Trustees of the California State University (Stanislaus) (PERB 2940H)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
EMPLOYEES UNION,
Charging Party,
v.
TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE
UNIVERSITY (STANISLAUS),
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CE-427-H
PERB Decision No. 2940-H
January 31, 2025
Appearances: Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld by Kerianne Steele and Ailyn Gonzalez,
Attorneys, for California State University Employees Union; California State University
Chancellor’s Office, by Diva M. Sanchez, Attorney, for Trustees of the California State
University (Stanislaus).
Before Banks, Chair; Krantz and Paulson, Members.
DECISION
PAULSON, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on California State University Employees Union’s (CSUEU)
appeal of the dismissal of its unfair practice charge against Trustees of the California
State University, Stanislaus. CSUEU’s charge alleged that the University violated the
Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA) when it refused to
provide the union with a copy of a report on the University’s investigation of a peace
officer’s alleged harassment of a CSUEU-represented employee.1 PERB’s Office of
1 HEERA is codified at Government Code section 3560 et seq.

2
the General Counsel (OGC) determined that the report was confidential pursuant to
Penal Code section 832.7, and that the University could not provide it except through
the discovery process described in Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1046. On this
basis, OGC concluded that the report was not disclosable through HEERA’s
request-for-information process and dismissed the charge.
On appeal, CSUEU argues that Penal Code section 832.7 should not be read to
strictly prohibit disclosure of information that is necessary and relevant to the union’s
representational duties. Instead, CSUEU argues, privacy interests must be balanced
against the union’s broad right to information under HEERA. CSUEU further argues
that, because of their representational duties, exclusive representatives should not be
held to the same standards and procedures for disclosure as members of the general
public.
We find that the University did not violate HEERA by refusing to furnish the
investigation report in response to CSUEU’s request for information. Confidential
peace officer personnel records may only be disclosed to an exclusive representative
in accordance with Penal Code section 832.7. Where, as here, the exclusive
representative seeks information outside the context of any pending proceeding where
section 832.7’s safeguards can be maintained, meeting and conferring would be futile.
We therefore affirm OGC’s dismissal of the unfair practice charge.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
CSUEU is the exclusive representative of CSU employees in Unit 7, the
Clerical/Administrative Support Services bargaining unit, including Dispatchers.

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Erin Salcedo was a Dispatcher at the University, and in that capacity worked
closely with peace officers in the University Police Department (UPD). UPD peace
officers are in a separate bargaining unit represented by a different organization, the
Statewide University Police Association (SUPA).
In or around December 2022, Salcedo submitted a formal complaint to the
University alleging harassment, disparate treatment, and hostile work environment
caused by the acts of a peace officer in the SUPA bargaining unit. The Stanislaus
County Sheriff’s Department (SCSD) investigated the allegations and created a report.
SCSD provided the investigation report to the University Chief of Police, and thereafter
the Chief of Police forwarded it to University human resources representatives. The
University notified Salcedo on or about February 2, 2023 that her allegations were not
sustained.
On or about August 8, 2023, CSUEU submitted a request for information
seeking, among other things, a copy of the investigation report.
On or about August 10, 2023, Paul Norris, University Executive Director for
Equity Programs and Compliance and Interim Senior Associate Vice President,
responded to CSUEU by e-mail. Norris stated that “per California Penal Code Section
832.7, [the University is] precluded from distributing copies of SCSD’s report on the
matter, absent a court order.” Counsel for CSUEU responded on December 14,
asserting that “CSU must agree to meet and confer over any confidentiality concerns
involved in providing the report. A failure to do so would present a basis for an unfair
practice charge.”

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On January 12, 2024, the University, through Guillermo Santucci, University
Assistant Director of Systemwide Labor Relations, again stated that it would not
provide the investigation report due to Penal Code section 832.7. CSUEU replied
through counsel on January 25, “CSU has an obligation to balance CSUEU’s interest
in the information with the interests of the peace officer(s) that are outlined in [the
Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights, Government Code section 3300 et
seq.]. CSU has a duty to meet and confer with us over methods to address its
confidentiality concerns. A flat denial, which is what you’ve written below and which
CSU has stated verbally too, is unlawful. Make a proposal to us to address your
confidentiality concerns (i.e., redaction, a protective order).”
On March 18, 2024, CSUEU filed its unfair practice charge alleging that the
University violated HEERA when it refused to furnish the investigative report or meet
and confer with the union to address any confidentiality concerns. On May 29, OGC
sent CSUEU a Warning Letter, advising that the allegations did not state a prima facie
case and providing a deadline to amend the charge. On June 6, counsel for CSUEU
sent an e-mail to the Board agent stating that it would not be filing an amended charge
and would appeal the dismissal. On June 12, OGC dismissed the charge for the
reasons described in the Warning Letter. On July 2, CSUEU filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
In an appeal of a dismissal, we review OGC’s decision de novo, applying the
same legal standard OGC applied to the allegations in the charge. (City and County of
San Francisco (2020) PERB Decision No. 2712-M, p. 2.) At this stage of litigation, “the
charging party’s burden is not to produce evidence, but merely to allege facts that, if

5
proven true in a subsequent hearing, would state a prima facie violation.” (County of
Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 13, fn. 8.) We thus assume the
charging party’s factual allegations are true, and we view them in the light most
favorable to the charging party. (Cabrillo Community College District (2019) PERB
Decision No. 2622, p. 4.)
We first discuss the general law on exclusive representatives’ right to
information, including where confidentiality concerns are present in the disclosure of
certain information. We then discuss the statutory scheme governing the
confidentiality and disclosure of peace officer personnel records. Lastly, we explain
how these principles interact in the context of an unfair practice charge alleging that
an employer unlawfully refused an information request involving peace officer
personnel records. We conclude that an employer does not violate HEERA when it
refuses to provide confidential peace officer personnel records to an exclusive
representative outside of a legal or administrative proceeding in which the judge or
hearing officer orders disclosure in accordance with Evidence Code sections 1043 and
1045.
I. 	Exclusive Representatives’ Right to Information
An exclusive representative is presumptively entitled to information that is
necessary and relevant in discharging its representational duties or exercising its right
to represent bargaining unit employees regarding terms and conditions of employment
within the scope of representation. (Contra Costa Community College District (2019)
PERB Decision No. 2652, pp. 16-17; Petaluma City Elementary School District/Joint
Union High School District (2016) PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 17 (Petaluma).) In this

6
context, the terms “necessary” and “relevant” do not have separate
meanings. (Petaluma, supra, PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 21.) PERB uses a liberal,
discovery-type standard, like that used by the courts, to determine relevance. (Id. at
p. 17.)
In City of Redding (2011) PERB Decision No. 2190-M, the Board held that
investigatory reports relating to hostile work environment claims impacting bargaining
unit members are presumptively relevant. (Id. at p. 2.) If such reports contain private
information of third parties, the Board applies a balancing test that weighs a union’s
need and interest in obtaining the information against the employer or third party’s
privacy and confidentiality interests. (Ibid.)
Typically, an employer may not flatly refuse to provide information based on
privacy concerns. Doing so “convert[s] the applicable procedure from a two-way
negotiation to a unilateral decision.” (Sacramento City Unified School District (2018)
PERB Decision No. 2597, p. 13.) Rather, the parties must meet and confer in good
faith to reach an accommodation. (Id. at p. 12.) Appropriate accommodations for
private information include redactions, and arrangements to limit using materials for a
given arbitration or negotiation and to prohibit public disclosure. (Id. at pp. 12-13.)
Because an exclusive representative has a greater right to information than
members of the general public, defenses to disclosure under the California Public
Records Act (CPRA, Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) do not automatically apply to a
request for information under a collective bargaining statute. (County of Tulare (2020)
PERB Decision No. 2697-M, p. 14, fn. 9.) Thus, for example, a union may obtain a
public entity’s internal deliberative records relating to its obligations under California

7
labor law. (Ibid.) But a union may not obtain information concerning an employer’s
bargaining strategies, unless the need for disclosure outweighs the employer’s
confidentiality interest. (Ibid.; Pasadena Area Community College District (2022)
PERB Order No. Ad-490, p. 12.)
II. 	Confidential Peace Officer Personnel Records and Pitchess Motions
In Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, a criminal defendant was
charged with committing battery against four deputy sheriffs. The defendant claimed
that he acted in self-defense in response to the use of excessive force by the
deputies, and he sought to discover evidence of their “propensity for violence.” (Id. at
p. 534.) Specifically, he sought records of several investigations conducted by the
sheriff’s internal unit investigating citizen complaints of excessive force by the
deputies in the past. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court held that criminal
defendants had a limited right to discover from a police officer’s employing agency the
existence of any previous complaints about the officer’s use of excessive force. (Id. at
pp. 537-538.)
In 1978, the Legislature enacted a set of discovery statutes in response to the
Court’s opinion in Pitchess. As summarized by the Court in a later case:
“Under the Pitchess statutes, a public entity that employs
peace officers must investigate and retain citizen
complaints of any officer misconduct, such as the use of
excessive force. (Pen. Code, § 832.5.) Litigants, upon a
showing of good cause, are given limited access to
records of such complaints and investigations (Evid. Code,
§§ 1043, 1045), but such records are otherwise
‘confidential’ and may ‘not be disclosed’ (Pen. Code,
§§ 832.7, subd. (a), 832.8, subd. (e)). Also protected as
‘confidential’ are ‘[p]eace officer . . . personnel records’
and ‘information obtained from these records.’ (Id., §

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832.7, subd. (a).) Such ‘personnel records’ include an
officer's personal and family information, medical history,
election of benefits (id., § 832.8, subds. (a), (b) & (c)), as
well as matters related to the officer's ‘advancement,
appraisal, or discipline’ (id., subd. (d)). In addition,
confidentiality applies to any information that ‘would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of [a peace officer's]
personal privacy.’ (Id., § 832.8, subd. (f).)”
(Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 68.)
These statutes “reflected the Legislature's attempt to balance a litigant's discovery
interest with an officer's confidentiality interest.” (Riverside County Sheriff's Dept.
v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 639.)
Most relevant to this case is Penal Code section 832.7, which provides that “the
personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records . . . or
information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in
any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and
1046 of the Evidence Code.” (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a).)
As interpreted by the courts, Penal Code section 832.7’s statement that certain
records “are confidential,” “establishes a general condition of confidentiality” for
specified information. (City of Hemet v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1411,
1427.) “The following clause, relating to disclosure in judicial proceedings, merely
creates a limited exception to the general principle of confidentiality.” (Ibid., emphasis
in original.) Thus, section 832.7 applies “beyond criminal and civil proceedings,” and
cannot be circumvented by third parties invoking CPRA. (Copley Press, Inc.
v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1286.)

9
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 establish procedures for discovery of
records or information covered by Penal Code section 832.7. Section 1043,
subdivision (b) requires a party seeking the records to file a noticed motion including
“all of the following:” “(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or
disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial
officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency that has custody and
control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or
disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of records or information
sought. (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought,
setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending
litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified
has the records or information from the records.” The employing agency must
“immediately” notify the peace officer whose records are sought upon receipt of the
motion. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (c).)
As noted by the Supreme Court, “[a] finding of ‘good cause’ under section 1043,
subdivision (b) is only the first hurdle in the discovery process.” (City of Santa Cruz
v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83, emphasis in original.) Next, the court
ruling on the motion must examine the records in camera and exclude from disclosure
both “the conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint,” and facts “that are so
remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” (Evid. Code, § 1045,
subd. (b).) Finally, the court “shall” order that any records disclosed “may not be used
for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.”
(Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).)

10
These same procedures apply in administrative proceedings, including
arbitrations governed by collective bargaining agreements. (Stiglitz, supra, 60 Cal.4th
624, 628.) In such cases, the arbitrator is empowered to conduct the in camera
document review and rule on the motion. (Id. at p. 647.) A PERB administrative law
judge (ALJ) plays the same role when a party files a Pitchess motion as part of
litigating a PERB case before an ALJ. (County of Santa Clara (2018) PERB Decision
No. 2613-M.) However, as explained further below, there is no such process available
in the present circumstances.
III. 	An Employer has no Duty to Provide Peace Officer Personnel Records Except
through the Pitchess Process
In its appeal, CSUEU asks us to harmonize HEERA with Penal Code section
832.7 and hold that an employer may not flatly refuse to furnish copies of peace officer
personnel records, but instead must meet and confer over ways to ameliorate
confidentiality concerns.2 Indeed, as discussed ante in section I, PERB has repeatedly
affirmed that an employer may not flatly refuse to provide information on the basis of
privacy concerns, or unilaterally determine how to address privacy concerns.
However, because of the unique statutory scheme governing peace officer personnel
records, a different procedure must be followed where Penal Code section 832.7 is
the source of the confidentiality concern. As we will explain, an exclusive
representative may obtain such information pursuant to its representational duties, but
only if it effectively complies with Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. Because
2 CSUEU does not dispute that the investigation report is a personnel record
covered by Penal Code section 832.7.

11
compliance is only possible in the context of a pending hearing, such as a grievance
arbitration—where a hearing officer is empowered to determine good cause and
materiality, and to review documents in camera—no violation is established in this
case.
We first observe that, if CSUEU had requested copies of the investigative report
as part of prosecuting a case before an arbitrator, ALJ, or court, there is no doubt that
Penal Code section 832.7 would require it to comply with Evidence Code sections
1043 and 1045. Courts have repeatedly held that these provisions “constitute the
exclusive means by which a litigant in a civil action may obtain discovery of records
governed by those statutes.” (City of Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423, citing
cases, emphasis in original.) As noted above, the same procedures apply in
administrative hearings, including arbitrations governed by collective bargaining
agreements. (Stiglitz, supra, 60 Cal.4th 624, 628.)
Thus, if CSUEU had filed a grievance and proceeded to arbitration over the
conduct Salcedo complained of, CSUEU could file a motion pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1043 seeking a copy of the investigative report. The University would be
required to immediately notify the peace officer who was the subject of the
investigation. The arbitrator would make a determination on CSUEU’s good cause to
obtain the records and their materiality to the dispute; we assume in a case such as
this that CSUEU’s representational duties would allow it to easily satisfy those
requirements. (See City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 [noting the “relatively
relaxed standards for a showing of good cause under section 1043”].) The arbitrator
would then conduct in camera review of the documents and apply the guidelines set

12
forth in section 1045, “guarantee[ing], in turn, a balancing of the officer's privacy
interests against the defendant's need for disclosure.” (Ibid.)
But here, CSUEU did not request the investigation report in the context of any
pending action before a hearing officer. Rather, as explained by CSUEU in a
December 14, 2023 letter to the University, it sought the investigation report “in light of
concerns regarding disparate treatment between CSUEU-represented employees and
SUPA-represented employees, among other concerns.” We agree that the information
sought is plainly necessary and relevant to CSUEU’s representational duties, even
outside the context of a pending action. (City of Redding, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2190-M, p. 2.) We must therefore consider Penal Code section 832.7’s impact on
CSUEU’s right to receive the information.
First, we note that, on its face, section 832.7 appears to set forth disclosure
procedures only applicable to criminal and civil proceedings. Several courts have
considered whether, therefore, the same procedures apply outside the litigation
context.
In Bradshaw v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 908, the Second
District Court of Appeal interpreted Penal Code section 832.7 narrowly, reasoning that
the statute’s dictate that certain records are “confidential” was descriptive and
prefatory to the ensuing language. Thus, peace officer personnel records “are
confidential only in the sense that, as stated in the ensuing statutory language, such
records, ‘shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by
[appropriate judicial] discovery . . . .’” (Bradshaw, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 908, 916.) It
follows from this view that, “[s]ince the statute specifically refers only to restrictions on

13
disclosure in ‘criminal or civil proceedings,’ the statute thus does not prohibit a public
agency from disclosing the records to the public.” (Ibid.)
In a subsequent case, the Second District Court of Appeal took a different tack,
though without referencing Bradshaw. A legal secretary in the office of a plaintiff’s
attorney petitioned under CPRA to compel disclosure of records of a county sheriff’s
office, after a court in a separate civil action alleging excessive force by sheriff’s
deputies denied that attorney’s client’s discovery motion for the same records under
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 588, 590-591.) As explained by the court, “the ultimate
purpose of the [CPRA] request [was] to discover indirectly information of the kind
governed by [the Pitchess statutes].” (Id. at p. 599.) The court observed that the
Pitchess statutes “set forth detailed and careful procedures to assure that the sensitive
information contained in records relating to allegations of police misconduct will be
disclosed only upon a showing of manifest necessity. Such procedures would be
nullified if . . . the same information, or information leading to it, could be obtained as a
matter of right through the Public Records Act.” (Id. at p. 600.) To avoid this result, the
court concluded that CPRA “simply cannot be construed in a way that authorizes the
circumvention of rulings of a court made pursuant to important discovery statutes
protecting the confidentiality of law enforcement information.” (Ibid.)
The First District Court of Appeal and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
rejected Bradshaw’s interpretation of Penal Code section 832.7. In City of Richmond
v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1430, a newspaper brought an action under
CPRA to compel a city to disclose records of investigations of citizen complaints

14
against the city’s police department. (Id. at p. 1432.) The newspaper, relying on
Bradshaw, argued that because it was not seeking discovery during a pending civil
action, CPRA procedures, rather than the Evidence Code, applied to its request.
(Ibid.) The trial court agreed and ordered the city to disclose its records for in camera
review and to prepare a descriptive index. (Id. at p. 1433.)
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal stated, “We disagree with
Bradshaw's suggestion that Penal Code section 832.7 did not establish the
confidentiality of these records.” (City of Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1430,
1439.) The court found that “the term ‘confidential’ in Penal Code section 832.7 has
independent significance” from the discovery procedures also mandated by the
statute. (Id. at p. 1440.) The court observed that “there is little point in protecting
information from disclosure in connection with criminal and civil proceedings if the
same information can be obtained routinely under CPRA.” (Ibid.) The court agreed
with the newspaper that, in principle, CPRA procedures applied. “By its terms, section
832.7 describes procedures for litigants in criminal and civil proceedings, not
procedures for nonlitigants seeking public records.” (Ibid.) However, section 832.7’s
confidentiality mandate meant that the records were exempt from disclosure under
CPRA, as records for which disclosure “is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal
or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to
privilege.” (Gov. Code, § 7927.705, formerly § 6254, subd. (k).)
The Fourth District Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion in City of
Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 1411, holding that “‘confidential,’ in section 832.7
means ‘confidential,’” and thus that covered records were exempt from disclosure

15
under CPRA. (Id. at pp. 1426-1427, emphasis in original.) The court, following City of
Richmond, held, “[w]e agree that, in the abstract, CPRA may be used to request
personnel records if no action or proceeding is pending. However, our decision, like
that in City of Richmond, makes such a practice pointless.” (Id. at p. 1427, fn. 16.)
The Supreme Court in Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1272 disapproved of
Bradshaw, and instead adopted the view of the courts of appeal in City of Hemet, City
of Richmond, and other cases, that Penal Code section 832.7 applies beyond criminal
and civil proceedings. (Id. at p. 1286.) The Court held, “We cannot conclude the
Legislature intended to enable third parties, by invoking the CPRA, so easily to
circumvent the privacy protection granted under section 832.7.” (Id. at p. 1286.) At
least partly on the basis of this concern, the Court concluded that section 832.7
protections rendered peace officer personnel records exempt from disclosure, under
CPRA’s exemption for records privileged under the Evidence Code. (Id. at pp. 1280,
1305, fn. 29, citing Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k), recodified at § 7927.705.)3
Returning to the matter before us, we are guided by these same concerns that
Penal Code section 832.7’s privacy protections could be circumvented if they did not
apply in the context of a pre-dispute information request. (See Copley Press, supra,
39 Cal.4th 1272, 1286 and fn. 6; see also County of Los Angeles, supra, 18
Cal.App.4th 588, 600.) As discussed above, if CSUEU was prosecuting a grievance
over Salcedo’s claims, or an unfair practice hearing in which a peace officer personnel
3 The Court also noted that, subsequent to Bradshaw, the Legislature had
amended CPRA to expressly provide that Penal Code section 832.7 operated to
exempt records from disclosure. (Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1283, citing
Gov. Code, § 6276.34, recodified at § 7930.180.)

16
record was arguably relevant to a discrimination claim or other charge, the union
would need to comply with Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 to obtain a copy of
the personnel record. The protections of section 832.7 would be undermined if
CSUEU could avoid that process altogether through a request for information
submitted before any action was pending before a hearing officer. In other words,
PERB will not issue a complaint alleging failure to provide information merely as a
mechanism to assign an ALJ and allow a Pitchess motion to be filed; such
bootstrapping falls outside the substantive and procedural boundaries of the
confidentiality exception explained in the above-referenced jurisprudence.
This is not to say that the investigation report is entirely exempt from disclosure
under HEERA. In many cases, records covered by Penal Code section 832.7 will be
necessary and relevant to a union’s representational duties. In recognition of the fact
that unions have greater rights to information than members of the general public, we
hold that peace officer personnel records’ exemption from disclosure under CPRA,
especially Government Code section 7927.705, does not render them absolutely
privileged under HEERA. (County of Tulare, supra, PERB Decision No. 2697-M, p. 14,
fn. 9.) However, the procedures for disclosure under HEERA must maintain the
balance that the Legislature struck with the Pitchess statutes. (See Stiglitz, supra, 60
Cal.4th 624, 639.) Although the procedures in Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045
do not directly apply outside of a civil or criminal proceeding (see City of Richmond,
supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1440), they represent critical safeguards for peace officer
personnel records under Penal Code section 832.7. We interpret HEERA to require
the same level of protection. Compliance with these safeguards is impossible if there

17
is no pending proceeding where the requesting party may file a motion to establish
good cause to receive and materiality of the records, and a hearing officer can
conduct in camera review prior to disclosure. For this reason, we find that an exclusive
representative is not entitled to receive records covered by Penal Code section 832.7
in the factual circumstances presented in this case. An exclusive representative may
instead obtain such records by invoking Evidence Code section 1043 in any hearing or
arbitration where they are material.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SA-CE-427-H is DISMISSED WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND.4
Chair Banks and Member Krantz joined in this Decision.
4 On August 6, 2024, one day after filings were complete and the case was
placed on the Board’s docket, SUPA filed a petition to file an informational brief in this
matter pursuant to PERB Regulation 32210. (Cal. Code Reg., tit. 8, § 32210.) In light
of the Board’s disposition of CSUEU’s appeal, we exercise our discretion to deny
SUPA’s petition to file an informational brief.