In re Hector V.

Filed 12/20/18 In re Hector V. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re HECTOR V., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HECTOR V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F076985
(Super. Ct. No. JJD070960)
OPINION
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Robert Anthony
Fultz, Judge.
Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Caely E.
Fallini, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.

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INTRODUCTION
A Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602 petition was filed against appellant
Hector V. After a contested jurisdictional hearing, it was found true that Hector
committed assault with a deadly weapon, elder abuse, second degree robbery, and grand
theft from a person. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court placed Hector on
probation subject to an electronic device search condition and committed him to 24
months in the Tulare County Long Term Program.
Hector contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the assault with a deadly
weapon and elder abuse counts. He also contends the electronic device search condition
is unconstitutionally overbroad and an invasion of his privacy. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On November 2, 2017, a section 602 petition was filed against Hector. It alleged
in counts 1 and 2 that Hector had committed assault with a deadly weapon and elder
abuse against Yang Saeturn. Counts 3 and 4 alleged offenses of second degree robbery
and grand theft from a person against two other victims.2
The jurisdictional hearing commenced on November 28, 2017. Saeturn and the
other victims testified. At the conclusion of testimony, the juvenile court found counts 1
through 4 to be true.
In the probation report prepared for the disposition hearing, Hector admitted being
a member of the North Side Visa gang. Hector was 14 years old at the time. While in
custody, Hector had been the subject of numerous incident reports. The probation report
recommended that Hector be subject to the “standard terms and conditions of probation,
as well as those specific to his needs.”
1 References to code sections are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
2 Other counts initially alleged were subsequently dismissed by the People.

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The matter was set for a contested disposition. The disposition hearing was held
on January 29, 2018. At the disposition hearing, 14-year-old Hector testified that he did
commit the crimes that were found true at the jurisdictional hearing. The juvenile court
declared Hector to be a ward of the court and placed him on probation, subject to terms
and conditions. Hector was committed to the Tulare County Long Term Program for a
period of 24 months and remanded forthwith.
Among the terms and conditions of probation was the requirement that Hector
“submit to a search of his electronic devices to ensure he refrains from having contact
with his coparticipants and victims.” Hector’s counsel objected to this condition of
probation but did not state the basis of the objection. The juvenile court responded that
the condition was appropriate “because of the no contact with the coparticipant clause.”
The facts of the offenses are set forth below.
Assault and Elder Abuse
Around 6:00 p.m. on September 20, 2017, Yang Saeturn was weeding a
community garden. Some boys picked up a hose and “drenched” her in water; they
sprayed the water into her face. There were four boys and while their faces were covered
in part, Saeturn could “recognize their eyes, their forehead and their stature.” Saeturn
recalled one of the boys was wearing a blue shirt, another wore jeans; none of the
clothing appeared to be gang attire. They all wore different clothing.
After drenching her in water, the boys left but returned with sticks and began
attacking Saeturn with the sticks. During the attack, she was “hit so hard that the blood
in my eyes was released and I was blinded by the blood.” Saeturn tried to walk away
using the garden hoe as a cane when she was struck in the leg and went down. She tried
to get up using the hoe for support but was struck in the arm. Saeturn used her cell phone
to call 911 for help.
Help arrived and Saeturn was taken to the hospital. Saeturn had injuries to the left
eye area, hand, and thigh where she was hit with a stick. One of the sticks had a nail in it

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and that was the stick that injured the eye area. She also was hurt when she fell to the
ground. At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, Saeturn was still in pain as a result of the
attack.
Saeturn identified Hector as one of her attackers at the jurisdiction hearing. She
testified Hector was wearing the same blue shirt at the hearing that he had worn on the
day she was attacked.
Irma Andrade lives across the street from the community garden. She was in her
yard when Saeturn was attacked. She saw a group of “kids” take a garden hose from
Saeturn, wet her, and then each boy hit her with sticks. All of them had sticks. Two of
them had been wearing masks but pushed them up when they finished the attack and
Andrade was able to see all their faces.
The attack was “real quick.” Andrade was dialing 911 as she ran across the street
to the garden to assist Saeturn. The boys ran away after the attack. Andrade testified she
saw Hector hitting Saeturn with a stick. Andrade said Saeturn was “really beaten bad.”
The sticks that were used to attack Saeturn were tree limbs of about six feet in length.
Later in the evening of the attack, police contacted Andrade to make a field
identification. She identified Hector as one of the attackers. Hector was wearing a black
shirt and black shorts when Andrade identified him the evening of the attack.
Visalia Police Officer Julian Lopez responded to the 911 call and saw four boys
come down from the top of a stairwell near the top of a building and scatter. None of the
boys were wearing masks. Hector was one of the boys; he was wearing all black. Two
of the juveniles, including Hector, were detained by officers.
Lopez issued Miranda3 rights to Hector and questioned him to determine if he
knew right from wrong. Hector was wearing black clothing. When asked to give an
example of the difference between right and wrong, Hector responded that it would be
3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

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wrong to “hurt somebody.” When asked if it would be wrong to hit somebody on
September 20, 2017, the date of the assault on Saeturn, Hector did not respond.
Visalia Police Officer Tim Haener interviewed Andrade the night of the attack on
Saeturn. Andrade told Haener she saw four juveniles walk toward the community
garden, put on Halloween masks, wet down Saeturn with a garden hose, arm themselves
with sticks from the garden, and beat the elderly woman. Andrade stated they took off
their masks as they ran away.
Three masks were found at the crime scene. Haener testified the masks would
cover one’s face but if they were made for an adult, they would be loose fitting on a
juvenile and allow a person to see more of the eyes, forehead, and bridge of the nose.
Other Counts
Teenaged A.R. was riding his bike to school when Hector ran up behind him and
slapped A.R. “hard” in the head, knocking him off his bike. Hector took A.R.’s bike and
rode away.
Eliana Cerna was standing outside her place of work, talking on her cell phone.
She watched as Hector approached her. Hector asked for directions and as Cerna turned
to point with her left hand, Hector grabbed the cell phone from her right hand. Hector
took off running.
DISCUSSION
Hector argues the evidence is insufficient to support the findings he committed the
offenses in counts 1 and 2, which are the offenses against Saeturn. He also contends the
electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and invades his privacy.
I. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Findings
Sufficiency of the Evidence Standard
The test of sufficiency of the evidence is whether, reviewing the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment below, substantial evidence is disclosed such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a

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reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; accord, Jackson v.
Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) Substantial evidence is that evidence which is
“reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 578.) An
appellate court must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421,
425.) An appellate court must not reweigh the evidence (People v. Culver (1973) 10
Cal.3d 542, 548), reappraise the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts,
as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96
Cal.App.3d 353, 367). This standard of review applies to juvenile proceedings. (In re
Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605.)
Analysis
We acknowledge that Hector’s counsel sought to discredit the testimony of
Saeturn at the jurisdictional hearing. Counsel questioned how Saeturn could recognize
her attackers if they were wearing masks; whether she could see clearly after being struck
near her eye; whether she was confused; and asked various other questions designed to
attack her identification of Hector.
Defense counsel also sought to attack the credibility of Andrade and her
identification of Hector as one of the attackers. Counsel questioned Andrade about her
prior statements to law enforcement and tried to show inconsistencies between the prior
statements and Andrade’s testimony at the jurisdictional hearing.
In finding counts 1 and 2 to be true, the juvenile court stated, “I understand there
are some inconsistencies in the testimony, but I find the testimony given in court was
compelling and was credible. In addition, the testimony and circumstantial evidence is—
shows this to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Here, Hector was identified at the jurisdictional hearing by both Saeturn and
Andrade as one of the boys that attacked Saeturn. Andrade also made a field
identification of Hector the night of the attack. The testimony of a single witness is

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sufficient to support a conviction, or true finding. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th
412, 480; People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.) Andrade’s field
identification of Hector is further evidence supporting the true findings. (People v.
Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 480.)
That Saeturn did not see all of Hector’s face is not grounds to dismiss her
identification of him. A witness may identify an attacker by “any peculiarities of size,
appearance, similarity of voice, features or clothing.” (People v. Mohammed (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 515, 522.) Moreover, any discrepancies between Saeturn’s and Andrade’s
observations, and between their initial statements and in court identifications, is not
grounds to reject their identification of Hector. These are matters that go to the weight of
the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, which are matters to be determined by the
trier of fact. (Ibid.)
Circumstantial evidence also supported the true findings against Hector. When
Lopez responded to the scene of the attack, he saw four boys come down from the top of
a stairwell near the top of a building and scatter. None of the juveniles were wearing
masks and Hector was one of the boys in the group. Hector was wearing all black, which
matched the description of his clothing given by Andrade.
Based upon the eyewitness identification of Hector and the circumstantial
evidence of his presence near the scene of the attack in clothing matching the description
of one of the attackers according to Andrade, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Hector committed the offenses against Saeturn. (People v. Jones
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
II. Electronic Search Condition

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The probation officer recommended imposition of various terms and conditions of
probation, including that “[t]he minor shall submit to a search of his/her electronic
devices to ensure: he refrains from having contact with his co-participants and victims.”
The juvenile court imposed this condition.
Forfeiture
Hector now contends the electronic devices search condition is unconstitutionally
overbroad and impinges on his constitutional right to privacy.4 We initially note that
Hector has forfeited this challenge. Although defense counsel objected to imposition of
the electronic search condition, counsel failed to articulate any basis for the objection.
“A defendant who contends a condition of probation is constitutionally flawed still has an
obligation to object to the condition on that basis in the trial court in order to preserve the
claim on appeal.” (People v. Gardineer (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 148, 151.) Having failed
to preserve the claim for appeal, the contention is forfeited.
Regardless, Hector’s challenge to the electronic search condition lacks merit.
Generally, we review the imposition of any condition of probation for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Snow (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 932, 940.) Reversal is required only
if the juvenile court’s ruling is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bounds of reason.
(People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) Constitutional challenges to
probation conditions, however, are reviewed de novo. (In re Malik J. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 896, 901.)
Juvenile Probation
4 Questions concerning the propriety of the imposition of electronic search
conditions are currently pending review before the state Supreme Court. (See, e.g.,
People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S238210;
In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016, S236628; In re
Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923.)
.

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A ward of the juvenile court placed on probation is subject to “any and all
reasonable conditions that [the court] may determine fitting and proper to the end that
justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”
(§ 730, subd. (b).) Thus, to effect an offender’s rehabilitation the juvenile court has
broad discretion to fashion the conditions of probation, and may even impose conditions
that are unconstitutional or otherwise improper, so long as they are tailored to meet the
juvenile’s specific needs. (In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 753-754.)
“The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions [of
probation] and may impose ‘ “any reasonable condition that is ‘fitting and proper to the
end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward
enhanced.’ ” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.) A condition of probation
that would be unconstitutional or improper for an adult may be permissible for a minor.
(Ibid.) “Juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than
adults, and their constitutional rights are more circumscribed. [Citation.] Further, when
the state asserts jurisdiction over a minor, it stands in the shoes of the parents. A parent
may curtail a child’s exercise of constitutional rights because a parent’s own
constitutionally protected ‘ “ ‘liberty’ ” ’ includes the right to ‘ “ ‘bring up children’ ” ’
and to ‘ “ ‘direct the upbringing and education of children.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, the
juvenile court may impose probation conditions that infringe on constitutional rights if
the conditions are tailored to meet the needs of the minor.” (In re Antonio C. (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033-1034.) In deciding what probation conditions are appropriate,
the juvenile court considers both the circumstances of the offense(s) and the minor’s
entire social history. (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.)
Privacy Contention
We turn first to Hector’s claim the electronic search condition unconstitutionally
infringes on his privacy.

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We disagree that the electronic search condition impermissibly infringes on
Hector’s privacy rights. As a ward of the court, Hector no longer enjoys the same
privacy rights as one who is not. The right of a ward, or probationer, to be free from
unreasonable searches or seizures gives way to government activities that reasonably
limit the expectation of privacy, such as probation supervision. (In re Kacy S. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 704, 710-711.)
Hector’s reliance on People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719 [adult
probationer], People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1211-1212 [search of adult’s
device incident to arrest under mistaken belief he was on probation], and Riley v.
California (2014) 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2477 [adult’s cell phone searched incident to arrest], is
misplaced. The constitutional interest in privacy of a juvenile ward of the court is
significantly more curtailed than that of an adult, or someone who has not been convicted
of a criminal offense. (In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 136; In re Antonio R.
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) The state, when it assumes jurisdiction over a minor,
stands in the shoes of the parent and a parent may curtail a child’s exercise of
constitutional rights. (In re Antonio R., at p. 941.)
A parent could quite reasonably elect to monitor a child’s use of electronic devices
for suspected association with persons the parent deems undesirable or criminal activity.
When, as here, a minor has been declared a ward of the court because of criminal
activity; has admitted to a history of substance abuse; has frequently been suspended
from school; is an acknowledged gang member; and the minor fails to comply with
parental rules and discipline; the state may elect to monitor use of electronic devices. (In
re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919-923.)
Overbreadth Contention
We next turn to Hector’s claim the electronic search condition is
unconstitutionally overbroad. Probation conditions are invalid when they (1) have no
relationship to the crime committed by the probationer; (2) relate to conduct which is not

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itself criminal; and (3) require or forbid conduct which is not reasonably related to the
probationer’s future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent).)
“This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will
invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).)
To avoid possible overbreadth, the probation condition must be closely tailored to its
purpose. (Id. at p. 384.)
We acknowledge the electronic search condition has no relationship to the crimes
committed by Hector, nor is the use of electronic devices itself criminal. However,
juvenile courts have broader discretion than adult criminal courts in fashioning conditions
of probation. (In re Antonio C., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033.) So long as
reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer is promoted, the juvenile court has
broad discretion to impose conditions of probation. (In re Luis F. (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 176, 188.) The electronic search condition promotes Hector’s rehabilitation,
tends to prevent future criminality, and satisfies Lent.
The electronic search condition is reasonably related to future criminality, even if
it had no connection to the offenses for which Hector was declared a ward of the court.
Hector engaged in criminal behavior with three other boys; admitted to the probation
officer he had a history of using illegal substances; had frequently been suspended from
school; and was an admitted gang member. Drug use and gang involvement are
recognized as precursors to serious criminality. (In re P.A. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23,
36; In re Robert M. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 812, 815-816.)
Access to electronic devices can be a useful tool in tracking possible use of illegal
substances, contacts with his coparticipants in the offenses against Saeturn, and contacts
with any of his victims, all of which is prohibited conduct under the terms and conditions
of Hector’s probation. A probation condition that enables a probation officer to
effectively supervise a minor on probation is reasonably related to future criminality and

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rehabilitation. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 379-381; People v. Ebertowski
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1176-1177.)
We respectfully disagree with In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 913, and
In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 756-7575 and their conclusion that because there
was nothing in the record to tie the use of electronic devices to Hector’s commitment
offenses, there was no reason to believe an electronic search condition would serve a
rehabilitative purpose. Nothing in Lent or Olguin requires a connection between a
probationer’s past conduct and the locations or items that may be subject to a search
condition.
Given the ubiquity of electronic devices, we are not prepared to say that an
electronic search condition is unreasonable simply because the record does not show the
minor used them to engage in illegal activity. While the record does not contain evidence
that Hector contacted associates or gang members or noted use of illegal substances
through social media or his electronic devices, it is naïve to suggest that such contact did
not or will not occur in the future. Call logs, text and voicemail messages, photographs,
social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), and emails are all likely to reveal
whether Hector is engaging in conduct that violates his probation.
DISPOSITION
The disposition order, including all terms and conditions of probation contained
therein, is affirmed.
5 Here, again, the other cases cited by Hector in this portion of his brief are
inapposite because they address adult probationers.

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