also no
coercion of court employees, as explained in the next section.
b. Coercing contributions
Judges are not permitted under any circumstance to use the prestige of judicial office in a
manner that is, or that would reasonably be perceived to be, coercive. (Canons 1, 2, 2A, 2B &
5B(4).) A judge’s position of influence or control over court employees might give rise to a risk
that an employee-initiated donation is, or is perceived to be, the result of coercion. The potential
for coercion depends on factors including the nature and length of the relationships judges have
with court employees, the size of the court, both numerically and geographically, the frequency
and proximity in which particular judges and court employees work together, and whether
contributions are designated for specific judicial campaigns or instead are intended to benefit all
judges equally. For example, in a small court with only one location and relatively few court
employees, where long term work assignments with single judges are commonplace, there may
be some risk that a judge could ascertain which individuals contributed funds to the Employee
PAC for the judge’s benefit, even when their identities have not been disclosed by the Employee
PAC. In that case, judges may need to exercise particular caution that court employees do not
feel pressured to contribute. Conversely, there may be less such risk in larger courts where court
employees are not assigned to a single judge, judges and court employees are spread out in
multiple courthouses, and employee contributions are not directed to any specific campaigns. In
either circumstance, to the extent possible, ensuring that the identities of court employees who

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donate to an Employee PAC remain unknown to the judges of the court greatly reduces the risk
of coercion.3
A judge cannot accept a campaign contribution from a Judicial PAC which received funds
from an Employee PAC if the judge knows, or reasonably should know, that a judge coerced
either the initial donation from court employees to the Employee PAC or the subsequent
donation of funds from the Employee PAC to the Judicial PAC. However, a judge may accept
such a campaign contribution where there is no judicial solicitation or coercion involved in
either (1) the initial contribution by employees to the Employee PAC or (2) the subsequent
donation by the Employee PAC to the Judicial PAC. (Rothman et al., Cal. Judicial Conduct
Handbook (4th ed. 2017) § 11.54, pp. 774–775; CJEO Oral Advice Summary No. 2018-026,
supra, at p. 4–5; Cal. Judges Assn., Judicial Ethics Update (Jan. 2017) § III.2, p. 6 [judge may
accept an unsolicited campaign donation from a commissioner on judge’s court].) 4
IV. 	Conclusion
The inquiring judge may accept the campaign contribution from a Judicial PAC that
accepted Employee PAC donations where there was no judicial solicitation of either the court
employees who initially donated the funds to the Employee PAC or of the Employee PAC that
3 	The risk of coercion increases if the identities of the employees who donate to an
Employee PAC are disclosed or otherwise made known to the judges of the court, or if their
identity can be ascertained somehow. In that case, coercion can be perceived if a judge fosters
warm relationships with court employees known to have contributed to an Employee PAC while
keeping those who have not at a distance, or treating non-contributors with any disrespect or
disdain. Similarly, if a presiding judge discharges his or her administrative duties of court
supervision or management in a manner that is consistently more favorable to known
contributors to an Employee PAC, employees may feel pressured to contribute.
4 	There may be circumstances in which judges are required to disclose campaign
contributions originating from a court employee that pass through an Employee PAC to a
Judicial PAC before being paid to the judge’s campaign at the direction of the Employee PAC.
CJEO Oral Advice Summary No. 2018-025, Disqualification and Disclosure Duties of a Trial
Judge Assigned as an Appellate Justice, Cal. Supreme Ct. Com. Jud. Ethics Opns., p. 3 [noting
that disclosures might be required when a party contributes to a super PAC that donates to a
judge’s campaign].)

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donated to the Judicial PAC, as long as the judge does not know, or have reason to know, that
either donation was coerced.

This expedited opinion is advisory only. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.80(a), (e); Cal.
Supreme Ct. Com. Jud. Ethics Opns. (CJEO), Internal Operating Rules & Proc. rule 1(a), (b).)
It is based on facts and issues, or topics of interest, presented to the California Supreme Court
Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions in a request for an opinion (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
9.80(i)(2); CJEO rules 2(f), 6(c)), or on subjects deemed appropriate by the committee (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 9.80(i)(1); CJEO rule 6(a)). The conclusions expressed in this expedited
opinion are those of the committee and do not necessarily reflect the views of the California
Supreme Court or any other entity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.80(b); CJEO rule 1(a)).)