Conservatorship of Karen N.

Filed 6/6/05 Conservatorship of Karen N. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Conservatorship of the Person of KAREN
N.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
KAREN N.,
Objector and Appellant.
D045389
(Super. Ct. No. MH97381)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Linda B.
Quinn, Judge. Affirmed.
After a jury found Karen N. (Karen) gravely disabled, the trial court appointed a
conservator of her person. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350 et seq.) Karen appeals.

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FACTS
Joy Villavicencio testified that she is a social worker with the inpatient psychiatric
unit at Bayview Hospital in Chula Vista. She is acquainted with Karen because of
Karen's previous stays at the hospital for grave disability. In July 2004, Karen was
residing in an independent living facility and she was brought to the hospital after she ran
into the street, took off her clothing, and urinated in a driveway. Although Karen told
Villavicencio she did not intend to return to the independent living facility and wanted to
live with her son, she was unwilling to provide contact information for him.
Villavicencio was of the opinion that Karen was not able to maintain shelter in the
community.
Doctor Gregory Bishop, Karen's treating psychiatrist during the preceding year,
testified that Karen has a chronic schizoaffective disorder, a combination of
schizophrenia and psychosis, and suffers from delusions. Although medication is
available, Karen frequently refuses to take it. Bishop's opinion was that Karen was
unable to maintain shelter in the community.
Karen testified that she does not have delusions; plans to stay with her son and
move back into a mobile home she owns or rent an apartment or room, and will try
medication if a psychiatrist recommends it.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief setting forth the evidence in the
superior court. Counsel presents no argument for reversal but asks this court to review
the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). In

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Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), the United States Supreme Court
held that when a criminal defendant's appointed counsel finds no meritorious ground of
appeal after conscientiously examining the record, counsel should advise the court and
request permission to withdraw. To protect the defendant's constitutional right to
assistance of counsel, counsel must identify anything in the record that might "arguably
support the appeal." (Id. at p. 744.) The defendant should be furnished with the brief and
be allowed to raise additional points. (Ibid.) The appellate court "then proceeds, after a
full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous."
(Ibid.) In Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 441, the California Supreme Court held that in
criminal appeals "Anders requires the court to conduct a review of the entire record
whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or describes
the appeal as frivolous."
In In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, the Supreme Court held that the
procedures of Anders and Wende are not applicable to juvenile dependency proceedings.
The court said, "[b]y its very terms, Anders's 'prophylactic' procedures are limited in their
applicability to appointed appellate counsel's representation of an indigent criminal
defendant . . . . An indigent parent adversely affected by a state-obtained decision on
child custody or parental status is simply not a criminal defendant. Indeed, the
proceedings in which he [or she] is involved must be deemed to be civil in nature and not
criminal." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 982.)
Before In re Sade C., the reviewing court in Conservatorship of Besoyan (1986)
181 Cal.App.3d 34, 36 (Besoyan), held the Wende procedure applied to an appeal of the

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imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). In
In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952, the court did not expressly disapprove of Besoyan
but said, "[t]o the extent that any decision of ours or of the Courts of Appeal states or
implies that the applicability of Anders goes beyond what is described in the text, it is
disapproved." (Id. at pp. 983-984, fn. 13, italics added.) In Conservatorship of Margaret
L. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 675 (Margaret L.), decided after In re Sade C., the majority
held that Anders and Wende remain applicable to LPS Act proceedings for
conservatorship of the person. However, in our view the Supreme Court's disapproval in
In re Sade C. of any Courts of Appeal case extending the procedural protections of
Anders and Wende beyond the factual context of Anders shows the Supreme Court's
intent to overrule Besoyan and make the procedural protections of Anders and Wende
inapplicable to conservatorship proceedings.1
In determining whether our independent review of the record is required, we note
that the LPS Act involves a balance between the medical objectives of treating sick
people without legal delays and insuring that persons are not deprived of their liberties
without due process of law. We agree with the dissent in Margaret L., that our
independent review of the appellate record is not required to maintain this delicate
balance, because there are safeguards afforded the conservatee throughout the duration of
the conservatorship process. (Margaret L., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 686-687 (conc.
1 This issue is currently pending before the California Supreme Court.
(Conservatorship of Ben C. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 710, review granted Sept. 15, 2004,
S126664.)

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& dis. opn. of Rylaarsdam, J.).) Additionally, the one-year limitation on a
conservatorship essentially renders Wende review ineffective because the commitment
order has or will soon automatically expire before an appeal is processed.
This court has noted that in the juvenile dependency context, Wende review is
"nearly always unproductive" and results in needless delay. (In re Kayla G. (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 878, 888; In re Angelica V. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1016.) We must
balance the benefit of applying Anders and Wende against "the lost time and money, and
most importantly, delay in entering a final decision." (Margaret L., supra, 89
Cal.App.4th at p. 687 (conc. & dis. opn. of Rylaarsdam, J.).) Historically, there have
been relatively few appeals of conservatorship orders. Extending Anders and Wende to
LPS Act proceedings may encourage appellate counsel who cannot find any appealable
issue to seek our independent review of the entire appellate record each time a
recommitment order is entered. As the court recognized in In re Sade C., "[p]rocedures
that are practically 'unproductive,' like those in question, need not be put into place, no
matter how many and how weighty the interests that theoretically support their use. To
be sure, these procedures may have 'symbolic' value of some kind. [Citation.] Such
value, however, is too slight to compel their invocation." (In re Sade C., supra, 13
Cal.4th at pp. 990-991.) We conclude that the procedures of Anders and Wende do not
apply to review of conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act. Accordingly, we do
not independently review the appellate record for error.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.

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