City and County of San Francisco (PERB A415M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO and
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY INVESTMENT &
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Respondents,
and
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION, LOCAL 1021,
Exclusive Representative.
Case No. SF-IM-140-M
Administrative Appeal
PERB Order No. Ad-415-M
August 19, 2014
CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO and
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY INVESTMENT &
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Respondents,
and
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL 21,
Exclusive Representative.
Case No. SF-IM-141-M
Appearances: Terence J. Howzell, Attorney, for City & County of San Francisco; Renne,
Sloan, Holtzman & Sakai by Jeffrey Sloan, Attorney, for Office of Community Investment &
Infrastructure; Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld by Robert E. Szykowny, Attorney, for Service
Employees International Union, Local 1021; Leonard Carder by Peter W. Saltzman, Attomey,
for International Federation of Professional & Technical Employees, Local 21.
Before Huguenin, Winslow and Banks, Members.
DECISION
. BANKS, Member: These cases, which were consolidated to address common issues, 1
are before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) on appeal from
1 The Board may sever, consolidate or otherwise alter the timelines or sequence in
which it investigates allegations before it to achieve administrative efficiency. (Trustees of the
California State University (2014) PERB Decision No. 2384-H, pp. 3-4.)

administrative determinations (attached) by the Office of the General Counsel. The
administrative determinations partially granted and partially denied requests by Service
Employees International Union, Local 1021 (SEIU) and International Federation of
Professional and Technical Employees, Local 21 (IFPTE) (collectively, Unions) for advisory
factfinding, pursuant to Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) section 3505.4, subd. (a).2 The
administrative determinations approved the Unions' requests for factfinding as to their
negotiations with the Office of Community Investments and Infrastructure (OCII), which is the
statutorily-designated "successor agency" to the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
(SFRA) whose former employees are represented by the Unions. However, the administrative
determinations denied the Unions' requests for factfinding with the City & County of San
Francisco (CCSF), which the Unions claim is, "at the very least, a joint employer" of the
former SFRA employees. The Unions currently have an unfair practice charge, PERB Case
No. SF-CE-1109-M, pending in the Office of the General Counsel that alleges CCSF, as a joint
employer of former SFRA employees, has failed and refused to meet and confer with the
Unions regarding the wages, hours and other tenns and conditions of employment of the
former SFRA employees, in violation ofMMBA section 3505 and PERB Regulations.3 The
Unions appeal from that portion of the administrative determinations denying their requests to
include CCSF in the factfinding.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the Office of the General Counsel's
administrative detenninations ordering factfinding for the disputes between the Unions and
2 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. All further statutory
references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
3 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 31001 et seq.
2

OCII. We also affinn the Office of the General Counsel's decision not to order factfinding for
the disputes between the Unions and CCSF but for different reasons than those stated in the
administrative determination. Instead of deciding whether CCSF's charter applies to the
Unions' disputes with CCSF, we believe that the central issue in theses appeals-whether
CCSF is a joint employer with OCII of the fonner SFRA employees-is best determined
through unfair practice proceedings. If it is ultimately determined that CCSF has an obligation
to bargain with the Unions regarding SFRA employees' terms and conditions of employment,
and if a bargaining order results, and if the parties to those negotiations thereafter reach bona
fide impasse, the issue of charter coverage may be addressed at that time. However, it is
premature to make such a determination at this stage of the proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 14, 2014, OCII's lead negotiator Jeffrey Sloan (Sloan) provided the Unions
with written confirmation of OCII' s declaration of impasse.
On February 12, 2014, the Unions filed separate, but otherwise identical, requests for
factfinding for negotiations with both OCII and CCSF.
On February 18, 2014, OCII and CCSF submitted position statements in response to the
Unions' factfinding requests. OCII stated its readiness to participate in factfinding with the
Unions, provided CCSF was not included in the factfinding. 	CCSF's position statement
argued that, by operation oflaw, it was not the employer Goint or otherwise) of the former
SFRA employees, and that, insofar as the Union's factfinding requests were directed at CCSF,
they were defective. Both OCII and CCSF also argued that, as a charter city and county, CCSF
3

is not subject to factfinding under MMBA section 3505.4, because section A8.409-4 of
CCSF's charter provides for binding arbitration for resolving impasse disputes.4
On February 13, 2014, SEIU requested that the Board agent take official notice of the
unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-1109-M and on February 15 and 19, 2014, SEIU
submitted position statements in support of the Unions' factfinding requests'.
On February 25, 2014, the Board agent issued her administrative determinations, which
approved factfinding for the Unions' dispute with OCII, but detennined that factfinding was
not appropriate for the Unions' disputes with CCSF.
On March 10, 2014, the Unions filed their appeals.
On March 24, 2014, CCSF filed its response to the Unions' appeals.
On March 25, 2014, OCII filed its response to the Unions' appeals.
FACTUALBACKGROUND5
The Unions are the exclusive representatives of former employees of SFRA which,
until 2011, was an agency of CCSF. In separate unfair practice proceedings, they allege that,
4 MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), reads as follows:
A charter city, charter county, or charter city and county with a
charter that has a procedure that applies if an impasse has been
reached between the public agency and a bargaining unit, and the
procedure includes, at a minimum, a process for binding
arbitration, is exempt from the requirements of this section and
Section 3505.4 with regard to its negotiations with a bargaining
unit to which the impasse procedure applies.
5 The following summary is comprised of facts set forth in the administrative
detenninations, which all parties have adopted in their respective position statements and/or
appeals or responses to appeals. Those facts are further supplemented by information from
various parties' requests for official notice.
4

before the dissolution of SFRA, they had memorandum of understandings (MOUs) with CCSF,
which were set to expire on January 31, 2014.6
In 2011, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill (AB) Nos. 26 and 27 to stabilize school
funding by reducing or eliminating the ability of community redevelopment agencies to divert
property tax revenues from school districts. AB 26, the Community Redevelopment Law,
dissolved local redevelopment agencies and transferred their assets and obligations to designated
"successor agencies," effective October 1, 2011. AB 26 defined the "successor agency" as "the
county, city, or city and county that authorized the creation of each redevelopment agency or
another entity as provided in [Health and Safety Code] Section 34173."7
In June 2012, the Legislature passed additional legislation, referred to as AB 1484,
which attempted to clarify the definition of "successor agency." Following passage of
AB 1484, Health and Safety Code, section 34173, subdivision (g), states that a "successor
agency" to a fonner local redevelopment agency is a separate public entity from the public
agency that provides for its governance, that the two entities shall not merge, and that the assets
and liabilities of the former redevelopment agency shall not merge with those of the "successor
organization." After enactment of AB 1484, a successor agency "has its own name, can be sued,
and can sue," and "[ a ]11 litigation involving a redevelopment agency shall automatically be
transferred to the successor agency." However, the "separate fonner redevelopment agency
6 Although we decline to resolve the issues raised by the Unions' unfair practice charge
in the present administrative appeal as requested by SEID Local 1021, we take official notice
of the contents of PERB's own case file in IFPTE AFL-CIO, Local 21 & SEID Local 1021 v.
City & County of San Francisco (Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-1109-M).
7 AB 27, which would have permitted redevelopment agencies to continue operating if
the cities and counties that created them agreed to make alternative payments into funds
benefiting the state's schools and special districts, was struck down as unconstitutional, though
the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of AB 26's provisions for the dissolution of
local redevelopment agencies and the transfer of their assets and liabilities to "successor
agencies." ( California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 241.)
5

employees shall not automatically become sponsoring entity employees of the sponsoring entity
and the successor agency shall retain its own collective bargaining status." (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 34173, emphasis added.)
All parties agree that OCII is the "successor agency" to SFRA, as defined by the statute.
On an unspecified date, the Unions began joint bargaining with OCII for memoranda of
understanding (MOUs) covering the former SFRA employees.
The Unions allege that, on or about July 25, 2012, the Unions and CCSF also agreed to
a set of ground rules for negotiations concerning successor MOUs covering the former SFRA
employees. In response to the Unions' unfair practice charge, Carol Isen, an employee
relations representative of CCSF, asserts that she was acting as a labor relations representative
of the successor agency to SFRA at the time she signed the ground rules.
Following passage of AB 1484, CCSF took the position that it is no longer the
employer of the former SFRA employees and it has since refused to meet with the Unions.
On or about August 6, 2013, the Unions filed their unfair practice charge,
captioned IFPTE AFL-CIO, Local 21 & SEIU Local 1021 v. City & County of San Francisco
(PERB Case No. SF-CE-1109-M). On or about November 21, 2013, the Unions filed a first
amended unfair practice charge, in which they allege, among other things, that CCSF retains
sufficient control over OCH and the former SFRA employees' tenns and conditions of
employment, that it is, at minimum, a "joint employer" of those employees, and that its refusal
to meet and confer with the Unions constitutes a failure and refusal to bargain, in violation of
MMBA section 3505 and PERB Regulations. Investigation of that charge is pending before
PERB' s Office of the General Counsel.
Without prejudice to their position in the unfair practice charge, during negotiations
with OCII, the Unions have proposed to recognize CCSF as an employer or joint employer of
6

the former SFRA employees. The Unions argue that, while the statute says "former
redevelopment agency employees shall not automatically become sponsoring entity employees
of the sponsoring entity," neither does it categorically preclude that result, if the sponsoring
entity agrees to be recognized as the employer. OCII bas consistently rejected these proposals
and CCSF argues that the intent of the 2011-2012 legislation was to establish a complete legal
separation between the sponsoring entities and the successor agencies, and that CCSF's
withdrawal from negotiations was an effort to comply with the newly-enacted legislation.
CCSF argues that, as of the date SFRA was dissolved, SFRA employees became
employees of the "successor agency," which, at that time, i.e., before the 2012 clarification of
the law brought about by AB 1484, meant "the county, city or city and county that authorized
the creation of each redevelopment agency or another entity as provided in [Health and Safety
Code] Section 34173." However, CCSF contends, after the passage of AB 1484 in June 2012,
the new definition of "successor agency" contained in Health and Safety Code section 34190,
subd. ( e) states the opposite, i.e., that "a successor agency is a separate public entity from the
public agency that provides for its governance and the two entities shall not merge."
(Emphasis added.)
The last meeting between the Unions and OCII occurred on January 9, 2014. On
Febrnary 9, 2014, Sloan infonned the Unions that OCII considered negotiations to be at
impasse. On January 14, 2014, Sloan provided the Unions with written confirmation of OCII's
declaration of impasse. The parties continued to exchange communications and discuss the
possibility of further negotiations. However, on January 23, 2014, Sloan again provided
written confirmation of OCII's declaration of impasse. At that time, OCII and the Unions
severed their previously joint negotiatfons, pursuant to their ground rnles.
7

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION
The status of OCII as "the" employer or "an" employer was not in dispute. Nor was
there any dispute that negotiations between the Unions and OCII had reached impasse on or
about Febrnary, which was confinned in writing by OCII's bargaining representative on
Febrnary 14, 2011. The administrative detenninations concluded that the Unions' requests for
factfinding as to their dispute with OCII satisfied the statutory criteria and PERB Regulation
32802. The Unions do not appeal this part of the administrative determinations.
In considering the Unions' requests for factfinding with CCSF, the Board agent
identified two issues: (1) whether CCSF is a joint employer of the former SFRA employees
(joint employer issue); and (2) whether the dispute between the Unions and CCSF is subject to
the binding interest arbitration provisions in the CCSF charter (the charter coverage issue). As
requested by the Unions, the administrative detenninations took official notice of the Unions'
unfair practice charge and recited various factual allegations included therein purporting to
document the nature and extent of CCSF's involvement in negotiations and CCSF's alleged
control over the former SFRA employees' tenns and conditions of employment. However, the
administrative determinations declined to reach the "joint employer" issue urged by the
Unions.
Instead, the Board agent considered the "Charter coverage issue" and concluded that
because the Unions' disputes with CCSF would not be subject to MMBA factfinding, even
assuming CCSF's joint employer status as alleged by the Unions, it was unnecessary to decide
whether CCSF is a "joint employer" or otherwise an appropriate party to the Unions' dispute
with OCII. As noted above, MMBA section 3505, subdivision (e) exempts charter entities
from the MMBA factfinding provisions if the bargaining dispute is subject to a process for
binding arbitration under the charter entity's charter. The administrative detenninations
8

reasoned that, because here, CCSF's charter provides for a three-member arbitration panel to
resolve bargaining disputes, under MMBA section 3505, subdivision (e), the Unions' dispute
with CCSF is not subject to the factfindingprovisions of the MMBA, regardless ofCCSF's
relationship to OCH and the fonner SFRA employees.
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Unions argue, among other things, that as a result of the denial of their factfinding
request, the former SFRA employees are left in a legal limbo. They argue that because CCSF
does not regard itself as a party to negotiations or a proper party to any factfinding concerning
this dispute, CCSF will not utilize the binding arbitration provisions included in the CCSF
charter or engage in MMBA factfinding, thereby "leaving [the former SFRA employees]
unable to pursue either MMBA fact-finding or Charter impasse procedures." According to the
Unions, such a result is repugnant to fundamental fairness and contrary to the intent of the
Legislature when it enacted t~e MMBA factfinding provisions.
The Unions also challenge the conclusion that their dispute with CCSF would not be
subject to MMBA factfinding, even assuming CCSF were deemed a proper party to such
factfinding, because the dispute would instead be subject to binding interest arbitration under
the CCSF charter. The Unions note that the charter does not cover all disputes with all
bargaining units. Rather; it only applies "with regard to ... negotiations with a bargaining unit
to which [the charter entity's] impasse procedures [apply]." Further, by its own terms, A8.409
categorically exempts some employee classifications, such as police officers, firefighters, and
unrepresented employees, from its binding arbitration provisions. Other employee
classifications, such as registered nurses, platform employees, and coach and bus operators, are
also exempted, but may opt into the binding arbitration provisions. They argue that whether a
9

bargaining unit of former SFRA employees is subject to the impasse resolution procedures of
AS.409 "remains an open question."
The Unions contend that CCSF cannot be permitted to "speak out of both sides of its
mouth" by both pointing to the CCSF charter's binding arbitration provisions as exempting it
from MMBA factfinding and, at the same time, asserting that CCSF is not subject to the
binding arbitration provisions of its charter as to the present dispute, because it is not the
employer of the former SFRA employees. According to the Unions, if CCSF contends that
disputes over negotiations for the fonner SFRA employees are ineligible for interest arbitration
under AS.409-4, then CCSF must be subject to factfinding under the language ofMMBA
section 3505.4.
CCSF contends that the only proper parties to MMBA factfinding proceedings are the
parties who have reached impasse in their negotiations. According to CCSF, it is not the
employer of the fonner SFRA employees or a party to negotiations concerning their terms and
conditions of employment, and because there were no negotiations between CCSF and the
Unions, there has been no impasse and no written notice declaring impasse as to negotiations
between the Unions and CCSF. Consequently, the statutory requirements for PERB to approve
MMBA factfinding have not been satisfied as to any dispute between the Unions and CCSF.
Additionally, CCSF argues that pursuant to MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), it is
exempt from factfindng, regardless of its relationship to OCII or fonner SFRA employees,
because CCSF's charter provides for binding interest arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes
that have reached impasse. It rejects the Unions' contention that former SFRA employees are
not covered by the Charter's interest arbitration provisions, by noting that section AS .409-1
applies to "all miscellaneous employees," which is defined elsewhere in the charter to include
all non-safety employees. It contends that only registered nurses and unrepresented employees
10

are exempt, because they are specifically exempted. CCSF also questions PERB's jurisdiction
to detennine administratively the central issue the Unions have asked PERB to decide in the
separate unfair practice charge pending before PERB, i.e., whether CCSF is a joint employer of
the OCII employees.
DISCUSSION
We begin by addressing CCSF's concern that PERB lacks jurisdiction to resolve in
administrative proceedings, such as factfinding requests, matters common to both the
factfinding request and an unfair practice case.
MMBA section 3505.4 establishes a factfinding procedure for resolving post-impasse
bargaining disputes. The procedure may be invoked only by the representative employee
organization after mediation efforts, if available, have failed to produce a settlement and its
timeline to request factfinding is triggered by either party's written declaration of impasse.
(City of Redondo Beach (2014) PERB Order No. Ad-409-M (City of Redondo Beach).) The
factfinding procedure is advisory only and is not available if the dispute is subject to binding
interest arbitration, as provided for by the charter of a charter city, charter county, or charter
city and county.
In City of Redondo Beach, the Board explained that PERB's authority to order factfinding
derives from MMBA section 3505.4 and not necessarily from section 3509, which establishes
PERB's jurisdiction to decide unfair practice issues under the MMBA. However, City of
Redondo Beach did not consider whether section 3505.4 is the sole source of PERB's authority
to act in the context of a factfinding request, or whether it may also rely on its unfair practice
jurisdiction under section 3509 to resolve overlapping unfair practice issues in the context of a
factfinding request and/or an administrative appeal arising therefrom.
11

In County of Contra Costa (2014) PERB Order No. Ad-410-M (Contra Costa) and in
County ofFresno (2014) PERB Order No. Ad-414 (County ofFresno), we held that PERB has
authority under MMBA section 3505.4 to determine whether factfinding applies to the particular
dispute in which the request for factfinding arises. This authority includes not only determining
whether a union's request for factfinding was timely (as was the issue in City of Redondo
Beach), but also whether any other statutory exceptions to MMBA factfinding apply, such as the
one set forth in MMBA section 3505.5. As stated in Contra Costa, "Implicitly contained within
the authority to detennine whether [a factfinding] request is sufficient is the jurisdiction to assess
whether the request is properly before the Board, i.e., whether the conditions precedent to a valid
request for factfinding exist." (Id. at p. 11.)
·. County of Fresno, supra, PERB Order No. Ad-414-M involved potentially overlapping
issues in a factfinding request (whether factfinding applied to the bargaining dispute) and in an
unfair practice case (whether the employer unilaterally imposed tenns and conditions of
employment before exhausting impasse resolution procedures). We explained that, although
the issues in the factfinding request conceivably overlaps with an issue in the unfair practice
case, their resolution does not prejudice or determine the ultimate outcome in the unfair
practice case, because unfair practice proceedings and potential orders following a
determination ofliability are distinct from administrative detenninations on whether the
prerequisites for factfinding exist.
Under PERB's "broad" remedial powers "to take action and make determinations that are
necessary to effectuate the policies of'' the statutes it administers (Mt. San Antonio Community
College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 178, 189-190), we
conclude that, in the course of responding to a factfinding request, the Board has jurisdiction to
decide all relevant and necessary factual and legal issues pertinent to that request, even if those
12

issues are also raised in a pending unfair practice case. Although PERB has thus far exercised its
jurisdiction to decide "joint employer," "single employer," "alter ego" or other jurisdictional
issues within the context of unfair practice cases (County of Ventura (2012) PERB Decision
No. 2272-M; El Camino Hospital District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2033-M; United Public
Employees v. Public Employment Relations Ed. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1119; Hornet
Foundation, Inc. (1985) PERB Decision No. 521-H), the Board may exercise that same authority
to resolve factual and legal issues in a factfinding request, even if they overlap with issues in a
pending unfair practice case. (Contra Costa, supra, PERB Order No. Ad-410-M, p. 11; County
ofFresno, supra, PERB Order No. Ad-414-M, pp. 5-8; City ofRedondo Beach, supra, PERB
Order No. Ad-409-M, pp. 4-5.)
Although we conclude that the Board has jurisdiction to resolve the "joint employer"
issue raised by the Unions, we are not persuaded by their argument that we must exercise that
power in this instance to resolve unfair practice issues in the context of an administrative appeal.
We do not adopt the Office of the General Counsel's detennination that the CCSF
charter precludes factfinding between the Unions and CCSF. We consider it unnecessary to
detennine the complex factual and legal issues regarding the meaning of the CCSF charter at
this stage of the proceedings. If it is determined CCSF is a joint employer and if it is ordered
to bargain and if it then reaches impasse, and then raises as a defense that the charter
provisions apply instead ofMMBA factfinding, and if the Unions dispute that contention, we
can decide it then.
In so ruling, we do not announce a general rule under which factfinding requests must
await the outcome of a separate unfair practice case simply because they involve potentially
common factual or legal issues. Because of the generally time-sensitive nature of factfinding
requests, in instances where it is necessary to resolve a factual dispute, we may exercise our
13

jurisdiction by remanding the request for an investigation or hearing, as appropriate. (MMBA,
§ 3509; EERA,8 § 3541.3, subd. (h).) We simply hold that in the circumstances of the present
administrative appeals and the separate unfair practice case, it is unnecessary for the Board to
attempt to resolve complex legal and factual issues that are better suited to the unfair practice
proceedings, with no resulting prejudice to the parties.
SEIU has also requested oral argument. Although PERB's Regulations generally
contemplate oral argument before the Board only in unfair practice cases, representation
matters, or other proceedings involving a fonnal hearing (compare PERB Reg. 32190,
subd. (d); 32315 with 32350; 32360), the Board's general powers "[t]o take any other action as
the board deems necessary to discharge its powers and duties and otherwise to effectuate the
purposes of [the MMBA ]" undoubtedly extend to hearing oral argument, where necessary to
decide an administrative appeal. (MMBA, § 3509; EERA, § 3541.3, subd. (n).) However, to
the extent the Unions have raised issues that the Board must decide in the current procedural
posture of these administrative appeals, those issues are sufficiently clear to make oral
argument unnecessary. (City of San Diego (Office of the City Attorney) (2010) PERB Decision
No. 2103-M, p. 2, fn. 4.)
ORDER
The Service Employees International Union, Local 1021 's appeal of the administrative
determination in Case No. SF-IM-140-M, and the International Federation of Professional &
Technical Employees, Local 21 's appeal of the administrative determination in Case
No. SF-IM-141-M are hereby DISMISSED.
Members Huguenin and Winslow joined in this Decision.
8 The Educational Employment Relations Act (BERA) is codified at section 3540 et seq.
14

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
gM L
gi AI/
gAti G A yp
San Francisco Regional Office
1330 Broadway, Suite 1532
Oakland, CA 94612-2514
Telephone: (510) 622-1021
Fax: (510) 622-1027
February 25, 2014
Kerianne R. Steele, Attorney
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld
1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200
Alameda, CA 94501
Rafal Ofierski, Deputy City Attorney
City & County of San Francisco
1390 Market Street, 5th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102
Jeffrey Sloan, Attorney
Renne, Sloan, Holtzman & Sakai
350 Sansome Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94104-1304
EDMUND G. BROWN
Re: City & County of San Francisco and Office of Community Investments & Infrastructure
and Service Employees International Union Local 1021
Case No. SF-IM-140-M
Administrative Determination
Dear Interested Parties:
On February 12, 2014, Service Employees International Union, Local 1021 (SEIU) filed a
request for factfinding with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board)
pursuant to section 3505.4 of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and PERB Regulation
32802. 1 SEIU asserts that it and joint employers Office of Community Investments and
Infrastructure (OCII) and the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) have been unable to
effect a settlement in their current negotiations for a successor agreement. The OCII gave
written notice of declaration of impasse by letter dated January 14, 2014.
On February 18, 2014, the OCII, through its attorney, Jeffrey Sloan, provided a position
statement. On February 18, 2014, the CCSF, through its attorney Rafal Ofierski, also provided
a position statement. SEIU, through its attorney, Kerianne Steele, provided a request for
official notice on February 13, 2014, and position statements on February 15 and February 19,
2014.
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. PERB Regulations
are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 31001 et seq. The text of the
MMBA and PERB Regulations may be found at www.perb.ca.gov.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 2
A separate factfinding request has been filed by the International Federation of Professional
and Technical Engineers, Local 21 (IFPTE Local 21) against both the OCII and the CCSF.
This factfinding request, case number SF-IM-141-M, will be addressed by a separate
document. 	Official notice is taken of the documents filed in case number SF-IM-141-M, .
particularly the reply position statement filed by IFPTE Local 21 on February 19, 2014.
Factual Background
The OCII is a successor agency to the former San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. Due to
this transformation, as well as recent statutory changes, the correct identity of the "employer,"
and/or the existence of a "joint employer" is currently in dispute between the parties.
Specifically, the issue is whether the bargaining unit members (of both IFPTE Local 21 and
SEIU) should be considered employees of the CCSF, the OCII, or both. This dispute over
employer identity is a central issue in pending unfair practice charge IFPTE Local 21 and
SEIU Local 1021 v. City and County of San Francisco, PERB UPC Case Number SF-CE-
1109-M.2
In 2011, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bills Nos. 26 and 27 (2011-201~ 1st Ex.
Sess.), which dissolved existing redevelopment agencies and transferred their assets and
obligations to "successor agencies." This enactment was upheld, in relevant part, in California
Redevelopment Assn. v. Motosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231. In June 2012, the Legislature
enacted Assembly Bill 1484 (2011-2012 Regular Sess.) which, among other things, clarified
the definition of "successor agency." (See, e.g., Health & Saf. Code, § 34173 .) In
approximately September 2012, the CCSF Board of Supervisors then passed City Ordinance
number 215-12 concerning the status of the successor agency, later known as the OCII. This
resulted in a dispute among the parties as to the correct identity of the employer of the
empl?yees in the SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 bargaining units
On an unspecified date, representatives of OCII and/or CCSF began meeting and negotiating
with SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 over a successor Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
While SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 represent separate bargaining units, joint bargaining sessions
have been conducted with the two unions together.
Ground rules for the joint negotiations were prepared on CCSF Department of Human
Resources letterhead, and signed on July 24, 2012, by Carol Isen3 on behalf of the CCSF.
These ground rules were also signed, on the same day, by Alex Tonisson for IFPTE Local 21
and by Leah Berlanga for SEIU. Ms. Isen later submitted a verification dated September 27,
2013, in connection with UPC Case No. SF-CE-1109-M, stating that she had been serving as
the labor relations representative for the successor agency to the San Francisco Redevelopment
This charge is presently under investigation by the Office of the General Counsel.
PERB takes official notice of the case file in this action.
3 Ms. lsen's title is not specified.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 3
Agency. Ms. Isen submitted a second verification dated January 10, 2014, stating that she was
an employee relations representative with the City and County of San Francisco. Accordingly,
it is unknown whether she was agreeing to the ground rules on behalf of the CCSF or on behalf
of the OCII.
According to IFPTE Local 21 and SEIU, the CCSF Department of Human Resources served as
the labor relations representative for the Redevelopment Agency until late 2013. Further,
SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 assert that the CCSF has exercised significant control over the
negotiations. It appears that SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 engaged in bargaining with the OCII,
but expressly reserved their rights as to their argument that the CCSF should also be a
participant. Mr. Sloan indicates that he served as chief negotiator for the OCII.
The parties' last meeting was on January 9, 2014. No agreement was reached at this meeting,
and the OCII verbally declared that it believed the parties were at impasse. According to the
OCH, the parties also severed, pursuant to the ground rules, what had previously been joint
negotiations with both unions.
On January 14, 2014, the OCII, through its attorney and chief negotiator Mr. Sloan, sent SEIU
representative Ms. Berlanga a written notice of declaration of impasse. The parties did not
agree to mediate the dispute. On January 23, 2014, Mr. Sloan sent a second letter confirming
the previous declaration of impasse.
Discussion
MMBA section 3505.4, subdivision (a),4 provides as follows:
The employee organization may request that the parties'
differences be submitted to a factfinding panel . . . If the dispute
was not submitted to mediation, an employee organization may
request that the parties' differences be submitted to a factfinding
panel not later than 30 days following the date that either party
provided the other with a written notice of a declaration of
unpasse ....
PERB Regulation 32802 provides as follows:
(a) An exclusive representative may request that the parties'
differences be submitted to a factfinding panel. The request shall
4 The factfinding provisions were added to the MMBA by Assembly Bill 646 (Stats.
2011, Ch. 680, § 2) and amended by Assembly Bill 1606 (Stats. 2012, Ch. 314, § 1.) The
amendment, which added the language about either party providing written notice of
declaration of impasse, was intended to be technical and clarifying of existing law. (Stats.
2012, Ch. 314, § 2.)

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 4
be accompanied by a statement that the parties have been unable
to effect a settlement. Such a request may be filed:
(1) Not sooner than 30 days, but not more than 45 days,
following the appointment or selection of a mediator pursuant
either to the parties' agreement to mediate or a mediation process
required by a public agency's local rules; or
(2) If the dispute was not submitted to mediation, not later than
30 days following the date that either party provided the other
with written notice of a declaration of impasse.
The parties did not submit the bargaining dispute to mediation or select a mediator. Therefore,
SEIU' s factfinding request is based upon the written notice of a declaration of impasse by
OCII. 5 It appears that there has been no written notice of declaration of impasse with respect
to bargaining with the CCSF. The OCII's letter dated January 14, 2014, constitutes a written
notice of declaration of impasse, with respect to the OCII, within the meaning of section
3505.4. The instant factfinding request was timely filed within thirty days, on February 12,
2014.
2. 	Charter Arbitration Exception to MMBA Factfinding
MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), provides as follows:
A charter city, charter county, or charter city and county with a
charter that has a procedure that applies if an impasse has been
reached between the public agency and a bargaining unit, and the
procedure includes, at a minimum, a process for binding
arbitration, is exempt from the requirements of this section and
Section 3505.4 with regard to its negotiations with a bargaining
unit to which the impasse procedure applies.
The CCSF provides a copy of its City Charter, Section AS.409-4. This section provides for
impasse resolution procedures. 	Unresolved bargaining disputes shall be submitted to a three-
member arbitration panel, upon the declaration of impasse by the CCSF or by a recognized
employee organization involved in the dispute. The ultimate decision of the arbitration board
is final and binding.6
5 In its position statement dated February 18, 2014, the OCII states that it is willing to
participate in factfinding upon the condition that the factfinding process will be between the
OCII and SEIU only.
6 The charter section further provides that the arbitration procedings are governed by
the Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1280 et seq.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 5
Accordingly, the CCSF-a charter city and county-has, in its charter, a procedure that applies
if an impasse is reached between the CCSF and its recognized employee organizations (i.e.,
SEIU and/or IFPTE Local 21). The charter further provides for final and binding arbitration.
Therefore, under MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), the CCSF is not subject to the
factfinding provision of the MMBA
The unions argue that the section 3505.5, subdivision (e) exemption does not apply because
these negotiations are not ones "to which the impasse procedure applies." The unions assert
that they believe that the CCSF would refuse to participate in the binding arbitration procedure
provided for by the Charter and that the CCSF has taken the position that the Charter impasse
procedures do not apply to the bargaining. However, to the extent that the CCSF is required to
bargain with SEIU and IFPTE Local 21, it is covered by the charter arbitration exception of
MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), and not by the MMBA factfinding provisions.
Accordingly, as to the CCSF, the instant factfinding request does not satisfy the requirements
of MMBA sections 3505.4 and 3505.5, and PERB Regulation 32802.
Next Steps
As to the OCII, the instant request satisfies the requirements of PERB Regulation 32802 in that
it was timely filed, based upon a written notice of declaration of impasse, and identifies the
dispute subject to factfinding. 	Each party must select its factfinding panel member and notify
this office in writing of his/her name, title, address and telephone number no later than March
4, 2014.7 Service and proof of service are required.
The resumes of seven factfinders, drawn from the PERB Panel of Neutrals, are being provided
to the parties via electronic mail. 8 The parties may mutually agree upon one of the seven, or
may select any person they choose, whether included on the PERB Panel of Neutrals or not. In
no case, however, will the Board be responsible for the costs of the chairperson.
If the parties select a chair, the parties should confirm the availability of the neutral, prior to
informing PERB of the selection.
Unless the parties notify PERB, on or before March 4, 2014, that they have mutually agreed
upon a person to chair their factfinding panel, PERB will appoint one of these seven
individuals to serve as chairperson.
This deadline, and any other referenced, may be extended by mutual agreement of the
parties.
8 The seven neutrals whose resumes are being provided are Norman Brand, Jerilou
Cossack, Ruth Glick, Robert Hirsch, John Kagel, Wilma Rader, and Paul Roose.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 6
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to PERB Regulations, an aggrieved party may file an appeal directly with the Board
itself and can request an expedited review of this administrative determination. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32147, subd. (a), 32350, 32360, 32802, 61060.) An appeal must be filed with
the Board itself within 10 days following the date of service of this determination. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 32360, subd. (b).) Any document filed with the Board must contain the case
name and number, and the original and five (5) copies of all documents must be provided to
the Board. (Ibid.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB business day.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code,§ 11020, subd.
(a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before
the close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet which meets the
requirements of PERB Regulation 32135(d), provided the filing party also places the original,
together with the required number of copies and proof of service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32090 and
32130.)
The Board's address is: 	Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
If a party appeals this determination, the other party(ies) may file with the Board an original
and five copies of a statement in opposition within 10 calendar days following the date of
service of the appeal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,.§ 32375.)
Service
All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served" upon all parties to the
proceeding, and a "proof of service" must accompany each copy of a document served upon a
party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32140 for the required
contents.) The document will be considered properly "served" when personally delivered or
deposited in the mail or deposited with a delivery service and properly addressed. A document
may also be concurrently served via facsimile transmission on all parties to the proceeding.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subd. (c).)

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 7
Extension of Time
A request for an extension of time, in which to file a document with the Board itself, must be
in writing and filed with the Board at the previously noted address. A request for an extension
must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before the expiration of the time required for
filing the document. The request must indicate good cause for and, if known, the position of
each other party regarding the extension, and shall be accompanied by proof of service of the
request upon each party. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32132.)
Sin~
Lau& Z. Davis
Senior Regional Attorney
LD
cc: 	Peter Saltzman, IFPTE Local 21
Ana Guzina, IFPTE Local 21
/

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
San Francisco Regional Office
1330 Broadway, Suite 1532
Oakland, CA 94612-2514
Telephone: (510) 622-1021
Fax: (510) 622-1027
February 25, 2014
Peter Saltzman, Attorney
Leonard Carder
1330 Broadway, Suite 1450
Oakland, CA 94612-2513
Rafal Ofierski, Deputy City Attorney
City & County of San Francisco
1390 Market Street, 5th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102
Jeffrey Sloan, Attorney
Renne, Sloan, Holtzman & Sakai
350 Sansome Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94104-1304
Re: 	City & County of San Francisco and Office of Community Investments & Infrastructure
and IFPTE, Local 21, AFL-CIO
Case No. SF-IM-141-M
. MMBA Factfinding Request (OCII)
Administrative Determination
Dear Interested Parties:
On February 12, 2014, the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers,
Local 21 (IFPTE Local 21) filed a request for factfinding with the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) pursuant to section 3505.4 of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
(MMBA) and PERB Regulation 32802. 1 IFPTE Local 21 asserts that it and joint employers
Office of Community Investments and Infrastructure (OCII) and the City and County of San
Francisco (CCSF) have been unable to effect a settlement in their current negotiations for a
successor agreement. The OCII gave written notice of declaration of impasse by letter dated
January 14, 2014.
On February 18, 2014, the OCII, through its attorney, Jeffrey Sloan, provided a position
statement. On February 18, 2014, the CCSF, through its attorney Rafal Ofierski, also provided
a position statement. IFPTE Local 21, through its attorney Peter Saltzman, provided a position
statement on February 19, 2014.
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. PERB Regulations
are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 3100 I et seq. The text of the
MMBA and PERB Regulations may be found at www.perb.ca.gov.
EDMUND G. BROWN

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 2
A separate factfinding request has been filed by the Service Employees International Union
Local 1021 (SEIU) against both the OCII and the CCSF. This factfinding request, case
number SF-IM-140-M, will be addressed by a separate document. Official notice is taken of
the documents filed in case number SF-IM-140-M, particularly the request for official notice
filed by SEIU on February 1 	2014, and position statements filed by SEIU on February 15 and
February 19, 2014.
Factual Background
The OCII is a successor agency to the former San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. Due to
this transformation, as well as recent statutory changes, the correct identity of the "employer,"
and/or the existence of a "joint employer" is currently in dispute between the parties.
Specifically, the issue is whether the bargaining unit members (of both IFPTE Local 21 and
SEIU) should be considered employees of the CCSF, the OCII, or both. This dispute over
employer identity is a central issue in pending unfair practice charge IFPTE Local 21 and
SEIU Local 1021 v. City and County o/San Francisco, PERE UPC Case Number SF-CE-
1109-M.2
In 2011, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bills Nos. 26 and 27 (2011-2012 1st Ex.
Sess.), which dissolved existing redevelopment agencies and transferred their assets and
obligations to "successor agencies." This enactment was upheld, in relevant part, in Cal~fornia
Redevelopment Assn. v. Motosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231. In June 2012, the Legislature
enacted Assembly Bill 1484 (2011-2012 Regular Sess.) which, among other things, clarified
the definition of"successoragency." (See, e.g., Health & Saf. Code,§ 34173.) In
approximately September 2012, the CCSF Board of Supervisors then passed City Ordinance
number 215-12 concerning the status of the successor agency, later known as the OCII. This
resulted in a dispute among the parties as to the correct identity of the employer of the
employees in the SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 bargaining units
On an unspecified date, representatives of OCII and/or CCSF began meeting and negotiating
with SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 over a successor Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
While SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 represent separate bargaining units, joint bargaining sessions
have been conducted with the two unions together.
Ground rules for the joint negotiations were prepared on CCSF Department of Human
Resources letterhead, and signed on July 24, 2012, by Carol Isen3 on behalf of the CCSF.
These ground rules were also signed, on the same day, by Alex Tonisson for IFPTE Local 21
and by Leah Berlanga for SEIU. Ms. Isen later submitted a verification dated September 27,
2013, in connection with UPC Case No. SF-CE-1109-M, stating that she had been serving as
2 This charge is presently under investigation by the Office of the General Counsel.
PERE takes official notice of the case file in this action.
3 Ms. Isen' s title is not specified.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 3
the labor relations representative for the successor agency to the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency. Ms. Isen submitted a second verification dated January 10, 2014, stating that she was
an employee relations representative with the City and County of San Francisco. Accordingly,
it is unknown whether she was agreeing to the ground rules on behalf of the CCSF or on behalf
of the OCII.
According to IFPTE Local 21 and SEIU, the CCSF Department of Human Resources served as
the labor relations representative for the Redevelopment Agency until late 2013. Further,
SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 assert that the CCSF has exercised significant control over the
negotiations. It appears that SEIU and IFPTE Local 21 engaged in bargaining with the OCII,
but expressly reserved their rights as to their argument that the CCSF should also be a
participant. Mr. Sloan indicates that he served as chief negotiator for the OCII.
The parties' last meeting was on January 9, 2014. No agreement was reached at this meeting,
and the OCII verbally declared that it believed the parties were at impasse. According to the
OCII, the parties also severed, pursuant to the ground rules, what had previously been joint
negotiations with both unions.
On January 14, 2014, the OCII, through its attorney and chief negotiator Mr. Sloan, sent IFPTE
Local 21 representative Mr. Tonisson a written notice of declaration of impasse. The parties
did not agree to mediate the dispute. On January 23, 2014, Mr. Sloan sent a second letter
confirming the previous declaration of impasse.
Discussion
MMBA section 3505.4, subdivision (a),4 provides as follows:
The employee organization may request that the parties'
differences be submitted to a factfinding panel . . . If the dispute
was not submitted to mediation, an employee organization may
request that the parties' differences be submitted to a factfinding
panel not later than 30 days following the date that either party
provided the other with a written notice of a declaration of
impasse ....
PERB Regulation 32802 provides as follows:
4 The factfinding provisions were added to the MMBA by Assembly Bill 646 (Stats.
2011, Ch. 680, § 2) and amended by Assembly Bill 1606 (Stats. 2012, Ch. 314, § 1.) The
amendment, which added the language about either party providing written notice of
declaration of impasse, was intended to be technical and clarifying of existing law. 	(Stats.
2012, Ch. 314, § 2.)

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 4
(a) An exclusive representative may request that the parties'
differences be submitted to a factfinding panel. The request shall
be accompanied by a statement that the parties have been unable
to effect a settlement. Such a request may be filed:
(1) Not sooner than 30 days, but not more than 45 days,
following the appointment or selection of a mediator pursuant
either to the parties' agreement to mediate or a mediation process
required by a public agency's local rules; or
(2) If the dispute was not submitted to mediation, not later than
30 days following the date that either party provided the other
with written notice of a declaration of impasse.
The parties did not submit the bargaining dispute to mediation or select a mediator. Therefore,
IFPTE Local 21 's factfinding request is based upon the written notice of a declaration of
impasse by OCIL5 It appears that there has been no written notice of declaration of impasse
with respect to bargaining with the CCSF. The OCII's letter dated January 14, 2014,
constitutes a written notice of declaration of impasse, with respect to the OCII, within the
meaning of section 3505.4. The instant factfinding request was timely filed within thirty days,
on February 12, 2014.
2. 	Charter Arbitration Exception to MMBA Factfinding
MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), provides as follows:
A charter city, charter county, or charter city and county with a
charter that has a procedure that applies if an impasse has been
reached between the public agency and a bargaining unit, and the
procedure includes, at a minimum, a process for binding
arbitration, is exempt from the requirements of this section and
Section 3505.4 with regard to its negotiations with a bargaining
unit to which the impasse procedure applies.
The CCSF provides a copy of its City Charter, Section A8.409-4. This section provides for
impasse resolution procedures. Unresolved bargaining disputes shall be submitted to a three-
member arbitration panel, upon the declaration of impasse by the CCSF or by a recognized
5 In its position statement dated February 18, 2014, the OCII states that it is willing to
participate in factfinding upon the condition that the factfinding process will be between the
OCII and IFPTE Local 21 only.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 5
employee organization involved in the dispute. The ultimate decision of the arbitration board
is final and binding.6
Accordingly, the CCSF-a charter city and county-has, in its charter, a procedure that applies
if an impasse is reached between the CCSF and its recognized employee organizations (Le., 	·
SEIU and/or IFPTE Local 21). The charter further provides for final and binding arbitration.
Therefore, under MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), the CCSF is not subject to the
factfinding provision of the MMBA.
The unions argue that the section 3505;5, subdivision (e) exemption does not apply because
these negotiations are not ones "to which the impasse procedure applies." The unions assert
that they believe that the CCSF would refuse to participate in the binding arbitration procedure
provided for by the Charter and that the CCSF has taken the position that the Charter impasse
procedures do not apply to the bargaining. However, to the extent that the CCSF is required to
bargain with SEIU and IFPTE Local 21, it is covered by the charter arbitration exception of
MMBA section 3505.5, subdivision (e), and not by the MMBA factfinding provisions.
Accordingly, as to the CCSF, the instant factfinding request does not satisfy the requirements
of MMBA sections 3505.4 and 3505.5, and PERB Regulation 32802.
Next Steps
As to the OCII, the instant request satisfies the requirements of PERB Regulation 32802 in that
it was timely filed, based upon a written notice of declaration of impasse, and identifies the
dispute subject to factfinding. 	Each party must select its factfinding panel member and notify
this office in writing of his/her name, title, address and telephone number no later than March
4, 2014.7 Service and proof of service are required.
The resumes of seven factfinders, drawn from the PERB Panel of Neutrals, are being provided
to the parties via electronic mail.8 The parties may mutually agree upon one of the seven, or
may select any person they choose, whether included on the PERB Panel of Neutrals or not. In
no case, however, will the Board be responsible for the costs of the chairperson.
If the parties select a chair, the parties should confirm the availability of the neutral, prior to
informing PERB of the selection.
6 The charter section further provides that the arbitration procedings are governed by
the Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1280 et seq.
7 This deadline, and any other referenced, may be extended by mutual agreement of the
parties.
8 The seven neutrals whose resumes are being provided are Norman Brand, Jerilou
Cossack, Ruth Glick, Robert Hirsch, John Kagel, Wilma Rader, and Paul Roose.

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 6
Unless the parties notify PERB, on or before March 4, 2014, that they have mutually agreed
upon a person to chair their factfinding panel, PERB will appoint one of these seven
individuals to serve as chairperson.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to PERB Regulations, an aggrieved party may file an appeal directly with the Board
itself and can request an expedited review of this administrative determination. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32147, subd. (a), 32350, 32360, 32802, 61060.) An appeal must be filed with
the Board itself within 10 days following the date of service of this determination. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 32360, subd. (b ).) Any document filed with the Board must contain the case
name and number, and the original and five (5) copies of all documents must be provided to
the Board. (Ibid.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually reeeived during a regular PERB business day.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code, § 11020, subd.
(a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before
the close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet which meets the
requirements of PERB Regulation 32135(d), provided the filing party also places the original,
together with the required number of copies and proofof service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32090 and
32130.)
The Board's address is: 	Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
If a party appeals this determination, the other party(ies) may file with the Board an original
and five copies of a statement in opposition within 10 calendar days following the date of
service of the appeal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32375.)
Service
All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served" upon all parties to the
proceeding, and a "proof of service" must accompany each copy of a document served upon a
party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32140 for the required
contents.) The document will be considered properly "served" when personally delivered or
deposited in the mail or deposited with a delivery service and properly addressed. A document
may also be concurrently served via facsimile transmission on all parties to the proceeding.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subd. (c).)

SF-IM-140-M
February 25, 2014
Page 7
Extension of Time
A request for an extension of time, in which to file a document with the Board itself, must be
in writing and filed with the Board at the previously noted address. A request for an extension
must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before the expiration of the time required for
filing the document. The request must .indicate good cause for and, if known, the position of
each other party regarding the extension, and shall be accompanied by proof of service of the
request upon each party. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32132.)
Since.relv./
L~ra 	Davis
Senior Regional Attorney
LD
cc: 	Kerianne Steele, SEIU
Ana Guzina, IFPTE Local 21