P. v. Jordan CA1/3 filed 6/30/26

Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Jordan CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TYRODRIC L. JORDAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

A173478

(Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. 105168)
In 1990, Tyrodric L. Jordan pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted murder, both offenses committed while using a firearm —he was sentenced to 20 years to life in prison. (Former Pen. Code, §§187, 664, 12022.5, undesignated statutory references are to the PenalCode.) In 2019, he petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition because Jordantestified at theparole hearing that he personally shot both victims. Heappeals, arguing the court prejudicially erred by admitting his parole hearing testimony because hewas entitled to limited use immunity and it was involuntary. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
In January 1990, Kevin Young was talking to Eugenia Crawford at her home when he saw Jordan driving his car. He walked to Jordan’s house to retrieve it. Jordan refused to return it, stating Young “pawned the car off” to him the night before and still owed him $300. Jordan asked for the money, but Young did not respond. Eventually, Young returned to Crawford’s house.
Jordan went to Crawford’s house later that evening and talked to Young in the kitchen. He claimed the car was stolen, and he had to flee from officers while driving it. He asked for the money, identification, and pink slips for the car. Jordan then spoke with Crawford in the living room, where he inquired about her relationship with Young. After she explained they were childhood friends, Jordan asked, “Can I kill him?” He asked her to unplug her phone and take her children upstairsto prevent any disturbances.
Jordan left Crawford’s house and returned with another man. Crawford came downstairsand sawa gun on the kitchen counter. She left the kitchen and heard a gunshottwo minutes later. She returned to the living room where she saw Jordan shoot Young twice, killing him. Crawford ran out the door, fell down, and felt a shot in her lower back. Officers arrived shortly after the shooting. The bullets recovered from Young’s body and Crawford’s spine were fired from the same gun.
Following a preliminary hearingin 1990 during which Crawford recounted the above series of events, Jordan pled guilty to seconddegree murder (former § 187) and attempted murder (former §§ 187,664), both with the use of a firearm (former § 12022.5). The trial court sentenced him to 20 years to life in prison.
At a parole hearing — accompanied by his counsel— Jordan admittedshooting Young because he felt threatened by his insistence on retrieving the car. He also admitted shooting Crawford because she was a witness, and he believed he killed her. He noted that, at the time of the shooting, he was part of a big gang known for fighting. Shooting Young, he explained, would prove something to those around him.
In his July 2019 petition for resentencing, Jordan alleged he could notnow be convicted of second degree murder based on recent amendments to the Penal Code. (§ 1172.6.) The trial court issued an order to show cause and conducted an evidentiary hearing in May 2025. Relying in part on the parole hearing testimony, the court denied the petition after findingJordan admitted to personally shooting both victims.
DISCUSSION
Jordan challenges the admission of his parole hearing testimony on several grounds. None are persuasive.
Until 2019, defendants could be convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449–450.)But amendments to the murder provisions, sections 188 and 189, subsequently limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and eliminated liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Ibid;Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1, subd. (f), 2–3; Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).)The legislation ensured that “murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
Those convicted of murder under the prior law may ask the trial court to vacate the conviction and resentence them on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v.Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449–450.) To obtain such relief, a defendant must establish: (1) the prosecution proceeded under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the defendant was convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) the defendant could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the changes to the murder provisions. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § (1)(a); Curiel, at p. 450.) If a prima facie case for eligibility is made, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c), (d)(1).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the court may consider evidence admitted at a prior hearing or trial, as well as new or additional evidence such as testimony at a parole hearing. (§ 1172.6,subd. (d)(3); People v. Zavala (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373(Zavala); People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 698(Myles) [“the Legislature intended to allow both the prosecution and defendant to rely on evidence that becomes available after a trial or plea, whether the evidence previously existed or not”].) The prosecution must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or attempted murder under the amended murder provisions. (§1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Jordan contends the trial court erred by admitting his parole hearing testimony because he is entitled to use immunity under People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867—concluding that a defendant’s testimony at a probation revocation hearing was inadmissible in a later trial to prove guilt on related criminal charges because it is unfair to require a defendant to choose between the privilege against self-incrimination and asserting other rights, such as a liberty interest in release on parole. (Id. at p. 878.) After independently reviewing this issue, we disagree — many of our sister courts have reached the same conclusion. (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373 [de novo review of whether “ ‘use immunity exists’ ”]; People v. Hart (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1099; People v. Rodriguez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 458, 466–468 (Rodriguez); People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588–590.)
We acknowledge cases have treated Coleman as creating a “limited species of use immunity grounded in California’s constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.” (Zavala, supra,105 Cal.App.5th at p.374; Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808–809.) Andcourts have applied Coleman’suse immunity rule in other contexts. (Zavala, atp.375 [collecting cases noting use immunity applying to privileged disclosures in other contexts].) But as Jordan recognizes, “California courts have uniformly concluded that incriminating statements made by a prisoner during parole proceedings may be admitted at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) without violating the privilege” against self-incrimination. (People v. Hart, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.)
The privilege against self-incriminationprotects defendants from serving as coerced government witnesses against themselves in criminal trials. (Myles, supra,69 Cal.App.5th at p. 705.)Section 1172.6 resentencing petitions, however, entail postconviction proceedings regarding acts of lenity—sentence modification — rather than a de novo trial on criminal charges. (Myles, at pp. 705–706.)Defendants are “not compelled to file . . . section [1172.6] petition[s],nor to testify at [their] parole hearing[s].” (Id. atp. 706.) A “defendant’s conviction remains ‘intact’ throughout the process and is not vacated unless and until the prosecution fails to prove a defendant’s ineligibility for relief beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Rodriguez, supra,110 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.) Thus, extendingColeman’suse immunity to this context is inappropriate. Jordan’s reliance on the dissenting opinion in People v. Mitchell— finding defendant’s statements made at a parole hearing inadmissible under Coleman — fails to persuade. (People v. Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 604–605(dis. opn. of Stratton, P.J.).)Like the majority in Mitchell, we discern no reason to depart from the reasoning in Myles.(Mitchell, at p. 588; Rodriguez, at p. 468 [no detrimental effect flowing from use of defendant’s prior statements since there are only two outcomes from a § 1172.6 resentencing petition: “a defendant’s conviction and sentence remain in place, or a defendant’s conviction and sentence are reduced to reflect their proven level of culpability”].)
Next, Jordan argues the parole hearing was coercive, rendering his incriminating statements involuntary. When reviewing a “claim of involuntary incriminating statements,” we examine the uncontradicted facts surrounding the statement to independently determine whether they were made voluntarily, without threat or inducement, and accept the version of events most favorable to the People. (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th atp.376.) Having reviewed the hearing transcript, we discern no coercion.
At the outset, we rejectJordan’s assertion that parole could be denied if he refused to admit his guilt, rendering his incriminating statements involuntary. But parole may not be denied based solely on the applicant’s assertion of innocence. (Rodriguez, supra,110 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.) “The Board of Prison Terms shall not require, when setting parole dates, an admission of guilt to any crime for which an inmate was committed.” (§ 5011, subd. (b); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236 [prohibiting the board from requiring “an admission of guilt to any crime for which the prisoner was committed” and allowing a prisoner to “refuse to discuss the facts of the crime in which instance a decision shall be made based on the other information available and the refusal shall not be held against the prisoner”].)“Standing alone, a defendant’s right to speak on their own behalf at a parole hearing cannot support a conclusion that parole hearing testimony was compelled or involuntary.” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 377.)Moreover, although “the parole hearing transcripts do not reflect whether [Jordan] was advised of his right not to discuss his commitment offense,” he was represented by counsel at the hearing, thus undermining his assertion his testimony was compelled. (Ibid.)
Jordan further insists certain statements made by the prison board commissioner during the parole hearing — noting Jordan’s need to demonstrate growth and maturity since his offenses; observing prior credibility issues in risk assessments, including his statements that he dealt drugs to feed his family; and emphasizing the importance of being truthful during the hearing—were improper implicit promises of leniencyin exchange for an admission of guilt. We see no such promises in the record. Those statements simply “emphasize[d] the importance of voluntary, unvarnished truthtelling,” as well asidentifying Jordan’sprospects.(People v.Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.)“ ‘[A]dvice or exhortation’ ” to be truthful “ ‘unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.’ ” (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549.) “That [Jordan] may have had an incentive to admit having committed the offenses of conviction”— e.g., parole —“does not suggest his will was overborne by official coercion, such that his statements were involuntary.” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 377, italics added.)Thus, the court did not err by admitting the parole hearing testimony. Given our conclusion, we do not address Jordan’s argument that admissionof the testimony was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Jordan’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

I CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.

A173478; P. v. Jordan
TUCHER, P. J., Concurring in the Judgment.
I concur in the result on harmless error grounds. Without deciding the weighty issue that divided the court in People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, I would affirm the order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing on the basis that no reasonable factfinder could conclude, even if the parole hearing testimony had been excluded, that appellant was neither the shooter nor “a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Eugenia Crawford’s testimony at the preliminary hearing established defendant had had a beef with Kevin Young that prompted him to ask about killing Young in Crawford’s home; he left Crawford’s home only to return with another individual and a firearm; and Crawford then saw defendant shoot Young twice, killing him, and was herself shot in the back with a bullet from the same gun as she fled the scene. Even if this evidence did not conclusively establish defendant as the shooter in both crimes, it admits to only one conclusion as to whether he was a major participant acting with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.) Defendant, thus, remains liable for felony murder even after changes in the law of homicide, and his petition for resentencing was appropriately denied.

TUCHER, P. J.