Chambers v. Appellate Division

Filed 5/4/06 Chambers v. Appellate Division CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL - FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TARIQ CHAMBERS,
Petitioner,
v.
THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO
COUNTY,
Respondent;
D047661
(San Diego County
Super. Ct. No. GIC856399)
THE SAN DIEGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Real Party in Interest.
PROCEEDINGS in mandate after the superior court (Browder Willis and
Stephanie Sontag, Judges) declined to order disclosure of Pitchess information and the
appellate division (Louis R. Hanoian, Peter C. Deddeh, and Robert J. Trentacosta,
Judges) denied petitioner's writ petition. Petition granted.

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In his petition, Tariq Chambers contends the trial court erred when it declined to
disclose evidence relevant to his defense of excessive force, namely, the identity of a
complaining citizen who Chambers's counsel knew to exist by virtue of her assignment to
an unrelated case involving the same officer, as well as a report prepared by defense
investigators who had interviewed the citizen. We conclude the trial court abused its
discretion in withholding disclosure of Pitchess information that is indisputably relevant
to Chambers's excessive force defense. We further conclude that, under the
circumstances of this case, the protective order mandated by Evidence Code section
1045, subdivision (e)1 does not encompass derivative information generated as a result of
a prior successful Pitchess motion as to the same police officer in the unrelated case, and
that Chambers is entitled to obtain that information from the prior litigant. Accordingly,
we grant Chambers's writ petition with directions set forth below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2004, Chambers was charged with resisting, delaying or obstructing a
peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) stemming from an incident in which San
Diego Police Officer S. E. and another officer appeared at Chambers's apartment in
response to a neighbor's 911 call. In January 2005, Chambers filed a pretrial Pitchess2
motion before Superior Court Judge Browder Willis to discover information in the
personnel file of the officers concerning evidence or complaints of excessive force,
1 All statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

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aggressive conduct, unnecessary violence and force, false arrest or detention, false
statements in reports, false claims of probable cause or dishonesty. In an accompanying
declaration, defense counsel averred that on the day in question, the officers appeared at
Chambers's apartment falsely telling him they were responding to a call from within the
residence, and asked to enter his home to check on the other inhabitants. According to
counsel, La Tasha Woods, who resided with Chambers, exited the apartment with two
young children, and when Chambers tried to join her and the officers outside, he was
physically blocked by Officer E. When Chambers walked back into his living room,
Officer E. "suddenly and aggressively" used pepper spray on him, pulled his gun, and
threatened to shoot Chambers while he was scrambling for ice and cold water in the
kitchen to sooth his burning face. Counsel averred that both officers lied about the events
on the day of Chambers's arrest; in particular, that Officer E. lied about whether
Chambers had "rushed" him as if he were going to attack him, thus justifying Officer E.'s
use of pepper spray. Counsel stated Chambers did not rush, physically threaten or
verbally indicate he wanted to make physical contact with either officer. Counsel further
averred that Officer E. overreacted and used excessive force when he sprayed Chambers
without provocation or justification. Considering the motion in February 2005, the court
found good cause to inspect the officers' personnel, divisional and internal affairs files,
but found no relevant information within them to disclose on Chambers's claims of
fabrication and excessive force.
In August 2005, Chambers filed a "supplemental" Pitchess motion seeking
information from Officer E.'s personnel file that had been disclosed via the Pitchess

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process in a different case involving a charge of resisting arrest, People v. Washington
(Super. Ct. San Diego County, No. M947152) (Washington). Chambers's counsel
averred she had learned of the existence of this information after overhearing another
public defender mention he had received Pitchess information about Officer E. in the
Washington matter. Thereafter, she was reassigned to the Washington case and learned
the identity of a complaining citizen disclosed in that case.3 Chambers asked the court to
(1) inquire whether Officer E.'s file was complete when it heard his first Pitchess motion;
(2) reconsider releasing the names contained in Officer E.'s file in his case; and (3) permit
his defense counsel to use "derivative information" from the Washington matter, i.e.,
materials generated by the public defender's office stemming from its investigation of the
Pitchess information disclosed in that case.
Chambers's supplemental Pitchess motion was brought before Superior Court
Judge Stephanie Sontag. Judge Sontag declined to reconsider Judge Willis's ruling.
However, she considered on the merits and denied defense counsel's request that
Chambers be permitted to use the derivative information from Washington in his case,
concluding that information could not be exchanged between the two cases.
Thereafter, Chambers refiled his supplemental motion and on September 30, 2005,
appeared before Judge Willis requesting that he reconsider his first Pitchess ruling. The
3 The court in Washington had disclosed the name of four persons from Officer E.'s
files. In this writ proceeding, Chambers requests identity and derivative information
pertaining to only one of those persons, whose claim was summarized by Chambers's
counsel in a sealed declaration. We will refer to that person as the complainant or
complaining citizen in this opinion.

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city attorney on behalf of the San Diego Police Department (Department) opposed the
motion in part on grounds it was not timely served and filed and did not accurately
identify the time and place of the motion under section 1043, subdivisions (a) and (b).
Judge Willis re-reviewed the files in camera to ensure he had not overlooked anything,
but again concluded there was no relevant information within the files subject to
disclosure in Chambers's case. The court confirmed the file was complete.
Chambers petitioned for a writ of mandate or alternatively habeas corpus in the
Superior Court's Appellate Department, requesting that the court (1) set aside the
September 30, 2005 order and enter a different order disclosing the identity of the
complaining citizen in the Washington case and the defense investigation report relating
information from that witness and (2) review and ascertain whether the record presented
in camera at the Pitchess hearing included the citizen's statement and rule upon the
propriety of the custodian's record production. In separate orders, the court denied
Chambers's petitions. Chambers filed the present writ petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court's Power to Hear Chambers's Motion
Preliminarily, we address and reject Department's procedural challenge to the trial
court's ability to hear Chambers's second Pitchess request. Department contends the
court exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing Officer E.'s file a second time because
Chambers did not provide the required 16 days notice of his Pitchess motion under
section 1043, subdivision (a). Department argues that as a result of this procedural error,
the court could not have disclosed any information even if it found it relevant. It further

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asserts that given the passage of time from the court's first Pitchess order issued in
February 2005, Chambers is not entitled to speedy writ relief from that decision.
Section 1043 sets forth the procedures and notice that must be given to the
governmental agency having custody and control of peace officer personnel records. In
part, it provides that notice of a Pitchess motion shall be given at the times prescribed
by Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), requiring that motions must
be served and filed at least 16 days before the hearing. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (a);
Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subds. (a)(6), (b).) Subdivision (c) of Evidence Code section
1043 requires that the defendant fully comply with the notice provisions unless he or
she shows good cause for noncompliance or the governmental agency waives the
requirement. The court may also prescribe a shorter period for notice. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1005, subd. (b).).
Here, over Department's objection of untimely notice, the court considered and
reached the merits of Chambers's motion for a supplemental Pitchess disclosure even
though the motion was served and filed only 14 days before the hearing. The court
responded to Department's argument by explaining the motion raised a unique question
as to whether there was a possibility that its initial review was incomplete or whether it
had overlooked something: "[T]hen the issue, as defense has raised, is can the Court
reconsider or reevaluate to determine whether or not it missed something, and I know that
in some way is allowing [Chambers] the benefit of knowledge raised at another Pitchess
motion, but I think the argument is that now that I am in possession, the Court is in
possession, that there may have been error, may have been something overlooked, should

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I in good faith hear that, and that's where I stand. [¶] If I am made aware that maybe I
missed something, then I think I'm obligated to at least hear that out."
As we construe its remarks, the trial court granted what it deemed to be a motion
for reconsideration of Chambers's initial Pitchess motion, which it had the inherent power
to entertain regardless of the foregoing statutory Pitchess procedures. This court has
explained that "[i]n criminal cases there are few limits on a court's power to reconsider
interim rulings." (People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.) "The
California Supreme Court has often recognized the 'inherent powers of the court . . . to
insure the orderly administration of justice.' [Citations.] In criminal cases, the court has
acknowledged 'the inherent power of every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at
facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment
of the truth.' [Citations.] . . . [¶] Some of the court's inherent powers are set out by
statute, but the inherent powers of the courts are derived from the Constitution and are
not confined by or dependent on statute. [Citations.] [¶] A court's inherent powers are
wide. [Citations.] They include authority to rehear or reconsider rulings: '[T]he power
to grant rehearings is inherent, — is an essential ingredient of jurisdiction, and ends only
with the loss of jurisdiction.' [Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . [¶] A court could not operate
successfully under the requirement of infallibility in its interim rulings. Miscarriage of
justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived legal errors,
particularly in criminal cases where life, liberty, and public protection are at stake. Such
a rule would be ' "a serious impediment to a fair and speedy disposition of causes. . . ." ' "
(Castello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1249 [rejecting application of rules of Civil

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Procedure governing reconsideration to criminal cases]; see also Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group
(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 388-389.) We uphold the court's ruling based on the
exercise of its inherent powers.
Alternatively, we interpret the court's comments as impliedly ruling that Chambers
had demonstrated good cause in his supplemental motion for a lesser period of notice by
raising the possibility that the court may have missed information in Officer E.'s
personnel files. As to that interpretation, the trial court's leniency as to the notice
requirement is supported by the language of Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (c),
which allows for less than full compliance with statutory notice upon a good cause
showing. Furthermore, a court may properly apply the doctrine of substantial compliance
to statutory requirements when the essential statutory purposes are satisfied and strict
compliance is not necessary to serve the statutory intent. (Los Angeles Chemical Co. v.
Superior Court (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 703, 712-713.) In this case, the City Attorney had
actual notice of the motion and an opportunity to respond, and there is no contention (nor
do we perceive) that the shortened notice caused any prejudice. Accordingly, we proceed
to Chambers's substantive contentions.
II. Pitchess Rulings
A. Legal Principles
In Pitchess, the California Supreme Court held that "a criminal defendant has a
limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel records in order to ensure 'a fair trial
and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.' "
(Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1038, fn. 3 (Alford), quoting Pitchess,

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supra, 11 Cal.3d. at p. 535.) Based on the accused's need for disclosure as well as an
officer's privacy expectations, and to prevent abuses, the Legislature codified the court's
decision in Pitchess and set out procedures designed to implement the court's discovery
rule. (Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1047; see People v. Mooc
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226 (Mooc); Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011,
1019 (Warrick).) Under these procedures, a defendant, by written motion, may obtain
information contained in a peace or custodial officer's personnel records by providing
certain identifying information, a declaration setting out good cause for disclosure, and a
showing of materiality to the subject matter of the pending litigation. (Evid. Code,
§ 1043, subds. (a), (b)(2), (b)(3); Mooc, at p. 1226.) When presented with such a motion,
the trial court rules as to whether there is good cause for disclosure. (§§ 1043, 1045.) If
the court finds the defendant has made the requisite good cause showing, the custodian of
the officer's records should bring to the court all "potentially relevant" documents and, in
camera outside the presence of the defense or prosecution, the trial court determines
whether any of the records are to be disclosed. (Mooc, at p. 1226.) In determining
relevance, the court examines the information in chambers in conformity with Evidence
Code section 915, which governs disclosure of information on a claim of privilege and
permits in camera review when the court cannot rule on the claim without requiring
disclosure of the assertedly privileged information. (§§ 915, 1045, subd. (b).) During the
in camera inspection, the court must exclude from disclosure (1) complaints concerning
conduct occurring more than five years before the event that is the subject of the
litigation in which Pitchess disclosure is sought, (2) the "conclusions of any officer

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investigating a complaint," and (3) facts "so remote as to make disclosure of little or no
practical benefit." (§ 1045, subd. (b); Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.)
If the court rules in favor of disclosing confidential information, which ordinarily
involves revealing only the name, address and telephone number of any prior
complainants and witnesses and the dates of the incidents in question (City of Santa Cruz
v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84; Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019),
section 1045 mandates entry of a protective order providing that the information
"disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding
pursuant to applicable law." (§ 1045, subd. (e); Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1037-
1039.) Further, "[t]he court, '[u]pon motion seasonably made by the governmental
agency which has custody or control of the records to be examined or by the officer
whose records are sought' . . . , may make such orders 'which justice requires to protect
the officer or agency from unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.' "
(Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1227, citing § 1045, subd. (d).)
We review the trial court's disclosure ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220;
Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086 (Haggerty).)
B. Chamber's Contentions
Chambers contends Judge Willis erred by declining to order disclosure of (1) the
name of the complaining citizen previously disclosed in the Washington case and (2) the
derivative investigation report generated as a result of that earlier Pitchess disclosure
detailing the circumstances of that citizen's complaint against Officer E. As to the

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Pitchess identifying information, Chambers argues it is relevant and material to his claim
of excessive force, and not subject to any of the section 1045, subdivision (b) disclosure
restrictions. As for the derivative information, Chambers maintains the issue presented is
unique and not governed by the California Supreme Court's holding regarding shared
Pitchess discovery in Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033, because his attorney knows the
information to exist and believes it is relevant to Chambers's claim of excessive force
against Officer E. and the officer's credibility. Chambers contends he is deprived of the
right to competent counsel under these circumstances because he is denied access to his
attorney's skill and knowledge of critical information in his defense.
1. Trial Court's Relevance Determination Regarding Pitchess Information From
Officer E.'s Files
Section 1045 sets out a broad relevance standard for a trial court's in camera
determination of what documents must be ultimately disclosed under a Pitchess request:
"Section 1045 provides 'Nothing in this article shall be construed to affect the right of
access to records of complaints, or investigations of complaints, or discipline imposed as
a result of those investigations, concerning an event or transaction in which the peace
officer . . . participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in
which he or she performed his or her duties, provided that information is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending litigation.' [Citation.] This subdivision is
'expansive.' [Citation.] Relevant information under section 1045 is not limited to facts
that may be admissible at trial, but may include facts that could lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087, emphasis omitted,

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citing People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 681-682 & People v. Hustead (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 410, 423.) If the court determines the requested information is relevant and
does not fall within the exceptions set forth in section 1045, subdivisions (b) and (c), the
court should generally order production subject to a protective order providing " 'that the
records disclosed . . . may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding
pursuant to applicable law.' " (Id. at p. 1088.)
Under these broad relevance standards, the court erred when it did not reveal the
identity of the complainant previously disclosed in the Washington case based on its in
camera review of Officer E.'s personnel files. We have reviewed the sealed reporter's
transcripts of the in camera hearings of Chambers's Pitchess requests, as well as the
personnel files of Officer E. and other documents provided by the custodian of records at
the time of the court's first and second review on September 30, 2005. Our review
reveals that the citizen's complaint against Officer E. is sufficiently similar to the subject
matter raised by Chambers's Pitchess motion such that the information might be
admissible or might lead to other admissible evidence in Chambers's defense. The court's
decision not to disclose the identity of the complainant was not accompanied by any
specific reasoning and we perceive no reasonable basis for its ruling.
Department urges that the trial court's decision was well within its broad
discretion; it points out the underlying circumstances, threats posed and force used in this
case and Washington differ, which might compel judges faced with Pitchess requests in
each case to reach different results. Our holding, however, does not turn on a comparison
of the circumstances between this case and Washington, it is based on Chambers's

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Pitchess motion, the averments of his counsel, and an assessment of the materiality of
Officer E.'s files produced in camera to the court in light of section 1045's broad
standards.
Relying on People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 and City of San Jose v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, Department further argues only very similar
incidents of excessive force occurring in similar contexts may be disclosed; that not every
claim of excessive force is subject to disclosure. These authorities do not compel a
different result. In Jackson, the defendant asserted his confession was coerced, and the
court upheld the trial court's rejection of his discovery request for all excessive force
complaints against his arresting officers. " 'Since [defendant] sought the information to
bolster his claim of involuntariness in the interrogation setting, only complaints by
persons who alleged coercive techniques in questioning were relevant.' " (Jackson,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1220.) In City of San Jose, the appellate court found fault in the
defendant's good cause showing intended to trigger the right to in chambers inspection
under section 1043, subdivision (b)(3), and also concluded his discovery request was
overly broad because he had not requested records pertinent to a "specific factual
scenario." (City of San Jose, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1149-1150.) Because the defendant
had not established a specific factual scenario establishing a plausible factual foundation
for his allegations, his requests for general categories of records (i.e., related to "illegal
search and seizure") were insufficient to permit the trial court to make a relevance
determination. (Id. at p. 1150.) Unlike these cases, Chambers set out a specific factual
scenario in which he claims Officer E. used excessive force, including unreasonably

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pepper spraying him, in the process of arresting him at his residence. Chambers denies
resisting arrest or failing to comply with the officer's commands. That scenario is close
enough in context to the complaint disclosed in the Washington case to require a
relevance finding and disclosure under section 1045, subject to an appropriate protective
order under section 1045, subdivision (e) and, if the trial court so exercises its discretion
on Department's motion, subdivision (d).
2. Derivative Information
We also order the trial court to disclose the derivative defense investigation report
generated by the public defender's office as a result of the prior Pitchess disclosure in the
Washington case. As we explain, in the present case the derivative report is not subject to
the protective order mandated by section 1045, subdivision (e). Our conclusion requires
a discussion of Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033.
In Alford, the California Supreme Court considered the scope of the mandatory
protective order imposed by section 1045, subdivision (e).4 At issue was whether a
defendant in possession of information disclosed following a successful Pitchess motion
could share that information with defendants in cases other than the one in which the
information was being sought. (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1039-1040, 1042.)
Adopting the reasoning of the court of appeal, the high court concluded the statutory
4 Section 1045, subdivision (e) provides in full: "The court shall, in any case or
proceeding permitting the disclosure or discovery of any peace or custodial officer
records requested pursuant to Section 1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered
may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable
law."

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scheme did not permit such sharing: "[B]ecause section 1045[, subdivision] (e) is part of
an overall statutory scheme that carefully balances peace officers' privacy interests in
their personnel records against defendants' rights of access to information relevant to
their defense, and because disclosure of information contained in such records is
permitted only on a showing of materiality to a particular case, to interpret the statute as
allowing a defendant to share such information with other defendants would defeat the
purpose of the balancing process." (Id. at p. 1042.)
The court in Alford limited its holding to "the information disclosed pursuant to a
Pitchess motion . . . [and] express[ed] no views [concerning] the treatment of information
developed as a result of the receipt of information disclosed pursuant to a Pitchess
motion." (Id. at p. 1037, fn. 2.) In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Moreno
pointed out the majority's holding left open the question "whether a section 1045
[, subdivision] (e) protective order (a) may only restrict the use of the actual information
disclosed by the trial court – i.e., the complainant's and witness's name, address,
telephone number and the date of the incident; or (b) may also encompass the direct fruits
of the information developed during this independent investigation – e.g., a complainant's
or disclosed witness's statement; or (c) may encompass other information obtained during
this independent investigation – e.g., physical evidence (such as a photograph of injuries),
or a statement obtained from a newly discovered witness." (Id. at p. 1063.)
Under Alford, a litigant who obtains Pitchess information is given authorized
access to certain information, but it "may not be used for any purpose" (§ 1045, subd. (e))
beyond the case in which the information was ordered disclosed. In such cases, the

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litigant may conduct further investigation to develop evidence material to the pending
litigation. While a section 1045, subdivision (e) protective order expressly limits a
litigant's use of the disclosed information, investigation reports or other evidence
developed as a result of the use of the disclosed information is the work product of the
successful Pitchess movant, and is not subject to this limitation. This follows because
statements obtained by the litigant from the disclosed complainant or witness are not
materials obtained from the peace officer's personnel records maintained by any state or
local agency, although a statement of the witness may be included in those records.
Rather, the statements obtained by investigation following a successful Pitchess motion
are available to anyone should the complainant be willing to discuss the matter; they are
not compelled by any court process and the substance of interviews that a complainant
gives to a litigant is not and does not become part of the peace officer's personnel record
maintained by the employer. The court cannot constitutionally prevent a litigant from
disseminating information that is acquired from efforts independent from formal
discovery processes. (See In re Marriage of Candiotti (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 718, 723-
726.)
Here, we have already held that the Pitchess identifying information (i.e., name,
address, and telephone number of the complainant) is to be disclosed to Chambers
pursuant to his own Pitchess motion. Under these circumstances, Chambers's use of the
derivative materials generated in the Washington case is not constrained by the protective
order in either case, and the litigant in Washington may disclose those materials to

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Chambers without limitation or redaction.5 When a trial court makes a particularized
determination that a litigant has justified access to specific Pitchess information about a
complainant, that litigant is entitled to investigate the underlying details or facts of that
complaint from any available source. When a later court faced with another Pitchess
request involving the same officer independently exercises its role and concludes another
litigant has shown the relevance of the same identifying complainant information (or as
here, when the reviewing court determines the defendant has made such a showing), we
see no reason why that second litigant should not have the same access to the duplicative
information as the first. That litigant obtains nothing beyond that which the Pitchess
statutory scheme contemplates he is able to obtain, and the first Pitchess litigant has not
permitted the information to be used for any court proceeding in which a Pitchess
relevance determination has not been made. In our view, a litigant who has
independently satisfied the Pitchess relevance requirements as to a specific complainant,
as here, is authorized to learn the identity of that same complainant in the possession of
other successful Pitchess litigants.
As Alford explains, in the Pitchess process, the court must strike a careful balance
between preserving a peace officer's privacy and the defendant's need to gather evidence
relevant to his or her defense. (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1042.) These purposes are
not compromised by deeming statements gathered as a result of the disclosed information
5 Our opinion is not intended to address other factual situations, as where a person
seeking disclosure of derivative information from a prior case has not made a successful
Pitchess motion in a subsequent case.

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outside the ambit of the protective order. The protective scheme of section 1045,
subdivision (e) is not impaired because that provision is not designed to delimit the
sources from which peace officer information may be obtained, it is designed to assure
that use of the information obtained by particular defendants is limited to the proceeding
in which the court has made a specific relevance determination. The defendant remains
able to prepare a defense, and the officer's privacy interest in the data contained in his
personnel file is not affected beyond that which occurred when Pitchess disclosure was
ordered. In sum, the success of a subsequent Pitchess motion that discloses Pitchess
information duplicative of a prior Pitchess motion permits the sharing of duplicative
confidential Pitchess information between the successful movants without violating the
section 1045, subdivision (e) protective order in either case.
DISPOSITION
Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate the August 23, 2005
and September 30, 2005 orders and to enter a new and different order (1) disclosing to
Chambers the name, address and telephone number of the complainant disclosed in the
Washington case and referenced by Chambers's counsel in her sealed declaration and (2)
permitting the public defender to use the derivative report resulting from the investigation
of the complainant in the Washington matter. The stay issued on December 30, 2005,
will be vacated when the opinion is final as to this court. Our order directing the

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custodian of the Department to preserve all records submitted for the in camera review
will expire upon issuance of the remittitur.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.

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