State of California (Department of Corrections) (PERB 1546S)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

WILLIAM F. HORSPOOL,
Charging Party, Case No. LA-CE-570-S

Vv. PERB Decision No. 1546-S

STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DEPARTMENT OF August 13, 2003

CORRECTIONS),

Respondent.

Appearance: William F. Horspool, on his own behalf.
Before Baker, Whitehead and Neima, Members.
DECISION

BAKER, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board (Board)
on what purports to be an appeal by William F. Horspool (Horspool) of the Board agent’s
partial dismissal (attached) and deferral of his unfair practice charge to arbitration. Horspool
argues that his charge was improperly deferred to arbitration. However, the record reveals that
this matter has not been deferred to arbitration, but that the charge was partially dismissed and
that a complaint has been issued on the remainder. Horspool’s appeal to the Board does not
challenge the partial dismissal, but merely seeks to amend the complaint to include additional
allegations. This is not a proper ground for appeal to the Board. The text of the complaint
placed Horspool on notice that:

Any amendment to the complaint shall be processed pursuant to

California Code of Regulations, title 8, sections 32647 and
32648. [Complaint, p. 2.]

Accordingly, having reviewed the entire record in this matter, the Board dismisses
Horspool's appeal as improper and affirms the Board agent's partial dismissal letter.
ORDER
The partial dismissal of the unfair practice charge in Case No. LA-CE-570-S is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Members Whitehead and Neima joined in this Decision.
2

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	GRAY DAVIS, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
PE.R.B
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1435
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
Telephone: (213) 736-3543
Fax: (213) 736-4901
October 31, 2002
William F. Horspool
Re: 	William F. Horspool v. State of California (Department of Corrections)
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CE-570-S
NOTICE OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
Dear Mr. Horspool:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on September 24, 2001. William F. Horspool alleges that the State of
California (Department of Corrections) (State or Respondent) violated section 3519(a), (b) and
(c) of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act)' by failing to bargain in good faith, by making a
unilateral change, and by retaliating against Mr. Horspool.
I indicated in the attached letter dated July 29, 2002, that all allegations concerning retaliation
contained in this charge were subject to deferral to arbitration. I also indicated that you lacked
standing to allege a) that the State failed to participate in the grievance procedure in good faith
and b) that the State unilaterally changed its policy regarding the payment of holiday pay and
breached the MOU in other respects. You were advised that if there were any factual
inaccuracies or additional facts which would correct the deficiencies explained in that letter,
the charge should be amended. You were further advised that unless the charge was amended
or withdrawn prior to August 5, 2002, the allegations concerning retaliation would be deferred
to arbitration and dismissed and the other allegations would be dismissed.
I received your First Amended charge on August 8, 2002." You allege that there is enmity
between you and the State especially in light of the prior charge you filed against the State,
Charge No. LA-CE-403-S, awaiting a decision by the Administrative Law Judge. You assert
that the grievance machinery on actions against you has been exhausted on all of the
grievances you filed, and that "further request for arbitration would be futile." The Amended
Charge provides the status of grievances discussed in my Warning Letter dated July 29, 2002.
The first grievance filed December 21, 2000 alleged that the State incorrectly calculated your
Industrial Disability Leave (IDL). The State has not responded at the fourth level.
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. The text of the
Dills Act and the Board's Regulations may be found on the Internet at www.perb.ca.gov.
This letter does not deal with the allegation or related December 2000 grievance that
you learned on December 8, 2000 that the State took adverse action against you by denying
your request for reclassification to full time employment.

LA-CE-570-S
October 31, 2002
Page 2
The next grievance was filed March 9, 2001 regarding a Letter of Instruction (LOI) given to
you. The State granted the grievance in part but you assert that you were not granted the
remedies you sought. In addition, the State did not comply with the letter granting the
grievance by returning the LOI and rebuttal you submitted.
On March 16, 2001, you filed a grievance concerning the State's conduct of prohibiting you
from returning to work after obtaining medical clearance. The State denied this grievance at
level four but failed to address the issue involved.
You point out that a copy of each grievance and the response are sent to CCPOA pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement at Article VI, section 6.09A.2.d. In addition, pursuant to
Article VI, section 6.11B, only CCPOA may appeal the Step 3 or 4 decision to binding
arbitration. Based on the same article and section, you assert that CCPOA denied arbitration
on all matters by failing to request arbitration within twenty-one (21) days as required.
Dills Act section 3514.5 provides in part,
Procedures for investigating, hearing, and deciding these cases
shall be devised and promulgated by the board and shall include
all of the following:
(a) Any employee, employee organization, or employer shall
have the right to file an unfair practice charge, except that the
board shall not ... (2) issue a complaint against conduct also
prohibited by the provisions of the agreement between the parties
until the grievance machinery of the agreement, if it exists and
covers the matter at issue, has been exhausted, either by
settlement or binding arbitration. However, when the charging
party demonstrates that resort to contract grievance procedure
would be futile, exhaustion shall not be necessary. The board
shall have discretionary jurisdiction to review such settlement or	
to.
arbitration award reached pursuant to the grievance machinery
solely for the purpose of determining whether it is repugnant to
the purposes of this chapter. If the board finds that such
settlement or arbitration award is repugnant to the purposes of
this chapter, it shall issue a complaint on the basis of a timely
filed charge, and hear and decide the case on the merits;
otherwise, it shall dismiss the charge... The board shall, in
determining whether the charge was timely filed, consider the
six-month limitation set forth in this subdivision to have been
tolled during the time it took the charging party to exhaust the
grievance machinery.

LA-CE-570-S
October 31, 2002
Page 3
Based on the above facts and Dills Act section 3514.5, the charge of retaliation for protected
activity must be deferred to arbitration under the MOU and dismissed in accordance with
PERB Regulation 32620(b)(5).
For the grievance where the State has not responded within the specified time frames, Article
VI, section 6.03B allows the grievant to file a grievance at the next level. For the grievance
where the State granted the grievance but you were not granted the remedies you sought, and
the State failed to comply with the decision, PERB has no jurisdiction over this. Pursuant to
Dills Act section 3514.5, it may only review settlements or arbitration awards for the purpose
of determining if they are repugnant to the Dills Act.
Also, futility has not been demonstrated. By Barrett McInerney's letter dated July 26, 2002,
the State has waived all contract based procedural defenses, which is required when a matter is
deferred to arbitration. (See State of California (Department of Food and Agriculture) (2002)
PERB Decision No. 1473-S.) In addition, I have confirmed with CCPOA that you must
request that CCPOA take the above grievances to arbitration. The CCPOA State Review
Committee meets each month to review requests. If CCPOA refuses to take a grievance to
arbitration, futility is established. (See State of California (Department of Corrections)
(Schwartzman)(1986) PERB Decision No. 561-S.)
As I explained in the attached letter, Government Code section 3514.5(a) and PERB
Regulation 32620(b)(5) require a Board agent to dismiss an allegation in a charge where the
dispute is subject to final and binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
(Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District (1980) PERB Order No. Ad-81; State of
California (Department of Food and Agriculture) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1473-S.) The
charge alleges that the State retaliated against you. This conduct is covered by the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, the Respondent has agreed to waive any procedural defenses,
and there is no evidence that the dispute arises in other than a stable collective bargaining
environment. Accordingly, the allegations of retaliation, except for footnote No. 2 above, must
be dismissed and deferred to arbitration. Following the arbitrations of this matter, the
Charging Party may seek a repugnanty review by PERB of the arbitrator's decisions under the
Dry Creek criteria. (See Regulation 32661; Los Angeles Unified School District (1982) PERB
Decision No. 218; Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District (1980) PERB Order No. Ad-
8la.)
Next, as discussed in my July 29, 2002 letter, since you lack standing to bring allegations
concerning unilateral change and the State's failure to bargain in good faith, these allegations
are also dismissed
' Pursuant to Government Code section 3514.5(a), the six-month limitation on the filing
of a charge is tolled during the time required to exhaust the grievance machinery where that
procedure ends in binding arbitration.

LA-CE-570-S
October 31, 2002
Page 4
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to PERB Regulations," you may obtain a review of this dismissal by filing an appeal
to the Board itself within twenty (20) calendar days after service of this dismissal.
(Regulation 32635(a).) Any document filed with the Board must contain the case name and
number, and the original and five (5) copies of all documents must be provided to the Board.
A document is considered "filed" when actually received before the close of business (5 p.m.)
on the last day set for filing or when mailed by certified or Express United States mail, as
shown on the postal receipt or postmark, or delivered to a common carrier promising overnight
delivery, as shown on the carrier's receipt, not later than the last day set for filing
Regulations 32135(a) and 32130.)
A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before the
close of business on the last day for filing together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet
which meets the requirements of Regulation 32135(d), provided the filing party also places the
original, together with the required number of copies and proof of service, in the U.S. mail.
(Regulations 32135(b), (c) and (d); see also Regulations 32090 and 32130.)
The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814-4174
FAX: (916) 327-7960
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal to issue a complaint, any other party may file with the
Board an original and five copies of a statement in opposition within twenty (20) calendar days
following the date of service of the appeal. (Regulation 32635(b).)
Service
All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served" upon all parties to the
proceeding, and a "proof of service" must accompany each copy of a document served upon a
party or filed with the Board itself. (See Regulation 32140 for the required contents and a
sample form.) The document will be considered properly "served" when personally delivered
or deposited in the first-class mail, postage paid and properly addressed. A document filed by
facsimile transmission may be concurrently served via facsimile transmission on all parties to
the proceeding. (Regulation 32135(c).)
PERB's Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.
l
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LA-CE-570-S
October 31, 2002
Page 5
Extension of Time
A request for an extension of time, in which to file a document with the Board itself, must be
in writing and filed with the Board at the previously noted address. A request for an extension
must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before the expiration of the time required for
filing the document. The request must indicate good cause for and, if known, the position of
each other party regarding the extension, and shall be accompanied by proof of service of the
request upon each party. (Regulation 32132.)
Final Date
If no appeal is filed within the specified time limits, the dismissal will become final when the
time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT THOMPSON
General Counsel
By
Marc S. Hurwitz
Regional Attorney
Attachment
cc: Barrett W. McInerney, Labor Relations Counsel, Department of Personnel Administration
~~CJ

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	GRAY DAVIS, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
P
Los Angeles Regional Office	Angeles
3530 Wilshire Blud., Suite 1435
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
Telephone: (213) 736-3127
Fax: (213) 736-4901
July 29, 2002
William F. Horspool
Re: 	William F. Horspool v. State of California (Department of Corrections)
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CE-570-S
WARNING LETTER (DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION)
Dear Mr. Horspool:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on September 24, 2001. William F. Horspool alleges that the State of
California (Department of Corrections) (State or Respondent) violated section 3519(a), (b) and
(c) of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act)' by failing to bargain in good faith, by making a
unilateral change, and by retaliating against Mr. Horspool.
My investigation revealed the following information. Charging Party is a Correctional Officer
for the Respondent at the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) and a job steward for The
California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA). At all times relevant to this
charge, CCPOA and the State were parties to a collective bargaining agreement effective
July 1, 1999 through July 2, 2001. The agreement culminates in binding arbitration pursuant
to Article VI, Section 6.12.D. On December 1, 2000, Charging Party completed testimony in a
previously filed unfair practice charge against the State. (Charge No. LA-CE-403-S.) The
present case involves a series of grievances which were filed by Mr. Horspool subsequent to
this protected activity.
The first grievance was filed on December 21, 2000 alleging that the State did not correctly
calculate Mr. Horspool's Industrial Disability Leave (IDL) benefits following a knee injury.
Charging Party alleges that the State violated Article XIII Section 13.06 of the MOU which
deals with such pay. This grievance was denied at the second step procedure. A third step
grievance was filed on May 22, 2001, but no response has been issued at this level.
A second grievance was filed December 26, 2000, after Charging Party learned that the State
had denied his request for reclassification to full time employment. This grievance reached the
fourth level, and was denied on August 1, 2001. The parties collective bargaining agreement
states at Article XXVI Section 26.01.J.1 that "[to be considered for a change in time base [ the
employee] must... b. Have a satisfactory performance evaluation for the prior six (6) month
period or term of service, whichever is shortest." The person ruling on the grievance found that
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. The text of the
Dills Act and the Board's Regulations may be found on the Internet at www.perb.ca.gov.

LA-CE-570-S
July 29, 2002
Page 2
Mr. Horspool's status could not be changed because Charging Party had not worked in the two
years prior to his application. He interpreted the MOU to mean that if "the prior six months is
shorter than your last term of service... you must have a satisfactory performance evaluation
for the prior six (6) month period." Charging Party alleges that the State treated him
differently because of his union activities in denying him full time status. He provides
examples of two employees who had been reclassified even though their names appeared on a
Delinquent Performance Reports List. Mr. Horspool never appeared on such a list and had
never received less than a satisfactory evaluation.
A third grievance was filed March 9, 2001 concerning a Letter of Instruction (LOI) received by
Charging Party on March 8, 2001. The LOI documented an incident that had occurred on
April 11, 1997. The second level response by the State granted Charging Party's grievance in
part, and ruled that the LOI was improperly filed because it had not been served on him within
the 30 day contractual time limit.
In a fourth grievance filed on March 16, 2001, Charging Party alleged that he had been
improperly prohibited from returning to work after obtaining medical clearance. Article X
Section 10.02.C.6. states in part:
If. .. the returning employee has a valid medical clearance
verification from his/her physician allowing said employee to
return to work and, with reasonable notice by the employee or
upon institutional order, the employee presents him/herself for
medical clearance... the employee shall be allowed to return to
paid status.
The second step officer found that the Return to Work Coordinator "had legitimate questions
related to [Mr. Harspool's] ability to work full duty with no restrictions," and denied the
grievance. Charging Party filed a third step grievance which has not been ruled upon.
Charging party filed a fifth grievance on May 1, 2001 on behalf of Officer M. Buchanan
regarding two LOIs that Mr. Buchanan had received. Charging Party alleges that the LOIs
were improper because they lacked a contractually required expiration date. This grievance
was denied. Charging Party also asserts that the State is not following DPA rules by refusing
the payment of premium holiday pay to Permanent Intermittent Employees (PIE). The state
only pays "the pro-rated holiday pay regardless if the PIE works on the holiday or not."
On March 26, 2001, Mr. Horspool was scheduled for a second level grievance conference
concerning his LDI and LOI grievances. Prior to the conference, Lt. R Halberg mistakenly
gave Mr. Horspool a document entitled "Second Level Grievance Response," denying his
grievance. After being notified of his mistake, Lt. Halberg asked for the return of the
document. Mr. Horspool refused, saying that the Response proved that the State was not
participating in the grievance process in good faith since the State had denied his grievance
even before he had a chance to present his case. Lt. Halberg informed Mr. Horspool that he
was being insubordinate, and could receive discipline as a result of his actions. Mr. Horspool

LA-CE-570-S
July 29, 2002
Page 3
again refused to return the documents. Later that day, Mr. Horspool copied the document, and
returned the original to Lt. Halberg. On March 27, 2001, a Second Level grievance response
was issued granting the grievance as described above. On March 28, 2001, Mr. Horspool
received a Memo from Lt. Halberg documenting the incident and stating in part: "You were
defiant and insubordinate to a higher ranking officer. Your conduct on this occasion was
unacceptable and will not be tolerated by this department."
Section 3519(a) of the Dills Act provides that "It shall be unlawful for the state to do any of
the following: (a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or
threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter..."
Article V, Section 5.03.A. of the MOU states:
The State and the Union shall not impose or threaten to impose
reprisals on employees, to discriminate or threaten to discriminate
against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed
by the Ralph C. Dills Act.
Article V, Section 5.03.B. of the MOU states:
The State shall not impose or threaten to impose reprisals on the
Union, to discriminate against the Union, or otherwise to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce the Union because of the exercise of
rights guaranteed to it by the Ralph C. Dills Act.
In order to state a prima facie case of retaliation, Charging Party must show that the employee
was engaged in protected activity, the activities were known to the employer, and that the
employer took adverse action because of ("nexus") such protected activity. (Novato Unified
School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210.)
Although the timing of the employer's adverse action in close temporal proximity to the
protected conduct is an important factor in establishing nexus, the Charging Party must also
allege facts establishing one or more of the following factors: "(1) the employer's disparate
treatment of the employee; (2) the employer's departure from established procedures and
standards when dealing with the employee; (3) the employer's inconsistent or contradictory
justifications for its actions; (4) the employer's cursory investigation of the employee's
misconduct; (5) the employer's failure to offer the employee justification at the time it took
action, or the offering of exaggerated, vague, or ambiguous reasons; or (6) any other facts
which might demonstrate the employer's unlawful motive." (Santa Clarita Community College
District (1996) PERB Decision No. 1178.)
Charging Party alleges that the State retaliated against Mr. Horspool by engaging in the
conduct alleged in his grievances and by rejecting those grievances because of his union
f

LA-CE-570-S
July 29, 2002
Page 4
activities. Furthermore, Charging Party alleges that the State has violated the parties'
collective bargaining agreement in numerous places. Specifically, the IDL grievance involves
an interpretation of Article XIII, Section 13.06 of the MOU dealing with Industrial Disability
Leave. The grievance concerning reclassification centers around Article XXVI, Section
26.01.J. quoted above. Finally, Charging Party's grievance concerning the State's refusal to let
him return to work after receiving medical clearance involves an interpretation of Article X,
Section 10.02.C.6 quoted above.
Based on these facts and Dills Act section 3514.5, the charge of retaliation for protected
activity must be deferred to arbitration under the MOU and dismissed in accordance with
PERB Regulation 32620(b)(5).
Section 3514.5(a) of the Dills Act states, in pertinent part, that PERB shall not:
Issue a complaint against conduct also prohibited by the
provisions of the [collective bargaining] agreement between the
parties until the grievance machinery of the agreement, if it exists
and covers the matter at issue, has been exhausted, either by
settlement or binding arbitration.
In Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District (1980) PERB Order No. Ad-81a, the Board
explained that:
While there is no statutory deferral requirement imposed on the
National Labor Relations Board (hereafter NLRB), that agency
has voluntarily adopted such a policy both with regard to post-
arbitral and pre-arbitral award situations." EERA
section 3541.5(a) essentially codifies the policy developed by the
NLRB regarding deferral to arbitration proceedings and awards.
It is appropriate, therefore, to look for guidance to the private
sector. [Fn. 2 omitted; fn. 3 to Fire Fighters Union v. City of
Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608.]
Although Dry Creek was decided under the Educational Employment Relations Act the NLRB
deferral standard has also been applied to the Dills Act. (State of California (Department of
Food and Agriculture) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1473-S.)
In Collyer Insulated Wire (1971) 192 NLRB 837 [77 LRRM 1931] and subsequent cases, the
National Labor Relations Board articulated standards under which deferral to the contractual
grievance procedure is appropriate in prearbitral situations. These requirements are: (1) the
dispute must arise within a stable collective bargaining relationship where there is no enmity
by the respondent toward the charging party; (2) the respondent must be ready and willing to
The Educational Employment Relations Act is codified at Government Code section
3540 et seq.

LA-CE-570-S
July 29, 2002
Page 5
proceed to arbitration and must waive contract-based procedural defenses; and (3) the contract
and its meaning must lie at the center of the dispute.
These standards are met with respect to this case. First, no evidence has been produced to
indicate that the parties are not operating within a stable collective bargaining relationship.
Second, by the attached letter from its representative, Barrett W. McInerney, Esq. dated
July 26, 2002, the Respondent has indicated its willingness to proceed to arbitration and to
waive all procedural defenses concerning the allegations of retaliation. Finally, the issues
raised by this charge directly involve an interpretation of Article V of the MOU.
It is clear that retaliation against employees or the union due to the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Dills Act is arguably prohibited by the MOU. Since the agreement
culminates in binding arbitration and the State has waived procedural defenses, this allegation
is subject to being deferred to arbitration (See State of California (Department of Food and
Agriculture) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1473-S.).
Mr. Horspool argues that deferral to arbitration is futile. He states that the State's failure to
respond to grievances in a timely fashion, their denial of his grievances, and the grievance
response given by Lt. Halberg prior to his conference shows that the grievance procedure is
futile. In California State University (1984) PERB Decision No. 392-H, the Board ruled that
deferral is inappropriate where the integrity of the arbitration process is at issue.
Charging Party's argument is not persuasive. Article VI, Section 6.03.B. of the parties'
agreement states:
If there has been no mutually agreed-upon time extension, failure
to respond to the grievance within the specified time frames shall
allow the grievant to file a grievance at the next level. If this
occurs, the higher level must respond to the grievance and may
not return it to a lower level.
This shows that the parties foresaw that the State may not respond to a grievance within the
specified time frames. Furthermore, mere denial of grievances does not show futility, and one
of Mr. Horspool's grievances was granted. Additionally, even if a tentative decision were
written prior to the grievance conference, this alone does not show futility of the process. The
person ruling on the grievance knew the relevant facts and arguments before the conference
occurred.
Accordingly, all allegations concerning retaliation must be deferred to arbitration and will be
dismissed. Following the arbitration of this matter, Charging Party may seek a repugnanty
review by PERB of the arbitrator's decision under the Dry Creek criteria. (See Regulation

LA-CE-570-S
July 29, 2002
Page 6
32661; Los Angeles Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 218; Dry Creek Joint
Elementary School District, supra.)
Charging party also alleges that the State violated the Dills Act by failing to participate in the
grievance procedure in good faith. However, the duty to bargain in good faith is not owed to
individual employees and they consequently lack standing to bring such a charge. (See State
of California (Department of General Services) (2001) PERB Decision No. 1420-S.) As an
employee, Mr. Horspool lacks standing and this allegation will be dismissed.
In addition, Charging Party alleges that the State unilaterally changed its policy regarding the
payment of holiday pay for PIEs and breached the MOU in other respects as indicated above.
Individual employees lack standing to bring a charge alleging unilateral change. (Oxnard
School District (Gorcey/Tripp) (1988) PERB Decision No. 667.) As an employee, Mr.
Horspool is without standing to bring such allegations and they will be dismissed.
If there are any factual inaccuracies in this letter or additional facts that would correct the
deficiencies explained above, please amend the charge. The amended charge should be
prepared on a standard PERB unfair practice charge form, clearly labeled First Amended
Charge, contain all the facts and allegations you wish to make, and be signed under penalty of
perjury by the Charging Party. The amended charge must have the case number written on the
top right hand corner of the charge form. The amended charge must be served on the
Respondent's representative, Barrett W. McInerney, Esq., Legal Office, Department of
Personnel Administration in Sacramento, California, and the original proof of service must be
filed with PERB. If I do not receive an amended charge or withdrawal from you before
August 5, 2002, I shall dismiss your charge. If you have any questions, please call me at
(213) 736-3543.
Sincerely,
Marc S. Hurwitz
Regional Attorney
Attachment
JET/MSH
'Pursuant to Government Code section 3514.5(a), the six-month limitation on the filing
of a charge is tolled during the time required to exhaust the grievance machinery where that
procedure ends in binding arbitration.
/
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