In re Cameron

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Filed 1/24/12 In re Cameron CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
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In re CHRISTINA CAMERON on Habeas
Corpus.
C065911
(Super. Ct. No.
10HB5321)
On May 27, 2009, the court sentenced petitioner Christina
Cameron to a stipulated term of 13 years in prison based upon
her guilty pleas to one count of identity theft (Pen. Code,
§ 530.5, subd. (a)),1 12 counts of second degree burglary
(§§ 459, 460), and an admission of having served two prior
prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). At the time of petitioner’s
sentencing, section 4019 provided that conduct credits could be
earned at the rate of two days for every four days served.
(§ 4019, former subds. (b), (c).) Petitioner received
presentence custody credit of 608 days, consisting of 406 days
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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of actual time served plus 202 days of conduct credit.
Petitioner did not appeal.
Effective January 25, 2010, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 3X 18,2 which amended section 4019 (the January 25
amendment) to provide essentially two days of conduct credit for
every two days actually served in presentence custody to a class
of prisoners (eligible prisoners) deemed safe for early release
from prison. This class consists of prisoners who were neither
required to register as sex offenders, nor committed for serious
felonies, nor who had prior convictions for serious or violent
felonies.
On July 23, 2010, petitioner filed a propria persona habeas
corpus petition in the superior court seeking, inter alia, to
have her “judgment of abstract [sic] . . . reflect the
appropriate amount of credits as dictated by law,” apparently
referring to the January 25 amendment. The court summarily
denied the petition on the ground it failed to state a prima
facie case for relief.
On August 27, 2010, petitioner filed a petition in this
court claiming that she was entitled to 406 days of additional
conduct credits based on the January 25 amendment. We issued an
order to show cause and appointed counsel to represent
petitioner. The People have filed their return and petitioner
has filed her traverse to the return.
2 Enacted during the 2009-2010 Third Extraordinary Session.
(See Stats. 2009, ch. 28, § 50.)

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Petitioner argues she is entitled to the January 25, 2010,
rate under principles of federal equal protection. The People
counter that equal protection was not violated because the
January 25 amendment seeks to encourage good conduct by
prisoners awaiting final sentencing and thus excludes prisoners
whose judgments are final; hence, the two groups are not
similarly situated. The People also propose a rational basis
for the disparate treatment, viz.: that retroactive application
of the new amendment to final judgments would violate the
separation of powers doctrine. We reject the People’s
contentions and conclude that under federal constitutional rules
of equal protection the new amendment is retroactive to all
eligible prisoners irrespective of the dates their judgments
became final.3
EQUAL PROTECTION
“The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the California Constitution are substantially
equivalent and analyzed in a similar fashion.” (People v. Leng
3 The People also contend the petition should be dismissed
because petitioner has failed to provide documentation
supporting the time credits she received and because she has
failed to rebut section 3’s presumption that statutes are to be
prospectively applied unless retroactivity is expressly
declared.
On June 9, 2011, we granted petitioner’s request for judicial
notice of documents that establish her time credits. And our
determination that federal constitutional principles of equal
protection require retroactive application of the January 25
amendment renders the petition’s second contention moot.

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(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.) We first ask whether the two
classes are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of
the law in question, but are treated differently. (Cooley v.
Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) If groups are
similarly situated but treated differently, the state must then
provide a rational justification for the disparity. (People v.
Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200-1201.)
The People’s justification for the new amendment, to wit,
to encourage good behavior, does not comport with the
Legislature’s stated purpose, and we are bound by the latter.
(People v. Butler (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1234.) The
purpose of the new amendment, as expressly stated in Senate Bill
No. 3X 18, was to aid the state in addressing the “fiscal
emergency” declared by the Governor in December 2008, rather
than to encourage good behavior as asserted by the People.4
(Stats. 2009, ch. 28, § 62.) The new amendment accomplishes
this fiscal purpose by identifying a class of prisoners deemed
safe for early release and increasing the rate at which they
earn presentence conduct credits, thereby reducing the cost of
their incarceration. Dividing the class of eligible prisoners
into two groups based on the date their judgments became final
bears no rational relationship to either their dangerousness or
4 Because the purpose of Senate Bill No. 3X 18 was solely
fiscal, In re Stinnette (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 800 and In re
Strick (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 906, relied on by the People, are
distinguishable because the purpose of the statutes at issue in
those cases was to encourage good behavior. (Stinnette at
p. 806; Strick at p. 913.)

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their cost of incarceration. (Cf. In re Kapperman (1974)
11 Cal.3d 542, 544-550 [finality of judgment does not constitute
rational basis for disparate treatment between groups of
prisoners equally situated].) Consequently, the new amendment
applies to all eligible prisoners regardless of when their
judgments became final.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Nor does retroactive application of the new amendment to
prisoners whose judgments were final prior to January 25, 2010,
violate the separation of powers doctrine by interfering with
judgments already final, as urged by the People. The awarding
of additional conduct credits is nothing more than a ministerial
act and does not constitute a resentencing or a material
interference with the judgment previously imposed. (See
Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117-118;
People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 508-509; In re Kapperman,
supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 548-550.)
CALCULATION OF CREDITS
Petitioner received total presentence custody credit of
608 days, consisting of 406 days for actual custody plus
202 days for conduct. Petitioner is therefore entitled to an
additional 204 days of conduct credit, for a total of 812 days.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the superior court with
directions to award petitioner an additional 204 days of
presentence conduct credit, for a total presentence custody
credit of 812 days. The court is further directed to prepare an

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amended abstract of judgment reflecting those changes and to
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Director
of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
RAYE , P. J.
We concur:
BLEASE , J.
MURRAY , J.

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