Solano County Fair Association (PERB 2035M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
FRANZ HINEK,
Charging Party, 	Case No. SF-CE-454-M
V . 	PERB Decision No. 2035-M
June 9, 2009	SOLANO COUNTY FAIR ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Appearances: Franz Hinek, on his own behalf; Kim Alexander Yarbor, Deputy County
Counsel, for Solano County Fair Association.
Before Rystrom, Chair; Neuwald and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
his case is an appeal to the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) by Franz Hinek (Hinek) of the Board agent's dismissal of Hinek's unfair
practice charge against the Solano County Fair Association (SCFA) brought under the Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).'
Hinek filed his unfair practice charge on July 12, 2007 based on his July 17, 2006
termination by SCFA alleging wrongful termination and retaliation. On August 17, 2007, the
was filed within the applicable six-month statute of limitations and he had not alleged a prima
facie case of discrimination under the MMBA. Hinek filed a timely appeal on September 5,
MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500, et seq. Unless otherwise noted,
all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
FRANZ HINEK,
Charging Party,
V.
SOLANO COUNTY FAIR ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-454-M
PERB Decision No. 2035-M
June 9, 2009
Appearances: Franz Hinek, on his own behalf; Kim Alexander Yarbor, Deputy County
Counsel, for Solano County Fair Association.
Before Rystrom, Chair; Neuwald and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
R YSTROM, Chair:	RYSTROM, Chair: T This case is an appeal to the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) by Franz Hinek (Hinek) of the Board agent's dismissal of Hinek's unfair
practice charge against the Solano County Fair Association (SCF A) brought under the Meyers-
T\lfili a"- 	1
Hinek filed his unfair practice charge on July 12, 2007 based on his July 17, 2006
termination by SCFA alleging wrongful termination and retaliation. On August 17, 2007, the
Board agent dismissed the unfair practice charge on the bases that Hinek had not established it	Board agent dismissed the unfair practice charge on the bases that Hinek had not established it
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facie case of discrimination under the MMBA. Hinek filed a timely appeal on September 5,
2007.	2007.
1 MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500, et seq. Unless otherwise noted,
all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

Upon a review of the entire record, including but not limited to, the unfair practice
charge, the SCFA's response thereto, the Board agent's warning letter, Hinek's amended
charge and supporting materials, the Board agent's dismissal letter, Hinek's appeal and
SCFA's statement in opposition to appeal, we affirm the Board agent's dismissal for the
reasons stated below.
BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2007, Hinek filed an unfair practice charge alleging as conclusions
wrongful termination, harassment and retaliation under the MMBA. The gravamen of his
complaint was that, without legitimate reason and presumably for purposes of discrimination,
Hinek had been terminated on July 17, 2006 from his seasonal job as an employee parking lot
attendant for SCFA. Hinek alleged he had been constantly harassed at work by other
employees with no intervention by his supervisors, subjected to paycheck shortages, moved
into jobs with hot working conditions and denied promotions to other horse race track jobs for
which he was qualified. No dates were stated for these alleged wrongful acts. According to
his allegations, Hinek filed a grievance about his discharge on July 18, 2006, was told there
would be a hearing, but then when he contacted the Teamsters Union Local No. 78 (Local 78)
representative on July 11, 2007, he was told there would not be a hearing. At that time he was
also told he would not be getting his job back.
The Board agent's August 2, 2007 warning letter characterized Hinek's charges as
alleging wrongful termination based on retaliation for protected activity and informed Hinek
that a six-month statute of limitations applied to his charge and that he had the burden of
proving it was timely. The Board agent noted that Hinek had claimed the limitations period
had been tolled during the grievance period since July 2006 but that more factual information,
such as a copy of the grievance, a copy of the grievance provision in the collective bargaining
2
Upon a review
of
the entire record, including but not limited to, the unfair practice
charge, the SCFA's response thereto, the Board agent's warning letter, Hinek's amended
charge and supporting materials, the Board agent's dismissal letter, Hinek's appeal and
SCFA's statement in opposition to appeal, we affirm the Board agent's dismissal for the
reasons stated below.
BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2007, Hinek filed an unfair practice charge alleging as conclusions
wrongful termination, harassment and retaliation under the MMBA. The gravamen
of
his
complaint was that, without legitimate reason and presumably for purposes
of
discrimination,
Hinek had been terminated on July 17, 2006 from his seasonal job as an employee parking lot
attendant for SCF A. Hinek alleged he had been constantly harassed at work by other
employees with no intervention by his supervisors, subjected to paycheck shortages, moved
into jobs with hot working conditions and denied promotions to other horse race track jobs for
which he was qualified. No dates were stated for these alleged wrongful acts. According to
his allegations, Hinek filed a grievance about his discharge on July 18, 2006, was told there
would be a hearing, but then when he contacted the Teamsters Union Local No. 78 (Local 78)
representative on July 11, 2007, he was told there wouid not be a hearing. At that time he was
also told he would not be getting his job back.
The Board agent's August 2, 2007 warning letter characterized Hinek's charges as
alleging wrongful termination based on retaliation for protected activity and informed Hinek
that a six-month statute of limitations applied to his charge and that he had the burden
of
proving it was timely. The Board agent noted that Hinek had claimed the limitations period
had been tolled during the grievance period since July 2006 but that more factual information,
such as a copy of the grievance, a copy of the grievance provision in the collective bargaining
2

agreement (CBA) between Local 78 and the SCFA and any written communications between
Hinek and Local 78 regarding his grievance, was needed to determine if the statute of
limitations was tolled. Additionally, Hinek was informed that his factual allegations had not
established a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of MMBA section 3506 and what
needed to be shown to correct that deficiency.
An amended charge was filed consisting of two letters dated August 9, 2007 and a third
letter dated August 14, 2007. Hinek responded to the statute of limitations warning by
providing a July 3, 2007 letter from an attorney addressed to Local 78's president, which
Hinek alleged proved that he was notified on July 3, 2007 of the Local 78 completion of his
union grievance against SCFA.
In pertinent part, this July 3, 2007 letter indicated that the Local 78 attorney had
reviewed the CBA between the Local 78 and the SCFA effective June 23, 2005 through
July 31, 2009. The letter concluded that the CBA has no grievance or arbitration procedures;
thus, if Local 78 believed that Hinek's termination was without cause Local 78 could pursue a
claim in state or federal court.
By letter dated August 27, 2007, the Board agent informed Hinek his unfair practice
charge was being dismissed because he had failed to establish that his charge was timely filed
or to allege a prima facie case of discrimination
On September 5, 2007, Hinek filed an appeal with numerous attached documents and
many new factual allegations.
3
agreement (CBA) between Local 78 and the SCF A and any written communications between
Hinek and Local 78 regarding his grievance, was needed to determine
if
the statute
of
limitations was tolled. Additionally, Hinek was informed that his factual allegations had not
established a prima facie case
of
discrimination in violation
of
MMBA section 3 506 and what
needed to be shown to correct that deficiency.
An amended charge was filed consisting
of
two letters dated August 9, 2007 and a third
letter dated August 14, 2007. Hinek responded to the statute
of
limitations warning by
providing a July 3, 2007 letter from an attorney addressed to Local
78's
president, which
Hinek alleged proved that he was notified on July 3, 2007
of
the Local 78 completion
of
his
union grievance against SCF A.
In pertinent part, this July 3, 2007 letter indicated that the Local 78 attorney had
reviewed the CBA between the Local 78 and the SCFA effective June 23, 2005 through
July 31, 2009. The letter concluded that the CBA has no grievance or arbitration procedures;
thus,
if
Local 78 believed that Hinek's termination was without cause Local 78 could pursue a
claim in state or federal court.
By letter dated August 27, 2007, the Board agent informed Hinek his unfair pr
charge was being dismissed because he had failed to establish that his charge was timely filed
or to allege a prima facie case
of
discrimination
actice
HINEK'S APPEAL	HINEK'S APPEAL
On September 5, 2007, Hinek filed an appeal with numerous attached documents and
many new factual allegations.
3

Pursuant to PERB Regulation 32635(a)(1)," which requires an appeal to state the
specific issues being appealed, Hinek's appeal stated only one issue: that his charge should not
have been dismissed because the July 3, 2007 letter from Local 78's attorney proves the
grievance procedures ended on July 3, 2007." Hinek argues that this fact is shown by the
following language in the letter: "I do not recommend that the Union pursue the grievance
filed by Mr. Hinek."
The remainder of Hinek's appeal consists of factual allegations, many of them new,
which he argues support the discrimination and harassment claims in his unfair practice
charge.
SCFA'S STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL
SCFA's September 7, 2007 opposition to Hinek's appeal contends that Hinek has not
shown that his unfair practice charge was timely nor that he supplied the factual allegations to
show a nexus between his allegedly protected conduct and his termination on July 17, 2006.
Additionally, SCFA objects to Hinek's presentation of new evidence in his appeal.
HINEK'S RESPONSE TO SCFA OPPOSITION TO APPEAL
On September 11, 2007, Hinek responded to SCFA's opposition by fax with a letter
which was subsequently filed on September 17, 2007. In this letter, which included additional
attached documents, Hinek argues that his appeal does not present any new charges or
supporting evidence contrary to the assertion by SCFA. He also argues that the July 3, 2007
attorney's letter to Local 78 proves the grievance procedure ended on that date.
" PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 31001 et seq.
PERB Regulation 32635(a)(1) provides that an appeal shall: "State the specific issues
of procedure, fact, law or rationale to which the appeal is taken."
4
Pursuant to PERB Regulation 32635(a)(l),2 which requires an appeal to state the
specific issues being appealed, Hinek's appeal stated only one issue: that his charge should not
have been dismissed because the July 3, 2007 letter from Local 78's attorney proves the
grievance procedures ended on July 3, 2007.3 Hinek argues that this fact is shown by the
following language in the letter: "I do not recommend that the Union pursue the grievance
filed by Mr. Hinek."
The remainder
ofHinek's
appeal consists
of
factual allegations, many
of
them new,
which he argues support the discrimination and harassment claims in his unfair practice
charge.
SCFA'S STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL
SCFA's September 7, 2007 opposition to Hinek's appeal contends that Hinek has not
shown that his unfair practice charge was timely nor that he supplied the factual allegations to
show a nexus between his allegedly protected conduct and his termination on July 17, 2006.
Additionally, SCFA objects to Hinek's presentation
of
new evidence in his appeal.
HINEK'S RESPONSE TO SCFA OPPOSITION TO APPEAL
On September 11, 2007, Hinek responded to SCF A's opposition by fax with a letter
which was subsequently filed on September 17, 2007. In this letter, which included additional
attached documents, Hinek argues that his appeal does not present any new charges or
supporting evidence contrary to the assertion by SCF A. He also argues that the July 3, 2007
attorney's letter to Local 78 proves the grievance procedure ended on that date.
2 PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 3 1001 et seq.
3 PERB Regulation 32635(a)(l) provides that an appeal shall: "State the specific issues
of procedure, fact, law or rationale to which the appeal is taken."
4

On September 18, 2007 and October 9, 2007, Hinek filed additional letters containing
more factual allegations and arguments, none of which added to his equitable tolling claims.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented by Hinek's appeal is whether his July 12, 2007 unfair practice
charge of an alleged July 17, 2006 wrongful termination is timely.
The statute of limitations period for processing an unfair practice claim under the
MMBA is six months. (County of Siskiyou (2006) PERB Decision No. 1837-M; Coachella
Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1072, 1090 (Coachella).)
When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run
In Regents of the University of California (2004) PERB Decision No. 1585-H
(Regents), PERB found that the six-month limitations period begins to run on the actual date of
the termination. This ruling was based on Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4h
479, 493 (Romano), which held that under the Fair Employment & Housing Act the statute of
limitations for an unfair employment practice based on a termination does not begin to run
until the date of actual termination. In Regents, PERB adopted the Romano rule, finding that it
was a better method when dealing with reprisals and discrimination and on the public policy
grounds that the rule includes the benefit of simplicity in determining when the unfair practice
occurred." We find for the same reasons that the Romano rule should apply to unfair practice
charges based on alleged wrongful terminations under the MMBA.
* This rule was also based on the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act
(HEERA) section 3563.2 providing that the limitations period is triggered when the unfair
practice occurs. (HEERA is codified at $ 3560 et seq.)
This holding is consistent with the high court's conclusion in Coachella, that the
Legislature intended the manner in which PERB processes unfair practice charges, including
5
On September 18, 2007 and October 9, 2007, Hinek filed additional letters containing
more factual allegations and arguments, none
of
which added to his equitable tolling claims.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented by Hinek's appeal is whether his July 12, 2007 unfair practice
charge
of
an alleged July 17, 2006 wrongful termination is timely.
The statute
of
limitations period for processing an unfair practice claim under the
MMBA is six months. (County
of
Siskiyou (2006) PERB Decision No. 1837-M; Coachella 
th
Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist.
v.
Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4
1072, 1090 (Coachella).)
When Statute
of
Limitations Begins to Run
In Regents
of
the University
of
California (2004) PERB Decision No. 1585-H
(Regents), PERB found that the six-month limitations period begins to run on the actual date
of
the termination. This ruling was based on Romano
v.
Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4
th
479, 493 (Romano), which held that under the Fair Employment & Housing Act the statute
of
limitations for an unfair employment practice based on a termination does not begin to run
until the date
of
actual termination. In Regents, PERB adopted the Romano rule, finding that it
was a better method when dealing with reprisals and discrimination and on the public policy
grounds that the rule includes the benefit
of
simplicity in determining when the unfair practice
occurred. 4 We find for the same reasons that the Romano rule should apply to unfair practice
charges based on alleged wrongful terminations under the MMBA. 5
This rule was also based on the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act
(HEERA) section 3563.2 providing that the limitations period is triggered when the unfair
practice occurs. (HEERA is codified at§ 3560 et seq.)
5
5 This holding is consistent with the high court's conclusion in Coachella, that the
Legislature intended the manner in which PERB processes unfair practice charges, including

Under the Romano rule, the applicable six-month statute
of
limitations period began toUnder the Romano rule, the applicable six-month statute of limitations period began to
run on the date
of
Hinek's termination, July 17, 2006. Therefore, Hinek's July 12, 2007run on the date of Hinek's termination, July 17, 2006. Therefore, Hinek's July 12, 2007
alleged retaliatory termination charge was untimely. Hinek argues that the statute
ofalleged retaliatory termination charge was untimely. Hinek argues that the statute of
limitations was tolled because he pursued a grievance procedure and, therefore, his charge was	limitations was tolled because he pursued a grievance procedure and, therefore, his charge was
timely.	timely.
Equitable Tolling
In Long Beach Community College District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2002 (Long	In Long Beach Community College District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2002 (Long
Beach JI), the Board reaffirmed its decision in Long Beach Community College District (2003)	Beach II), the Board reaffirmed its decision in Long Beach Community College District (2003)
PERB Decision No. 1564 (Long Beach I), which confirmed that equitable tolling is available	PERB Decision No. 1564 (Long Beach D), which confirmed that equitable tolling is available
under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) when parties are utilizing a non-	under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) when parties are utilizing a non-
binding dispute resolution procedure.6 Likewise, in Trustees
of
California State University
(Onkvisit) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2032-H, the Board recently concluded that equitable
tolling applies to cases under HEERA when parties utilize a binding dispute resolution
procedure contained in a negotiated agreement.
binding dispute resolution procedure." Likewise, in Trustees of California State University
(Onkvisit) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2032-H, the Board recently concluded that equitable
tolling applies to cases under HEERA when parties utilize a binding dispute resolution
procedure contained in a negotiated agreement.
PERB has not yet considered whether the equitable tolling doctrine set forth in	PERB has not yet considered whether the equitable tolling doctrine set forth in
Long Beach II applies also to cases under the MMBA. In Coachella, supra, the CaliforniaLong Beach II applies also to cases under the MMBA. In Coachella, supra, the California
Supreme Court recognized that the MMBA "is part
of
a larger system
of
law for the regulation	Supreme Court recognized that the MMBA "is part of a larger system of law for the regulation
of
public employment relations under the initial jurisdiction
of
the PERB." (Coachella, atof public employment relations under the initial jurisdiction of the PERB." (Coachella, at
p. l 089.) Thus, the Court found it reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended that there	p. 1089.) Thus, the Court found it reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended that there
be a "coherent and harmonious system
of
public employment relations laws in which all unfair	be a "coherent and harmonious system of public employment relations laws in which all unfair
practice charges filed with the PERB are subject to the same six-month limitations period."	practice charges filed with the PERB are subject to the same six-month limitations period."
the limitations period, to be the same for MMBA as it is for the other public employment	the limitations period, to be the same for MMBA as it is for the other public employment
relations laws under PERB.	relations laws under PERB.
EERA is codified at Section 3540 et seq.
6 EERA is codified at Section 3540 et seq.
66

(Id., at p. 1090.) Accordingly, although the MMBA itself did not specify the statute of
limitations for filing a charge with PERB under that statute, the Court found that the
Legislature intended for the same six-month limitations period to apply to charges filed with
PERB under the MMBA as that provided in all the other statutes under PERB's jurisdiction.
In Long Beach II, PERB found that requiring the existence of an agreement on the
dispute resolution process is integral to insuring the application of the traditional standards for
equitable tolling. This limitation was also found to be consistent with the goals and framework
of EERA as delineated in EERA section 3540, which are very similar to the goals specified in
MMBA section 3500(a). We hold that this same limitation on equitable tolling should apply to
cases filed under the MMBA.'
We find these same principles applicable to the doctrine of equitable tolling, and hold
that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to cases filed under the MMBA. Under Long
Beach II, the six-month statute of limitations under EERA "is tolled during the period of time
the parties are utilizing a non-binding dispute resolution procedure if: (1) the procedure is
contained in a written agreement negotiated by the parties; (2) the procedure is being used to
resolve the same dispute that is the subject of the unfair practice charge; (3) the charging party
reasonably and in good faith pursues the procedure; and (4) tolling does not frustrate the
purpose of the statutory limitation period by causing surprise or prejudice to the respondent."
(Long Beach II, at p. 15.) Long Beach II merely refined the equitable tolling test set forth in
Long Beach I, which held that the six-month limitations period under EERA and related
statutes was no longer jurisdictional, and that the six-month limitation period should be
"It is appropriate to take guidance from cases interpreting California labor relations
statutes with parallel provisions. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d
608.)
7
(Id., at p. 1090.) Accordingly, although the MMBA itself did not specify the statute
of
limitations for filing a charge with PERB under that statute, the Court found that the
Legislature intended for the same six-month limitations period to apply to charges filed with
PERB under the MMBA as that provided in all the other statutes under PERB's jurisdiction.
In Long Beach
11,
PERB found that requiring the existence
of
an agreement on the
dispute resolution process is integral to insuring the application
of
the traditional standards for
equitable tolling. This limitation was also found to be consistent with the goals and framework
of
EERA as delineated in EERA section 3540, which are very similar to the goals specified in
MMBA section 3500(a). We hold that this same limitation on equitable tolling should apply to
cases filed under the MMBA. 7
We find these same principles applicable to the doctrine
of
equitable tolling, and hold
that the doctrine
of
equitable tolling applies to cases filed under the MMBA. Under Long
Beach II, the six-month statute
of
limitations under EERA "is tolled during the period
ohime
the parties are utilizing a non-binding dispute resolution procedure if: ( 1) the procedure is
contained in a written agreement negotiated by the parties; (2) the procedure is being used to
resolve the same dispute that is the subject
of
the unfair practice charge; (3) the charging party
reasonably and in good faith pursues the procedure; and (4) tolling does not frustrate the
purpose
of
the statutory limitation period by causing surprise or prejudice to the respondent."
(Long Beach
11,
at p. 15.) Long Beach II merely refined the equitable tolling test set forth in
Long Beach I, which held that the six-month limitations period under EERA and related
statutes was no longer jurisdictional, and that the six-month limitation period should be
It is appropriate to take guidance from cases interpreting California labor relations
statutes with parallel provisions. (Fire Fighters Union
v.
City
of
Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d
608.)
7

extended equitably only when a party utilizes a bilaterally agreed upon dispute resolution
procedure. (Long Beach I, at p. 16.)
Hinek argues the limitations period applicable to his charge was equitably tolled
because the alleged grievance procedures he pursued immediately following his July 17, 2006
termination did not end until July 3, 2007. To determine whether equitable tolling applies
herein, our threshold issue is whether Hinek has alleged facts showing that his grievance was
being pursued under a bilaterally agreed upon dispute resolution procedure. The only factual
allegations Hinek made regarding the processing of his grievance concerned the July 3, 2007
letter he attached to his amended charge. In his amended charge, Hinek alleges that this letter
'proves that I was notified July 3, 2007 of Teamsters Local 78 [sic] completion of my union
grievance versus Solano County Fair" and that "This [letter] should prove I meet the deadline
of six months of [sic] the Statute of Limitations."
We find that this letter does not establish that Hinek's July 18, 2006 grievance had been
pursued for almost a year under grievance procedures in his CBA. To the contrary, the letter
notifies Hinck that no grievance has been filed on his behalf by Local 78 because there are no
grievance procedures available under the CBA between Local 78 and the SCFA.
Based on the criteria for equitable tolling established in Long Beach II and Hinek's
failure to allege facts in either his original or amended charge to show that his termination
claim is timely, we hold Hinek's unfair practice charge must be dismissed. Whatever
grievance Hinek filed against the SCFA, there were no facts alleged to show it was pursuant to
a bilaterally agreed upon dispute resolution procedure and that the processing of his grievance
under the CBA's procedures ended on a date which would make his unfair practice charge
timely.
88
extended equitably only when a party utilizes a bilaterally agreed upon dispute resolution
procedure. (Long Beach
I,
at p. 16.)
Hinek argues the limitations period applicable to his charge was equitably tolled
because the alleged grievance procedures he pursued immediately following his July 17, 2006
termination did not end until July 3, 2007. To determine whether equitable tolling applies
herein, our threshold issue is whether Hinek has alleged facts showing that his grievance was
being pursued under a bilaterally agreed upon dispute resolution procedure. The only factual
allegations Hinek made regarding the processing
of
his grievance concerned the July 3, 2007
letter he attached to his amended charge. In his amended charge, Hinek alleges that this letter
"proves that I was notified July 3, 2007
of
Teamsters Local
78
[sic] completion
of
my union
grievance versus Solano County Fair" and that "This [letter] should prove I meet the deadline
of
six months
of
[sic] the Statute
of
Limitations."
We find that this letter does not establish that Hinek' s July 18, 2006 grievance had been
pursued for almost a year under grievance procedures in his CBA. To the contrary, the letter
notifies Hinek that no grievance has been filed on his behalf by Local 78 because there are no
grievance procedures available under the CBA between Local 78 and the SCF A.
Based on the criteria for equitable tolling established in Long Beach II and Hinek's
failure to allege facts in either his original or amended charge to show that his termination
claim is timely, we hold Hinek's unfair practice charge must be dismissed. Whatever
grievance Hinek filed against the SCF A, there were no facts alleged to show it was pursuant to
a bilaterally agreed upon dispute resolution procedure and that the processing of his grievance
under the CBA' s procedures ended on a date which would make his unfair practice charge
timely.

We next address SCFA's objection based on PERB Regulation 32635 that Hinek's new
factual allegations and documentary evidence contained in his appeal were improper. PERB
Regulation 32645(b) prohibits a party from presenting new supporting evidence in an appeal
before PERB, unless good cause is shown. We agree with SCFA that Hinek did not show good
cause to present new evidence supporting his appeal and we decline to consider any of the new
factual allegations or additional documentation presented by Hinek on appeal.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-454-M is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
99
We next address SCFA's objection based on PERB Regulation 32635 that Hinek's new
factual allegations and documentary evidence contained in his appeal were improper. PERB
Regulation 32645(b) prohibits a party from presenting new supporting evidence in an appeal
before PERB, unless good cause is shown. We agree with SCF A that Hinek did not show good
cause to present new evidence supporting his appeal and we decline to consider any
of
the new
factual allegations or additional documentation presented by Hinek on appeal.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-454-M is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Members Neuwald and Wesley joined in this Decision.	Members Neuwald and Wesley joined in this Decision.