Woodard v. Crane Co.

Filed 8/25/11 Woodard v. Crane CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
DENNIS H. WOODARD et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CRANE CO.,
Defendant and Respondent.
B219366
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC387774)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jane L.
Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
Waters, Kraus & Paul, Paul C. Cook, and Michael B. Gurien for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
K&L Gates, Robert E. Feyder, Geoffrey M. Davis, Nicholas P. Vari (Pro Hac
Vice), and Michael J. Ross for Defendant and Respondent.

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In this asbestos product liability action, defendant Crane Co. successfully moved
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co.,
Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 564, 570 (Taylor), which affirmed a summary judgment for
Crane on the ground that it had no duty to warn the United States Navy of the potential
dangers of asbestos-containing products manufactured and supplied by third parties. In
this appeal fro1m the judgment, plaintiff Dennis H. Woodard argues that Taylor was
erroneously decided and should not be followed.1 We reject his contentions and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From 1961 to 1965, Woodard served onboard two Navy vessels built between
1943 and 1945: the USS Rogers, a steam-operated destroyer, and the USS Salisbury
Sound, a steam-operated sea plane tender. The propulsion systems of both vessels
contained metal valves that Crane had manufactured and supplied to the Navy in the
1940‟s. It is undisputed that all of the asbestos-containing gaskets and packing materials
on both vessels were manufactured by others, and that any asbestos-containing materials
supplied by Crane in the 1940‟s had been replaced with similar products manufactured
and supplied by third parties prior to Woodard‟s service in the 1960‟s. Accordingly,
there is no evidence that any of the injury-causing asbestos products was manufactured or
supplied by Crane.
Upon being diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2007, Woodard sued Crane (and
others not involved in this appeal) for negligence and strict product liability in 2008.
1 The issue is presently before the California Supreme Court. (O’Neil v. Crane Co.
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1019, review granted Dec. 23, 2009, S177401; Merrill v. Leslie
Controls, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 262, review granted Feb. 3, 2010, S178957;
Walton v. The William Powell Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1470, review granted June 30,
2010, S183059.)
Dennis H. Woodard‟s wife, plaintiff Myra J. Woodard, will not be mentioned in
this opinion unless necessary.

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This appeal concerns only the strict product liability claim against Crane.2 Recovery in
strict product liability is permitted for three types of defects: manufacturing defects,
design defects, and failure to warn. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991)
53 Cal.3d 987, 995.) In his complaint, Woodard alleged that Crane‟s valves were
defective based on theories of defective design and failure to warn. Although the jury
found there was no design defect, it found that the valves were defective as a result of
Crane‟s failure to warn the Navy of the dangers of asbestos products manufactured and
supplied by third parties. Based solely on a theory of failure to warn, the jury returned a
strict liability verdict against Crane. Of the damages award of $14.4 million to Woodard
and $2.5 million to his wife, the jury assessed Crane‟s liability at 0.5 percent.
Crane moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on Taylor, supra,
171 Cal.App.4th 564, which affirmed a summary judgment for Crane on the ground that
it had no duty to warn the Navy of the dangers of asbestos products manufactured and
supplied by third parties. Based on facts indistinguishable from those of this case,3 the
trial court in Taylor granted Crane‟s motion for summary judgment “on the ground that,
under California law, a manufacturer‟s duty to warn extends only to the manufacturer‟s
own products.” (Id. at p. 571.) The appellate court in Taylor affirmed the summary
judgment, stating “that the trial court was correct in concluding that California law
2 The jury rejected the negligence claim, which is no longer at issue.
3 In Taylor, the plaintiff‟s late husband (Taylor) had served during the 1960‟s on the
USS Hornet, which was built in the 1940‟s. The valves in the Hornet‟s propulsion
system had been manufactured and supplied to the Navy by Crane in the 1940‟s. Taylor
was exposed to asbestos fibers on the Hornet during the 1960‟s, while removing and
replacing asbestos-containing gaskets, packing, and insulation materials from the valves.
After Taylor was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he and his wife sued Crane (and others)
for strict product liability based on theories of defective design and failure to warn. As in
this case, it was undisputed that Crane did not manufacture or supply the injury-causing
materials, because “by the time Mr. Taylor served aboard the Hornet, all of the original
asbestos-containing parts of [Crane‟s] equipment would have been removed.” (Taylor,
supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.)

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imposed no duty on respondents to warn of the hazards inherent in defective products
manufactured or supplied by third parties.” (Ibid.)
The trial court in this case granted Crane‟s motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, stating that it “has reviewed Taylor and agrees with Defendant; it is
controlling precedent. [¶] Each of Plaintiffs‟ arguments in opposition to the motion fails.
First, Plaintiffs argue that Taylor applies only to failure to warn causes of action. The
Court need not determine whether this is true, as the only theory on which Plaintiffs
prevailed against Crane was failure to warn. Plaintiffs go on to argue that Taylor is
distinguishable, but fail to point to any actual facts upon which the two cases can be
distinguished. Plaintiffs next argue that Taylor was wrongly decided. This Court, of
course, cannot make that determination. Taylor is the only appellate authority that is
directly on point with respect to the issue before the Court today, and the Court is bound
by Taylor. [¶] The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted.”
The trial court entered judgment for Crane. Woodard filed a timely appeal from
the judgment.
DISCUSSION
“It is settled that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be
granted only if a motion for directed verdict should have been granted (DeVault v. Logan
(1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 802, 810) and that the cardinal requirement for the granting of
either motion is the absence of any substantial conflict in the evidence. (Robinson v.
North American Life & Cas. Co. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 111, 118.) Stated differently, a
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be sustained only when it
can be said as a matter of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible
from the evidence and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support
that the reviewing court would be compelled to reverse it or the trial court would be
required to set it aside as a matter of law. (Scott v. John E. Branagh & Son (1965) 234

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Cal.App.2d 435, 437.)” (Spillman v. City etc. of San Francisco (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d
782, 786.)
Woodard‟s theory of strict liability for failure to warn is based on the following
factors: (1) the valves were intended to transport steam and other superheated materials
through the ship‟s propulsion system; (2) the valves could not perform their intended
function without the addition of asbestos-containing gaskets, packing, and insulation
materials that were manufactured and supplied by third parties; (3) the asbestos-
containing gaskets, packing, and insulation materials required periodic replacement due
to wear; (4) during the removal and replacement of the asbestos-containing gaskets,
packing, and insulation materials, Woodard was exposed to hazardous asbestos fibers;
and (5) because the “operation and required maintenance of the valves directly
contributed to creating the asbestos-related hazard, . . . Crane was therefore required to
warn of the hazard.”
With the above factors in mind, we turn to the issues on appeal.
I. Crane Did Not Manufacture or Supply a Defective Product That Caused
Woodard’s Injury
There is no evidence in this case that Crane manufactured or supplied an asbestos-
containing product or defective valve that caused Woodard‟s injury. Woodard did not
allege in his complaint a manufacturing defect claim, and he does not challenge on appeal
the jury‟s rejection of the design defect claim. On this record, Woodard‟s injury could
not have been caused by a defect in any product manufactured or supplied by Crane. The
facts of this case are therefore indistinguishable from those in Taylor, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th 564.
In granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court
concluded that Crane is not subject to strict liability for failing to warn of the potential
hazards of products manufactured and supplied by others, because California law restricts
such liability to the manufacturers, retailers, and others in the manufacturing or marketing
chain of a defective product. (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 576; Peterson v.

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Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1188.) As a court of inferior jurisdiction, the
trial court was bound to follow the appellate court‟s decision in Taylor. (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) As there is no factual basis for
distinguishing Taylor, the trial court correctly granted the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. We see no reason to depart from Taylor, which we believe
was correctly decided.
II. The Component Part Doctrine
Woodard contends that Crane may not avoid liability under the component part
doctrine. We disagree.
When Crane supplied the Navy with asbestos-containing gaskets and packing
materials in the 1940‟s, it did so in compliance with the Navy‟s specifications. In
designing the propulsion systems of its vessels, the Navy specified the addition of
asbestos-containing insulation, packing, and gaskets to the valves so that steam and
superheated fluids could be transported through the system. The fact that asbestos-
containing materials were supplied by Crane pursuant to the Navy‟s specifications does
not mean that the valves were defective in manufacture or design, or that the valves did
not perform their intended function.
As explained in Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at page 585, “California law
makes the liability of a component part manufacturer dependent on two factors:
(1) whether the component itself was defective when it left the component
manufacturer‟s factory, and (2) whether these defects caused injury. [Citations.]”
Neither factor is present in this case. There was no claim of a manufacturing
defect and the jury rejected the design defect claim. There was no claim that Crane‟s
valves released the asbestos that caused Woodard‟s injuries. We agree with the appellate
court‟s determination in Taylor that Crane is not liable under the component part
doctrine: “[I]t is undisputed that [Woodard‟s] injuries were caused by his exposure to
asbestos fibers released from gaskets, packing, and insulation manufactured by other
companies, and installed long after [Crane‟s] products were supplied to the Navy. [Fn.

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omitted.] Further, there is no evidence that [Crane] participated in the integration of their
components into the design of the [ships‟] propulsion system. [Citation.] Instead, it is
undisputed that [Crane] provided components in accordance with Navy specifications.
On these facts, [Crane is] not liable as a matter of law.” (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th
at p. 585.)
III. Reasonably Foreseeable Modifications
Woodard contends that because it was reasonably foreseeable that the asbestos-
containing gaskets and packing supplied by Crane would require replacement with
similar products from other manufacturers, Crane‟s failure to supply the replacement
products is not a defense to a claim of strict liability. Woodard states that “[p]roduct
modification is a defense to a claim of strict liability only if the modification was
unforeseeable, . . . and „foreseeability is a question for the jury unless undisputed facts
leave no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.‟” We are not persuaded.
Under California‟s product liability law as enunciated in Taylor, Crane is not
subject to strict liability for asbestos-containing products with which it had no
connection. (Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 579.) According to Taylor, “Peterson
[v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1185] and Cadlo [v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2004) 125
Cal.App.4th 513] make clear that respondents cannot be strictly liable for failing to warn
of the dangers inherent in the asbestos-containing materials that were used with their
products. Respondents were not part of the „chain of distribution‟ of the gaskets,
packing, discs, and insulation that Mr. Taylor encountered during his service on the
Hornet in the 1960‟s. It is undisputed that all of the original asbestos-containing
materials that may have been supplied when respondents delivered their equipment to the
Navy in 1943 had been removed by the time Mr. Taylor served aboard the Hornet. Even
if respondents were part of the chain of distribution of these original materials, they were
certainly not part of the chain of distribution for the asbestos-containing materials to
which Mr. Taylor was exposed.” (Taylor, supra, at p. 579.)

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Woodard‟s reliance on Thompson v. Package Machinery Co. (1971) 22
Cal.App.3d 188 (Thompson) is misplaced. Thompson involved an injury caused by a
machine that, due to alleged design defects, prematurely closed on the plaintiff‟s hand.
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer in strict liability. Following a jury trial, the
manufacturer obtained a defense verdict. The appellate court reversed on several grounds
of instructional error. In light of the plaintiff‟s expert testimony that tended to support
her design defect theory, the appellate court in Thompson concluded the instructional
errors were prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 192-195.) In this case, unlike Thompson, there is no
claim of instructional error and Woodard does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury‟s rejection of his design defect claim. Thompson is thus
distinguishable and irrelevant to this appeal.
IV. Taylor Does Not Conflict With Established Precedent
Woodard contends that Taylor conflicts with established precedent such as Tellez-
Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Co. (2004) 129 Cal.App.4th 577 (Tellez-
Cordova), Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218 (Wright), and
DeLeon v. Commercial Manufacturing & Supply Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 336
(DeLeon). He states that “[i]n each of these cases, a dangerous condition was created by
the combination of the defendant‟s product with a product supplied by another; the
defendant, however, was subject to liability because the danger created by the
combination was foreseeable. To affirm the [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] in
favor of Defendant Crane, this Court would have to reject these precedents. It should not
do so. These cases are in harmony with California products liability law and they should
be followed here.” We are not persuaded.
None of the cited cases considered whether defendants who are absolved of
liability as to their own products may be held strictly liable for failing to warn of the
potential risks of other products manufactured and supplied by third parties. As none of
the cited cases considered the issue addressed in Taylor, they do not conflict with Taylor.
“„An appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the court‟s opinion but only

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“for the points actually involved and actually decided.” [Citations.]‟ (Santisas v. Goodin
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620.)” (Cellphone Fee Termination Cases (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 298, 325.)
In addition, all three cases are distinguishable on procedural grounds. In Tellez-
Cordova, the appellate court reinstated a complaint that had been dismissed on demurrer,
and in Wright and DeLeon, the appellate court reversed summary judgments for the
defendant manufacturers. As a result, viable design defect claims remained to be
litigated in all three cases. In light of the unresolved factual issues, the defendants could
not prevail by arguing that because their own products were free of defects, they had no
duty to warn of defects existing solely in the products of others. In this case, however,
the jury rejected the design defect claim and no manufacturing defect claim was alleged
in the complaint. Accordingly, the cited cases do not preclude Crane from arguing that
because its valves are free of defects, it had no duty to warn of defects existing solely in
the products of others.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Crane is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
SUZUKAWA, J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, Acting P.J. MANELLA, J.

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