State of California (Department of Veterans Affairs) * * * OVERRULED IN PART by County of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M (PERB 2110S)

OVERRULED IN PART by County of Sacramento
(2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
UNION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS &
DENTISTS,
Charging Party,
V.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (DEPARTMENT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS),
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CE-1808-S
PERB Decision No. 2110-S
June 1, 2010
Appearances: Davis, Cowell & Bowe by Andrew J. Kahn, Attorney, for Union of American
Physicians & Dentists; State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) by Jake
M. Hurley, Labor Relations Counsel, for State of California (Department of Veterans Affairs).
Before Dowdin Calvillo, Chair; McKeag and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
DOWDIN CALVILLO, Chair: This case is before the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on appeal by the Union of American Physicians & Dentists (UAPD)
of a Board agent's dismissal of its unfair practice charge. The charge, as amended, alleged that
the State of California (Department of Veterans Affairs) (DVA or State) violated the Ralph C.
Dills Act (Dills Act)1 by unilaterally deciding to close the acute care unit at the Yountville
Veterans Home (Home) and refusing UAPD's demands to bargain over the closure and its
effects. The Board agent dismissed the charge for failure to state a prima facie case of refusal
to bargain.
1 The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to the Government Code.

The Board has reviewed the dismissal and the record in light of UAPD's appeal, DVA's	The Board has reviewed the dismissal and the record in light of UAPD's appeal, DVA's
response and the relevant law. Based on this review, the Board affirms the dismissal of the	response and the relevant law. Based on this review, the Board affirms the dismissal of the
unfair practice charge for the reasons discussed below.	unfair practice charge for the reasons discussed below.
BACKGROUND	BACKGROUND
of employees in State Bargaining Unit 16,	UAPD is the exclusive representative of employees in State Bargaining Unit 16,	UAPD is the exclusive representative
including physicians employed by DVA. In May 2009, DVA sent layoff notices to Unit 16including physicians employed by DVA. In May 2009, DVA sent layoff notices to Unit 16
members employed in the Home's acute care unit. The layoff notices informed employees that	members employed in the Home's acute care unit. The layoff notices informed employees that
DVA was closing the acute care unit effective August 1, 2009. UAPD learned of the closure	DVA was closing the acute care unit effective August 1, 2009. UAPD learned of the closure
decision and layoffs from employees who had received layoff notices.	decision and layoffs from employees who had received layoff notices.
Sometime in July 2009, DVA posted a Public Notice of Proposed Closure stating that	Sometime in July 2009, DVA posted a Public Notice of Proposed Closure stating that
"acute care hospital services will be eliminated" at the Home effective August 1, 2009.	"acute care hospital services will be eliminated" at the Home effective August 1, 2009.
Around	Around this time, UAPD President Dr. Stuart Bussey (Bussey) met with Department of	this time, UAPD President Dr. Stuart Bussey (Bussey) met with Department of
Personnel Administration (DPA) representatives about the closure. UAPD requested	Personnel Administration (DPA) representatives about the closure. UAPD requested
information about the reasons for the closure and said it wanted to negotiate over the decision.	information about the reasons for the closure and said it wanted to negotiate over the decision.
According to Bussey, DPA representatives responded with words to the effect "we're not	According to Bussey, DPA representatives responded with words to the effect "we're not
going to get into that."	going to get into that."
On July 16, 2009, Andrew Kahn, UAPD's attorney, sent a letter to DVA officials and	On July 16, 2009, Andrew Kahn, UAPD's attorney, sent a letter to DVA officials and
DPA representatives regarding the closure. The letter asserted that the closure and the	DPA representatives regarding the closure. The letter asserted that the closure and the
resulting use of private hospitals to provide acute care services to Home residents were illegal	resulting use of private hospitals to provide acute care services to Home residents were illegal
for three reasons: (1) they violated state constitutional limits on contracting out civil service	for three reasons: (1) they violated state constitutional limits on contracting out civil service
work; (2) they violated the Legislative mandate that acute care services be performed on-site;	work; (2) they violated the Legislative mandate that acute care services be performed on-site;
and (3) DVA failed to bargain with UAPD over the closure. Regarding the third reason, the	and (3) DVA failed to bargain with UAPD over the closure. Regarding the third reason, the
letter stated in full:	letter stated in full:
The decision to close this unit and contract-out the work to	The decision to close this unit and contract-out the work to
private hospitals was not bargained with UAPD, in violation of	private hospitals was not bargained with UAPD, in violation of
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the Dills Act. UAPD learned of this decision only after its	the Dills Act. UAPD learned of this decision only after its
members at the facility were notified that it was happening.	members at the facility were notified that it was happening.
UAPD would have liked the opportunity to show the State it will	UAPD would have liked the opportunity to show the State it will
only end up paying more, as noted above.	only end up paying more, as noted above.
The letter closed:	The letter closed:
If we do not hear from you or your attorneys within 48 hours that	If we do not hear from you or your attorneys within 48 hours that
you are either going to hold off on closure or can show us why	you are either going to hold off on closure or can show us why
these claims lack merit, then we intend to immediately seek	these claims lack merit, then we intend to immediately seek
judicial and administrative relief.	judicial and administrative relief.
UAPD filed the instant unfair practice charge on July 20, 2009. The following day,	UAPD filed the instant unfair practice charge on July 20, 2009. The following day,
DV A Deputy Secretary and Chief Counsel Robert D. Wilson (Wilson) responded to UAPD by	DVA Deputy Secretary and Chief Counsel Robert D. Wilson (Wilson) responded to UAPD by
letter. Regarding the alleged Dills Act violation, Wilson stated that the closure decision was	letter. Regarding the alleged Dills Act violation, Wilson stated that the closure decision was
not negotiable because it "does not alter the conditions of any employment" but merely affects	not negotiable because it "does not alter the conditions of any employment" but merely affects
the fact of employment.	the fact of employment.
The amended charge, filed on October 26, 2009, alleged:	The amended charge, filed on October 26, 2009, alleged:
In or about July 28, 2009 at a meeting with DPA's Jackie	In or about July 28, 2009 at a meeting with DPA's Jackie
Cervantes and a DVA representative, UAPD through	Cervantes and a DVA representative, UAPD through
representatives Zegory Williams, Al Groh and Jim Moore sought	representatives Zegory Williams, Al Groh and Jim Moore sought
to	to negotiate over the decision to close and its impact, but were	negotiate over the decision to close and its impact, but were
told by these management representatives that these were not	told by these management representatives that these were not
negotiable matters and all that would take place is that DV A	negotiable matters and all that would take place is that DVA
would explain its layoff implementation plan.	would explain its layoff implementation plan.
3
DVA closed the Home's acute care unit on August 1, 2009, as planned. After that date,	DVA closed the Home's acute care unit on August 1, 2009, as planned. After that date,
Home residents were transported to nearby private hospitals for acute care services.	Home residents were transported to nearby private hospitals for acute care services.
The Board agent dismissed the charge on the ground that UAPD failed to allege facts	The Board agent dismissed the charge on the ground that UAPD failed to allege facts
establishing	establishing it made a valid request to bargain over the effects of the closure. On appeal,	it made a valid request to bargain over the effects of the closure. On appeal,
UAPD	UAPD asserts it made two valid requests to bargain both the closure decision and its effects:	asserts it made two valid requests to bargain both the closure decision and its effects:
the July 16, 2009 letter and the July 28, 2009 oral request. UAPD also contends that DVA	the July 16, 2009 letter and the July 28, 2009 oral request. UAPD also contends that DVA
made an unlawful unilateral change by closing the acute care unit because "contracting out	made an unlawful unilateral change by closing the acute care unit because "contracting out
services is within the scope of bargaining." DPA responds that the charge failed to establish a	services is within the scope of bargaining." DPA responds that the charge failed to establish a
3

valid demand by UAPD to bargain the effects of the closure decision and that the decision is	valid demand by UAPD to bargain the effects of the closure decision and that the decision is
not negotiable because it involved a cessation of operations rather than contracting out of	not negotiable because it involved a cessation of operations rather than contracting out of
bargaining unit work.	bargaining unit work.
DISCUSSION	DISCUSSION
11.. 	UAPD's Request for Leave to File Reply Brief	UAPD's Request for Leave to File Reply Brief
UAPD has requested leave to file a reply brief in response to DP A's brief in opposition to	UAPD has requested leave to file a reply brief in response to DPA's brief in opposition to
the appeal. The basis for UAPD's request is that DP A's briefraised the issue of contracting out,	the appeal. The basis for UAPD's request is that DPA's brief raised the issue of contracting out,
which was not addressed in the Board agent's dismissal. DPA opposes the request on the ground	which was not addressed in the Board agent's dismissal. DPA opposes the request on the ground
the contracting out issue was raised before the Board agent and therefore UAPD was on notice	the contracting out issue was raised before the Board agent and therefore UAPD was on notice
that DPA disputed the issue.	that DPA disputed the issue.
PERB regulations do not expressly provide for or preclude the filing of reply briefs on	PERB regulations do not expressly provide for or preclude the filing of reply briefs on
appeal. (Los Angeles Unified School District/Los Angeles Community College District (1984)	appeal. (Los Angeles Unified School District/Los Angeles Community College District (1984)
PERB Decision No. 408.) Consequently, the Board has ruled that it has discretion to allow the	PERB Decision No. 408.) Consequently, the Board has ruled that it has discretion to allow the
filing of a reply brief when a response to exceptions "raises new issues, discusses new case law	filing of a reply brief when a response to exceptions "raises new issues, discusses new case law
or formulates new defenses to allegations." (Ibid.)	or formulates new defenses to allegations." (Ibid.)
The issue of whether DVA contracted out bargaining unit work by closing the acute care	The issue of whether DVA contracted out bargaining unit work by closing the acute care
unit and sending Home residents to private hospitals for acute care services is not a new issue	unit and sending Home residents to private hospitals for acute care services is not a new issue
first	first raised by DPA in its opposition to the appeal. As DPA points out, the contracting out	raised by DP A in its opposition to the appeal. As DP A points out, the contracting out
argument in its opposition brief is almost identical to that set forth in DP A's earlier positionargument in its opposition brief is almost identical to that set forth in DPA's earlier position
statements. Moreover, in the unilateral change section of its appeal, UAPD itself raises the issue	statements. Moreover, in the unilateral change section of its appeal, UAPD itself raises the issue
"that contracting out services is within the scope of bargaining." The fact that the Board agent	"that contracting out services is within the scope of bargaining." The fact that the Board agent
did not address the contracting out issue in the dismissal does not mean the issue is no longer	did not address the contracting out issue in the dismissal does not mean the issue is no longer
before PERB because the Board may affirm a dismissal on any ground supported by the record.	before PERB because the Board may affirm a dismissal on any ground supported by the record.
(See	(See Pleasant Valley School District (1988) PERB Decision No. 708 [affirming ALJ's finding	Pleasant Valley School District (1988) PERB Decision No. 708 [affirming ALJ's finding
44

violation	of a violation on different grounds].) Accordingly, we deny UAPD's request for leave to file a	
of
a 	on different grounds].) Accordingly, we deny
UAPD's
request for leave to file a
reply brief.	reply brief.
2.	2. 	Merits
of
the Charge	Merits of the Charge
UAPD's
charge raises two issues: (1) whether
DVA
made an unlawful unilateralUAPD's charge raises two issues: (1) whether DVA made an unlawful unilateral
change when it decided to close the
Home's
acute care unit; and (2) whether DVA unlawfully	change when it decided to close the Home's acute care unit; and (2) whether DVA unlawfully
refused
UAPD's
requests to bargain over the effects
of
the closure on Unit 16 members.	refused UAPD's requests to bargain over the effects of the closure on Unit 16 members.
a. 	Unilateral Change	
a.	
Unilateral Change
An employer's unilateral change in terms and conditions
of
employment is considered a	An employer's unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment is considered a
per se violation
of
Dills Act section 3519, subdivision (c) if: (1) the employer breached
orper se violation of Dills Act section 3519, subdivision (c) if: (1) the employer breached or
altered the parties' written agreement or its own established past practice; (2) such action was	altered the parties' written agreement or its own established past practice; (2) such action was
taken without giving the other party notice or an opportunity to bargain over the change; (3) the	taken without giving the other party notice or an opportunity to bargain over the change; (3) the
change was not merely an isolated breach of the contract, but amounts to a change in policy (i.e.,	change was not merely an isolated breach
of
the contract, but amounts to a change in policy (i.e.,
it has a generalized effect or continuing impact upon bargaining unit members' terms and	it has a generalized effect or continuing impact upon bargaining unit members' terms and
conditions
of
employment); and (4) the change in policy concerns a matter within the scope
of	conditions of employment); and (4) the change in policy concerns a matter within the scope of
representation. (Walnut Valley Unified School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 160; Grantrepresentation. (Walnut Valley Unified School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 160; Grant
Joint Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196.)	Joint Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196.)
DV A changed its past practice
of
providing acute care services at the Home, a changeDVA changed its past practice of providing acute care services at the Home, a change
which necessarily had a generalized effect and continuing impact on Unit 16 members	which necessarily had a generalized effect and continuing impact on Unit 16 members
employed in the Home's acute care unit. The May 2009 layoff notices to Unit 16 members didemployed in the Home's acute care unit. The May 2009 layoff notices to Unit 16 members did
not constitute sufficient notice to UAPD of DVA's decision to close the acute care unit.	not constitute sufficient notice to U APD
of
DV
A's
decision to close the acute care unit.
(Fall River Joint Unified School District (1998) PERB Decision No. 1259.) Moreover, the	(Fall River Joint Unified School District (1998) PERB Decision No. 1259.) Moreover, the
layoff notices indicated that DVA had already made a firm decision to close the acute care unit	layoff notices indicated that DV A had already made a firm decision to close the acute care unit
and therefore any request by UAPD to bargain over the decision would have been futile.	and therefore any request by UAPD to bargain over the decision would have been futile.
5

(Ibid.) Consequently, we find DVA did not provide UAPD with notice and an opportunity to	(Ibid.) 	Consequently, we find DVA did not provide UAPD with notice and an opportunity to
bargain before reaching a firm decision to close the Home's acute care unit.	bargain before reaching a firm decision to close the Home's acute care unit.
The parties dispute whether DVA's closure decision concerned a matter within the	The parties dispute whether DVA's closure decision concerned a'matter within the
scope of representation and therefore was subject to negotiation. UAPD asserts the decision to	scope of representation and therefore was subject to negotiation. UAPD asserts the decision to
close the acute care unit and layoff unit employees was negotiable because it was the result of	close the acute care unit and layoff unit employees was negotiable because it was the result of
DV A contracting out bargaining unit work to private hospitals. DV A counters that theDVA contracting out bargaining unit work to private hospitals. DVA counters that the
decision was a non-negotiable managerial prerogative because it involved a change in the	decision was a non-negotiable managerial prerogative because it involved a change in the
scope of services provided by the Home.scope of services provided by the Home.
6
As a general rule, the decision to layoff employees is not within the scope of	As a general rule, the decision to layoff employees is not within the scope of
representation. (State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) (1987) PERBrepresentation. (State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) (1987) PERB
Decision No. 648-S; Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision	Decision No. 648-S; Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision
No. 223.) However, when the layoffs result from a decision to contract out bargaining unit	No. 223.) However, when the layoffs result from a decision to contract out bargaining unit
work, "the decision to subcontract and lay off employees is subject to bargaining." (Fire	work, "the decision to subcontract and lay off employees is subject to bargaining." (Fire
Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 621.) Contracting out is negotiable in	Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 621.) Contracting out is negotiable in
either of two circumstances: (1) where the employer simply replaces its employees with those	either of two circumstances: (1) where the employer simply replaces its employees with those
of a contractor to perform the same services under similar circumstances; or (2) where the	of a contractor to perform the same services under similar circumstances; or (2) where the
decision was motivated substantially by potential savings in labor costs. (Lucia Mar Unified	decision was motivated substantially by potential savings in labor costs. (Lucia Mar Unified
School District (2001) PERB Decision No. 1440.)	School District (2001) PERB Decision No. 1440.)
To establish that an employer contracted out bargaining unit work, the charging party	To establish that an employer contracted out bargaining unit work, the charging party
must show the employer entered into an agreement with a contractor under which the	must show the employer entered into an agreement with a contractor under which the
contractor will perform the same work formerly performed by bargaining unit members.	contractor will perform the same work formerly performed by bargaining unit members.
(Rialto Police Benefit Assn. v. City of Rialto (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1299; Oakland	(Rialto Police Benefit Assn. v. City of Rialto (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1299; Oakland
Unified School District (2005) PERB Decision No. 1770.) In Oakland Unified School District,	Unified School District (2005) PERB Decision No. 1770.) In Oakland Unified School District,
supra, the Board found contracting out where the district laid off its security officers and	supra, the Board found contracting out where the district laid off its security officers and
6

7
entered into a written memorandum of understanding with the Oakland Police Department to	entered into a written memorandum of understanding with the Oakland Police Department to
provide security on district campuses for two years in exchange for a $1 million payment. Theprovide security on district campuses for two years in exchange for a $1 million payment. The
Board	Board rejected the district's argument that its decision to no longer provide security services	rejected the district's argument that its decision to no longer provide security services
was a "change in direction" that was not subject to negotiation. The Board suggested that hadwas a "change in direction" that was not subject to negotiation. The Board suggested that had
the district merely laid off its security officers and then allowed the police department to patrol	the district merely laid off its security officers and then allowed the police department to patrol
its campuses as part of its regular beat, the Board would have reached a different conclusion.	its campuses as part of its regular beat, the Board would have reached a different conclusion.
Here, it is undisputed that, following closure of the acute care unit, Home residents	Here, it is undisputed that, following closure of the acute care unit, Home residents
received acute care services at private hospitals. However, UAPD failed to allege facts	received acute care services at private hospitals. However, UAPD failed to allege facts
showing that DVA had an agreement with the private hospitals to provide those services.	showing that DVA had an agreement with the private hospitals to provide those services.
UAPD provided no written agreements nor did it allege that such agreements existed. The	UAPD provided no written agreements nor did it allege that such agreements existed. The
allegation that DVA arranged to have Home residents transported to private hospitals for acute	allegation that DV A arranged to have Home residents transported to private hospitals for acute
care services falls far short of establishing a contractual agreement with the hospitals to	care services falls far short of establishing a contractual agreement with the hospitals to
provide those services. In short, U APD' s assertion that the work was contracted out, absent	provide those services. In short, UAPD's assertion that the work was contracted out, absent
allegations establishing an agreement, is insufficient to show that DV A contracted out	allegations establishing an agreement, is insufficient to show that DVA contracted out
bargaining unit work. (See United Teachers-Los Angeles (Ragsdale) (1992) PERB Decision	bargaining unit work. (See United Teachers-Los Angeles (Ragsdale) (1992) PERB Decision
No. 944 [legal conclusions are not sufficient to state a prima facie case].)	No. 944 [legal conclusions are not sufficient to state a prima facie case].)
UAPD nonetheless argues that DVA contracted out bargaining unit work because the	UAPD nonetheless argues that DVA contracted out bargaining unit work because the
State continued to pay for Home residents' acute care services via Medi-Cal. As the affected	State continued to pay for Home residents' acute care services via Medi-Cal. As the affected
employees' appointing authority, DVA is the "State employer" for purposes of this charge.	employees' appointing authority, DVA is the "State employer" for purposes of this charge.
(State of California (Department of Veterans Affairs) (2004) PERB Decision No. 1686-S.)(State of California (Department of Veterans Affairs) (2004) PERB Decision No. 1686-S.)
The charge failed to establish that DVA paid the private hospitals to perform services for	The charge failed to establish that DV A paid the private hospitals to perform services for
Home residents that were previously performed by DV A employees. Rather, it appears that	Home residents that were previously performed by DVA employees. Rather, it appears that
Medi-Cal paid the hospitals directly based on patient eligibility, without any funds passing	Medi-Cal paid the hospitals directly based on patient eligibility, without any funds passing
through DVA.	through DV A.
7

b. 	Refusal to Bargain Effects of Closure	b. 	Refusal to Bargain Effects of Closure
8
In sum, the charge failed to allege facts to establish that DV A contracted out	In sum, the charge failed to allege facts to establish that DVA contracted out
Bargaining Unit 16 work. Accordingly, we conclude that DVA's decision to close the acute	Bargaining Unit 16 work. Accordingly, we conclude that DVA's decision to close the acute
care unit and layoff unit employees was not within the scope of representation, and thus DV A	care unit and layoff unit employees was not within the scope of representation, and thus DVA
did not commit an unfair practice by unilaterally making that decision.	did not commit an unfair practice by unilaterally making that decision.
An employer's duty to bargain is triggered by an exclusive representative's validAn employer's duty to bargain is triggered by an exclusive representative's valid
demand to bargain. (Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District, supra.) While thedemand to bargain. (Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District, supra.) While the
demand need not take any particular form, it must sufficiently signify the exclusive	demand need not take any particular form, it must sufficiently signify the exclusive
representative's desire to bargain over a subject within the scope ofrepresentation. (Sylvan	representative's desire to bargain over a subject within the scope of representation. (Sylvan
Union	Union Elementary School District (1992) PERB Decision No. 919.) When an exclusive	Elementary School District (1992) PERB Decision No. 919.) When an exclusive
representative demands to bargain over the effects of a non-negotiable decision, the demand	representative demands to bargain over the effects of a non-negotiable decision, the demand
must clearly identify the negotiable effects. (State of California (Department of Corrections)	must clearly identify the negotiable effects. (State of California (Department of Corrections)
(2006)	(2006) PERB Decision No. 1848-S; Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District, supra.)	PERB Decision No. 1848-S; Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District, supra.)
UAPD alleged that it requested to bargain over the effects of DVA's decision to close	UAPD alleged that it requested to bargain over the effects of DVA' s decision to close
the Home's acute care unit on two occasions: (1) in its July 16, 2009 letter to DVA; and (2)	the Home's acute care unit on two occasions: (1) in its July 16, 2009 letter to DVA; and (2)
during a meeting with DV A and DPA representatives on July 28, 2009.	during a meeting with DVA and DPA representatives on July 28, 2009.
UAPD admits in its appeal that it did not specifically request to negotiate in its July 16,	UAPD admits in its appeal that it did not specifically request to negotiate in its July 16,
2009 letter but nonetheless claims that the letter constituted a "general notice of interest" in the	2009 letter but nonetheless claims that the letter constituted a "general notice of interest" in the
closure sufficient to trigger DVA's duty to bargain pursuant to Allan Hancock Community	closure sufficient to trigger DVA's duty to bargain pursuant to Allan Hancock Community
College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 768. However, while the letter addressed the	College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 768. However, while the letter addressed the
closure decision, it merely stated UAPD's displeasure that it was not afforded an "opportunity	closure decision, it merely stated UAPD's displeasure that it was not afforded an "opportunity
to show the State it will only end up paying more." The letter did not mention the layoffs at	to show the State it will only end up paying more." The letter did not mention the layoffs at
all, much less any effects of the layoffs on acute care unit employees. Consequently, the letter	all, much less any effects of the layoffs on acute care unit employees. Consequently, the letter
did not constitute a valid demand to bargain over the effects of the layoffs.	did not constitute a valid demand to bargain over the effects of the layoffs.
8

During the July 28, 2009 meeting, UAPD representatives "sought to negotiate over the	During the July 28, 2009 meeting, UAPD representatives "sought to negotiate over the
decision to close and its impact." The amended charge provides no further details of the	decision to close and its impact." The amended charge provides no further details of the
bargaining demand. Thus, the charge failed to allege that UAPD's demand identified any	bargaining demand. Thus, the charge failed to allege that UAPD's demand identified any
negotiable effects of the closure decision.	negotiable effects of the closure decision.
For the above reasons, we conclude that UAPD did not make a valid demand to bargain	For the above reasons, we conclude that UAPD did not make a valid demand to bargain
over negotiable effects of DVA's decision to close the acute care unit and layoff Unit 16	over negotiable effects of DVA's decision to close the acute care unit and layoff Unit 16
employees. Accordingly, DV A did not violate Dills Act section 3 519, subdivision (c) by	employees. Accordingly, DVA did not violate Dills Act section 3519, subdivision (c) by
failing to bargain with UAPD over such effects.	failing to bargain with UAPD over such effects.
ORDER
9
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SA-CE-1808-S is hereby DISMISSED	The unfair practice charge in Case No. SA-CE-1808-S is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.	WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Members Mckeag and Wesley joined in this Decision.	Members McKeag and Wesley joined in this Decision.
9