Evans v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. CA2/7 filed 7/20/26

Filed 7/20/26 Evans v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

PAUL EVANS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LONG BEACH UNIFED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B340972

(Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 23LBCP00091)

APPEAL from ajudgment of the Superior Court of LosAngeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Lex Rex Institute, Alexander H. Haberbush, DeborahL.Pauly, and Tom Holloman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Anthony P.DeMarco, Jacquelyn Takeda Morenz, and Allison R.DeLaRiva for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Paul Evans appeals from the judgment after the trial court denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate. Evans’s petition challenged the decision by the Long Beach Unified School District to terminate his employment as an instructional aid for deaf and hard of hearing students, after he refused to comply with the District’sAugust 2021 policy requiring all employees to submit proof of COVID-19vaccination or weekly negative test results. Evans objected to the vaccinationrequirement on religious grounds and refused to test.
Evans arguesthat the trial court erred in ruling the District’s Board of Education did not violate the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act;Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.) when the Board deliberated in a closed sessionabout terminating his employment; that the trial court deprived him of due process; that the District violated federal law by requiring him, as a condition of employment, to submit to COVID-19 tests approved by the Food and Drug Administration under an emergency-use authorization;and that the District failed to engage in a good faith interactive process and failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his religious beliefs. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. To Comply with a State Public Health Order Issued During the COVID-19 Pandemic, the District Requires All Employees To Submit Proof of Vaccination or Weekly Negative Test Results
In August 2021the California Department of Public Health issued an order (the state vaccinate-or-test order) applicable to “public and private schools serving students in transitional kindergarten through grade 12. . . .”The state vaccinate-or-test order required all schools to verify and track the vaccine status of their workers.The order stated any worker “not fully vaccinated, or for whom vaccine status is unknown or documentation is not provided, must be considered unvaccinated.”The order also stated that unvaccinated or partially vaccinated workers were “required to undergo diagnostic screening testing ... at least once weekly with either PCR testing or antigen testing” and that “[a]ny PCR (molecular) or antigen test used must either have Emergency Use Authorization by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or be operating per the Laboratory Developed Test requirements by the U.S. Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services.” The order required all facilities to comply by October15, 2021.
To comply with the state vaccinate-or-test order, the Districtadopted a vaccinate-or-test policy. TheDistrict sent an email message to staff members, including Evans, a few weeks before the start of the 2021-2022 school yearstating that,“in order to do everything that we can to maintain the health and safety of our staff and students, we will be requiring all staff to provide proof of vaccination or participatein weekly COVID testing when school starts this year.”
B.Evans Refuses To Participate in Weekly COVID-19 Testing Offered by the District
Evans did not receive the COVID-19 vaccine, nor did he participate in weekly COVID-19 screening tests offered by the District.On September 5, 2021 the office supervisor at his school notified Evans that, because he had not submitted proof of his vaccination status, he had been placed on the weekly COVID19 testing schedule. The office supervisor toldEvans that he could test at the school site or arrange an alternative screening option and that, if he failed to submit either his vaccine status or negative test results before the upcoming school week, he would not be allowed on campus. On September 7, 2021, after Evans failed to complywith the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy, David Zaid, an assistantsuperintendent of the District, sent Evans a letter stating that the state vaccinate-or-test order required all District employees to vaccinate against COVID-19 or test for COVID-19 on a weekly basis. Zaid also stated that the District had no discretion to depart from thestate’s order and that, if Evans was not vaccinated and refused weekly testing, he would be placed on an unpaid leave of absence.
On September 8, 2021 and September 9, 2021 Evans emailed Zaid and several other District administrators. Evans asserted he did not refuse to test for COVID-19 but would only agree to test using a fully FDA approved screening test. As everyone including Evans knew, however, the federal government had only approved COVID-19 tests under the emergency-use authorization at that time. Evans also asserted the state vaccinate-or-test order was “an illegal mandate.” When Evans continued to refuse to test, Zaid offered to meet with him regarding his concerns. Zaid and another District administrator, Ann Culton, met with Evans and his attorney on November 2, 2021. After the meeting ended and Evans and his attorney were leaving, counsel for Evans handed Zaid a document in which Evans asserted for the first time that he had a religious objection to vaccination and that the District was refusing to engage in an interactive process regarding accommodation.
A few days after the meeting, counsel for Evans sent Zaid a lengthy letter regarding the “unlawful denial of constitutional and statutory rights” purportedly stemming from the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy. The letter claimed the District “denied Evans’Title VII and First Amendment Free Exercise Protections by Rejecting Evans’Religious Accommodation Request”; discriminated against Evans because of his religious beliefs in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, §12900 et seq.);violated “state and federal law by requiring Evans to disclose confidential medical information”;offered an accommodation for Evans’s religious beliefs (frequent testing) “designed to make the exercise of religious rights as inconvenient and unpleasant as possible” and “to effectively coerce Evans into accepting vaccination instead”; attempted to coerce Evans to accept unwanted medical treatment, in violation of state and federal law; violated the Emergency Use Authorization statute (21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1)) by requiring Evans to test for COVID-19; violated Evans’s free speech rights by compelling him to vaccinate or test for COVID-19; and failed to provide an adequate accommodation regarding Evans’s refusal to vaccinate. The letter attached a page titled “assertion of Religious Exemption from COVID-19 Vaccination” signed by Evans, describing his “sincerely held religious beliefs” against COVID-19vaccination.Evans requested as an accommodation “weekly COVID19 testing with a noninvasive fully FDA approved test,” to “work remotely,” or to “work outside.” Evans did not assert any religious objection to testing.
A series of meetings and additional correspondence between Zaid, Evans, and counsel for Evans failed to result in Evans complying with the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy. The District issued a document titled “Letter of Reprimand/Notice That Failure to Comply with Required COVID-19 Testing will result in unpaid suspension and dismissal.” The letter stated Evans could not return to work until he complied with the vaccinate-or-test policy. The District stated Evans’s “continued refusal to undergo testing constitutes failure to comply with the conditions of your employment” and violates Board Policies 4119.21 (Code of Ethics) and 5137 (Positive School Climate).The District’s letter stated that, if Evans failed to comply with the vaccinate-or-test policy by December 17, 2021, the District would take “disciplinary action in the form of unpaid suspension and dismissal.”

C.The Board Terminates Evans’s Employment, and Evans Appeals to the Personnel Commission
In January 2022 Zaid recommended that the District’s Governing Board terminate Evans’s employment with the District. Zaid sent Evans (and the Board’s Personnel Commission) a document titled “notice of recommendation for immediate unpaid suspension and dismissal and statement of charges against permanent classified employee,” citing Evans’s persistent refusal to comply with the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy.The document included four charges: (1)“Incompetency, inefficiency, insubordination, inattention to or dereliction of duty. [Rule 11.1.8.]”; (2) “Discourteous treatment of, or illegal, unwelcome, or inappropriate conduct or behavior toward the public, students, or fellow employees, or any other willful failure of good conduct tending to injure the public service. [Rule11.1.9.]”; (3) “Any willful or persistent violation of the provisions of the Education Code or Board of Education, Personnel Commission, or administration approved policies, rules, regulations, procedures, or established practices. [Rule11.1.10.]”; and (4) “Failure to meet job requirements such as loss of licenses or expiration of required certificates or licenses. [Rule11.1.15.]” The notice advised Evans he could request a Skellyconference or respond to the statement of charges in writing.
A Skelly conference took place on February 24, 2022. The presiding officer determined there was“sufficient cause to proceed with the recommended disciplinary action of immediate unpaid suspension and dismissal.” The District subsequently notified Evans that, at the regularly scheduled meeting on March16, 2022, the Board would consider whether to terminate Evans’s employment. The District sent Evans a letter (titled “Brown Act Notice”) advising him that the District would consider confidential personnel matters in closed session and that, pursuant to Government Code section 54957 (section 54957), Evans could request to have the statement of charges heard in an open session.Through his attorney Evans asked “to exercise his right to request an open session with respect to the entirety of the action proposed against him, including his right to address the Board and Board deliberation.”
The statement of charges was read during the open session of the March 16, 2022 Board meeting. Evans and his counsel addressed the Board for approximately 15 minutes. The Board deliberated on the charges against Evansin a closed session. The Boardnotified Evans in writing the Board was terminating his employment with the District effective March 17, 2022. Evans appealed the decision to the Personnel Commission and asked for a hearing.
D.The Hearing Officer Recommends the Personnel Commission Affirm the Board’s Decision, and the Commission Does
The Personnel Commission appointed a hearing officer, who heard testimony and received documentary evidence during a two-day hearing. Several District administrators testified regarding their discussions with Evans about the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy and their attempts to accommodate his objections. Evans also testified, and he clarified he did not have any religious objection to the District’s testing requirement. Instead, Evans stated, he believed the District’s policy infringed on his “medical freedom” byrequiring him to disclose “private medical information”the District might share with government actors. Evans also stated that he believed the available tests for COVID19, which were approved only under the federal government’s emergency-use authorization, were “experimental” and that he had the right to refuse to use them: “That’s part of my freedom to control my own body.” Evans conceded, however, one of the tests the District offered to him as an accommodation was non-invasive because it only required him to spit into a cup.
The hearing officer requested and received written closing statements. Evans argued that the District failed to prove Evans violated any applicable rule or committed any misconduct; that “[t]he disciplinary process . . . has been characterized by procedural abuse of every kind, amounting to the gross deprivation of [Evans’s] due process rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution”; and that, because all available COVID19 tests were approved by the federal governmentonly under an emergency-use authorization, the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy was unlawful.The District argued that, because Evans refused to comply with its vaccinate-or-test policy,which was designed to comply with the state vaccinate-or-test order, the District properly terminated Evans’s employment.
In early November 2022 the hearing officer recommended the Personnel Commission deny Evans’s appeal and uphold the Board’s decision to terminate Evans’s employment. The hearing officer concluded(1)the District proved that, by refusing to comply with the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy, Evans was “insubordinate” and “derelict in his duty” and therefore violated Personnel Commission Rule 11.1.8; (2)the District proved that, by willfully violating Board of Education policies 4119.21 and 5137 and the state vaccinate-or-test order, Evans violated Personnel Commission Rule 11.1.10; (3)the District failed to prove Evans violated Personnel Commission Rules 11.1.9 or 11.1.15; and (4)Evans received “[a]ll due process required”; and (5)there was good cause to discipline Evans. In December 2022 the Personnel Commission unanimously adopted the findings of fact and recommendation of the hearing officer and sustained the Board’s decision to terminate Evans’s employment.

E.Evans Files a Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate
In March 2023 Evans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section1094.5 seeking to compel the District to reinstate his employment. In the operative first amended petition and supporting memorandum of points and authorities, Evans claimedthe hearing officer erred in concluding(1)Evans’s refusal to submit weekly COVID-19 test results violated Personnel Commission Rule 11.1.10 and11.1.8; (2) the California Department of Public Health lawfully required schools to verify the vaccine status of its employees or, in the alternative, to require weekly diagnostic testing for COVID-19; (3) the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy properly implemented the state vaccinate-or-test order; (4)Evans refused to submit to COVID-19 testing; (5)Evans had no religious objection to COVID-19 testing; (6)Evans violated Rule 11.1.8 by “failing to make every effort to protect students and to provide a safe and [healthy] environment”; (7) Evans violated Rule 11.1.10 by inhibiting the District from providing a positive school climate; and (8) Evans receivedadequate due process under the Brown Act during the administrative proceedings. Evansasked the trial court to order the District to reinstate his employment with backpay and interest.
F. The Trial Court Denies the Petition, and Evans Appeals
The trial court initially ruled the District violated the Brown Act by considering Evans’s employment termination in a closed session. After supplemental briefing, however, the court ruled the Board did not violate the Brown Act, and the courtdenied the petition for writ of administrative mandatein its entirety.

1. The April 19, 2024 Tentative Ruling
In its April 19, 2024 tentative ruling the trial court rejected most of Evans’s arguments, but ruled the Board violated the Brown Act. First, the court statedthat, because Evans’s willful refusal to comply with the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy constituted “insubordination” within the meaning of Personnel Commission Rule 11.1.8, the District had reasonable grounds to terminate Evans’s employment.Second, the court stated Evans failed to “meaningfully articulate” how the state vaccinate-or-test order was unlawful.Third, the court rejected Evans’s claim that, because he objected only to the use of COVID-19 screening tests approved by the federal government under emergency-use authorization, he did not “refuse” to test for COVID-19. The court concludedEvans’s refusal to use tests approved under emergency useauthorization—the only available tests—constituted a refusal to test. Fourth, the court stated that, by offering testing as an alternative to vaccination, the District offered Evans a reasonable accommodation for his religious objection to vaccination. Regarding the District’s March 16, 2022 meeting, however, the trial court determined the Board improperly rejected Evans’s request to conduct all the proceedings regarding his employment termination in an open session. The court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the appropriate remedy for the Brown Act violation.

2. Supplemental Briefs
In his supplemental brief Evans argued that, because the Board failed to comply with the Brown Act when it decided to terminate his employment, the Board’s decision was “null and void.” Thus, Evans argued, the court should order the Board to reinstate his employment with backpay. Evans also requested attorneys’ fees, costs, and punitive damages.
The District argued Evans was not entitled to any remedy because the Board did not violate the Brown Act. Specifically, the District argued that, under section 54957, subdivision(b)(1), an employee could request an open (public) session where the Board would “hear complaints or charges” against the employee, but an employee could not compel the Board to “consider” or deliberate about employee discipline in an open session. The District asserted the March 16, 2022 meeting was not a “hearing” on the charges against Evans, but rather was a meeting for the Board to “consider” and “deliberate” whether to initiate Evans’s employment termination, subject to Evans’s right to appeal to the Personnel Commission, where he could request an evidentiary hearing on the charges.In addition, the District argued, the Board complied with the Brown Act by allowing Evans to hear and address the statement of charges in open session at the March 16, 2022 meeting.
Evans asked the court to strike the District’s brief and impose sanctions against the District. Evans argued that, instead of complying with the court’s order to address the appropriate remedy for a Brown Act violation, the Districtimproperly relitigated whether the Board violated the Brown Act. At Evans’s request, the trial court continued the hearing on the petition and allowed Evans to submit a second supplemental brief addressing the contentions in the District’s supplemental brief.
In his second supplemental brief Evans argued the Board violated the Brown Act because it did not merely deliberate regarding employee discipline during its closed session. Instead, Evans argued, the Board received evidence and heard testimony from Zaid about the charges against Evans. Evans also argued the Board lacked authority to bifurcate its proceedings to include both open and closed sessions, as the Districtargued.
3. The July 16, 2024 Order
On July 16, 2024 the court denied Evans’s petition. The court stated it had further researched the Brown Act issue, including whether and when the District could hold a closed hearing to consider disciplinary action. The court ruled that, under section 54957, subdivision(b)(1), the Board had to conduct open proceedings to receive and weigh evidence, but that the Board could conduct closed proceedings to deliberate on what actions to take in light of the evidence. The court observed the essential facts—that the District gave Evans the option to vaccinate againstCOVID19 or test on a weekly basis and that Evans refused both options—were not in dispute. The court ruled that, becauseEvans failed to show the Board did anything more than deliberate during its closed session, the Board did not violate the Brown Act. Evans timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 allows judicial review of a public agency’s “decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer.” (Code Civ. Proc., §1094.5, subd. (a).) The trial court must decide whether an agency “proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Id., subd. (b).) “Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
“When a fundamental vested right is involved, such as the right of a [public] employee to continued employment [citation], the trial court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether due process requirements were met and whether the agency’s findings are supported by the weight of the evidence.” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Comrs. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 272, 279; accord,Sandhu v. Board of Administration etc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1062, fn.5; Lozano v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 723.) “The trial court reviews the administrative decision de novo but affords the administrative findings ‘a strong presumption of correctness.’” (Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 106Cal.App.5th442, 454.)We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. (See Bedard, at pp. 453-454; Lozano, at p.723.)
B.The Trial Court Properly Concluded the Board DidNot Violate the Brown Act
Evans argues he had the “absolute right” under the Brown Act to demand the Board consider whether to terminate his employment in an open, public session.He also argues that, even if the Brown Act authorized the Board to consider some personnel-related matters in a closed session,the Board had to hear complaints or charges in an open sessionand that the Board violated the Brown Act by failing to do so in Evans’s case. Evans is wrong on the law and on the facts.
1. The Brown Act Allows an Employee To Request a Public Hearing Only When the Employer Hears Complaints or Charges
The Brown Act generally requires public agencies to hold open public meetings. “The Brown Act is intended to ensure the public’s right to attend the meetings of public agencies. [Citation.] ‘All meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the legislative body of a local agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.’([Gov. Code,] §54953, subd. (a).) ‘The Act thus serves to facilitate public participation in all phases of local government decisionmaking and to curb misuse of the democratic process by secret legislation by public bodies.’”(Berkeley People’s Alliance v. City of Berkeley (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 984, 991; seeBurton v. Campbell (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 953, 961.) The Brown Act applies to school districts. (See Gov. Code, §54951 [ “‘local agency’” includes a “school district” “or any board, commission or agency thereof”]; Kolter v. Commission on Professional Competence of LosAngeles Unified School Dist. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1350 [Brown Act “applies to school districts”].)
Section 54957 creates an exception to the open meeting rule by allowing public agencies to considerpersonnel matters in closed sessions. Section54957, subdivision (b)(1), states: “Subject to paragraph(2), this chapter does not prevent the legislative body of a local agency from holding closed sessions during a regular or special meeting to consider the appointment, employment, evaluation of performance, discipline, or dismissal of a public employee or to hear complaints or charges brought against the employee by another person or employee unless the employee requests a public session.”
Evansargues section 54957allowed him to compel the Board to consider all aspects of his personnel matter in an open public session. Interpreting that statute, Evans argues the phrase “unless the employee requests a public session” modifies the entire list of personnel matters that precedes it, thereby empowering an employee to require a governing body to hold an open session regarding any and all personnel-related matters upon request. The District argues the phrase modifies only the immediately preceding category—meaning, an employee may only compel a governing body to hold a public session to “hear complaints or charges brought against the employee by another person or employee. . . .”
“In statutory interpretation cases, ‘we begin by looking to the statutory language.’ [Citation.] ‘We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute’s underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components.’ [Citation.] ‘If the language is clear in context, our work is at an end. If it is not clear, we may consider other aids, including the statute’s legislative history.’” (City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38, 51; see National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9Cal.5th 488, 498.) Thoughsection 54957, subdivision (b)(1), is reasonably susceptible to both sides’ proposed interpretation, the District’s is the better one.
First, “‘[a] longstanding rule of statutory construction—the “last antecedent rule”—provides that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.”’” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743; accord,Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 50.) That rule supports the District’s interpretation that an employee may compel a public hearing only where the session involves complaints or charges brought by a third party or another employee.Similarly, the Legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” before the phrase “to hear complaints or charges” suggests the qualifying phrase (“unless the employee requests a public session”) modifies only the phrase after the disjunctive “or.” (SeeFischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 87, 96-97[applying the last antecedent rule to conclude “‘the qualifying phrase concerning an employee’s request for a public session refers only to situations where the Board is hearing complaints or charges against the employee’”]; Furtado v. Sierra Community College (1998) 68Cal.App.4th 876, 881 [same, and observing “the word ‘or’ appears before ‘dismissal’ and then again before ‘to hear complaints’”].)
Second, the provisions of section 54957, subdivision (b)(2), support the District’s proposed construction. That subdivisionspecifies an employee must receive 24-hour notice of a meeting, but onlyif the employer intends to hear complaints or charges against the employee: “As a condition to holding a closed session on specific complaints or charges brought against an employee by another person or employee, the employee shall be given written notice of his or her right to have the complaints or charges heard in an open session rather than a closed session, which notice shall be delivered to the employee personally or by mail at least 24 hours before the time for holding the session. If notice is not given, any disciplinary or other action taken by the legislative body against the employee based on the specific complaints or charges in the closed session shall be null and void.”
The requirement that an employee receive notice of the right to have complaints or charges heard in open session does not extend to the other personnel matters listed in section 54957, subdivision(b)(1). “This omission means that the Legislature intended to exclude these personnel matters from the right to receive 24-hour written notice, and intended to restrict the requirement of 24-hour written notice of the right to request an open session to ‘specific complaints or charges brought against an employee by another person or [persons]....’A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed. [Citation.]When the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place but has excluded it in another, the term should not be implied where it does not appear.” (Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.)
Third, interpreting section 54957, subdivision (b)(1), to allow an employee a limited right to compel a public meeting only when charges against the employee are at issuemakes sense in light of the statute’s dual purposes. Evans argues that “[w]hen an employee explicitly waives privacy protection and demands public accountability—as Mr. Evans did here—the primary justification for secrecy evaporates. Interpreting the [personnel] exception to allow agencies to override such demands subverts the [Brown] Act’s core objective and would convert a provision designed to protect Mr. Evans into a sword to deny him the very transparency the Act requires.”But though the Brown Act generally favors open public meetings, the Legislature created an exception for personnel matters for two reasons—one protecting the employee and the other protecting the employer. “‘[T]he underlying purposes of the “personnel exception” are to protect the employee from public embarrassment and to permit free and candid discussions of personnel matters by a local governmental body....”(Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82Cal.App.4th 672, 682; accord, Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1438;Fischer v. LosAngeles Unified School Dist., supra,70 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.) Allowing an employee to request a public meeting to hear charges against that employee, i.e., to waive the privacy right the Legislature has provided employees, gives an employee the power to weighpotential public embarrassment against the opportunity to address the chargespublicly. But allowing an employee to compel a public entity to deliberate publicly on every personnel decision would allow the employee to unilaterally waive the confidentiality the Legislature has provided public entities regarding sensitive personnel matters—a result it is unlikely the Legislature intended. “In the employee discipline context, the value competing against the public’s ‘right to know what is going on’ is not a right to take evidence in secret, but the need for free and candid discussion of the action the agency should take in light of that evidence. As one commentator has noted, ‘it makes a good deal of sense for any governmental body to retain a zone of privacy within which its members can air internal disagreements.’” (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 875-876, fn. omitted; see Furtado v. Sierra Community College, supra, 68Cal.App.4th at p. 882 [“the Legislature has drawn a reasonable compromise, leaving most personnel matters to be discussed freely and candidly in closed session, but permitting an employee to request an open session to defend against specific complaints or charges brought against him or her by another individual”].)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Findingthe Board Did Not Hear Complaints or Charges Against Evans in a Closed Session
Evans argues that, even if section 54957 allows an employee to request an open session only where the governing body intends to “hear complaints or charges,” the Boardin fact heard complaints or charges against him in its closed session on March16, 2022. Again, Evans is wrong on the law, as well asthe facts.
As discussed,the 24-hour notice requirement applies only when a governing body hears specific complaints or charges against an employee by another person or employee. Thus, cases considering when notice is required typically focus on the governing body’s activities, i.e., whether the body convened to “hear” complaints or charges orto “consider” other types of personnel matters.InBollinger v. San Diego Civil Service Com. (1999) 71Cal.App.4th 568 thecourtstated that, in the notice provision of section 54957, the Legislature used the verb “hear” in connection with “‘complaints or charges,’” but the verb “consider” in connection with “dismissal of a public employee.” (Bollinger, at p. 574.) The court in Bollinger found the word choice significant because to “consider” is to “‘deliberate upon,’” while to “‘hear’ is to ‘listen to in an official ... capacity[.]’ [Citation.] A‘hearing’ is ‘[a] proceeding of relative formality..., generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which witnesses are heard and evidence presented.’” (Ibid.)The court inBollingeralso cited the legislative history of section 54957 and observed one proposed version of the statute stated: “‘As a condition to holding a closed session on the complaints or charges to consider disciplinary action or to consider dismissal, the employee shall be given written notice of his or her right to have a public hearing rather than a closed session, which notice shall be delivered to the employee personally or by mail at least 24hours before the time for holding the session.’” (Bollinger, at p.574.)The court concluded that, because the Legislature removed the italicized language before enacting section 54957, the Legislature “specifically rejected the notion an employee is entitled to 24-hour written notice when the closed session is for the sole purpose of considering, or deliberating, whether complaints or charges brought against the employee justify dismissal or disciplinary action.” (Bollinger, at p. 575.)
Citing Bollinger and similar cases, Evans argues “a public agency ‘hears’ such complaints or charges when the body receives accusations and must make substantive determinations about them.”The court in Bollingerheld “a public agency may deliberate in closed session on complaints or charges brought against an employee without providing the statutory notice.” (Bollingerv. San Diego Civil Service Com., supra, 71Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575, italics added.) Contrary to Evans’s argument, however, an agency does not “hear” complaints or charges when it is decidingwhat disciplinary action to take on complaints or charges the agency has already heard and found true. Two of the other cases Evans cites reach the same conclusion: If a governing body does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the truth of the allegations against the employee, the hearing does not need to be open. (SeeRicasa v. Office of Administrative Hearings (2018) 31Cal.App.5th 262, 276 [24-hour notice was not required where acommunity college board did not receive evidence or conduct a hearing on the charges, but debated whether the undisputed facts warranted discipline]; Kolter v. Commission on Professional Competence of Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 170Cal.App.4th at p.1352 [24-hour notice was not required where a schoolboard did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the charges, but “considered whether those charges justified the initiation of dismissal proceedings”].)
Moreno v. City of King (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 17, cited by Evans, is distinguishable. There, in a closed session, the city council authorized its city manager to fire the employee after the councilreceived the manager’s account of five instances of alleged misconduct by the employee. The council did not provide the employee with advance notice of the closed session, nor did the employee have the opportunity to hear, respond to, or defend against the manager’s accusations before the city terminated his employment. The court in Moreno concluded the council violated the Brown Act by failing to provide the employee with 24-hour notice under section 54957, subdivision (b)(2), because it heard “complaints or charges” by the city manager. (Moreno, at pp. 23, 27-29.) Here, in contrast,the Board notified Evans that it would consider terminating his employment at the March 16, 2022 meeting, the statement of charges against him was read during the open meeting, and the Board gave Evans 15minutes to respond to the statement of charges. In addition, and also unlike Moreno, the facts the Board relied on in making its decision to terminate Evans’s employment were (and are) undisputed.
Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 860, is alsodistinguishable.After the housing authority in that case terminated the employee’s employment based on alleged misconduct, the employee appealed the decision to the commissioners of the housing authority. The commissionersreferred the employee’sappeal to a hearing officer, who heard testimony from multiple witnesses and received documentary evidence. The hearing officer weighed conflicting evidence, made credibility findings about the witnesses, andsent the commissioners findings of fact and a disciplinary recommendation. (Id. at pp. 865-866.) At a closed meeting (and without notice to the employee), thecommissioners reviewed the evidence in significant detail, rejected the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation, reweighed the evidence, and affirmed the housing authority’s decision to terminate the employee’s employment. (Id. at p. 867.)The court in Morrison held the commissioners “heard” complaints and charges within the meaning of the Brown Act when they “decide[d] to reject the hearing officer’s findings as to the facts and the credibility of the witnesses and make their own factual findings and credibility determinations.” (Id. at p. 874; see id. at p. 876 [“where the governing body of a public entity, in a case involving employee discipline, rejects its hearing officer’s findings of fact and engages in its own fact finding it is conducting a ‘hearing’ on the charges against the employee for purposes ofsection 54957”].)
Here, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findingthat, because the Board did not receive evidence or weigh conflicting evidence during its closed session, it did not “hear” complaints or charges against Evans.As the trial court stated, the essential facts were undisputed. The District required Evans to provide proof of vaccination againstCOVID-19 or weekly COVID-19 test results. Evans refused. The Board did not hear testimony or receive any evidence on those issues; the Board received only the statement of charges, which is a pleading, not evidence. (See Ricasa v. Office of Administrative Hearings, supra, 31Cal.App.5thatp. 277 [“the charges considered by the Board is a pleading, based on information and belief, not a piece of evidence”].) The only issue for the Board to consider was whether the undisputed facts provided avalid basis to discipline Evans or terminate his employment—an issue that falls squarely within the personnel exception to the Brown Act’s open meeting requirement.
Evans also accuses the Board of “obvious procedural manipulation” by “artificially splitting a single proceeding into a purely ceremonial public recitation of charges, followed by a secret closed-door deliberation on the substance of those same charges.” But section 54957 contemplates open and closed sessions may occur during the same proceeding. As discussed, section 54957, subdivision (b)(1),states “this chapter does not prevent the legislative body of a local agency from holding closed sessions during a regular or special meeting to consider” personnel matters. Section 54957.7also contemplates that closed sessions may be held in conjunction with open ones. That section requires a governing body, prior to holding a closed session, to disclose in an open meeting the item(s) to be discussed in the closed session. It further requires the body to reconvene, after holding a closed session, in an open session to make any disclosures required under the Brown Act.
Again citing Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of LosAngeles Bd. of Comrs., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 860, Evans argues the Board engaged in “a transparently evasive tactic” by holding an open meeting and a closed session on the same date.But that isn’t what happened in Morrison. There, as discussed, the commissioners considered evidence in a closed session without notice to Morrison. They later held an open meeting—purportedly to reach a “final” decision on Morrison’s employment termination—and they gave Morrison notice of that meeting. The court in Morrisonheld the notice of the second (open) session did not cure the Brown Act violation during the first (closed) session. (Id. at p.876.) That is not an issue here.
C.Evans’s Remaining Arguments Lack Merit
1. The Trial Court Did Not Deny Evans Due Process of Law
Evans argues the trial court violated his due process rights in several ways.None of his arguments has merit.
“‘The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.’... Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (People v. Hamilton (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 423, 438-439, citations omitted;see U.S. Const., 14th Amend.;Cal. Const., art.I, § 7(a).)
Evans contends the trial court violated his due process rights by permitting the District, but not Evans, “to revisit previously decided issues,” failing to strike the District’s supplemental brief “that impermissibly reargued the merits of the single issue they had lost,” failing “to enforce its own orders” (specifically, the order requesting supplemental briefs regarding the remedy for a Brown Act violation), and “permitting [the District] to circumvent procedural protections set forth in” Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.We address these arguments together because they all essentially challenge the court’s decision to reconsider its tentative ruling the Board violated the Brown Act.
As Evans correctly points out, the trial court tentatively ruled on April19, 2024 the Board violated the Brown Act by deliberating in a closed session regarding its decision to terminate Evans’s employment with the District. And though the trial court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the appropriate remedy for a Brown Act violation, the District submitted a supplemental brief arguing Evans was not entitled to a remedy because the Board did not violate the Brown Act. The trial court reconsidered its tentative ruling andchanged its conclusion regarding the Brown Act violation in its final July 16, 2024 ruling.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering and finalizing its tentative ruling. (See People v. Lujan (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507 [reviewing trial court’s exercise of inherent authority for abuse of discretion].)The court’s initial ruling was a tentative ruling, not a final ruling, and Evans cites no authoritystating a court cannot revise or modify a tentative ruling before it becomes the court’s final ruling. And even then, after the court enters a ruling on a matter, Code of Civil Procedure section1008, subdivision (c),gives the court authority to reconsider it if the court “determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered . . . .” Indeed, even without a change in the law, the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider a ruling.(Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 840; seeLe Francois v. Goel (2005) 35Cal.4th 1094, 1107 [Code of CivilProcedure section 1008 does “not limit the court’s ability, on its own motion, to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors”]; see alsoPhillips v. Sprint PCS(2012) 209Cal.App.4th 758, 768 [“‘“‘Miscarriage of justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived legal errors.’”’”].)In its July 16, 2024 ruling, the trial court explainedthat it researched the Brown Act issue and that, with the benefit of additional time and review, it reached a different conclusion. The court properly corrected its error.Evans cites no case holding, or even suggesting, the court’s reconsiderationof its tentative ruling—after allowing the parties to submit written briefs and present argument on the issue the court intended to reconsider—violates due process.
Evans also argues the trial court “ought not to have considered [the District’s] newly-raised arguments at all. Courts may not consider arguments raised for the first time in reply or supplemental briefing unless the opposing party is given an opportunity to respond.”This argument fails for two reasons. First, the cases Evans cites relate to the submission of new evidence(rather than a new argument) with a reply brief. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537 [“The general rule of motion practice, which applies here, is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.”]; Alliant Ins. Services, Inc. v. Gaddy (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1307 [trial court properly considered a supplemental declaration submitted with a reply brief, where the court gave the opposing party the opportunity to testify in response]; San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102Cal.App.4th 308, 316[trial court violated a party’s due process rights by considering a supplemental declaration submitted after the party filed its opposition brief and response to a separate statement]; Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11Cal.App.4th 349, 362, fn. 8 [“the inclusion of additional evidentiary matter with the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case, the trial court’s consideration of such additional evidence is not an abuse of discretion so long as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment has notice and an opportunity to respond to the new material”].) The District did not submit new evidence with its supplemental brief regarding the Brown Act.
Second, there wasno due process violation. “‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,’[citation] while ensuring the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Ramirez v. City of Indio (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 939, 952.) As explained, after the District filed its supplemental brief on the Brown Act, Evans moved to strike the brief because it raised issues other than the appropriate remedy for a Brown Act violation. The court held a hearing on June 20, 2024 and, at Evans’s request,continued the matter for a month to allow Evans to submit an additional brief addressing the issues raised by the District. The trial court also asked the parties to addressthose issues during the hearing on July 12, 2024.Thus, the trial court notified Evans it would reconsider its April 19, 2024 tentative ruling and provided Evans two opportunities to be heard. Nothing more was required.
Evans alsoargues the trial court committed “an outright denial of due process” through its “starkly different treatment of Mr.Evans” at the hearing on July 12, 2024. Specifically, Evans complains the court limited his attorney’s argument “to only ten minutes, after [the District] had extensively briefed their newly introduced arguments.”That’s not quite what happened. As discussed, the trial court allowed Evans to address in writing the issues raised by the District in its supplemental brief. The court read and considered all the supplemental briefing.And at the July 12, 2024 hearing the court allowed each side to argue for up to 10 minutes and asked the parties to focus on a single issue—whether the Board violated the Brown Act. The court heard argumentfrom both sides on that issue and asked several questions. Then, though the trial court stated the only relevant issue at the hearing was the Brown Act violation, the court gave counsel for Evans an additional 10 minutes to address other issues in the court’s April 19, 2024 tentative ruling. The court gave the District five minutes to respond. Contrary to Evans’s assertion, the trial court gave Evans more time to argue than the District, not less.
2. Evans Has NotEstablished Federal Law Preempts the Public Health Department’s Vaccinate-or-test Mandate
Evans argues “the District violated federal law by conditioning employment on acceptance of an emergency use authorization medical procedure.” By failing to provide an adequate discussion of the relevant statutes and legal principles in the trial court and on appeal, Evans forfeited the issue.
As a preliminary matter, Evans complains the trial court “never substantively ruled on [Evans’s] claims regarding compelled EUA testing or denial of reasonable accommodation—issues extensively briefed by [Evans] and central to his petition.” The trial court, however, may not have addressed Evans’s claim because Evans did not adequately raise it. “A trial court may decline to consider an argument that does not comply with rule 3.1113 of the California Rules of Court.” (Nationwide Ins. Co. of America v. Tipton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1355, 1365.) “Fairness dictates all arguments be presented in the memorandum of points and authorities, which ‘must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced.’” (Ibid.; seeQuantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197Cal.App.4th 927, 932-933 [trial court was justified in rejecting a posttrial motion that “merely quoted” applicable statutes and did not discussrelevant facts or law];Black v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 917, 925, fn. 9 [respondent forfeited an argument on appeal under predecessor to rule 3.1113 that was “not presented to any material extent at all in respondents’ motion” in the trial court].)
Evans failed to providethe trial court witheither “a concise statement of the law” or “a discussion of the statutes [and] cases” relevant to his argument. Though Evans referred to the emergency-use statutein his memorandum of points and authorities, he did not analyze the federal law preemption issue or cite any caselaw supporting his position the statute applied to the District. Here’s his argument: “Part of the explicit statutory conditions for an EUA requires that all individuals to whom the product approved for emergency use may be administered be informed ‘of the option to accept or refuse administration of the product.’ 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1). By requiring the Secretary to ‘inform’ individuals of the option to reject, the statute presumes that such an option exists. By way of the Supremacy Clause, this section of the United States Code applies irrespective of the [state vaccinate-or-test mandate] or any other state law. [fn. omitted] [¶] As a state actor, the District is subject to the EUA’s requirements.” Given the complex legal doctrines and statutory schemes Evans invoked, he needed to do more to raise the issue adequately in the trial court.
Evans makes a similar error on appeal by failing to adequately develop his federal preemption argument. Evans argues that, because the only available tests for COVID-19 were authorized by the federal government under an emergency-use authorization, he had “a federally protected right” to “‘accept or refuse’” to undergo testing for COVID-19. He claims federal law (specifically, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and title 21 United States Codesection 360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III)) preempted the state vaccinate-or-test order and, by extension, the District’s vaccinate-or-test policy. Whether and under what circumstances federal law preempts state law is a complex inquiry. (See Coastline JX Holdings LLC v. Bennett (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 985, 1015 [federal preemption issues are “novel and complex”]; Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC (8thCir.2024) 112 F.4th 556, 562 [“federal preemption [is] a complex subject”]; Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. Red River Coal Co., Inc. (4thCir. 2021) 992 F.3d 306, 314 [“federal preemption . . . involves complex questions of federalism”].)“‘The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.’ [Citations.] ... [Citations.] Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law? [Citations.][¶] . . . Congress may expressly preempt state law through an explicit preemption clause, or courts may imply preemption under the field, conflict, or obstacle preemption doctrines.” (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62Cal.4th 298, 307-308.)The burden is on the party asserting preemptionto demonstrate that preemption applies. (Ibid.; see People v. Dillard (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1205, 1214.)
Evans invokes obstacle preemption, which “permits courts to strike state law that stands as ‘an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ [Citations.]It requires proof Congress had particular purposes and objectives in mind, a demonstration that leaving state law in place would compromise those objectives, and reason to discount the possibility theCongress that enacted the legislation was aware of the background tapestry of state law and content to let that law remain as it was. Ultimately, ‘what constitutes a “sufficient obstacle [for a finding of implied preemption] is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”’” (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., supra, 62Cal.4th at p. 312.)
Evans citesonly two preemption casesin his opening brief:Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council(2002) 530 U.S. 363, 372 and Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 387, 406.Neither case advances his preemption argument. In Arizonathe United States Supreme Court considered whether federal law preempted an Arizona law (or portions thereof) designed “‘to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully in the United States.’” (Arizona, at pp. 392-393.)After summarizing the federal government’s extensive authority over immigrationand applicable principles of federalism, the Supreme Courtconducted a lengthy analysis of four provisions of the Arizona law, along with similar provisions of federal law. The Supreme Court concluded federal immigration law preempted three of the four provisions. (Id. at pp. 400-415.) Immigration is not an issue in this case.
In Crosbythe United States Supreme Court considered whether federal law preempted a Massachusetts law restricting local government entities’ ability to purchase goods or services from companies doing business with Burma (also called Myanmar). (Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 367-368.) Three months after the Massachusetts law was enacted, Congress passed a statute imposing a set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma.(Id.at pp. 368-370.)The Supreme Court analyzed three areas where the Massachusetts law undermined the intended purpose of the federal law: “its delegation of effective discretion to the President to control economic sanctions against Burma, its limitation of sanctions solely to United States persons and new investment, and its directive to the President to proceed diplomatically in developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy toward Burma.” (Id. at pp. 373-375.) The Supreme Court held the Massachusetts law “stands as an obstacle in addressing the congressional obligation to devise a comprehensive, multilateral strategy” regarding trade policy with Burma. (Id. at p. 385.) Federal trade policy is not an issue here either.
Arizona andCrosby provide a road map for the sort of analysis required in a case implicating federal preemption generally and obstacle preemption in particular. The United States Supreme Court scrutinized the provisions of both the state and federal law, considered the intent of the respective legislatures in enacting the laws, evaluated the potential impact of the state law on federal action, and explored potential conflicts between the two statutory schemes. Far from assisting Evans, however, Arizona and Crosbyhighlight the deficiencies in Evans’s strategy on appeal.
Evans needed to do more than assert, in passing, federal law preempted the state vaccinate-or-test order. Here’s his argument in his opening brief: “Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts any state law or order that conflicts with or stands as an obstacle to federal objectives. [Citations.] [¶] Because 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 conditions EUA authorization on voluntariness, any state or local mandate that eliminates the option to refuse is preempted under obstacle preemption principles. The [state vaccinate-or-test order] itself acknowledges the applicability of federal law concerning informed consent and the option to refuse EUA vaccines, and by extension, EUAtests. . . . [¶] State or local health orders cannot transform a federally protected voluntary choice into a mandatory employment condition.” Evans does not discuss the purposes and objectives Congress had in mind when it adopted the emergencyuse authorization provision, title 21 United States Code section 360bbb-3. He does not discuss the statutory scheme the emergency-useauthorization provision is a part of. And he does not explain how the state’s vaccinate-or-test order was an obstacle to Congress’s intended regulation of biological products authorized for emergency use. He simply focuses on one sub-sub-subsection and, from there, hypothesizes an inalienable federal right to refuse to comply with a state public health directive issued in the middle of a global pandemic.
As the appellant, Evans had to provide a cogent legal analysis of the challenged state law, the competing federal law, and the interplay between the two. He did not. (See, e.g., In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 808 [“‘a party’s failure to perform its duty to provide argument, citations to the record, and legal authority in support of a contention’” forfeits the issue]; Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799 [appellant must support issues raised with “‘reasoned argument and citations to authority’”].)

3.Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding the District Offered Evans a Reasonable Accommodation for His Religious Objection to Vaccination
Evans argues the District “utterly failed to engage in a good faith interactive process and failed to provide any lawful reasonable accommodation” for his religious objection to vaccination. Not so.
Government Code section 12940, subdivision (l),provides it is unlawful “[f]or an employer ... to discharge a person from employment ... or to discriminate against a person ... because of a conflict between the person’s religious belief or observance and any employment requirement, unless the employer... demonstrates that it has explored any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious belief or observance ....” To establish a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs, “the employee must establish a prima facie case that he or she had a bona fide religious belief, of which the employer was aware, that conflicts with an employment requirement.” (Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51Cal.App.4th 345, 370; seeCalifornia Fair Employment &Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004) 122Cal.App.4th 1004, 1016.) If the employee establishes he or she had such a bona fide religious belief, “the employer must establish it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate or no accommodation was possible without producing undue hardship.” (Soldinger, at p. 370; see California Fair Employment & Housing Com., at p. 1016.)
The District does not dispute Evans had a bona fide religious objection to vaccination. Evans advised the District of his “sincerely held religious belief in the sanctity of all human life.” He explained his belief: “[T]he most significant reason why I cannot accept these vaccines [is] because of the fact that fetal stem cell lines from electively aborted babies were used in either the development and/or testing of the currently available COVID-19 shots. I believe that abortion is murder and is prohibited in the Bible (Exodus 20:13, Psalm 139:13-16, Jeremiah 1:5, Isaiah 49:15). By receiving the shot, Ibelieve Iwould be complicit in the act of abortion.”
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling the District accommodated his religious objection to vaccination by providing testing for COVID-19 as an alternative. It was undisputed the District offered testingfor COVID-19 at the District’s expense and on school grounds. Because Evans objected to COVID-19testing on grounds not protected under the Fair Employment and Housing Act—he testified before the hearing officer that he had no religious objection to testing for COVID-19—that objection did not trigger anyadditional duty to accommodate Evans.
Evans argues the District failed to consider his preferred accommodation—transfer to a facility where District employees were not subject to the state’s vaccination-or-test order—and claims “[t]he record indicates such positions existed.”The record actually shows that the District applied its vaccinate-or-test policy to all District facilities and that, in any event, there were no available positions at the specific facilities Evans identified.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Long Beach Unified School District is to recover its costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.