Huynh v. City and County of S.F. CA1/4 filed 6/29/26

Filed 6/29/26 Huynh v. City and County of S.F. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

FREDERICK HUYNH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Defendant and Respondent.

A174269

(San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-23-610509)

Frederick Huynh appeals from a judgment in favor of the City and County of San Francisco (City) following a bench trial in which the court found Huynh failed to prove his claim against the City under the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 12945.1 et seq.; CFRA). Huynh contends the trial court judge had cognitive challenges that impacted his ability to understand the scope of Huynh’s claim, substantial evidence does not support many of the trial court’s findings, and the trial court erred in many of its conclusions of law. We find no error warranting reversal and will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Legal Background
“The CFRA entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 unpaid workweeks in a 12-month period for family care and medical leave to care for their children, parents, or spouses, or to recover from their own serious health condition. [Citations.] An employee who takes CFRA leave is guaranteed that taking such leave will not result in a loss of job security or other adverse employment actions. [Citations.] Upon an employee’s timely return from CFRA leave, an employer must generally restore the employee to the same or a comparable position.” (Rogers v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 487.) “Violations of the CFRA generally fall into two types of claims: (1) ‘interference’ claims in which an employee alleges that an employer denied or interfered with her substantive rights to protected medical leave, and (2) ‘retaliation’ claims in which an employee alleges that she suffered an adverse employment action for exercising her right to CFRA leave.” (Id. at pp. 487–488.)
Factual Background
We present the facts relevant to resolution of Huynh’s arguments on appeal in the manner most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and resolve all conflicts and draw all inferences in favor of City as the respondent. (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 35.)
In 2018, Huynh began working as a journey-level industrial hygienist in the City’s Department of Public Health, Occupational Safety and Health division (OSH). His initial supervisor was Karen R., a senior industrial hygienist.
Edward Ochi had been an industrial hygienist in OSH, transferred out of OSH for a number of years, progressed to senior industrial hygienist, and eventually returned to OSH as its director in May 2019. When Ochi started as the director of OSH, he brought with him from his previous office a flat metal pry bar that he used as a gavel, as a joke. Within a week of Ochi using the bar in OSH meetings, someone commented that it made them uncomfortable, so Ochi promptly quit using it.
Ochi’s initial impression of Huynh was that Huynh was too narrowly focused on the specialty area of industrial hygiene dealing with office ergonomics. Ochi discussed these concerns with Huynh at the time. Ochi also told Huynh’s supervisor, Karen R., that he did not think Huynh was meeting performance expectations because Huynh could not handle all of the duties in the job description for his position. One of these essential duties was maintaining a respiratory protection program.
Huynh was assigned to prepare a respiratory protection program for the city’s library in November or December of 2019. Ochi expected this would take two to four weeks at most. Huynh seemed to be struggling with the assignment, so around January 2020 Huynh was tasked with writing an outline of the program, with the individual elements to be filled in afterwards.
In late January 2020, Huynh requested leave for the birth of his daughter, whose due date was February 8, 2020. He indicated he would use his accrued paid leave hours for the period from February 3 to February 14 but would be out until February 21. Huynh did not have enough leave hours to cover the last week of this period so Ochi assumed Huynh would be using paid parental leave for that week. Ochi approved the request.
Huynh’s daughter was born after the due date, on February 17, 2020. While he was out, Huynh requested additional leave, to end on March 9, 2020. Ochi did not have any issues with the additional time, but he was confused about which hours of the whole period Huynh should charge to discretionary leave and which he should charge to paid CFRA leave. Ochi sent an email to human resources to clarify. Ochi was told that non-birth parents were not eligible for paid CFRA leave until after the birth of a child. If a non-birth parent employee requests paid CFRA leave from the expected due date of a child and the child is born later than expected, the employee’s manager must approve the time taken before the child’s birth.
While Huynh was on leave, Ochi received an inquiry from the library about the respiratory protection program. Karen R. could not tell Ochi the status of the project or any other projects that Huynh had been working on. This disappointed and frustrated Ochi.
When Huynh returned from leave on March 9, 2020, Ochi met with him to discuss his timekeeping. Ochi told Huynh that Huynh was not in trouble but that the time records needed to be correct because if the records were inaccurate and OSH were audited, then accusations of wage theft could start flying. Ochi did not accuse Huynh of wage theft.
In a separate meeting shortly after Huynh returned from leave, Ochi told Huynh that he was changing Huynh’s supervisor from Karen R. to Nancy T., a safety officer who spent about half of her time working with the library. Because Nancy T. was not an industrial hygienist, Ochi told Nancy T. that he would coach and mentor Huynh on technical issues relating to industrial hygiene, but Nancy T. would supervise Huynh on a day-to-day basis and make sure he got his assignments done.
Ochi did not take away Huynh’s projects or assignments after his leave. But everyone’s job assignments in OSH changed in March 2020 due to the pandemic. The ergonomics program changed because a large number of health department employees were working from home and the ergonomics program provided only general guidance for home offices.
In April 2020, Huynh asked to take a second period of CFRA leave at the end of May for child bonding. Ochi did not have concerns about this. On May 12, 2020, Huynh submitted an outline of the respiratory protection program for the library. Ochi then told Huynh to write a draft of two sections of the outline before going out on his next CFRA leave. Ochi wanted a work product to show the client while Huynh was out. He also wanted to keep making progress on the project since the assignment dated to November or December of the previous year. Huynh emailed the draft to Nancy T. about 20 minutes before the end of the day preceding his leave.
Ochi thought Huynh’s draft was not good. The writing was not strong or clear, one provision was inaccurate for the plan’s need, and overall it was too complex for the client’s needs.
After Huynh returned from his second leave on June 2, 2020, Ochi placed him on a performance improvement plan. Two days later, Huynh emailed Ochi a revised draft of one of the sections of the library’s respiratory protection program. This draft was considerably shorter, less than one page as compared to the eight pages of the original draft. Ochi responded that the draft was a huge improvement and far closer to what he expected the first time. Huynh completed his performance improvement plan when he completed the library’s respiratory protection program, in June or July 2020.
In August and December 2020, Huynh took additional CFRA leaves. While Huynh was on his last CFRA leave in December 2020, the Department of Public Health’s director of human resources, Michael Brown, interviewed Huynh in connection with a complaint another OSH employee had filed against Ochi. Huynh told Brown about Ochi’s actions towards him, and Brown responded that if Huynh believed he was being discriminated against based on a protected category, Huynh should file an equal employment opportunity complaint. Brown was not responsible for investigating equal employment opportunity complaints.
In February2021, Huynh told Nancy T. that he planned to transfer to a different department. In March 2021, Huynh asked to use leave to attend a medical examination for the transfer. Ochi denied the request because he did not think Huynh needed to use leave for this purpose. Normally, when an employee transfers between departments, the hiring department notifies the employee’s current department of the transfer, and then as a courtesy the existing department assigns the employee to attend the medical exam, to avoid requiring the employee to use leave. So Ochi told Huynh that he would just send Huynh to the medical exam as soon as he was notified of the transfer. Huynh complained to his union representative. Huynh submitted a second leave request, which was approved.
In late March 2021, OSH hired a new senior industrial hygienist. Huynh at the time was seated in an office with two senior industrial hygienists. Ochi wanted to have the new employee sit in that office, to learn from the existing senior industrial hygienists. He therefore moved Huynh’s workstation just outside the office to a larger area of the office with five or six workstations, next to a door.
On May 1, 2021, Huynh transferred to a new department. His salary, benefits, title, and leave balances remained the same.
Huynh filed a complaint against the City and Ochi in November 2023. By the time of trial, the only cause of action remaining was against the City for violation of the CFRA. Judge Andrew Y.S. Cheng presided over the trial.
Three witnesses testified for Huynh that Ochi spoke to others about Huynh committing wage theft or being AWOL (absent without leave) while Huynh was out on his first CFRA leave. According to Huynh’s own testimony, Ochi accused him of wage theft the day he returned from the first leave in March 2020. After Ochi replaced Karen R. with Nancy T. as Huynh’s supervisor, Ochi expressly prohibited Huynh from asking either Karen R. or Nancy T. for technical guidance. Huynh said that he had been assigned to write a respiratory protection program for the entire city in the fall of 2019, not the library. Ochi took away all of his projects, including the department-wide respiratory protection program, when Huynh returned from leave in March 2020, although Huynh went back to working on some of the projects a week later.
Huynh said he was assigned the library’s program in mid-May 2020, a week before his second leave. The draft he submitted before his leave was just intended to be a rough start, not a completed product, and he submitted the draft on time.
Karen R. testified for Huynh that she thought Huynh was an excellent employee for where he was in his career and, while he had room for improvement, he did not need to be on an improvement plan.
The trial court issued a tentative statement of decision after the trial. Huynh submitted objections about three weeks later, although those objections are not in the record. The trial court issued a final statement of decision in May 2025 and entered judgment accordingly. Huynh moved to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, although his motion is not in the record. Judge Cheng was unavailable, so a different judge, Judge Mary E. Wiss, considered and denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo” and “apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “ ‘Under [the substantial evidence] standard of review, “the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.” [Citation.] In so doing, we accept all evidence that supports the judgment, disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] “It is not our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it.” ’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘[T]he direct testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a finding unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent “without resorting to inferences or deductions.” ’ [Citation.] A party ‘raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a “daunting burden.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Nelson (2025) 115Cal.App.5th 904, 914.)
“ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a unique formulation where, as here, “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals.” ’ [Citation.] Under these circumstances, ‘ “ ‘ “the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1)‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 597 (Symons).)
An appellant making a substantial evidence challenge must take care when preparing its opening brief. “ ‘[I]t is presumed that the evidence is sufficient to support [the trier of fact’s] factual findings, and it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate that it does not. . . . And in furtherance of that burden, the appellant must fairly summarize the facts in the light favorable to the judgment.’ [Citation.] ‘To overcome the trial court’s factual findings,’ the appellant is ‘ “ ‘required to set forth in [his] brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely [his] own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be [forfeited].’ ” ’ ” (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) The Rules of Court governing appellate briefs also require that factual statements, wherever in a brief they appear, be supported by citations to the volume and page number in the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C);Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8.) We will not consider “any factual assertion unsupported by record citation at the point where it is asserted.” (Alki Partners, at p. 590, fn. 8.)
“The doctrine of implied findings requires the appellate court to infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment. [Citation.] The doctrine is a natural and logical corollary to three fundamental principles of appellate review: (1) a judgment is presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) A party can defeat the doctrine of implied findings in a bench trial only by taking two steps. (Id. at pp. 58–59.) First, after the trial court announces its tentative decision, the party must timely make a request under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 for a statement of decision. (Id. at p. 59.) The request must “specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (a).) If a party believes the statement of decision “does not resolve a controverted issue” or is ambiguous, the party must bring the issue to the attention of the trial court before entry of judgment or in conjunction with a new trial motion or motion to vacate the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) “[I]f a party fails to bring omissions or ambiguities in the statement of decision’s factual findings to the trial court’s attention, then ‘that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was deficient in these regards,’ and the appellate court will infer the trial court made implied factual findings to support the judgment.” (Fladeboe, at p. 59.)
Presiding Judge’s Cognitive Ability
Huynh argues at the outset of his brief that Judge Cheng may have been experiencing a cognitive disorder during the trial that prevented him from understanding Huynh’s cause of action. Huynh asserts that Judge Cheng passed away from cerebral hemorrhage within a few months of the judgment. He extrapolates backwards to infer that Judge Cheng was displaying signs of an unspecified disorder during the trial. As purported evidence of Judge Cheng’s disorder, Huynh cites several remarks by Judge Cheng during the trial asking Huynh’s counsel what Huynh’s allegations were, what the case was about, and why Huynh’s counsel was spending so much time on certain lines of questioning.
Huynh cites nothing in the record or outside it to support his assertions about the fact of Judge Cheng’s death, the date of his death, the cause of his death, and that the cause of death could have caused Judge Cheng to experience cognitive difficulties months earlier during the trial. Nor does Huynh cite any authority on which he bases his challenge to Judge Cheng’s cognitive abilities after the fact. We therefore reject Huynh’s attempt to call into question Judge Cheng’s ability to preside over the trial. Moreover, nothing in the record before us supports Huynh’s contention that Judge Cheng was unable to understand the trial as it proceeded. Judge Cheng’s remarks during the trial were the type of comments or questions common in bench trials in which a judge asks a party to clarify the scope of a claim to allow the judge to understand the relevance of particular evidence, or tells a lawyer to wrap up a line of questioning to expedite matters. The transcript of the trial as a whole shows that Judge Cheng intelligently ruled on evidentiary objections and consistently attempted to streamline proceedings by preventing Huynh’s counsel from straying into irrelevant matters.
Findings of Fact
Huynh contends a host of the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. We need not address most of his arguments, however, because he has failed to satisfy his obligation to cite all material evidence regarding the findings at issue. (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) For example, Huynh challenges the trial court’s finding that Ochi assigned Huynh to prepare a respiratory protection program for the city library in November 2019. The only evidence he cites is his own testimony that he was working on a broader respiratory protection program for the entire department of public health in the fall of 2019, his own testimony that he was assigned the library’s program in May 2020, and three exhibits that Huynh contends support his testimony about the May 2020 date. Huynh fails to mention, much less provide record citations for, Ochi’s testimony that Huynh was assigned the library’s respiratory protection program in November or December 2019, the project should have taken two to four weeks at most, Huynh was told to prepare an outline for the project in January 2020, and he finally submitted one in May 2020. Huynh’s brief is therefore insufficient and he has forfeited this challenge. (Ibid.; accord, Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [a challenge that the evidence does not support a finding of fact “is deemed to be waived” unless the challenging parties “set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence”].)
Similarly, Huynh challenges the trial court’s finding that Ochi and Nancy T. denied Huynh’s request for leave for a medical exam for his transfer because Huynh could attend the exam without using leave once the appropriate paperwork was cleared. Huynh maintains that Ochi instead denied the leave as an adverse employment action against Huynh and only approved the leave after Huynh’s union got involved. He cites his own testimony that he notified Ochi of his transfer, requested leave for the medical exam, the leave was denied, Huynh got his union representative involved, and then Ochi approved a new request for the leave. Huynh does acknowledge that Ochi testified that he denied the leave request because he had not been notified by the hiring agency and that such notification would be a professional courtesy. But Huynh’s briefing still omits the core testimony supporting the trial court’s finding: Ochi testified that part of the professional courtesy would be to allow a transferring employee to attend a medical exam without needing to take leave and that he denied Huynh’s leave request to avoid Huynh needing to use leave. Huynh’s brief on this issue is therefore insufficient and he has forfeited this challenge as well.
Huynh’s briefing on most of his other factual challenges suffers from the same defect, with the same result that the challenges are forfeited. (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p.598.) This is true even though Huynh’s position is that his evidence is of such weight that the trial court could not reasonably reject it. Because Huynh has not cited all of the pertinent evidence, we cannot evaluate his argument about the relative weight of the evidence, or his other contentions that the City’s evidence was discredited, impeached, self-serving, or unsubstantiated. (McCauley v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [“If one is going to make a ‘the-facts-compel-that-I-win-as-a-matter-of-law’ argument, one’s brief must fairly state all the evidence”].) “ ‘An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment must cite the evidence in the record supporting the judgment and explain why such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. [Citations.] An appellant who fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient.’ ” (Verrazono v. Gehl Co. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 636, 652.)
Only Huynh’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that Huynh officially transferred out of OSH on March 21, 2021, satisfies the briefing requirements. Huynh contends that there is no testimony to support this date and that his actual transfer date was May 1, 2021. Because Huynh’s argument is that no evidence supports the trial court’s finding regarding the March 21, 2021, date, he cannot be faulted for failing to cite evidence supporting the judgment. Huynh also appears to be right that the trial court’s finding lacks any support, as the City implicitly concedes. Huynh’s testimony is the only evidence on the date of his transfer, and he said it occurred on May 1, 2021. The trial court appears to have mistaken the date that Ochi moved Huynh’s workstation in OSH’s office for the date that Huynh left OSH entirely. However, the trial court’s error is harmless. Huynh does not explain and we cannot see how the date of his transfer out of OSH, whether March or May 2021, is relevant to the substance of his claim that Ochi took adverse employment actions and retaliated against him for using CFRA leave. It is not reasonably probable that the trial court would have reached a result more favorable to Huynh if it had correctly stated the date of his transfer, so the error is harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Conclusions of Law
Huynh contends the trial court erred in many of its conclusions of law. These arguments have no merit.
Interference and Retaliation By Adverse Employment Action
The trial court stated, “ ‘Violations of the CFRA generally fall into two types of claims: (1) ‘interference’ claims in which an employee alleges that an employer denied or interfered with her substantive rights to protected medical leave, and (2) ‘retaliation’ claims in which an employee alleges that she suffered an adverse employment action for exercising her right to CFRA leave.’ ” (See Rogers v. County of Los Angeles, supra,198 Cal.App.4th at pp.487–488.) Huynh agrees that there are two types of CFRA causes of action in this case, known as interference and retaliation. But he argues the trial court’s statement was nonetheless error because there are three different types of interference claims: adverse employment actions for taking leave, failing to return an employee to the same or comparable job after leave, and interfering with CFRA rights or the use of leave. (But see Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 920 [under the CFRA, “ ‘[i]nterference’ claims prevent employers from wrongly interfering with employees’ approved leaves of absence, and ‘retaliation’ or ‘discrimination’ claims prevent employers from terminating or otherwise taking action against employees because they exercise those rights”].) Even assuming Huynh is correct about adverse employment actions being one of three ways to interfere with CFRA rights, that does not make the trial court’s statement incorrect. Different types of CFRA interference violations still fall into the overall category of interference claims, precisely as the trial court stated.
The trial court listed the elements of an interference claim as “(1) the employee’s entitlement to CFRA leave rights; and (2)the employer’s interference with or denial of those rights.” (See Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 601.) Huynh contrasts this with the six elements of an interference claim listed in the CACI No. 2600 jury instruction. Those elements are: (1) the plaintiff was eligible for CFRA leave; (2) the plaintiff requested or took leave for the birth of a child or other CFRA-eligible purpose; (3) the plaintiff gave reasonable notice of the need for the CFRA leave to the employer; (4) the employer refused to grant the leave, refused to return the employee to the same or comparable position after the leave, or committed some other violation of the plaintiff’s CFRA rights; (5) the plaintiff was harmed; and (6) the employer’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (CACI No. 2600.)
The trial court was following Soria, supra,5 Cal.App.5th at page 601. Soria’s first element, entitlement, can be understood to include the eligibility and reasonable notice elements from CACI No. 2600. Soria’s second element, which focuses on the denial or interference with CFRA rights, encompasses the other CACI No. 2600 elements. The trial court was not unaware of the pattern jury instructions for CFRA claims, as evidenced by its subsequent citation to CACI No. 2620 for Huynh’s CFRA retaliation claim.
The trial court next stated that Huynh took four approved CFRA leaves despite the alleged adverse actions and found that he failed to prove his interference claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Huynh argues this was error because even if an employer approves an employee’s request for leave, an employer can be liable for interference or retaliation under the CFRA if it takes an adverse employment action to punish the employee for taking the leave. He then lists various adverse employment actions he contends he suffered for taking leave, such as being accused of wage theft or being AWOL, removal of his projects and assignments, change of his supervisor, intimidation by Ochi’s metal bar, being placed on a performance improvement plan, denial of his request for leave to facilitate his transfer, and movement of his workstation. But the rest of the statement of decision makes clear that the trial court also rejected the factual basis for Huynh’s claims regarding these adverse employment actions. After finding Huynh failed to prove an interference claim because he succeeded in taking leave, the trial court went on to find Huynh had failed to prove a retaliation claim because he had not shown that his use of CFRA leave was a substantial reason for the adverse employment actions allegedly taken against him. It found that some of the adverse employment actions that Huynh cites in his brief did not occur and the City put forth credible evidence of legitimate reasons for the other actions. The trial court’s rejection of Huynh’s allegations of adverse employment actions adequately supports its denial of Huynh’s interference and retaliation theories.
The doctrine of implied findings also forecloses any argument by Huynh that the trial court’s basis for rejecting his interference or retaliation theories is ambiguous or inadequate. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58–60.) For the first step, it appears that at the trial court’s invitation Huynh submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which perhaps satisfied or obviated the requirement that Huynh request a statement of decision. Even so, the document is not in the record so we cannot determine what findings Huynh requested or controverted issues he identified. For the second step, the record shows that Huynh filed objections to the trial court’s tentative decision, as well as a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial. But those documents are not in the record, either. The record therefore contains nothing to show that Huynh specifically brought to the court’s attention any inadequacies in its findings or conclusions of law regarding his interference and retaliation by adverse employment action theories. (Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188Cal.App.4th 866, 896 [“To bring an omission or ambiguity to the trial court’s attention for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 634, a party must identify the defect with sufficient particularity to allow the court to correct the defect”];Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant]’ ”].) Accordingly, we must assume the trial court made the necessary factual findings regarding adverse employment actions to support its ruling on both Huynh’s interference and retaliation claims.
Causal Connection Between CFRA Leave and Adverse Employment Actions
The trial court, citing CACI No. 2507, defined the “substantial motivating reason” standard of causation as “a reason that actually contributed to the adverse employment action. It must be more than a remote or trivial reason. It does not have to be the only reason motivating the adverse employment action.” Huynh contends the trial court erred by applying this definition to his interference claim, rather than just his retaliation claim. Huynh offers no authority or rationale for this argument, so we may disregard it. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [appellate courts “may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt’ ”].) We also disagree with it. Huynh’s position is that an employer interferes with CFRA rights by taking adverse employment actions against an employee in response to an employee’s request for or use of CFRA leave. This theory necessarily requires some causal connection between the adverse employment actions and the CFRA leave or request for leave, to distinguish between actions that interfere with CFRA rights and employment actions taken for permissible, unrelated reasons. (See Richey v. AutoNation, Inc., supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 919–921 [employer that terminated employee for violating policy prohibiting outside work during CFRA leave, rather than because of the use of leave itself, did not violate CFRA].) The substantial motivating reason test for causation is a reasonable one to apply for this purpose, and Huynh, in any event, does not suggest any alternatives.
Huynh further contends the trial court applied this standard more stringently than the standard requires. He cites Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.(1997) 16 Cal. 4th 953, 969 as instructing that “[u]ndue emphasis should not be placed on the term ‘substantial’ ” in the substantial factor causation standard.” But Huynh does not cite and we do not see anything in the statement of decision that indicates the trial court believed the substantial motivating reason standard was a heightened standard or that the court applied it more stringently than is appropriate.
Huynh points out that when an adverse employment action “ ‘ “follows hard on the heels of protected activity, the timing often is strongly suggestive of retaliation.” ’ ” (Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 571.) He also argues he provided overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence of escalating adverse actions following his protected leaves. Although Huynh does not cite the City’s evidence, Huynh’s evidence was hardly uncontroverted. Moreover, Huynh does not cite and we are not aware of any authority holding that an adverse action following a protected leave is conclusively presumed to be motivated by the leave. The timing of an adverse action following an invocation of CFRA rights may simply support an inference of a causal connection, nothing more. The trial court was entitled to reject the timing inference here and accept instead Ochi’s explanation for his actions. Huynh’s disagreement with the trial court’s conclusions does not mean it misapplied the governing standard.
Huynh quarrels with the trial court’s conclusions that Huynh had not proven some alleged adverse employment actions, the City took other adverse employment actions against Huynh for legitimate reasons, and there was no connection between the actions and Huynh’s CFRA leave. Huynh’s arguments are factual, and he again discusses only on his own evidence (often without record citations) without citing or meaningfully addressing the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusions, primarily from Ochi’s testimony. For the reasons discussed ante, Huynh has therefore forfeited these arguments by failing to properly provide and cite all relevant evidence. Huynh’s arguments fail in any event. While Huynh’s evidence might have supported a contrary finding, it was not so strong or uncontradicted as to dictate a verdict in his favor as a matter of law. The trial court was within its rights to find Ochi’s testimony more credible than that of Huynh and his witnesses.
The trial court said in its statement of decision that it found “no credible direct evidence of retaliatory animus.” Huynh argues the reference to “direct” evidence shows the trial court erroneously ignored his indirect or circumstantial evidence, which is just as valid as direct evidence. The primary authority Huynh cites is an unpublished 2006 Court of Appeal decision, which is improper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).) Putting that aside, Huynh’s argument is not persuasive. Immediately before and after its statement about the lack of credible direct evidence of animus, the trial court made findings showing that it also rejected Huynh’s circumstantial evidence of animus. For example, while Huynh argues that the change in his work assignments in March 2020 upon his return from his first CFRA leave is evidence of animus, the trial court found instead that his assignments changed because of the demands of the pandemic. Besides, as discussed ante, the doctrine of implied findings that Huynh has failed to displace requires us to infer that the trial court impliedly made any necessary additional findings rejecting his circumstantial evidence.
Huynh finally challenges the trial court’s conclusion that Brown, the director of human resources, did not fail to investigate Huynh’s complaints about Ochi’s behavior and that Brown’s actions had no causal connection to Huynh’s CFRA leave. Huynh contends this was error because there is no evidence that Brown or anyone else investigated Huynh’s case and the failure to investigate was an adverse employment action that violated Huynh’s CFRA rights. Huynh provides no authority or reasoned argument for his assertion that a failure to investigate is an adverse employment action, so we need not consider it. We observe that our Supreme Court has held under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) that while inaction or a failure to investigate an employee’s complaint of harassment by fellow employees can support an employer’s liability for the harassment, the failure to investigate does not itself constitute retaliation. (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 626–627, 640.) The same rationale dictates that a failure to investigate will not alone constitute interference or retaliation via adverse employment action under the CFRA.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
SWEET, J.
Huynh v. City & County of San Francisco(A174269)