P. v. Riel

Filed 1/12/07 P. v. Riel CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JULIAN JOE RIEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
G036592
(Super. Ct. No. 04WF0822)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, M. Marc
Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf
and Erika Hiramatsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *

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Appellant Julian Joe Riel was convicted of the felony of reckless evasion of
a peace officer under California Vehicle Code section 2800.2 and driving without a valid
license, a misdemeanor under section 12500, subdivision (a) of the same code. He was
sentenced to the aggravated term of three years for the felony. The court struck two of
his “Three Strikes” law priors for sentencing, but used the third to double his term for the
reckless evasion and added another year for another prior. The resultant sentence was
imprisonment for seven years.
Riel does not complain about the conduct of his trial, so a précis of its facts
is not necessary. He complains only that his sentencing was improper. We find no flaw
in the sentencing that we can address, and therefore affirm the conviction in its entirety.
* * *
Appellant complains that, “The trial court erred in imposing an aggravated
term of imprisonment based on facts neither alleged in the information nor found true by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” He seeks reversal on the authority of Blakely v.
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296.
Riel concedes this issue has been decided against him in People v. Black
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, and that, “Black is controlling at this time within the California
courts . . . .” Nonetheless, he urges us, in the absence of a “published federal opinion on
whether Black can be reconciled with the Blakely opinion,” to adopt his argument that
“Black was wrongfully decided,” and order stricken those portions of the sentencing
order which he feels violate Blakely.
But we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Black. While we can
understand Riel’s desire to preserve the issue for further review in the event the federal
courts disagree with Black, we are not free to reassess Supreme Court precedent unless
and until the United States Supreme Court weighs in on the issue. (See Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

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That day may come (see People v. Cunningham (Apr. 18, 2005, A103501)
[nonpub. opn.] cert. granted sub nom. Cunningham v. California, Feb. 21, 2006, No. 05-
6551, __ U.S. __, on the issue of whether Blakely applies to California’s sentencing law),
but until it does, we have neither reason nor power to grant appellant relief. The
judgment is affirmed.
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, J.
MOORE, J.

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