PERB Decision No. 2355E

Testo completo

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
HARRISON SHAMPINE, TOMMIE BROWN,
AND GALDA ORTIZ,
Case No. LA-CO-1543-E
Charging Parties,
PERB Decision No. 2355
v .
February 14, 2014
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION & ITS CHAPTER 47,
Respondent.
Appearances: Harrison Shampine, Tommie Brown, and Galda Ortiz, on their own behalf;
Sonja J. Woodward, Attorney, for California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47.
Before Martinez, Chair; Huguenin and Winslow, Members.
DECISION
WINSLOW, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on appeal by Harrison Shampine (Shampine), Tommie Brown, and
Galda Ortiz (collectively, Charging Parties) from the dismissal (attached) by the Office of the
General Counsel of Charging Parties' first amended unfair practice charge. The first amended
charge alleges that California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47 (CSEA or
Chapter 47) violated the Education Employment Relations Act (EERA) by failing to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement, by not responding to members' interests, and by failing to
PERB Regulation 32320(d) provides, in pertinent part: "Effective July 1, 2013, a
majority of the Board members issuing a decision or order pursuant to an appeal filed under
section 32635 [Board Review of Dismissals] shall determine whether the decision or order, or
any part thereof, shall be designated as precedential." Having met the following criteria
enumerated in the regulation, "(3) Modifies, clarifies or explains existing law or policy" and
"(5) Addresses a legal or factual issue of continuing interest," the decision herein is designated
as precedential. (PERB Regs. are codified at Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 31001 et seq.)
EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
HARRISON SHAMPINE, TOMMIE BROWN,
AND GALDA ORTIZ,
Charging Parties,
V.
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION & ITS CHAPTER 47,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CO-1543-E
PERB Decision No. 2355
February 14, 2014
Appearances: Harrison Shampine, Tommie Brown, and Galda Ortiz, on their own behalf;
Sonja
J.
Woodward, Attorney, for California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47.
Before Martinez, Chair; Huguenin and Win~low, Members.
DECISION1
WINSLOW, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on appeal by Harrison Shampine (Shampine), Tommie Brown, and
Galda Ortiz (collectively, Charging Parties) from the dismissal (attached) by the Office
of
the
General Counsel
of
Charging Parties' first amended unfair practice charge. The first amended
charge alleges that California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47 (CSEA or
Chapter 4 7) violated the Education Employment Relations Act (EERA)2 by failing to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement, by not responding to members' interests, and by failing to
1 PERB Regulation 32320(d) provides, in pertinent part: "Effective July 1, 2013, a
majority
of
the Board members issuing a decision or order pursuant to an appeal filed under
section 32635 [Board Review
of
Dismissals] shall determine whether the decision or order, or
any part thereof, shall be designated as precedential." Having met the following criteria
enumerated in the regulation, "(3) Modifies, clarifies or explains existing law or policy" and
"(5) Addresses a legal or factual issue of continuing interest," the decision herein is designated
as precedential. (PERB Regs. are codified at Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 31001 et seq.)
2 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

conduct union meetings in accordance with its by-laws. The charge also alleged that CSEA
failed to grant Shampine's request for Chapter 47's financial records. The Office of the
General Counsel dismissed the charge in its entirety for failure to state a prima facie case of a
breach of CSEA's duty of fair representation and failure to provide its financial report to a
CSEA member.
The Board has reviewed the record in its entirety and has fully considered the appeal
and the response thereto. Based on this review, we find the warning and dismissal letters to be
well-reasoned and in accordance with applicable law with respect to the disposition of the
allegations concerning a breach of the duty of fair representation. Accordingly, we adopt those
sections of the dismissal letter as the decision of the Board itself.
However, we find that Charging Parties have alleged sufficient facts to state a prima
facie violation of EERA section 3546.5, i.e., failure to provide a financial report to members.
We, therefore, reverse the General Counsel's dismissal of these allegations and order
Chapter 47 to produce the financial records as defined in EERA section 3546.6 in accordance
with the following discussion.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
This charge was initially filed on October 24, 2012, by three bargaining unit members
who alleged that CSEA had failed in its efforts to force the Centinela Valley Union High
School District (District) to employ bargaining unit members instead of substitutes in classified
jobs. The charge also alleged that the District was not following seniority lists and laid off
workers when there was a dire need for them. As for CSEA, Charging Parties alleged
corruption, favoritism, "half hearted attempts at negotiating," and that it "failed to provide
financial records. They say they are lost."
2
conduct union meetings in accordance with its by-laws. The charge also alleged that CSEA
failed to grant Shampine's request for Chapter 47's financial records. The Office
of
the
General Counsel dismissed the charge in its entirety for failure to state a prima facie case
of
a
breach
of
CSEA' s duty
of
fair representation and failure to provide its financial report to a
CSEA member.
The Board has reviewed the record in its entirety and has fully considered the appeal
and the response thereto. Based on this review, we find the warning and dismissal letters to be
well-reasoned and in accordance with applicable law with respect to the disposition
of
the
allegations concerning a breach
of
the duty
of
fair representation. Accordingly, we adopt those
sections
of
the dismissal letter as the decision
of
the Board itself.
However, we find that Charging Parties have alleged sufficient facts to state a prima
facie violation
of
EERA section 3546.5, i.e., failure to provide a financial report to members.
We, therefore, reverse the General Counsel's dismissal
of
these allegations and order
Chapter 47 to produce the financial records as defined in EERA section 3546.6 in accordance
with the following discussion.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
This charge was initially filed on October 24, 2012, by three bargaining unit members
who alleged that CSEA had failed in its efforts to force the Centinela Valley Union High
School District (District) to employ bargaining unit members instead
of
substitutes in classified
jobs. The charge also alleged that the District was not following seniority lists and laid off
workers when there was a dire need for them. As for CSEA, Charging Parties alleged
corruption, favoritism, "half hearted attempts at negotiating," and that it "failed to provide
financial records. They say they are lost."
2

The Office of the General Counsel issued a warning letter on January 24, 2013,
explaining that the charge failed to state a prima facie case for a breach of the duty of fair
representation because the Charging Parties did not demonstrate that CSEA's decisions
regarding contract enforcement were dishonest, unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith.
With respect to the request for financial information, the warning letter noted that the
charge failed to establish the records were requested within 60 days after the end of CSEA's
fiscal year and failed to specify the "type of 'financial records' requested by Shampine." For
those reasons, according to the Office of the General Counsel, the charge failed to state a prima
facie case for a violation of EERA section 3546.5, and the Charging Parties were provided an
opportunity to amend the charge.
First Amended Charge
The first amended charge, filed on February 14, 2013, provided more detail but
essentially complained of the same conduct: CSEA failed to adequately enforce the collective
bargaining agreement; it failed to file unfair practice charges against the District; its president
is inattentive and self-interested; it failed to properly communicate with employees regarding
work hours issues; it does not adhere to its own by-laws, etc.
With regard to financial records, the first amended charge provided more detail and
alleged that on October 10, 2012, Shampine, a steward, requested "financial records
(Treasurer's Report)" from Union President Carmen Maria Rosas (Rosas). The charge
alleged this document should "show the members the chapter funds, the income for the
reporting period and should include all receipts. The reporting period would also show all
"None of the Charging Parties' documents identify whether Rosas is president of
CSEA or its Chapter 47, but CSEA's documents identify Rosas as president of Chapter 47.
3
The Office
of
the General Counsel issued a warning letter on January 24, 2013,
explaining that the charge failed to state a prima facie case for a breach
of
the duty
of
fair
representation because the Charging Parties did not demonstrate that CSEA's decisions
regarding contract enforcement were dishonest, unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith.
With respect to the request for financial information, the warning letter noted that the
charge failed to establish the records were requested within 60 days after the end
of
CSEA' s
fiscal year and failed to specify the "type
of
'financial records' requested by Shampine." For
those reasons, according to the Office
of
the General Counsel, the charge failed to state a prima
facie case for a violation
of
EERA section 3546.5, and the Charging Parties were provided an
opportunity to amend the charge.
First Amended Charge
The first amended charge, filed on February 14, 2013, provided more detail but
essentially complained
of
the same conduct: CSEA failed to adequately enforce the collective
bargaining agreement; it failed to file unfair practice charges against the District; its president
is inattentive and self-interested; it failed to properly communicate with employees regarding
work hours issues; it does not adhere to its own by-laws, etc.
With regard to financial records, the first amended charge provided more detail and
alleged that on October 10, 2012, Shampine, a steward, requested "financial records
(Treasurer's Report)" from Union President Carmen Maria Rosas (Rosas). 3 The charge
alleged this document should "show the members the chapter funds, the income for the
reporting period and should include all receipts. The reporting period would also show all
3 None of the Charging Parties' documents identify whether Rosas is president
ofCSEA or its Chapter 47, but CSEA's documents identify Rosas as president of Chapter 47.
3

disbursements, credit union, bank statements, mileage forms and credit cards if any."
Shampine asked for these documents pursuant to CSEA's legal obligation under EERA to keep
accurate financial records and reports. Rosas informed Shampine that she would have the
financial documents ready on October 12, 2012. When Shampine approached Rosas about the
records on October 12, 2012, Rosas informed Shampine that she had no such documents and
that the records had not been kept in the last 10 years.
As a remedy for the failure to provide financial records, the Charging Parties asked that
there be a full investigation and an audit of Chapter 47, and that PERB require "this chapter to
submit all financial documents as aforementioned."
CSEA's Response
CSEA filed a response on March 1, 2013, asserting that the first amended charge still
does not provide a clear and concise statement of the charges pursuant to PERB
Regulation 32615(a)(5), and failed to provide the "who, what, when, where, and how" facts
required to constitute a prima facie violation of the duty of fair representation. At most, the
charge alleges that CSEA has been negligent in handling internal matters and negotiations, and
PERB has held that negligence is insufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the duty of
fair representation.
With regard to the financial document request, CSEA asserts that Shampine was not
clear with Rosas as to what he meant by "financial records" when he requested them. Rosas
did not know what financial records Shampine was requesting, but she informed him that the
financial records of the chapter were located at the home of former Chapter President
Juan Carlo Gutierrez, where they still are to this day. CSEA further asserts that Shampine is
not entitled to the financial documents he seeks. EERA section 3546.5 does not require
4
disbursements, credit union, bank statements, mileage forms and credit cards
if
any."
Shampine asked for these documents pursuant to CSEA's legal obligation under EERA to keep
accurate financial records and reports. Rosas informed Shampine that she would have the
financial documents ready on October 12, 2012. When Shampine approached Rosas about the
records on October 12, 2012, Rosas informed Shampine that she had no such documents and
that the records had not been kept in the last
10
years.
As a remedy for the failure to provide financial records, the Charging Parties asked that
there be a full investigation and an audit
of
Chapter 47, and that PERB require "this chapter to
submit all financial documents as aforementioned."
CSEA's Response
CSEA filed a response on March
1,
2013, asserting that the first amended charge still
does not provide a clear and concise statement
of
the charges pursuant to PERB
Regulation 32615(a)(5), and failed to provide the "who, what, when, where, and how" facts
required to constitute a prima facie violation
of
the duty
of
fair representation. At most, the
charge alleges that CSEA has been negligent in handling internal matters and negotiations, and
PERB has held that negligence is insufficient to establish a prima facie violation
of
the duty
of
fair representation.
With regard to the financial document request, CSEA asserts that Shampine was not
clear with Rosas as to what he meant by "financial records" when he requested them. Rosas
did not know what financial records Shampine was requesting, but she informed him that the
financial records of the chapter were located at the home
of
former Chapter President
Juan Carlo Gutierrez, where they still are to this day. CSEA further asserts that Shampine is
not entitled to the financial documents he seeks. EERA section 3546.5 does not require
4

Chapter 47 to produce for members all the documents sought by Shampine. His request is
overbroad and the charge should be dismissed on that basis.
In neither position statement did CSEA assert that Shampine's request for financial
information was time-barred, or otherwise made too late in the year.
Dismissal Letter
After considering the first amended charge filed in response to the warning letter, the
Office of the General Counsel dismissed the entire charge on March 22, 2013, because the
charge did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that CSEA's action, or inaction, with
respect to contract enforcement was an abuse of discretion, or without rational basis or devoid
of honest judgment.
The Office of the General Counsel dismissed the allegations that CSEA failed to adhere
to its bylaws, because PERB does not have jurisdiction over matters concerning internal union
affairs unless they have a substantial impact on the relationship of bargaining unit employees
to their employer, so as to give rise to a duty of fair representation. These alleged violations
had no substantial impact on employer-employee relations, and therefore failed to state a prima
facie case.
With regard to the allegation regarding failure to provide financial records, the Office
of the General Counsel essentially repeated its warning letter, finding that the charge failed to
establish that Shampine's request for financial records was made within 60 days after the end
of CSEA's fiscal year and should therefore be dismissed. The Office of the General Counsel
also dismissed these allegations because it concluded that EERA section 3546.5 does not
entitle Shampine to all the documents he requested, and for that reason the charge failed to
state a prima facie case.
5
Chapter 47 to produce for members all the documents sought by Shampine. His request is
overbroad and the charge should be dismissed on that basis.
In neither position statement did CSEA assert that Shampine's request for financial
information was time-barred, or otherwise made too late in the year.
Dismissal Letter
After considering the first amended charge filed in response to the warning letter, the
Office
of
the General Counsel dismissed the entire charge on March 22, 2013, because the
charge did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that CSEA's action, or inaction, with
respect to contract enforcement was an abuse
of
discretion, or without rational basis or devoid
of
honest judgment.
The Office
of
the General Counsel dismissed the allegations that CSEA failed to adhere
to its bylaws, because PERB does not have jurisdiction over matters concerning internal union
affairs unless they have a substantial impact on the relationship
of
bargaining unit employees
to their employer, so as to give rise to a duty
of
fair representation. These alleged violations
had no substantial impact on employer-employee relations, and therefore failed to state a prima
facie case.
With regard to the allegation regarding failure to provide financial records, the Office
of
the General Counsel essentially repeated its warning letter, finding that the charge failed to
establish that Shampine's request for financial records was made within 60 days after the end
of
CSEA' s fiscal year and should therefore be dismissed. The Office of the General Counsel
also dismissed these allegations because it concluded that EERA section 3546.5 does not
entitle Shampine to all the documents he requested, and for that reason the charge failed to
state a prima facie case.
5

Appeal of Dismissal
Charging Parties filed a timely appeal of the dismissal on April 16, 2013, alleging for
the first time that Chapter 47 filed the grievance involving unit member Monique Demery
(Demery) in September 2012; that Demery was replaced by a substitute worker, which was a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the District and CSEA; and that the
complaint over this alleged violation was never resolved. Although the appeal contends that
Demery was not adequately represented by CSEA, the Charging Parties allege no facts
supporting their contention.
With regard to Shampine's request for financial records, the appeal states that "[there
is nothing in the law that states that we have to wait until the end of the year."
The appeal also complains that the Office of the General Counsel wrongfully credited
CSEA's version of events concerning the statements allegedly made by Rosas.
CSEA's Response to the Appeal
In its response to the appeal, CSEA reiterates its earlier arguments, and objects to the
new information included in the appeal that was not included in the first amended charge,
asserting that Charging Parties could have, with reasonable diligence, alleged these new
matters in the first amended charge. With regard to the Demery grievance, CSEA argues that
the appeal does not cure the Charging Parties' failure, identified in the dismissal letter, to
identify the person who filed the grievance on behalf of Demery. CSEA alleges that "[the
Chapter itself cannot file a grievance but requires an agent to do so. Neither the First
Amended Charge, nor the appeal, name that agent."
CSEA alleges that, contrary to the allegations in the first amended charge, the dismissal
letter does not dispute that Rosas made the statements alleged in the first amended charge.
6
Appeal
of
Dismissal
Charging Parties filed a timely appeal
of
the dismissal on April 16, 2013, alleging for
the first time that Chapter 4 7 filed the grievance involving unit member Monique Demery
(Demery) in September 2012; that Demery was replaced by a substitute worker, which was a
violation
of
the collective bargaining agreement between the District and CSEA; and that the
complaint over this alleged violation was never resolved. Although the appeal contends that
Demery was not adequately represented by CSEA, the Charging Parties allege no facts
supporting their contention.
With regard to Shampine's request for financial records, the appeal states that "[t]here
is nothing in the law that states that we have to wait until the end
of
the year."
The appeal also complains that the Office
of
the General Counsel wrongfully credited
CSEA's version
of
events concerning the statements allegedly made by Rosas.
CSEA's Response to the Appeal
In its response to the appeal, CSEA reiterates its earlier arguments, and objects to the
new information included in the appeal that was not included in the first amended charge,
asserting that Charging Parties could have, with reasonable diligence, alleged these new
matters in the first amended charge. With regard to the Demery grievance, CSEA argues that
the appeal does not cure the Charging Parties' failure, identified in the dismissal letter, to
identify the person who filed the grievance on behalf
of
Demery. CSEA alleges that "[t]he
Chapter itself cannot file a grievance but requires an agent to do so. Neither the First
Amended Charge, nor the appeal, name that agent."
CSEA alleges that, contrary to the allegations in the first amended charge, the dismissal
letter does not dispute that Rosas made the statements alleged in the first amended charge.
6

DISCUSSION
New Matters
PERB Regulation 32635, prescribing the content of appeals from dismissals of unfair
practice charges, states in subsection (b):
Unless good cause is shown, a charging party may not present on
appeal new charge allegations or new supporting evidence.
Charging Parties failed to provide any good cause for including new charge allegations
in their appeal. We, therefore, do not consider those allegations in our review of the appeal.
Financial Records
EERA section 3546.5 provides, in relevant part:
Every recognized or certified employee organization shall keep
an adequate itemized record of its financial transactions and shall
make available annually, to the board and to the employees who
are members of the organization, within 60 days after the end of
its fiscal year, a detailed written financial report thereof in the
form of a balance sheet and an operating statement, signed and
certified as to accuracy by its president and treasurer, or
corresponding principal officers. In the event of failure of
compliance with this section, any employee within the
organization may petition the board for an order compelling such
compliance, or the board may issue such compliance order on its
The Office of the General Counsel dismissed the allegations concerning Shampine's
request for CSEA's financial records on two grounds: (1) the charge failed to establish that a
request for a financial report was made within 60 days after the end of CSEA's fiscal year, and
(2) EERA section 3546.5 does not entitle Shampine to all of the documents he requested,
which the General Counsel interpreted to include CSEA's treasurers report, Chapter 47 funds,
the income for the reporting period, all receipts, disbursements, credit union, bank statements,
mileage forms and credit cards, if any. In other words, Charging Parties' request for financial
records was overbroad, in the General Counsel's view, and therefore not a valid request.
J
DISCUSSION
New Matters
PERB Regulation 32635, prescribing the content
of
appeals from dismissals
of
unfair
practice charges, states in subsection (b
):
Unless good cause is shown, a charging party may not present on
appeal new charge allegations or new supporting evidence.
Charging Parties failed to provide any good cause for including new charge allegations
in their appeal. We, therefore, do not consider those allegations in our review
of
the appeal.
Financial Records
EERA section 3546.5 provides, in relevant part:
Every recognized or certified employee organization shall keep
an adequate itemized record
of
its financial transactions and shall
make available annually, to the board and to the employees who
are members
of
the organization, within 60 days after the end
of
its fiscal year, a detailed written financial report thereof in the
form
of
a balance sheet and an operating statement, signed and
certified as to accuracy by its president and treasurer, or
corresponding principal officers. In the event
of
failure
of
compliance with this section, any employee within the
organization may petition the board for an order compelling such
compliance, or the board may issue such compliance order on its
motion.	motion.
The Office
of
the General Counsel dismissed the allegations concerning Shampine' s
request for CSEA's financial records on two grounds: (1) the charge failed to establish that a
request for a financial report was made within 60 days after the end
of
CSEA's fiscal year, and
(2) EERA section 3546.5 does not entitle Shampine to all
of
the documents he requested,
which the General Counsel interpreted to include CSEA's treasurers report, Chapter 47 funds,
the income for the reporting period, all receipts, disbursements, credit union, bank statements,
mileage forms and credit cards,
if
any. 	In other words, Charging Parties' request for financial
records was overbroad, in the General Counsel's view, and therefore not a valid request.
'
7

Timeliness
We disagree with the Office of the General Counsel's conclusion that EERA
section 3546.5 establishes a 60-day window from the end of an employee organization's fiscal
year within which a member must request the organization's financial report. The statute
requires that the organization "make available" to the member (and to PERB) the financial
report "within 60 days after the end of its fiscal year." Instead of requiring a member of an
employee organization to request financial reports within 60 days of the end of the employee
organization's fiscal year, we hold that the better reading of EERA section 3546.5 gives a
union up to 60 days from the end of its fiscal year to prepare and make available reports
required by EERA section 3546.5.
Nothing in the plain meaning of EERA section 3546.5 supports the Office of the
General Counsel's view that a member must request the financial report within 60 days of the
end of the fiscal year. An employee organization must make available to its members "a
detailed written financial report" within 60 days after the end of the organization's fiscal year.
This gives the organization up to 60 days to prepare such a report. If a member were to
demand the report 45 days after the end of the fiscal year, the organization would not have a
duty to produce it until the 61" day after the end of its fiscal year.
Pursuant to PERB Regulation 32602, any alleged violation of EERA, including EERA
section 3546.5, is to be processed as an unfair practice charge." Therefore, the six-month
statute of limitations found in EERA section 3541.5(a)(1) applies.' The question then
Prior to 2006, former PERB Regulation 32125(b) provided the procedure to remedy
an employee organization's failure to comply with EERA section 3546.5. However, that
regulation was repealed in 2006, leaving the unfair practice charge as the sole method whereby
an individual member could enforce his or her right under EERA section 3546.5.
PERB may not issue a complaint "in respect of any charge based upon an alleged
unfair practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge."
8
Timeliness
We disagree with the Office
of
the General Counsel's conclusion that EERA
section 3546.5 establishes a 60-day window from the end
of
an employee organization's fiscal
year within which a member must request the organization's financial report. 	The statute
requires that the organization "make available" to the member (and to PERB) the financial
report "within 60 days after the end
of
its fiscal year." Instead
of
requiring a member
of
an
employee organization to request financial reports within 60 days
of
the end
of
the employee
organization's fiscal year, we hold that the better reading
of
EERA section 3546.5 gives a
union up to 60 days from the end
of
its fiscal year to prepare and make available reports
required by EERA section 3546.5.
Nothing in the plain meaning
of
EERA section 3546.5 supports the Office
of
the
General Counsel's view that a member must request the financial report within 60 days
of
the
end
of
the fiscal year. 	An employee organization must make available to its members
"a
detailed written financial report" within 60 days after the end
of
the organization's fiscal year.
This gives the organization up to 60 days to prepare such a report.
	If
a member were to
demand the report 45 days after the end
of
the fiscal year, the organization would not have a
duty to produce it until the
61
st day after the end
of
its fiscal year.
Pursuant to PERB Regulation 32602, any alleged violation
of
EERA, including EERA
section 3546.5, is to be processed as an unfair practice charge.4 Therefore, the six-month
statute
of
limitations found in EERA section 3541.5(a)(l) applies.5 The question then
4 Prior to 2006, former PERB Regulation 32125(b) provided the procedure to remedy
an employee organization's failure to comply with EERA section 3546.5. However, that
regulation was repealed in 2006, leaving the unfair practice charge as the sole method whereby
an individual member could enforce his or her right under EERA section 3546.5.
5 PERB may not issue a complaint "in respect of any charge based upon an alleged
unfair practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge."
8

becomes: when does a violation of EERA section 3546.5 arise, when a member requests the
financial report, or when the employee organization fails to make it available within 60 days of
the end of its fiscal year?
The Board's decision in Rio Teachers Association (Lucas) (2011) PERB Decision
No. 2157 (Rio) pp. 4-5, a case not considered by the Office of the General Counsel, suggests
that a violation occurs when the employee organization refuses to provide the financial
information upon a member's request. In that case, an individual bargaining unit member
requested the employee organization provide her with financial reports for the current fiscal
year and for the previous nine years." The organization refused to provide any reports. Rio,
states that a violation occurs when the charging party knew or should have known that the
employee organization "failed or refused to provide the requested financial report for the
immediately preceding fiscal year." As a practical matter, not every member of an employee
organization will be routinely and reliably informed of the date the organization's fiscal year
ends. Enforcement of this statute, which was enacted for the benefit of employee organization
members, who do not have the right to receive the financial data routinely and annually sent to
agency fee payers, should therefore not turn on members keeping track of a date not always
obvious to them and which could change, depending on whether the end of the fiscal year
changes.
It is unclear from the decision in Rio, supra, PERB Decision No. 2157, whether the
requesting party, Lynette Lucas, was a member of the employee organization, the Rio Teachers
Association, as she is described only as "a member of the bargaining unit." (Rio, p. 2.) We
take this opportunity to underscore that EERA section 3546.5 provides rights only to members
of the employee organization. Non-member agency fee payers derive their right to financial
information pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson (1986) 475 U.S. 292 and its
progeny.
9
becomes: when does a violation
of
EERA section 3546.5 arise, when a member requests the
financial report, or when the employee organization fails to make it available within 60 days
of
the end
of
its fiscal year?
The Board's decision in Rio Teachers Association (Lucas) (2011) PERB Decision
No. 2157 (Rio) pp. 4-5, a case not considered by the Office
of
the General Counsel, suggests
that a violation occurs when the employee organization refuses to provide the financial
information upon a member's request. In that case, an individual bargaining unit member
requested the employee organization provide her with financial reports for the current fiscal
year and for the previous nine years. 6 The organization refused to provide any reports. Rio,
states that a violation occurs when the charging party knew or should have known that the
employee organization "failed or refused to provide the requested financial report for the
immediately preceding fiscal year." As a practical matter, not every member
of
an employee
organization will be routinely and reliably informed
of
the date the organization's fiscal year
ends. Enforcement
of
this statute, which was enacted for the benefit
of
employee organization
members, who do not have the right to receive the financial data routinely and annually sent to
agency fee payers, should therefore not turn on members keeping track
of
a date not always
obvious to them and which could change, depending on whether the end
of
the fiscal year
changes.
6 It is unclear from the decision in Rio, supra, PERB Decision No. 2157, whether the
requesting party, Lynette Lucas, was a member of the employee organization, the Rio Teachers
Association, as she is described only as "a member of the bargaining unit." (Rio, p. 2.) We
take this opportunity to underscore that EERA section 3546.5 provides rights only to members
of the employee organization. Non-member agency fee payers derive their right to financial
information pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union
v.
Hudson (1986) 475 U.S. 292 and its
progeny.
9

Nor do we read EERA section 3546.5 to require the employee organization to discharge
its duty to "make available" by affirmatively distributing its financial report to members who
do not request it. Thus, it is a member's request that triggers the organization's duty to provide
the financial report, not the passing of the 60" day after the close of the organization's fiscal
year. If an unfair practice charge is filed within six months of the organization's refusal or
failure to provide its financial report to a member who has asked for it, the charge is timely.
We reiterate the limitation articulated in Rio, supra, PERB Decision No. 2157, members are
entitled only to financial reports for the immediate preceding fiscal year. Requests for
financial reports must be renewed each fiscal year.
This charge alleged that Shampine learned on October 12, 2012, that CSEA refused to
provide the financial documents he requested. The charge was filed 12 days later. It is
therefore timely under Rio, supra, PERB Decision No. 2157.
Contents of a Valid Request
Regarding the second ground for dismissal, we disagree with the Office of the General
Counsel's conclusion that a union member's request for "financial records (Treasurer's
Report)" does not satisfy as adequate notice to the union of a request for the union's financial
report required under EERA section 3546.5.
As a preliminary matter, the dismissal letter does not directly address whether the
allegation that Shampine requested "financial records (Treasurer's Report)" from Rosas
indicates that Shampine used this exact terminology when speaking to Rosas. However,
regardless of what words Shampine used in his request, the charge alleges sufficient facts that
Shampine reasonably put CSEA on notice that he was requesting the financial report within the
meaning of EERA section 3546.5.
10
Nor do we read EERA section 3546.5 to require the employee organization to discharge
its duty to "make available" by affirmatively distributing its financial report to members who
do not request it. Thus, it is a member's request that triggers the organization's duty to provide
the financial report, not the passing
of
the 60 th day after the close
of
the organization's fiscal
year.
If
an unfair practice charge is filed within six months
of
the organization's refusal or
failure to provide its financial report to a member who has asked for it, the charge is timely.
We reiterate the limitation articulated in Rio, supra, PERB Decision No. 2157, members are
entitled only to financial reports for the immediate preceding fiscal year. Requests for
financial reports must be renewed each fiscal year.
This charge alleged that Shampine learned on October 12, 2012, that CSEA refused to
provide the financial documents he requested. The charge was filed
12
days later. It is
therefore timely under Rio, supra, PERB Decision No. 2157.
Contents
of
a Valid Request
Regarding the second ground for dismissal, we disagree with the Office
of
the General
Counsel's conclusion that a union member's request for "financial records (Treasurer's
Report)" does not satisfy as adequate notice to the union
of
a request for the union's financial
report required under EERA section 3546.5.
As a preliminary matter, the dismissal letter does not directly address whether the
allegation that Shampine requested "financial records (Treasurer's Report)" from Rosas
indicates that Shampine used this exact terminology when speaking to Rosas. However,
regardless
of
what words Shampine used in his request, the charge alleges sufficient facts that
Shampine reasonably put CSEA on notice that he was requesting the financial report within the
meaning of EERA section 3546.5.
10

We also disagree with the Office of the General Counsel's conclusion that, since the
information the Charging Parties believed to be included in the financial report is not governed
by EERA section 3546.5 (e.g., credit card information, bank statements, mileage forms, etc.),
the request for such report itself is not governed by EERA section 3546.5. Regardless of the
information Shampine believes the documents "should" or "would" show (or whether that
information is governed by EERA section 3546.5), a member's request for a "Treasurer's
Report" constitutes a sufficient request for the detailed written financial report envisioned by
EERA section 3546.5.
This conclusion is borne out in the PERB authority to which the Office of the General
Counsel cites in the dismissal letter, viz., State Employees Trade Council United (Ventura
et al.) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2069-H (Ventura).'
In Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, charging party Allen Rutherford
(Rutherford) asked a representative of the State Employees Trade Council United (Council) in
September 2008 to view the Council's annual report to get an idea of the cost of a joint
apprenticeship and training committee program relative to the overall Council budget (the
Council's previous fiscal year ended December 31, 2007). The Council representative replied
that the 2007 annual report was unavailable because it was still at the auditor, but that he did
have some quarterly reports from 2006 that Rutherford could examine. Rutherford requested
that the Council representative send him what he could get. However, Rutherford never
received any 2006 quarterly reports.
This case arose under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act
(HEERA). (HEERA is codified at Gov. Code, $ 3560 et seq.) Although the decision
references HEERA section 3587, the only difference between HEERA section 3587 and EERA
section 3546.5, is EERA requirement that the financial report be "signed and certified as to
accuracy by its president and treasurer," as opposed to HEERA's requirement that the report be
"certified" but not "signed." The statutes are otherwise (and for our purposes) identical.
11
We also disagree with the Office
of
the General Counsel's conclusion that, since the
information the Charging Parties believed to be included in the financial report is not governed
by EERA section 3546.5 (e.g., credit card information, bank statements, mileage forms, etc.),
the request for such report itself is not governed by EERA section 3546.5. Regardless
of
the
information Shampine believes the documents "should" or "would" show (or whether that
information is governed by EERA section 3546.5), a member's request for a "Treasurer's
Report" constitutes a sufficient request for the detailed written financial report envisioned by
EERA section 3546.5.
This conclusion is borne out in the PERB authority to which the Office
of
the General
Counsel cites in the dismissal letter, viz., State Employees Trade Council United (Ventura
et al.) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2069-H (Ventura). 7
In Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, charging party Allen Rutherford
(Rutherford) asked a representative
of
the State Employees Trade Council United (Council) in
September 2008 to view the Council's annual report to get an idea
of
the cost
of
a joint
apprenticeship and training committee program relative to the overall Council budget (the
Council's previous fiscal year ended December 31, 2007). The Council representative replied
that the 2007 annual report was unavailable because it was still at the auditor, but that he did
have some quarterly reports from 2006 that Rutherford could examine. Rutherford requested
that the Council representative send him what he could get. However, Rutherford never
received any 2006 quarterly reports.
7 This case arose under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act
(HEERA). (HEERA is codified at Gov. Code, § 3560 et seq.) Although the decision
references HEERA section 3587, the only difference between HEERA section 3587 and EERA
section 3546.5, is EERA requirement that the financial report be "signed and certified as to
accuracy by its president and treasurer," as opposed to HEERA's requirement that the report be
"certified" but not "signed." The statutes are otherwise (and for. our purposes) identical.
11

After the unfair practice charge was filed, Rutherford received the third quarterly report
for 2008. On November 25, 2008, Rutherford e-mailed the Council's secretary-treasurer and
asked her when the fiscal year ended. Additionally, he requested the 2007 annual report. Later
that day, the secretary-treasurer e-mailed Rutherford and informed him that the report for 2007
was not yet completed. She further stated that she would forward the report to him upon
receipt. However, Rutherford never received the 2007 annual report.
In Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, PERB stated:
Charging Parties do not need to demonstrate whether [the
Union's] annual financial report or its quarterly reports qualify as
"a balance sheet and an operating statement." Rather, all
Charging Parties must do is request the "financial report." It is
the recognized or certificated employee organization that must
have a financial report in the form of a balance sheet and an
operating statement.
The fact that Charging Parties did not utilize the specific verbiage
of 'financial report' does not change our conclusion. On
September 9, 2008, Rutherford requested a copy of the [Union]
annual report. He again requested a copy of the financial
document on November 25, 2008. [Union] informed Rutherford
that the 2007 annual report was still being audited and was not
complete. It is clear that [Union] understood Charging Parties to
have requested the financial report specified in HEERA
section 3587. As such, Charging Parties requested a financial
report as provided for under HEERA section 3587.
(Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, p. 1 1.)
The dismissal letter cites to Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H for the
proposition that "[ajn employee alleging that the employee organization failed to produce a
record of its financial transactions need not have made a specific request for the employee
organization's 'financial report' where the employee organization understood the charging
party to have requested the reports specified in the statute." However, the dismissal is not
consistent with this standard. We also note that in Ventura, the union member made his
12
After the unfair practice charge was filed, Rutherford received the third quarterly report
for 2008. On November 25, 2008, Rutherford e-mailed the Council's secretary-treasurer and
asked her when the fiscal year ended. Additionally, he requested the 2007 annual report. Later
that day, the secretary-treasurer e-mailed Rutherford and informed him that the report for 2007
was not yet completed. She further stated that she would forward the report to him upon
receipt. However, Rutherford never received the 2007 annual report.
In Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, PERB stated:
Charging Parties do not need to demonstrate whether [the
Union's] annual financial report or its quarterly reports qualify as
"a balance sheet and an operating statement." Rather, all
Charging Parties must do is request the "financial report." It is
the recognized or certificated employee organization that must
have a financial report in the form
of
a balance sheet and an
operating statement.
The fact that Charging Parties did not utilize the specific verbiage
of
'financial report' does not change our conclusion. On
September 9, 2008, Rutherford requested a copy
of
the [Union]
annual report. He again requested a copy
of
the financial
document on November 25, 2008. [Union] informed Rutherford
that the 2007 annual report was still being audited and was not
complete. It is clear that [Union] understood Charging Parties to
have requested the financial report specified in HEERA
section 3587. As such, Charging Parties requested a financial
report as provided for under HEERA section 3587.
(Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H,
p.
11.)
The dismissal letter cites to Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H for the
proposition that "[a]n employee alleging that the employee organization failed to produce a
record
of
its financial transactions need not have made a specific request for the employee
organization's 'financial report' where the employee organization understood the charging
party to have requested the reports specified in the statute." However, the dismissal is not
consistent with this standard. We also note that in Ventura, the union member made his
12

request for the union's 2007 annual report subsequent to the 60-day period following the end
of the Council's 2007 fiscal year, yet the member was still entitled to the report.
Under Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, Chapter 47 reasonably should have
understood Shampine to have requested the financial report for Chapter 47's previous fiscal
year specified in EERA section 3546.5. Charging Parties have, therefore, alleged sufficient
facts to warrant the remedy we discuss below.
Under most circumstances where the Board itself overturns a dismissal of a charge, it
orders the case remanded to the Office of the General Counsel for the issuance of a complaint.
However, EERA section 3546.5 gives the Board itself the authority to issue a compliance order
on its own motion. We find it is appropriate to do so in this case, instead of remanding for the
issuance of a complaint. Because the unfair practice charge was timely filed as to the request
for financial records for the immediately preceding fiscal year, and because CSEA's position
statement indicates that the documents exist and are located at the home of its former
president, it is appropriate to order CSEA and its Chapter 47 to produce the documents
required by EERA section 3546.5 for the fiscal year in question, that is "a detailed written
financial report thereof in the form of a balance sheet and an operating statement."
ORDER
Upon the foregoing discussion and the record as a whole, and pursuant to the authority
granted the Public Employment Relations Board (Board) in section 3546.5 of the Education
Employment Relations Act, the Board orders the California School Employees Association &
its Chapter 47 (CSEA) to immediately provide Harrison Shampine (Shampine) with a detailed
written financial report in the form of a balance sheet and an operating statement for the CSEA
fiscal year ending prior to October 10, 2012, date of Shampine's request. The Board
13
request for the union's 2007 annual report subsequent to the 60-day period following the end
of
the Council's 2007 fiscal year, yet the member was still entitled to the report.
Under Ventura, supra, PERB Decision No. 2069-H, Chapter 47 reasonably should have
understood Shampine to have requested the financial report for Chapter 47' s previous fiscal
year specified in EERA section 3546.5. Charging Parties have, therefore, alleged sufficient
facts to warrant the remedy we discuss below.
Remedy	Remedy
Under most circumstances where the Board itself overturns a dismissal
of
a charge, it
orders the case remanded to the Office
of
the General Counsel for the issuance
of
a complaint.
However, EERA section 3546.5 gives the Board itself the authority to issue a compliance order
on its own motion. We find it is appropriate to do so in this case, instead
of
remanding for the
issuance
of
a complaint. Because the unfair practice charge was timely filed as to the request
for financial records for the immediately preceding fiscal year, and because CSEA's position
statement indicates that the documents exist and are located at the home
of
its former
president, it is appropriate to order CSEA and its Chapter 4 7 to produce the documents
required by EERA section 3546.5 for the fiscal year in question, that is "a detailed written
financial report thereof in the form
of
a balance sheet and an operating statement."
ORDER
Upon the foregoing discussion and the record as a whole, and pursuant to the authority
granted the Public Employment Relations Board (Board) in section 3546.5 of the Education
Employment Relations Act, the Board orders the California School Employees Association &
its Chapter 47 (CSEA) to immediately provide Harrison Shampine (Shampine) with a detailed
written financial report in the form of a balance sheet and an operating statement for the CSEA
fiscal year ending prior to October 10, 2012, date of Shampine' s request. The Board
13

REMANDS compliance with the Board's Order herein to the Office of the General Counsel.
The Board AFFIRMS the dismissal of Shampine, Tommie Brown, and Galda Ortiz' remaining
allegations.
Chair Martinez and Member Huguenin joined in this Decision.
14
REMANDS compliance with the Board's Order herein to the Office
of
the General Counsel.
The Board AFFIRMS the dismissal
of
Shampine, Tommie Brown, and Galda Ortiz' remaining
allegations.
14
Chair Martinez and Member Huguenin joined in this Decision.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Governor
STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
EDMUND G. BROWN Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ILATIONS BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
Telephone: (916) 327-7242
Fax: (916) 327-6377
ATICE MORE
PERB
March 22, 2013
Harrison Shampine
Re: Harrison Shampine, et al. v. California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CO-1543-E
DISMISSAL LETTER
Dear Mr. Shampine:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on October 24, 2012. Harrison Shampine (Shampine), Tommie
Brown (Brown) and Galda Ortiz (Ortiz) (collectively Charging Parties)' allege that the
California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47 (Union or Respondent) violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA or Act) by breaching its duty of fair
Charging Parties were informed in the attached Warning Letter dated January 24, 2013
(Warning Letter), that the above-referenced charge did not state a prima facie case. Charging
Parties were advised that, if there were any factual inaccuracies or additional facts that would
correct the deficiencies explained in that letter, they should amend the charge. Charging
Parties were further advised that, unless they amended the charge to state a prima facie case or
withdrew the charge on or before February 8, 2013, the charge would be dismissed.
On February 14, 2013, the Charging Parties filed a timely First Amended Charge."
he filings with the charge contain the signature of each individual. PERB will
consider each individual as a Charging Party.
EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. The text of the EERA and
PERB Regulations may be found at www.perb.ca.gov. PERB regulations are codified at
California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 31001 et seq.
The undersigned granted Charging Parties an extension of time until February 15,
2013 to file a First Amended Charge.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
l"'...:.iLATIONS
BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
Telephone: (916) 327-7242
Fax: (916) 327-6377
March 22, 2013
Harrison Shampine
1505 Gardena Ave.
Glendale, CA 91203
Re: Harrison Shampine, et
al.
v.
California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CO-1543-E
DISMISSAL LETTER
Dear Mr. Shampine:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on October 24, 2012. Harrison Shampine (Shampine), Tommie
Brown (Brown) and Galda Ortiz (Ortiz) (collectively Charging Parties)1 allege that the
California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47 (Union or Respondent) violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA or Act)2 by breaching its duty
of
fair
representation. representation.
Charging Parties were informed in the attached Warning Letter dated January 24, 2013
(Warning Letter), that the above-referenced charge did not state a prima facie case. Charging
Parties were advised that,
if
there were any factual inaccuracies or additional facts that would
correct the deficiencies explained in that letter, they should amend the charge. Charging
Parties were further advised that, unless they amended the charge to state a prima facie case or
withdrew the charge on or before February
8,
2013, the charge would be dismissed.
On February 14, 2013, the Charging Parties filed a timely First Amended Charge. 3
The filings with the charge contain the signature
of
each individual. PERB will T
consider each individual as a Charging Party.
2 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. The text of the EERA and
PERB Regulations may be found at www.perb.ca.gov. PERB regulations are codified at
California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 31001 et seq.
3 The undersigned granted Charging Parties an extension of time until February 15,
2013 to file a First Amended Charge.

LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 2
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 2
FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE FIRST AMENDED CHARGE
At an unspecified time, Union President Carmen Maria Rosas (Rosas) was asked by an
unspecified individual, "What is being done about the District's disregard for the collective
bargaining contract signed by CSEA Chapter 47 and Centinela Valley Union High School
District (District)?"
From July 2, 2012 through August 30, 2012, a Union member employed as a Behavior
Management aide "was not allowed to work a summer assignment." A grievance was filed
concerning the District's conduct in relation to the Behavior Management aide." According to
the charge, the grievance "went unanswered " by the Union. According to the charge, "it has
been questioned [that] the Union allows everyone but the aides [to receive] full hours during
the extended school year."
On September 26, 2012, the Union held a meeting with bargaining unit members. At the
September 26, 2012, meeting, Rosas stated that "she was in ongoing talks with the [District]
board." She also stated that "at one point, the [District] board blew her off." Charging Parties
overheard Rosas' statement. The charge states that Rosas "was to[o] busy securing her own
position to deal with member issues."
On September 26, 2012, Rosas stated that "the reason that she retained her job was because of
the work that she had done with the Union."
On October 10, 2012, Shampine, a Union steward, "requested financial records (Treasurer's
Report) from the Union President, Carmen Rosas." The Treasurer's Report purports to "show
the members the chapter funds, the income for the reporting period and should include all
receipts. The reporting period would also show all disbursements, credit union, bank
statements, mileage forms and credit cards, if any." According to the charge, it is "a legal
obligation for each chapter under [EERA] to keep accurate financial reports and records."
On October 12, 2012, Shampine "approached Ms. Rosas about the records." Rosas "informed
[Shampine] that she had no such documents and that records had not been kept in the last 10
years." Describing the Union's conduct, the charge states the following
It must be noted that this Union is unorganized and does not
conduct the meetings using the bylaws. There are never any
minutes read and there is no accounting from the Treasurer at the
meetings. As a matter of [fact, ] there was no Treasurer or
minutes read at the meeting [on]... September 26, 2012, October
19, 2012, November 16, 2012, December 12, 2012, or January 9,
2013. The secretary has been witnessed sleeping at these
*It is unclear from the charge whether the Union or the Behavior Management aide
filed the grievance.
FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE FIRST AMENDED CHARGE
At an unspecified time, Union President Carmen Maria Rosas (Rosas) was asked by an
unspecified individual, "What is being done about the District's disregard for the collective
bargaining contract signed by CSEA Chapter 4 7 and Centinela Valley Union High School
District (District)?"
From July 2, 2012 through August 30, 2012, a Union member employed as a Behavior
Management aide "was not allowed to work a summer assignment." A grievance was filed
concerning the District's conduct in relation to the Behavior Management aide. 4 According to
the charge, the grievance "went unanswered" by the Union. According to the charge, "it has
been questioned [that] the Union allows everyone but the aides [to receive] full hours during
the extended school year."
On September 26, 2012, the Union held a meeting with bargaining unit members. At the
September 26, 2012, meeting, Rosas stated that "she was in ongoing talks with the [District]
board." She also stated that "at one point, the [District] board blew her off." Charging Parties
overheard Rosas' statement. The charge states that Rosas "was to [o] busy securing her own
position to deal with member issues."
On September 26, 2012, Rosas stated that "the reason that she retained her job was because of
the work that she had done with the Union."
On October 10, 2012, Shampine, a Union steward, "requested financial records (Treasurer's
Report) from the Union President, Carmen Rosas." The Treasurer's Report purports to "show
the members the chapter funds, the income for the reporting period and should include all
receipts. The reporting period would also show all disbursements, credit union, bank
statements, mileage forms and credit cards, if any." According to the charge, it is "a legal
obligation for each chapter under [EERA] to keep accurate financial reports and records."
On October 12, 2012, Shampine "approached Ms. Rosas about the records." Rosas "informed
[Shampine] that she had no such documents and that records had not been kept in the last 10
years." Describing the Union's conduct, the charge states the following:
It must be noted that this Union is unorganized and does not
conduct the meetings using the bylaws. There are never any
minutes read and there is no accounting from the Treasurer at the
meetings. As a matter of [fact,] there was no Treasurer or
minutes read at the meeting [on] ... September 26, 2012, October
19, 2012, November 16, 2012, December 12, 2012, or January 9,
2013. The secretary has been witnessed sleeping at these
4 It is unclear from the charge whether the Union or the Behavior Management aide
filed the grievance.

LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 3
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 3
meetings. There does not seem to be any [talking] going on. The
Chapter [introduced new Treasurers] at the December 12, 2012,
meeting.
On December 23, 2012, Rosas "had a conversation with" Shampine. Rosas told Shampine that
"she was sorry for being selfish." Charging Parties overheard Rosas' statement.
The Marysville Joint Unified Union chapter "was steadfast and forceful in their commitment to
their Union members when their district laid off every single six-hour para-educator." The
Marysville district "months later, re-hired about half of them back at half the hours because it
would save the [Marysville] district the cost of the workers medical benefits. Marysville
district backed down and reinstated all six-hour positions, including medical benefits."
THE UNION'S POSITION'
The Union filed a position statement in response to the First Amended Charge on March 1,
2013. In its position statement, the Union contends: (1) the Charging Parties have failed to
provide a clear and concise statement of the charge; (2) Shampine is not entitled to the
financial documents that he seeks; and (3) the charge fails to show a prima facie violation of
the duty of fair representation.
DISCUSSION
The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
Charging Parties have alleged that the exclusive representative denied Charging Parties the
right to fair representation guaranteed by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section
3543.6(b). The duty of fair representation imposed on the exclusive representative extends to
grievance handling. (Fremont Unified District Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (King) (1980)
PERB Decision No. 125; United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins) (1982) PERB Decision
No. 258.) In order to state a prima facie violation of this section of EERA, Charging Parties
must show that the Respondent's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. In
United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins), the Public Employment Relations Board stated:
Absent bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrary conduct, mere
negligence or poor judgment in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty. [Citations omitted.]
Board agent is permitted to consider undisputed facts supplied by a respondent
during charge investigation. (Service Employees International Union #790 (Adza) (2004) .
PERB Decision No. 1632-M.) To the extent there are any factual disputes, those questions are
properly resolved through PERB's hearing processes. (Golden Plains Unified School District
(2002) PERB Decision No. 1489.)
meetings. There does not seem to be any [talking] going on. The
Chapter [introduced new Treasurers] at the December 12, 2012,
meeting.
On December 23, 2012, Rosas "had a conversation with" Shampine. Rosas told Shampine that
"she was sorry for being selfish." Charging Parties overheard Rosas' statement.
The Marysville Joint Unified Union chapter "was steadfast and forceful in their commitment to
their Union members when their district laid off every single six-hour para-educator." The
Marysville district "months later, re-hired about half of them back at half the hours because it
would save the [Marysville] district the cost of the workers medical benefits. Marysville
district backed down and reinstated all six-hour positions, including medical benefits."
THE UNION'S POSITION5
The Union filed a position statement in response to the First Amended Charge on March 1,
2013. In its position statement, the Union contends: (1) the Charging Parties have failed to
provide a clear and concise statement of the charge; (2) Shampine is not entitled to the
financial documents that he seeks; and (3) the charge fails to show a prima facie violation of
the duty of fair representation.
DISCUSSION
The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
Charging Parties have alleged that the exclusive representative denied Charging Parties the
right to fair representation guaranteed by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section
3543.6(b). The duty of fair representation imposed on the exclusive representative extends to
grievance handling. (Fremont Unified District Teachers Association, CTAINEA (King) (1980)
PERB Decision No. 125; United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins) (1982) PERB Decision
No. 258.) In order to state a prima facie violation of this section of EERA, Charging Parties
must show that the Respondent's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 	In
United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins), the Public Employment Relations Board stated:
Absent bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrary conduct, mere
negligence or poor judgment in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty. 	[Citations omitted.]
•
AA Board agent is permitted to consider undisputed facts supplied by a respondent
during charge investigation. (Service Employees International Union #790 (Adza) (2004)
PERB Decision No. 1632-M.) To the extent there are any factual disputes, those questions are
properly resolved through PERB's hearing processes. (Golden Plains Unified School District
(2002) PERB Decision No. 1489.)

LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 4
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 4
A union may exercise its discretion to determine how far to
pursue a grievance in the employee's behalf as long as it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process a grievance
in a perfunctory fashion. A union is also not required to process
an employee's grievance if the chances for success are minimal.
[Citations omitted.]
In order to state a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct violating the duty of fair representation,
a charging party:
must at a minimum include an assertion of sufficient facts from
which it becomes apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
representative's action or inaction was without a rational basis or
devoid of honest judgment.
(Reed District Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (Reyes) (1983) PERB Decision No. 332, p. 9,
quoting Rocklin Teachers Professional Association (Romero) (1980) PERB Decision No. 124;
emphasis in original.)
With regard to when "mere negligence" might constitute arbitrary conduct, the Board observed
in Coalition of University Employees (Buxton) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1517-H that, under
federal precedent, a union's negligence breaches the duty of fair representation "to cases in
which the individual interest at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial
act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim." (Quoting Dutrisac v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. (9th Cir. 1983) 749 F.2d 1270, at p. 1274; see also Robesky v. Quantas
Empire Airways, Lid. (9th Cir. 1978) 573 F.2d 1082.)
Here, the First Amended Charge adds to the original charge the allegations that the Union
breached its duty of fair representation by engaging in the following conduct: (1) failing to
"answer" a grievance filed sometime after August 30, 2012; (2) Rosas was too busy "securing
her own position to deal with member issues"; (3) Rosas' December 23, 2012, admission that
she had been "selfish"; (4) failing to be "steadfast and forceful in their commitment to Union
members"; and (5) failing to adhere to Union bylaws.
1. Failing to "Answer" a Grievance
PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5) requires, inter alia, that an unfair practice charge include a
"clear and concise statement of the facts and conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice."
In doing so, a charging party should allege sufficient facts to establish the "who, what, when,
where and how" of an unfair practice. (State of California (Department of Food and
Agriculture) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1071-S, citing United Teachers-Los Angeles
(Ragsdale) (1992) PERB Decision No. 944.) Mere legal conclusions are not sufficient to state
a prima facie case. (Ibid.; Charter Oak Unified School District (1991) PERB Decision No.
873.)
A union may exercise its discretion to determine how far to
pursue a grievance in the employee's behalf as long as it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process a grievance
in a perfunctory fashion. A union is also not required to process
an employee's grievance if the chances for success are minimal.
[Citations omitted.]
In order to state a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct violating the duty of fair representation,
a charging party:
must at a minimum include an assertion of sufficient facts from
which it becomes apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
representative's action or inaction was without a rational basis or
devoid of honest judgment.
(Reed District Teachers Association, CTAINEA (Reyes) (1983) PERB Decision No. 332, p. 9,
quoting Rocklin Teachers Professional Association (Romero) (1980) PERB Decision No. 124;
emphasis in original.)
With regard to when "mere negligence" might constitute arbitrary conduct, the Board observed
in Coalition of University Employees (Buxton) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1517-H that, under
federal precedent, a union's negligence breaches the duty of fair representation "to cases in
which the individual interest at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial
act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim." (Quoting Dutrisac v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. (9th Cir. 1983) 749 F.2d 1270, at p. 1274; see also Robesky v. Quantas
Empire Airways, Ltd. (9th Cir. 1978) 573 F.2d 1082.)
Here, the First Amended Charge adds to the original charge the allegations that the Union
breached its duty of fair representation by engaging in the following conduct: ( 1) failing to
"answer" a grievance filed sometime after August 30, 2012; (2) Rosas was too busy "securing
her own position to deal with member issues"; (3) Rosas' December 23, 2012, admission that
she had been "selfish"; (4) failing to be "steadfast and forceful in their commitment to Union
members"; and (5) failing to adhere to Union bylaws.
1. 	Failing to "Answer" a Grievance
PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5) requires, inter alia, that an unfair practice charge include a
"clear and concise statement of the facts and conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice."
In doing so, a charging party should allege sufficient facts to establish the "who, what, when,
where and how" of an unfair practice. (State of California (Department of Food and
Agriculture) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1071-S, citing United Teachers-Los Angeles
(Ragsdale) (1992) PERB Decision No. 944.) Mere legal conclusions are not sufficient to state
a prima facie case. (Ibid.; Charter Oak Unified School District (1991) PERB Decision No.
873.)

LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 5
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 5
Here, the First Amended Charge fails to identify who filed the grievance, when the grievance
was filed, and in what manner the District failed to "answer" the grievance. Accordingly, as to
this allegation, the charge fails to state a prima facie case.
Moreover, PREB will dismiss charges that the duty of fair representation has been breached by
a refusal to pursue a grievance, if the exclusive representative made an honest, reasonable
determination that the grievance lacked merit. (Sacramento City Teachers Association
(Fanning, et al.) (1984) PERB Decision No. 428.) The burden is on the charging party to
show how the exclusive representative abused its discretion, not on the union to show how it
properly exercised its discretion. (United Teachers - Los Angeles (Wyler) (1993) PERB
Decision No. 970.) Here, the charge alleges that the Union failed to "answer" a grievance, but
fails to state additional facts to demonstrate how the Union abused its discretion.
2. Rosas Was Too Busy, Rosas' Admission to Being "Selfish," and the Lack of
Commitment to Union Members
PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5) requires, inter alia, that an unfair practice charge include a
"clear and concise statement of the facts and conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice."
The First Amended Charge fails to allege sufficient facts to establish how each of these
allegations demonstrate that the Union acted arbitrarily, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Further, as to these allegations, the charge fails to include, at a minimum, an assertion of
sufficient facts from which it becomes apparent how or in what manner the Union's action or
inaction was without a rational basis or devoid of honest judgment. Thus, as to these
allegations, the charge fails to state a prima facie case.
3. Failure to Adhere to Bylaws
It is well-established that PERB does not have jurisdiction over matters concerning internal
union affairs unless they have a substantial impact on the relationship of bargaining unit
employees to their employer so as to give rise to a duty of fair representation. (Service
Employees International Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106.) In
California State Employees Association (Hutchinson) (1999) PERB Decision No. 1369-S, the
Board found no substantial impact on the employer-employee relationship where the union
conducted elections outside the timeframe required by union bylaws and improperly installed
union officers in violation of union bylaws because the charge failed to show a substantial
impact on employer-employee relations.
Here, the First Amended Charge alleges that the Union failed to adhere to its bylaws by not
reading minutes at the Union meetings and not having the Treasurer account for Union
finances during meetings. This allegation appears to concern solely internal union affairs and
has no substantial impact on employer-employee relations. Accordingly, as to this allegation,
the charge fails to state a prima facie case.
Here, the First Amended Charge fails to identify who filed the grievance, when the grievance
was filed, and in what manner the District failed
to
"answer" the grievance. Accordingly, as to
this allegation, the charge fails to state a prima facie case.
Moreover, PREB will dismiss charges that the duty
of
fair representation has been breached by
a refusal to pursue a grievance,
if
the exclusive representative made an honest, reasonable
determination that the grievance lacked merit. (Sacramento City Teachers Association
(Fanning, et al.) (1984) PERB Decision No. 428.) The burden is on the charging party to
show how the exclusive representative abused its discretion, not on the union to show how it
properly exercised its discretion. ( United Teachers
Decision No. 970.) Here, the charge alleges that the Union failed to "answer" a grievance, but
fails to state additional facts to demonstrate how the Union abused its discretion.
- Los Angeles (Wyler) (1993) PERB
2. Rosas Was Too Busy, Rosas' Admission to Being "Selfish," and the Lack
of
Commitment to Union Members
PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5) requires, inter alia, that an unfair practice charge include a
"clear and concise statement
of
the facts and conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice."
The First Amended Charge fails to allege sufficient facts to establish how each
of
these
allegations demonstrate that the Union acted arbitrarily, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Further, as to these allegations, the charge fails to include, at a minimum, an assertion
of
sufficient facts from which it becomes apparent how or in what manner the Union's action or
inaction was without a rational basis or devoid
of
honest judgment. Thus, as to these
allegations, the charge fails to state a prima facie case.
3. Failure to Adhere to Bylaws
It is well-established that PERB does not have jurisdiction over matters concerning internal
union affairs unless they have a substantial impact on the relationship
of
bargaining unit
employees to their employer so as to give rise to a duty
of
fair representation. (Service
Employees International Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106.) In
California State Employees Association (Hutchinson) (1999) PERB Decision No. 1369-S, the
Board found no substantial impact on the employer-employee relationship where the union
conducted elections outside the timeframe required by union bylaws and improperly installed
union officers in violation of union bylaws because the charge failed to show a substantial
impact on employer-employee relations.
Here, the First Amended Charge alleges that the Union failed to adhere to its bylaws by not
reading minutes at the Union meetings and not having the Treasurer account for Union
finances during meetings. This allegation appears to concern solely internal union affairs and
has no substantial impact on employer-employee relations. Accordingly, as to this allegation,
the charge fails to state a prima facie case.

LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 6
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 6
Request for Financial Documents
EERA requires a recognized or certified employee organization to keep an adequate itemized
record of its financial transactions. (Gov. Code $ 3546.5.) A detailed written financial report
of such transactions, in the form of a balance sheet and an operating statement, must be made
available annually to PERB and to the employees who are members of the organization within
60 days after the end of the employee organization's fiscal year. (Gov. Code $ 3546.5.) An
employee alleging that the employee organization failed to produce a record of its financial
transactions need not have made a specific request for the employee organization's "financial
report" where the employee organization understood the charging party to have requested the
reports specified in the statute. (State Employees Trades Council United (Ventura, et al.)
(2009) PERB Decision No. 2069-H.) The report must be signed and certified as to accuracy by
the organization's president and treasurer, or corresponding principal or comparable officers.
(Gov. Code $ 3546.5.)
Here, the First Amended Charge alleges that, on October 10, 2012, Shampine requested a
"Treasurer's Report" from Rosas. The charge alleges that the "Treasurer's Report" contains:
(1) chapter funds; (2) income for the reporting period; (3) receipts; (4) disbursements; (5)
credit union information; (6) bank statements; (7) mileage forms; and (8) credit cards.
The charge fails to establish that Shampine's request was made within 60 days after the end of
the Union's fiscal year. Moreover, EERA section 3546.5 does not entitle Shampine to all of
the requested documents. As such, this allegation fails to state a prima facie case.
Therefore, the charge is hereby dismissed based on the facts and reasons set forth in this
Dismissal Letter and the Warning Letter.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to PERB Regulations, Charging Parties may obtain a review of this dismissal of the
charge by filing an appeal to the Board itself within twenty (20) calendar days after service of
this dismissal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32635, subd. (a).) Any document filed with the
Board must contain the case name and number, and the original and five (5) copies of all
documents must be provided to the Board
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB business day.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $$ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code, $ 11020, subd.
(a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before
the close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet which meets the
requirements of PERB Regulation 32135(d), provided the filing party also places the original,
together with the required number of copies and proof of service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, $ 32135, subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $$ 32090 and
32130.)
Request for Financial Documents
EERA requires a recognized or certified employee organization to keep an adequate itemized
record of its financial transactions. (Gov. Code§ 3546.5.) A detailed written financial report
of such transactions, in the form of a balance sheet and an operating statement, must be made
available annually to PERB and to the employees who are members of the organization within
60 days after the end of the employee organization's fiscal year. (Gov. Code§ 3546.5.) 	An
employee alleging that the employee organization failed to produce a record of its financial
transactions need not have made a specific request for the employee organization's "financial
report" where the employee organization understood the charging party to have requested the
reports specified in the statute. (State Employees Trades Council United (Ventura, et al.)
(2009) PERB Decision No. 2069-H.) The report must be signed and certified as to accuracy by
the organization's president and treasurer, or corresponding principal or comparable officers.
(Gov. Code§ 3546.5.)
Here, the First Amended Charge alleges that, on October 10, 2012, Shampine requested a
"Treasurer's Report" from Rosas. The charge alleges that the "Treasurer's Report" contains:
(1) chapter funds; (2) income for the reporting period; (3) receipts; (4) disbursements; (5)
credit union information; (6) bank statements; (7) mileage forms; and (8) credit cards.
The charge fails to establish that Shampine's request was made within 60 days after the end of
the Union's fiscal year. Moreover, EERA section 3546.5 does not entitle Shampine to all of
the requested documents. As such, this allegation fails to state a prima facie case.
Therefore, the charge is hereby dismissed based on the facts and reasons set forth in this
Dismissal Letter and the Warning Letter.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to PERB Regulations, Charging Parties may obtain a review of this dismissal of the
charge by filing an appeal to the Board itself within twenty (20) calendar days after service of
this dismissal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32635, subd. (a).) Any document filed with the
Board must contain the case name and number, and the original and five (5) copies of all
documents must be provided to the Board.
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB business day.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code,§ 11020, subd.
(a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before
the close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet which meets the
requirements of PERB Regulation 32135(d), provided the filing party also places the original,
together with the required number of copies and proof of service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32090 and
32130.)

LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 7
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 7
The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal to issue a complaint, any other party may file with the
Board an original and five copies of a statement in opposition within twenty (20) calendar days
following the date of service of the appeal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32635, subd. (b).)
Service
All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served" upon all parties to the
proceeding, and a "proof of service" must accompany each copy of a document served upon a
party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32140 for the required
contents.) The document will be considered properly "served" when personally delivered or
deposited in the mail or deposited with a delivery service and properly addressed. A document
may also be concurrently served via facsimile transmission on all parties to the proceeding.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32135, subd. (c).)
Extension of Time
A request for an extension of time, in which to file a document with the Board itself, must be
in writing and filed with the Board at the previously noted address. A request for an extension
must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before the expiration of the time required for
filing the document. The request must indicate good cause for and, if known, the position of
each other party regarding the extension, and shall be accompanied by proof of service of the
request upon each party. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32132.)
The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
1031
18th Street
If
you file a timely appeal
of
the refusal to issue a complaint, any other party may file with the
Board an original and five copies
of
a statement in opposition within twenty (20) calendar days
following the date
of
service
of
the appeal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
8,
§ 32635, subd. (b).)
Service
All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served" upon all parties to the
proceeding, and a "proof
of
service" must accompany each copy
of
a document served upon a
party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32140 for the required
contents.) The document will be considered properly "served" when personally delivered or
deposited in the mail or deposited with a delivery service and properly addressed. A document
may also be concurrently served via facsimile transmission on all parties to the proceeding.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit.
8,
§ 32135, subd. (c).)
Extension
of
Time
A request for an extension
of
time, in which to file a document with the Board itself, must be
in writing and filed with the Board at the previously noted address. A request for an extension
must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before the expiration
of
the time required for
filing the document. The request must indicate good cause for and,
if
known, the position of
each other party regarding the extension, and shall be accompanied by proof
of
service
of
the
request upon each party. (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
8,
§ 32132.)

LA-CO-1543-E
arch 22, 2013
age 8
LA-CO-1543-E
March 22, 2013
Page 8
M
P
Final Date
If no appeal is filed within the specified time limits, the dismissal will become final when the
time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
M. SUZANNE MURPHY
General Counsel
James Coffey
Regional Attorney
Attachment
cc: Sonja J. Woodward, Attorney
Final Date
If no appeal is filed within the specified time limits, the dismissal will become final when the
time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
M. SUZANNE MURPHY
General Counsel
y	By 	~'---:ttnrres Coffey
Regional Attorney
Attachment
cc: 	Sonja J. Woodward, Attorney

STATE OF CALIFORNIA EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Governor STATE OF CALIFORNIA EDMUND G. BROWN Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
Telephone: (916) 327-7242
Fax: (916) 327-6377
January 24, 2013
Harrison Shampine
Re: Harrison Shampine, et al. v. California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CO-1543-E
WARNING LETTER
Dear Mr. Shampine:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on October 24, 2012. Harrison Shampine (Shampine), Tommie
Brown (Brown) and Galda Ortiz (Ortiz) (Charging Parties)' allege that the California School
Employees Association & its Chapter 47 (Union or Respondent) violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act (EERA or Act) by breaching its duty of fair representation.
FACTS AS ALLEGED
The Union is the exclusive representative of a wall-to-wall unit of approximately 230 classified
employees at the Centinela Valley Union High School District (District), including Shampine,
Brown and Ortiz.' The Union and the District are parties to a collective bargaining agreement
that expires on June 30, 2014.
The charge consists of approximately two, hand written pages. The hand written pages state,
in relevant part, the following:
The Union has failed in efforts to stop the District from the
unlawful practice of allowing substitutes to work in the place of
regular employees. The District is even allowing long-term
teacher substitutes to work in classified jobs. They are not
following the seniority lists, overtime assignments, and have laid
The filings with the charge contain the signature of each individual. PERB will
consider each individual as a Charging Party.
2 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. The text of the EERA and
PERB Regulations may be found at www.perb.ca.gov.
Based on the facts provided, it appears that Charging Parties are members of the
Union, and not agency fee payers.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT h=LATIONS BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
I 031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
Telephone: (916) 327-7242
Fax: (916) 327-6377
January 24, 2013
Harrison Shampine
P.O. Box 1621
Hawthorne, CA 90251
Re: Harrison Shampine, et al. v. California School Employees Association & its Chapter 47
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CO-1543-E
WARNING LETTER
Dear Mr. Shampine:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on October 24, 2012. Harrison Shampine (Shampine), Tommie
Brown (Brown) and Galda Ortiz (Ortiz) (Charging Parties) 1 allege that the California School
Employees Association & its Chapter 47 (Union or Respondent) violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act (EERA or Act)2 by breaching its duty of fair representation.
FACTS AS ALLEGED
The Union is the exclusive representative of a wall-to-wall unit of approximately 230 classified
employees at the Centinela Valley Union High School District (District), including Shampine,
Brown and Ortiz.3 The Union and the District are parties to a collective bargaining agreement
that expires on June 30, 2014.
The charge consists of approximately two, hand written pages. The hand written pages state,
in relevant part, the following:
The Union has failed in efforts to stop the District from the
unlawful practice of allowing substitutes to work.in the place of
regular employees. The District is even allowing long-term
teacher substitutes to work in classified jobs. They are not
following the seniority lists, overtime assignments, and have laid
1 The filings with the charge contain the signature of each individual. PERB will
consider each individual as a Charging Party.
2 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. The text of the EERA and
PERB Regulations may be found at www.perb.ca.gov.
3 Based on the facts provided, it appears that Charging Parties are members of the
Union, and not agency fee payers.

LA-CO-1543-E
January 24, 2013
Page 2
LA-CO-1543-E
January 24, 2013
Page 2
off workers when there is a dire need in the classroom and other
sites. There is much corruption in our local. The Union president
stated in our September meeting" that she was given the job as a
developer because of her work with the Union. This statement
was witnessed by everyone at the meeting. Jobs should not be
given because of favoritism. We are not being represented fully.
There seems to be half-hearted attempts at negotiating. We need
help with this. This chapter is running amok. We don't know
how much money we have. There is no accountability. The
board's' representative never ventures into the sites to see what's
occurring. On October 10, 2012, Harrison Shampine requested
financial records. He was told that he would have them Friday,
October 12, 2012. When he inquired that Friday, he was
informed that the documents are lost. We need up to date
information. These people on this board need to be audited. If
there are questions, please contact us.
The charge also states, in relevant part:
The president of [the Union] has failed to negotiate with the
employer. She said that the District blew her off and she just left
the meeting. She has not exhausted any other avenue like filing
[an unfair practice charge]. She and the board have failed to
provide financial records. They say they are lost. This Union has
no treasurer, minutes are not being read. Members were coerced
by the Union by using "scare tactics." They informed the
members that jobs will be lost. The Union did not inform the
members of the impact of the furloughs on their benefits. The
president and the board are using their positions in the union to
gain favors in the school District. The president of the Union was
given a job by the board. A job for which she was in a totally
different classification. She tested for the job and interfered with
testing by approaching the test clerk at the site. She was an
applicant at that time and not the union president. Juan Carlos'
daughter, Alma Gutiezz, was and is offered a job as an assistant
food service manager. Juan Carlos is the past president. These
are favors. All alleged to put in place in September 2012.
It is unclear from the charge what year this "September" meeting took place.
Examining the allegations in the light most favorable to Charging Parties, it will be assumed
that the meeting took place in September 2012.
The "board" appears to refer to the Chapter representatives.
off
workers when there
is
a dire need in the classroom and other
sites. There is much corruption in our local. The Union president
stated in our September meeting4 that she was given the job
as a
developer because
of
her work with the Union. This statement
was witnessed by everyone at the meeting. Jobs should not be
given because
of
favoritism. We are not being represented fully.
There seems to be half-hearted attempts at negotiating. We need
help with this. This chapter is running amok. We don't know
how much money we have. There is no accountability. The
board's5 representative never ventures into the sites to see what's
occurring. On October 10, 2012, Harrison Shampine requested
financial records. He was told that he would have them Friday,
October 12, 2012. When he inquired that Friday, he was
informed that the documents are lost. We need up to date
information. These people on this board need to be audited.
If
there are questions, please contact us.
The charge also states, in relevant part:
The president
of
[the Union] has failed to negotiate with the
employer. She said that the District blew her off and she just left
the meeting. She has not exhausted any other avenue like filing
[an unfair practice charge]. She and the board have failed to
provide financial records. They say they are lost. This Union has
no treasurer, minutes are not being read. Members were coerced
by the Union by using "scare tactics." They informed the
members that jobs will be lost. The Union did not inform the
members
of
the impact
of
the furloughs on their benefits. The
president and the board are using their positions in the union to
gain favors in the school District. The president
of
the Union was
given a job by the board. A job for which she was in a totally
different classification. She tested for the job and interfered with
testing by approaching the test clerk at the site. She was an
applicant at that time and not the union president. Juan Carlos'
daughter, Alma Gutiezz, was and is offered a job as an assistant
food service manager. Juan Carlos is the past president. These
are favors. All alleged to put in place in September 2012.
4 It is unclear from the charge what year this "September" meeting took place.
Examining the allegations in the light most.favorable to Charging Parties, it will be assumed
that the meeting took place in September 2012.
5 The "board" appears to refer to the Chapter representatives.

LA-CO-1543-E
January 24, 2013
Page 3
LA-CO-1543-E
January 24, 2013
Page 3
THE UNION'S POSITION
The Union filed a position statement on November 30, 2012. In its position statement, the
Union contends the following: (1) the charge fails to provide a clear and concise statement of
the facts; (2) the District and the Union have not negotiated since December 2011, so any
allegations regarding the Union's breach of its duty of fair representation as it relates to
negotiations is beyond the statute of limitations; (3) some of the allegations relate to the
conduct by the District; and (4) the charge fails to state a prima facie case because, at most, the
charge alleges negligence by the Union.
DISCUSSION
The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
Charging Parties have alleged that the exclusive representative denied them the right to fair
representation guaranteed by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section 3543.6(b).
The duty of fair representation imposed on the exclusive representative extends to grievance
handling. (Fremont Unified District Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (King) (1980) PERB
Decision No. 125; United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins) (1982) PERB Decision No. 258.)
In order to state a prima facie violation of this section of EERA, a charging party must show
that the Respondent's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. In United
Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins), the Public Employment Relations Board stated:
Absent bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrary conduct, mere
negligence or poor judgment in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty. [Citations omitted.]
A union may exercise its discretion to determine how far to
pursue a grievance in the employee's behalf as long as it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process a grievance
in a perfunctory fashion. A union is also not required to process
an employee's grievance if the chances for success are minimal.
[Citations omitted.]
Board agent is permitted to consider undisputed facts supplied by a respondent
during charge investigation. (Service Employees International Union #790 (Adza) (2004)
PERB Decision No. 1632-M.) To the extent there are any factual disputes, those questions are
properly resolved through PERB's hearing processes. (Golden Plains Unified School District
(2002) PERB Decision No. 1489.)
THE UNION'S POSITION6
The Union filed a position statement on November 30, 2012. In its position statement, the
Union contends the following: 	(1) the charge fails to provide a clear and concise statement
of
the facts; (2) the District and the Union have not negotiated since December 2011, so any
allegations regarding the Union's breach
of
its duty
of
fair representation as it relates to
negotiations is beyond the statute
of
limitations; (3) some
of
the allegations relate to the
conduct by the District; and ( 4) the charge fails to state a prima facie case because, at most, the
charge alleges negligence by the Union.
DISCUSSION
The Union's Duty
of
Fair Representation
Charging Parties have alleged that the exclusive representative denied them the right to fair
representation guaranteed by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section 3543.6(b).
The duty
of
fair representation imposed on the exclusive representative extends to grievance
handling. (Fremont Unified District Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (King) (1980) PERB
Decision No. 125; United Teachers
of
Los Angeles (Collins) (1982) PERB Decision No. 258.)
In order to state a prima facie violation
of
this section
of
EERA, a charging party must show
that the Respondent's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 	In United
Teachers
of
Los Angeles (Collins), the Public Employment Relations Board stated:
Absent bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrary conduct, mere
negligence or poor judgment in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach
of
the union's duty. 	[Citations omitted.]
A union may exercise its discretion to determine how far to
pursue a grievance in the employee's behalf as long as it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process a grievance
in a perfunctory fashion. 	A union is also not required to process
an employee's grievance
if
the chances for success are minimal.
[Citations omitted.]
a	A A Board agent is permitted to consider undisputed facts supplied by 	respondent
during charge investigation. (Service Employees International Union #790 (Adza) (2004)
PERB Decision No. 1632-M.) To the extent there are any factual disputes, those questions are
properly resolved through PERB's hearing processes. (Golden Plains Unified School District
(2002) PERB Decision No. 1489.)

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In order to state a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct violating the duty of fair representation,
a charging party:
must at a minimum include an assertion of sufficient facts from
which it becomes apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
representative's action or inaction was without a rational basis or
devoid of honest judgment.
(Reed District Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (Reyes) (1983) PERB Decision No. 332, p. 9,
quoting Rocklin Teachers Professional Association (Romero) (1980) PERB Decision No. 124;
emphasis in original.)
With regard to when "mere negligence" might constitute arbitrary conduct, the Board observed
in Coalition of University Employees (Buxton) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1517-H that, under
federal precedent, a union's negligence breaches the duty of fair representation "to cases in
which the individual interest at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial
act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim." (Quoting Dutrisac v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. (9th Cir. 1983) 749 F.2d 1270, at p. 1274; see also Robesky v. Quantas
Empire Airways, Lid. (9th Cir. 1978) 573 F.2d 1082.)
PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5)' requires, inter alia, that an unfair practice charge include a
"clear and concise statement of the facts and conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice."
In doing so, a charging party should allege sufficient facts to establish the "who, what, when,
where and how" of an unfair practice. (State of California (Department of Food and
Agriculture) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1071-S, citing United Teachers-Los Angeles
(Ragsdale) (1992) PERB Decision No. 944.) Mere legal conclusions are not sufficient to state
a prima facie case. (Ibid.; Charter Oak Unified School District (1991) PERB Decision No.
873.)
Here, the charge appears to allege that, by engaging in the following conduct, the Union
breached its duty of fair representation: (1) the Union chapter president was "[blown] off" by
the District at a negotiations meeting and the chapter president has failed to "exhaust any other
avenue like filing [an unfair practice charge];" (2) the Union failed to prevent the District from
using substitutes in place of bargaining unit members; (3) the Union engaged in "scare tactics"
to coerce Union members; (4) the Union failed to inform members of the impact of furlough
days on benefits; and (5) Union chapter presidents have received benefits due to "favoritism."
PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.
In order to state a prima facie case
of
arbitrary conduct violating the duty
of
fair representation,
a charging party:
must at a minimum include an assertion
of
sufficient facts from
which it becomes apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
representative's action or inaction was without a rational basis or
devoid
of
honest judgment.
(Reed District Teachers Association, CTAINEA (Reyes) (1983) PERB Decision No. 332, p. 9,
quoting Rocklin Teachers Professional Association (Romero) (1980) PERB Decision No. 124;
emphasis in original.)
With regard to when "mere negligence" might constitute arbitrary conduct, the Board observed
in Coalition
of
University Employees (Buxton) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1517-H that, under
federal precedent, a union's negligence breaches the duty
of
fair representation "to cases in
which the individual interest at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial
act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim." (Quoting Dutrisac
v.
Caterpillar Tractor
Co.
(9th Cir. 1983) 749 F.2d 1270, at p. 1274; see also Robesky
v.
Quantas
Empire Airways, Ltd. (9th Cir. 1978) 573 F.2d 1082.)
PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5)7 requires, inter alia, that an unfair practice charge include a
"clear and concise statement
of
the facts and conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice."
In doing so, a charging party should allege sufficient facts to establish the "who, what, when,
where and how"
of
an unfair practice. (State
of
California (Department
of
Food and
Agriculture) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1071-S, citing United Teachers-Los Angeles
(Ragsdale) (1992) PERB Decision No. 944.) Mere legal conclusions are not sufficient to state
a prima facie case. (Ibid.; Charter Oak Unified School District (1991)
PERB_
Decision No.
873.)
Here, the charge appears to allege that, by engaging in the following conduct, the Union
breached its duty
of
fair representation: (1) the Union chapter president was "[blown]
off'
by
the District at a negotiations meeting and the chapter president has failed to "exhaust any other
avenue like filing [an unfair practice charge];" (2) the Union failed to prevent the District from
using substitutes in place
of
bargaining unit members; (3) the Union engaged in "scare tactics"
to coerce Union members; (4) the Union failed to inform members of the impact of furlough
days on benefits; and (5) Union chapter presidents have received benefits due to "favoritism."
7 PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.

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1. Union's Failure to Exhaust Remedies Such as Filing an Unfair Practice Charge
Here, the charge appears to allege that the Union "failed to exhaust remedies such as filing an
unfair practice charge" in response to the District's apparent refusal to negotiate. The charge
fails to provide a date as to when the meeting in question occurred in order for PERB to
determine whether the charge was filed within the six-month statutory period. In a duty of fair
representation case, the statute of limitations begins to run when the charging party knew or
should have known that further assistance from the union was unlikely. (California State
Employees Association (Chen) (2005) PERB Decision No. 1736-S.) As such, the charge fails
to state sufficient facts for PERB to determine whether the alleged conduct falls within the
statute of limitations. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
Moreover, it is well-established that an exclusive representative enjoys a wide range of
bargaining discretion. (Mount Diablo Education Association (DeFrates) (1984) PERB
Decision No. 422.) The exclusive representative is not required to satisfy all union members,
and is not obligated to bargain all items at the request of union members. (Ibid.) There is no
breach of the duty of fair representation if the exclusive representative refuses to pursue an
unfair practice, so long as the exclusive representative made an honest, reasonable
determination that the charge lacks merit. (Sacramento City Teachers Association (Fanning,
et al.) (1984) PERB Decision No. 428.) The burden is on the charging party to show that the
union abused its discretion, not on the union to show how it properly exercised its discretion.
(United Teachers - Los Angeles (Wyler) (1993) PERB Decision No. 970.)
In this case, Charging Parties' have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that the Union
abused its discretion by not filing an unfair practice charge when the District refused to
negotiate. Absent facts demonstrating that the Union's decision not to pursue the unfair
practice was dishonest or unreasonable, this allegation does not state a prima facie case.
2. Failure to Prevent the District From Using Substitutes to Replace Unit Members
Here, the charge fails to provide facts to show that the Union's failure to prevent the District
from using substitute teachers to replace unit members was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith. The charge also fails to demonstrate how the alleged failure was without rational basis
or honest judgment. (United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins), supra, PERB Decision
No. 258.) Without facts to demonstrate that the Union acted in concert with the District, or
tacitly allowed the District to replace unit members with substitute teachers, the charge fails to
state a prima facie case. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
3. Usage of "Scare Tactics"
Here, the charge fails to allege when the Union representatives engaged in "scare tactics" to
coerce Union members and thus, the charge fails to establish that the alleged conduct occurred
within the six-month statute of limitations. The charge also fails to allege how the Union
engaged in the "scare tactics." Because the charge fails to provide evidence of when the
1.
Union's Failure to Exhaust Remedies Such as Filing an Unfair Practice Charge
Here, the charge appears to allege that the Union "failed to exhaust remedies such as filing an
unfair practice charge" in response to the District's apparent refusal to negotiate. The charge
fails to provide a date as to when the meeting in question occurred in order for PERB to
determine whether the charge was filed within the six-month statutory period. In a duty
of
fair
representation case, the statute
of
limitations begins to run when the charging party knew or
should have known that further assistance from the union was unlikely. ( California State
Employees Association (Chen) (2005) PERB Decision No. 1736-S.) As such, the charge fails
to state sufficient facts for PERB to determine whether the alleged conduct falls within the
statute oflimitations. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
Moreover, it is well-established that an exclusive representative enjoys a wide range
of
bargaining discretion. (Mount Diablo Education Association (DeFrates) (1984) PERB
Decision No. 422.) The exclusive representative is not required to satisfy all union members,
and is not obligated to bargain all items at the request
of
union members. (Ibid.) There is no
breach
of
the duty
of
fair representation
if
the exclusive representative refuses to pursue an
unfair practice, so long as the exclusive representative made an honest, reasonable
determination that the charge lacks merit. (Sacramento City Teachers Association (Fanning,
et al.) (1984) PERB Decision No. 428.) The burden is on the charging party to show that the
union abused its discretion, not on the union to show how it properly exercised its discretion.
(United Teachers - Los Angeles (Wyler) (1993) PERB Decision No. 970.)
In this case, Charging Parties' have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that the Union
abused its discretion by not filing an unfair practice charge when the District refused to
negotiate. Absent facts demonstrating that the Union's decision not to pursue the unfair
practice was dishonest or unreasonable, this allegation does not state a prima facie case.
2.
Failure to Prevent the District From Using Substitutes to Replace Unit Members
Here, the charge fails to provide facts to show that the Union's failure to prevent the District
from using substitute teachers to replace unit members was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith. The charge also fails to demonstrate how the alleged failure was without rational basis
or honest judgment. (United Teachers
of
Los Angeles (Collins), supra, PERB Decision
No. 258.) Without facts to demonstrate that the Union acted in concert with the District, or
tacitly allowed the District to replace unit members with substitute teachers, the charge fails to
state a prima facie case. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
3. Usage of "Scare Tactics"
Here, the charge fails to allege when the Union representatives engaged in "scare tactics" to
coerce Union members and thus, the charge fails to establish that the alleged conduct occurred
within the six-month statute of limitations. The charge also fails to allege how the Union
engaged in the "scare tactics." Because the charge fails to provide evidence of when the

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alleged conduct occurred and whether the conduct was unlawful, the charge fails to state a
prima facie case. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
4. Failing to Inform Members of Impact of Furlough Days
Here, the charge fails to show how the Union's alleged failure to inform members of the
impact of furlough days was in bad faith. Further, the charge fails to allege when the furlough
days were implemented and how the Union's failure to inform members of the impact of
furlough days constitutes more than mere negligence. Because there are insufficient facts to
determine approximately when the alleged failure to inform the members occurred, and
because the charge fails to demonstrate how the failure was in bad faith or amounted to more
than mere negligence, the allegation does not state a prima facie case. (United Teachers of
Los Angeles (Collins), supra, PERB Decision No. 258.)
5. Favoritism Benefits
Here, the charge fails to provide facts to demonstrate how any employment appointments given
to chapter presidents or their relatives by the District were in bad faith, or how the employment
appointments relate to the Union's duty of fair representation. As such, as to this allegation,
the charge fails to state a prima facie case. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
Lost "Financial Records"
EERA requires a recognized or certified employee organization to keep an adequate itemized
record of its financial transactions. (Government Code $ 3546.5.) A detailed written financial
report of such transactions, in the form of a balance sheet and an operating statement, must be
made available annually to PERB and to the employees who are members of the organization
within 60 days after the end of the employee organization's fiscal year. (Government Code $
3546.5.) An employee alleging that the employee organization failed to produce a record of its
financial transactions need not have made a specific request for the employee organization's
"financial report" where the employee organization understood the charging party to have
requested the reports specified in the statute. (State Employees Trades Council United
(Ventura, et al.) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2069-H.) The report must be signed and certified
as to accuracy by the organization's president and treasurer, or corresponding principal or
comparable officers. (Government Code $ 3546.5.)
Here, the charge appears to allege that the Union lost "financial records." According to the
charge, on October 10, 2012, Shampine requested "financial documents" from the Union. On
October 12, 2012, the Union told Shampine that the documents were lost.
The charge fails to establish that Shampine's request was made within 60 days after the end of
the Union's fiscal year, or specify the type of "financial records" requested by Shampine.
Accordingly, this allegation fails to provide sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case.
alleged conduct occurred and whether the conduct was unlawful, the charge fails to state a
prima facie case. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
4.
Failing to Inform Members oflmpact
of
Furlough Days
Here, the charge fails to show how the Union's alleged failure to inform members
of
the
impact
of
furlough days was in bad faith. Further, the charge fails to allege when the furlough
days were implemented and how the Union's failure to inform members
of
the impact
of
furlough days constitutes more than mere negligence. Because there are insufficient facts to
determine approximately when the alleged failure to inform the members occurred, and
because the charge fails to demonstrate how the failure was in bad faith or amounted to more
than mere negligence, the allegation does not state a prima facie case. (United Teachers
of
Los Angeles (Collins), supra, PERB Decision No. 258.)
5.
Favoritism Benefits
Here, the charge fails to provide facts to demonstrate how any employment appointments given
to chapter presidents or their relatives by the District were in bad faith, or how the employment
appointments relate to the Union's duty
of
fair representation. As such, as to this allegation,
the charge fails to state a prima facie case. (PERB Regulation 32615(a)(5).)
Lost "Financial Records"
EERA requires a recognized or certified employee organization to keep an adequate itemized
record
of
its financial transactions. (Government Code § 3546.5.) A detailed written financial
report
of
such transactions, in the form
of
a balance sheet and an operating statement, must be
made available annually to PERB and to the employees who are members
of
the organization
within 60 days after the end
of
the employee organization's fiscal year. (Government Code§
3546.5.) An employee alleging that the employee organization failed to produce a record
of
its
financial transactions need not have made a specific request for the employee organization's
"financial report" where the employee organization understood the charging party to have
requested the reports specified in the statute. (State Employees Trades Council United
(Ventura, et al.) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2069-H.) The report must be signed and certified
as to accuracy by the organization's president and treasurer, or corresponding principal or
comparable officers. (Government Code§ 3546.5.)
Here, the charge appears to allege that the Union lost "financial records." According to the
charge, on October 10, 2012, Shampine requested "financial documents" from the Union. On
October 12, 2012, the Union told Shampine that the documents were lost.
The charge fails to establish that Shampine's request was made within 60 days after the end of
the Union's fiscal year, or specify the type of "financial records" requested by Shampine.
Accordingly, this allegation fails to provide sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case.

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For these reasons the charge, as presently written, does not state a prima facie case." If there
are any factual inaccuracies in this letter or additional facts that would correct the deficiencies
explained above, Charging Parties may amend the charge. The amended charge should be
prepared on a standard PERB unfair practice charge form, clearly labeled First Amended
Charge, contain all the facts and allegations you wish to make, and be signed under penalty of
perjury by an authorized agent of Charging Parties. The amended charge must have the case
number written on the top right hand corner of the charge form. The amended charge must be
served on the Respondent's representative and the original proof of service must be filed with
PERB.
If an amended charge or withdrawal is not filed on or before February 8, 2013," PERB will
dismiss your charge. If you have any questions, please call me at the above telephone number.
Regional Attorney
JC
n Eastside Union School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 466, the Board
explained that a prima facie case is established where the Board agent is able to make "a
determination that the facts as alleged in the charge state a legal cause of action and that the
charging party is capable of providing admissible evidence in support of the allegations.
Consequently, where the investigation results in receipt of conflicting allegations of fact or
contrary theories of law, fair proceedings, if not due process, demand that a complaint be
issued and the matter be sent to formal hearing." (Ibid.)
" A document is "filed" on the date the document is actually received by PERB,
including if transmitted via facsimile. (PERB Regulation 32135.)
For these reasons the charge, as presently written, does not state a prima facie case. 8 If there
are any factual inaccuracies in this letter or additional facts that would correct the deficiencies
explained above, Charging Parties may amend the charge. The amended charge should be
prepared on a standard PERB unfair practice charge form, clearly labeled First Amended
Charge, contain all the facts and allegations you wish to make, and be signed under penalty of
perjury by an authorized agent of Charging Parties. The amended charge must have the case
number written on the top right hand corner of the charge form. The amended charge must be
served on the Respondent's representative and the original proof of service must be filed with
PERB.
If an amended charge or withdrawal is not filed on or before February 8, 2013,9 PERB will
dismiss your charge. If you have any questions, please call me at the above telephone number.
James Coffey
Sincerely,
James Coffey
Regional Attorney
JC
I In Eastside Union School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 466, the Board
explained that a prima facie case is established where the Board agent is able to make "a
determination that the facts as alleged in the charge state a legal cause of action and that the
charging party is capable of providing admissible evidence in support of the allegations.
Consequently, where the investigation results in receipt of conflicting allegations of fact or
contrary theories of law, fair proceedings, if not due process, demand that a complaint be
issued and the matter be sent to formal hearing." (Ibid.)
9 A document is "filed" on the date the document is actually received by PERB,
including if transmitted via facsimile. (PERB Regulation 32135.)

California School Employees Association and its Chapter 47 (Shampine, et al.) (PERB 2355E)

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