25-1067 Keila Garcíacolón v. State Insurance Fund Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 24-1786
25-1067
KEILA GARCÍA COLÓN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
STATE INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee,
INSURANCE COMPANY A, B AND C,
Defendant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Hamilton,* and Aframe,
Circuit Judges.
Juan R. González Muñoz, with whom Gonzalez Muñoz Law Offices,
P.S.C., Natalia E. del Nido Rodríguez, and Casillas, Santiago &
Torres LLC were on brief, for appellant.
Peter W. Miller, with whom Javier A. Vega Villalba, and
Weinstein-Bacal, Miller & Vega, P.S.C. were on brief, for appellee.
* Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

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February 27, 2026

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HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Keila García Colón
("García") works as a nurse for Puerto Rico's State Insurance Fund
Corporation ("SIFC"). In 2021, after making a complaint against
another employee, she brought this suit alleging unlawful
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Puerto Rico Law 115. García won a jury verdict and was
ultimately awarded $300,000 in damages.
These appeals are not about that verdict but about what
came after. They present three distinct sets of issues. First,
the district court denied García's motion for a permanent
injunction. García challenges that denial. Second, the district
court later awarded García approximately $301,000 in attorney fees
and costs under the Title VII fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k). García challenges the fee award as insufficient.
Third, the SIFC did not appeal the final judgment or the fee award.
Citing Puerto Rico Act No. 66-2014, as amended by Act No. 68-2023,
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 9141-42, the district court nevertheless
stayed execution of the judgment and fee award until the Secretary
of Justice approves a payment plan stretching out payments over at
least three years. García also challenges that stay of execution.
We affirm the denial of the permanent injunction and the
award of attorney fees and costs. We already lifted the stay of
execution shortly after oral argument in October 2025. We explain
our reasons in this opinion.

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Part I of this opinion lays out the relevant facts and
procedural history. Part II affirms the denial of a permanent
injunction. Part III affirms the attorney fee award. Part IV
explains why § 9141 cannot be applied to delay indefinitely the
execution of this federal judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, without necessarily vouching for the objective
accuracy of each fact. Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Management, Inc., 671
F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2012).
A. GARCÍA'S EMPLOYMENT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINT
García has worked as a nurse since 2004 for the State
Insurance Fund Corporation, also known as SIFC or El Fondo, which
administers the worker's compensation system in Puerto Rico. In
2014, she asked to work out of SIFC's Arecibo Regional Office, and
she worked there until 2023. Among her duties, she administers
medication, supports doctors, and evaluates patients. By all
accounts, she is an excellent nurse.
In 2020, per her complaint, García believed another
employee of the SIFC was sexually harassing her. In February 2020,
she complained about the sexual harassment to her employer. A few
months later, in October 2020, she filed an administrative charge
of sex discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. García eventually dropped her claims of

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actual sexual harassment in this case, so we need not discuss the
specifics of the alleged harassment. Our focus is on García's
claim of retaliation, which produced the jury verdict in her favor.
While the administrative complaints were pending, the
events at the crux of this case occurred. To start, García's
co-worker Migdalia Baerga, who was assigned to patient intake,
began intimidating and threatening García, according to the trial
evidence. Baerga frequently waited by the punch clock to "place
herself there close to" García as she arrived for her shift.
Baerga also made it a habit to sit in her car and to watch García
as she left for lunch. That scene was so commonplace that García's
friends began accompanying her to the parking lot. According to
multiple accounts, Baerga made menacing comments to and about
García. In particular, García alleged that Baerga once said that
García was "so pretty to stab."
B. THE JULY 2020 INCIDENTS
July 2020 was a pivotal month for García. SIFC's
facilities had just reopened after being shut down for several
months during the COVID-19 pandemic. Not long after, three people
filed grievances and complaints against García, each of which, as
will be described, turned out to have little or no merit. The
first: on July 3, 2020, García and other nurses were offering
services at screening tables. An administrator, Albert Vargas,
instructed García to cover a table other than the one she was

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working at the time. She refused, and for seemingly good reason.
Vargas was not her direct supervisor and did not have any authority
in the chain of command to instruct nursing personnel like García.
García's own supervisor, Nora Rosario Medina ("Rosario"), had told
her and the other nurses to "remain the way we were."
Vargas complained about García's noncompliance to
Magalis Soto Pagán ("Soto"), who was then SIFC's Regional Executive
Director for Arecibo. Soto asked Rosario to reprimand García.
Instead, Rosario counseled all the staff on proper protocol.
Rosario described the dispute in a report as simply a
misunderstanding between Vargas and García. In response, Soto
criticized Rosario for not following her instructions; she
insisted that the "guidance was only for" García, no one else.
The next two incidents both happened on July 14, 2020.
First, a maintenance supervisor, Jorge Ramos Cuevas ("Ramos"),
asked García to provide him with a hospital gown. She denied the
request, explaining that Ramos needed to make the request to a
nursing supervisor. At that point in the COVID-19 pandemic, the
supply of such personal protective equipment was limited. Instead
of speaking to García's supervisor about her behavior, Ramos filed
a grievance with the Office of the Executive Director. But a
follow-up letter from a labor relations officer indicated that
García was correct in declining Ramos's request, and in any event,
Rosario had spoken with her about the incident. The letter

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concluded: "This situation should never have been referred to our
office, it was handled internally and absolutely cannot be used to
establish a pattern of behavior on the part of [García]."
On that same day, García was said to have called
Radiology Service Supervisor Roberto Rosado-González ("Rosado")
homophobic slurs. Rosado filed a complaint alleging as much with
the Office of Labor Relations, which investigated. The incident
started when García had confronted Rosado for wearing his facemask
improperly. Baerga, who was a witness to the confrontation, said
that after Rosado left, García screamed slurs about his sexual
orientation -- allegedly calling him, for example, a "dirty
faggot."
Summarizing the follow-up investigation, Rosario
testified at trial that Rosado "entered into the immediate care
unit with his mask down to his chin, leaving uncovered his nose
and his mouth." When García pointed out the problem, two nurses
said that Rosado raised his voice at García, and not vice versa.
To be sure, as a letter following the investigation stated,
García's tone was inappropriate, but no witness other than Baerga
said García had used the offensive language.
C. THE FEDERAL LAWSUIT AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
García filed this suit in May 2021 against SIFC in the
District of Puerto Rico largely under both Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and Puerto Rico Law 115

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("Law 115"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 194 et seq. Her central
claim is that she faced retaliation for months after she complained
about sexual harassment in the workplace and said that her employer
was legally responsible for it. In June 2021, the district court
issued a preliminary injunction requiring SIFC to separate García
from Baerga. García continued working in the Arecibo Regional
Office. Baerga was assigned to continue working remotely.
D. THE PARKING DISPUTE AND TRANSFER TO MANATÍ DISPENSARY
As the lawsuit proceeded, García found herself in
another dispute. In October 2022, she parked in a parking lot
that was closed off for construction. Rosario and the Arecibo
then-interim Regional Executive Director Humberto Deliz Vélez
("Deliz") reprimanded her. Rosario warned García that if she
continued her behavior, she would be referred to the Office of
Labor Relations. Around the same time, Deliz made the referral to
the Office. In February 2023, the Office declined to take further
action, noting that no referral was necessary. Rosario had "the
situation . . . handled."
Five months later, and after the preliminary injunction
had been in place for nearly two years, SIFC reassigned García in
March 2023 from the Arecibo Regional Office to the Manatí
Dispensary. By that point, García had been working in the Arecibo
Regional Office for almost ten years. The situation had changed,
however. For reasons having nothing to do with García or this

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lawsuit, Baerga was now being required to return to in-person work.
SIFC notified García of her transfer to Manatí in a letter giving
three reasons. First, the letter said, there was a shortage of
nurses at the Manatí Dispensary. Second, Baerga herself could not
be transferred to the Manatí Dispensary because of a medical
condition that required accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Third, the
preliminary injunction of June 4, 2021, required SIFC to ensure
that Baerga and García were not working at the same location. SIFC
had no real choice. If it did not transfer García to another
office, it would either violate a court order or fail to
accommodate Baerga's medical condition in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. García was unhappy with the
change and believed it was further unlawful retaliation against
her. The involuntary transfer became part of García's retaliation
case for trial.
E. THE TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Meanwhile, in the district court, this case was moving
toward trial. By then, García had already agreed to dismiss her
sexual harassment claim, leaving only the retaliation claim for
trial. At trial, García advanced a theory of retaliation based on
a hostile work environment. The jury returned a verdict for
García, and the court ultimately entered a judgment in her favor

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for $300,000 under federal and Puerto Rico law. See P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 29, § 123; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
After trial, García filed several motions. She first
moved for permanent injunctive relief seeking, among other things,
an order reassigning her to the Arecibo Regional Office and
expunging documents related to the four July 2020 and October 2022
incidents described above in Parts I.B and I.D. The district court
denied that motion. García later petitioned for attorney fees and
costs, and the district court awarded her $300,936.10. Finally,
García moved for execution of the final judgment and fees and
costs. That motion was initially granted as to her motion for
execution of judgment, but upon a motion for reconsideration, the
district court changed its mind. Citing § 9141, the district court
stayed execution pending the Secretary of Justice's approval of a
payment plan that would allow SIFC, as a public corporation, at
least three years to make payments to García and her lawyers.
García appealed the order denying permanent injunctive
relief, the fee award, and the stay of the execution of judgment.
We consolidated the appeals. Shortly after oral argument in
October 2025, we lifted the stay of execution of the judgment and
attorney fees and costs. These amounts have largely been paid.1
1 The parties have reported that SIFC retained a percentage
of both payments for Puerto Rico taxes, and the parties disagree
whether those retentions were legal or justified. We express no
views on those issues.

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II. DENIAL OF A PERMANENT INJUNCTION
Title VII gives courts broad authority to order
injunctive relief when "the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint[.]" 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 421 (1975) ("Congress' purpose [was] . . . to make possible
the fashioning of the most complete relief possible." (cleaned
up)). The decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction
requires a district court to engage with the facts of the specific
case and to exercise its sound discretion. E.g., Howe v. City of
Akron, 801 F.3d 718, 752–53 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing Title VII
injunction); Brown v. Alabama Dep't of Transportation, 597 F.3d
1160, 1185 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); E.E.O.C. v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1577–78 (7th Cir. 1997), modifying on
rehearing 97 F.3d 204 (1996) (same); accord, Doe v. Rhode Island
Interscholastic League, 137 F.4th 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2025) (same for
Titles II and III of Americans with Disabilities Act); Shell Co.
(Puerto Rico) Ltd. v. Los Frailes Service Station, Inc., 605 F.3d
10, 19 (1st Cir. 2010) (same under Petroleum Marketing Practices
Act).
We review findings of fact for clear error and
conclusions of law de novo. See Doe, 137 F.4th at 39–40; Howe,
801 F.3d at 753; Brown, 597 F.3d at 1185. We review for an abuse

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of discretion the district court's balancing of factors governing
equitable relief. See Financial Oversight & Management Board for
Puerto Rico v. Estate of Serrano, 102 F.4th 527, 534 (1st Cir.
2024); E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 113 F.4th 777, 791
(7th Cir. 2024). That "discretion must be guided by legal
principles," of course, including the objectives of Title VII and
its major purpose of making persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination or retaliation.
Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming
denial of equitable relief), citing Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at
416, 418; accord, Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32,
56–57 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming award of front pay); Lussier v.
Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir. 1995) (same), citing Albemarle
Paper, 422 U.S. at 417.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit in Miles that we should
approve a denial of equitable relief under Title VII "only if that
denial does not frustrate Title VII's objective of making the
plaintiff whole." 387 F.3d at 599; accord, Brown v. Trustees of
Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 360 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Once Title VII
liability has been imposed, a court should deny 'make whole' relief
'only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate
the central statutory purpose of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination.'"), quoting Albemarle Paper,

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422 U.S. at 421. As we explain here, we are satisfied that the
district judge in this case carefully weighed the question of
injunctive relief and reasonably decided to deny such relief.
In the district court, García made five requests for
permanent injunctive relief under Title VII. The district judge
denied them all. On appeal, García challenges the denial of two:
first to enjoin her relocation to the Manatí Dispensary, and second
to expunge certain disciplinary records from her employee file.
A. TRANSFER TO THE MANATÍ DISPENSARY
García contends the district court was required to
permanently enjoin her transfer to the Manatí Dispensary. The
district court declined to do so because it found that the transfer
itself was not retaliatory. García argues, however, that the
district court was forbidden from making its own finding. The
jury found that SIFC retaliated against her by subjecting her to
a hostile work environment. García infers that the jury
necessarily found the transfer itself was retaliatory and that
such an implied finding is binding on the district court. In the
alternative, she argues that the district court clearly erred in
making its factual findings. We reject both arguments.
1. THE JURY VERDICT
Before getting to the analysis, we start with a
clarification. The district court asserted that it had no
"jurisdiction" to order the relief because the transfer was not

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pleaded in the complaint. The transfer occurred after the
operative complaint was filed. We reject the suggestion that, at
the end of a case, a plaintiff can be granted injunctive relief
only when her complaint pleads exactly what she will seek to
enjoin.
That limit would run afoul of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 54(c) instructs courts to "grant the relief to
which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
that relief in its pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). To receive
the benefit of Rule 54(c), the basis for relief must still have
been squarely presented and litigated by the parties, but it need
not have been demanded in the pleadings. See Rodriguez v. Doral
Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1173 (1st Cir. 1995) (vacating relief
ordered by district court on legal theory not pleaded or litigated
at trial as required under Rule 54(c)); see also In re Rivinius,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the rule
"does not allow [a party] to obtain relief based upon a . . .
theory that was not properly raised at trial").
In a situation like this, where the plaintiff contends
that retaliation continued during the lawsuit (and after the
operative complaint), Rule 15(b) is also instructive. It
provides: "When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by
the parties' express or implied consent, it must be treated in all
respects as if raised in the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2).

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Put differently, issues that are actually tried can call for a
remedy under Rule 54(c) even if the pleadings do not mention them.
See Evans Products Co. v. West American Insurance Co., 736 F.2d
920, 923–24 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting interplay between Rules 15(b)
and 54(c)); Cioffe v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539, 541–42 (11th Cir. 1982)
(same). The only hurdle at that point is consent, which a party
can provide implicitly "by either treating a claim introduced
outside the complaint as having been pleaded, either through [the
party's] effective engagement of the claim or through his silent
acquiescence; or by acquiescing during trial in the introduction
of evidence which is relevant only to that issue." In re Fustolo,
896 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2018), quoting Antilles Cement Corp. v.
Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310, 319 (1st Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
A district court of course does not need to grant a
remedy for a cause of action not identified in the complaint or
raised otherwise at any point in the case. See Town of Portsmouth
v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2016) (discussing this and
other limits of Rule 54(c)). But this is not one of those
instances. García pleaded a retaliation claim in her complaint.
That claim was the core of her case even if some specific acts of
alleged retaliation had not occurred when the pleadings were closed
and even if the specifics were not identified until later in the
case. García tried the transfer issue as part of her retaliation
claim, and both parties fully aired their evidence and arguments

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during trial. García's transfer became part of the case. The
district court had the power to issue injunctive relief related to
García's transfer; it was not without jurisdiction to do so.2
Turning to the merits, García relies upon a well-settled
principle: When a plaintiff seeks both legal and equitable relief
with common issues of fact, the legal claims must be tried first
before a jury. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479
(1962). After the trial, the jury's findings of fact can bind the
district court when it later decides about equitable relief.
Perdoni Brothers, Inc. v. Concrete Systems, Inc., 35 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 1994).
This principle, however, binds the judge to only what
the jury actually decided; the judge "is not bound as to an issue
not resolved by the jury[.]" 18 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4418 (3d ed.); see Brown, 597 F.3d at 1184–85 (no
deference to findings that the jury did not necessarily make on a
legal claim); Franzen v. Ellis Corp., 543 F.3d 420, 428 (7th Cir.
2008) ("[A] district court may not re-decide factual issues already
necessarily determined by a jury."); cf. Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d
469, 472 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming judgment notwithstanding jury
2 For its conclusion that it had no jurisdiction, the district
court relied only on a Ninth Circuit case, Pacific Radiation
Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th
Cir. 2015). That case is not on-point. It and the precedent it
cited spoke only to preliminary injunctions, which are governed by
a different set of considerations. Id. at 636.

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verdict where district court's decision accepted all of special
verdict's explicit or implicit findings).
In this case, the jury made no findings of fact specific
enough to bind the judge on specific requests for permanent
injunctive relief. The verdict form asked in general terms whether
García "was subjected to retaliation by [SIFC] because she engaged
in protected conduct." If the jury answered "Yes," as it did, the
verdict form asked only if SIFC "exercised reasonable care to
prevent and promptly correct the retaliatory hostile work
environment." There was no follow-up or explanation. The verdict
thus does not tell us whether the jury found García's 2023 transfer
was an act of unlawful retaliation.
There is room to argue that the judge is bound by the
necessary implications of the jury's explicit findings. Other
circuits have recognized "that district courts sitting in equity
follow necessary factual implications in jury verdicts," while
"any findings not necessarily implied by, but nonetheless
consistent with, the verdict [are] left to the trial judge."
Covidien LP v. Esch, 993 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2021), citing
Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2016), Miles,
387 F.3d at 599–600, and Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc.,
374 F.3d 906, 912–13 (10th Cir. 2004); cf. Hoult v. Hoult, 157
F.3d 29, 31–32 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing similar rule where claim

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was barred by collateral estoppel because of jury verdict in
earlier action).
In a case seeking both damages and injunctive relief
based on common facts, a judge should consider both the jury's
explicit findings and facts it necessarily decided implicitly.
Covidien LP, 993 F.3d at 56–57 (applying this standard); Kairys v.
Southern Pines Trucking, Inc., 75 F.4th 153, 161 (3d Cir. 2023)
(adopting and applying this standard). When a factual issue was
not explicitly determined and not "necessarily implie[d]" by a
jury's verdict, however, the judge can make that factual finding
in the first instance. Kairys, 75 F.4th at 161, quoting Ag
Services of America, Inc. v. Nielsen, 231 F.3d 726, 731 (10th Cir.
2000).3
Invoking these general principles, García contends the
jury necessarily found that her transfer to the Manatí Dispensary
was retaliatory. We disagree. The verdict simply was not that
specific. García brought retaliation claims under Title VII and
Puerto Rico Law 115. The two "are largely symmetrical in scope."
3 García criticizes the district court for quoting the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591 (7th Cir.
2004). We find no error in the district court's use of Miles as
persuasive authority, and its quotation of Miles was fair. The
standard applied in Miles is consistent with our approach here and
in Covidien LP, as well as with other circuits that have discussed
the issue. E.g., Kairys, 75 F.4th at 161; Teutscher, 835 F.3d at
944, 955; Nielsen, 231 F.3d at 731.

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Velez v. Janssen Ortho, LLC, 467 F.3d 802, 809 (1st Cir. 2006).
To prevail under both statutes, a plaintiff must prove, among other
things, that she suffered a "materially adverse action." Stratton
v. Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2024) (discussing
Title VII claim). A materially adverse action might be the
"creation of a hostile work environment or the intensification of
a pre-existing hostile environment." Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson,
439 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006). In this case, García premised her
retaliation claim on the creation of a hostile work environment.
That was how the case was tried and how the jury was instructed.
The jury was not instructed that any particular
incidents or actions had to be part of the hostile work environment
for García to succeed. The jury was instructed in broad terms
that García needed to show that "she was subjected to severe or
pervasive harassment," not that she needed to show specifically
that the transfer was retaliatory. Per the instructions:
"Retaliation claims can be predicated on the cumulative effect of
a defendant's retaliatory acts . . . or one that a reasonable
employee would have found to be materially adverse." During
closing argument, García's counsel said correctly that a
materially adverse employment action could be a "collection -- a
combination of situations," and her counsel described several that
could contribute to a hostile work environment in this case.

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It is possible the jury thought that García's transfer
was part of the retaliatory and hostile work environment, created
and cultivated by SIFC. But the trial record does not compel that
conclusion. García could have prevailed even if the jury saw the
transfer differently and based its verdict on a broader combination
of excessive and meritless disciplinary actions against her.
Finally, García argues that the jury implicitly rejected
the non-retaliatory reasons SIFC gave for her transfer because
they were instructed on pretext: "If García proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that El Fondo's [SIFC's] explanation
for the adverse employment action is a pretext, then Plaintiff may
prevail."
The pretext instruction does not solve García's problem.
The instruction offered proof of pretext as only one way in which
García "may" prevail, not as the only way she could prevail. The
verdict for García did not mean that the jury necessarily found
her transfer was retaliatory.
"[W]hen the basis of the jury's verdict is unclear, each
of the potential theories supporting the verdict is open to
contention 'unless this uncertainty [is] removed by extrinsic
evidence showing the precise point involved and determined.'"
Miles, 387 F.3d at 600, quoting Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608
(1876). García has not shown that the district court denied her

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request for injunctive relief based on any factual finding that
was inconsistent with the jury's verdict.
2. CLEARLY ERRONEOUS?
With the ability and duty to make its own factual
findings, the district court ultimately found that García's
transfer did not amount to retaliation. García contends the court
was wrong to do so. We disagree. It did not clearly err.
The district court found that SIFC's reasons for
transferring García were legitimate and non-retaliatory. First,
as noted, SIFC said that it needed to transfer García because there
was a shortage of nurses at the Manatí Dispensary. That finding
was not clearly erroneous. Trial testimony indicated that both
the Manatí Dispensary and the Arecibo Regional Office were facing
nurse shortages.
Second, the court found that Baerga's return to the
workplace offered a legitimate and non-retaliatory reason to move
García to the Manatí dispensary. Baerga was set to return to work
in-person due to concerns about an impending audit. But there
were several limits on where she could work. For one, she has an
eye condition, protected under the American Disabilities Act, that
prevented her from driving long distances and in the dark. That
condition would rule out transferring her to the Manatí Dispensary,
which would have required such driving. She also could not return
to the Arecibo Regional Office while García worked there. The

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district court's preliminary injunction barred SIFC from having
Baerga and García work in the same facility. Faced with these
limits, SIFC chose to transfer García to the Manatí Dispensary.
The court's finding that SIFC transferred her because of those
limits rather than to retaliate against her for complaining about
sexual harassment was not clearly erroneous.
In making this finding, the district court credited the
testimony of SIFC Director of Labor Relations Gladys Meléndez Díaz
("Meléndez"). García says the court was wrong to do so because
Meléndez was evasive in her testimony. In relevant part, Meléndez
testified that she did not know whether García was transferred
pursuant to Article 25, Section 8 of the collective bargaining
agreement. Per García, this testimony led the district court
astray. Under Section 8, García argues, an employee cannot be
transferred involuntarily to a temporary placement for more than
five days. If the transfer had been made under Section 8, her
argument goes, that fact would have tended to show that the
transfer amounted to retaliation.
We see no reason to reject the district court's
credibility determination on this matter. See United States v.
Pérez-Díaz, 848 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2017). A trial court has a
better vantage point to assess and appraise witnesses than does an
appellate court. Id.; United States v. Guzmán-Batista, 783 F.3d
930, 937 (1st Cir. 2015). The trial record does not undermine

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this district court finding. García points to no facts in the
record suggesting that the transfer was actually made pursuant to
Article 25, Section 8. And contrary to García's belief, SIFC was
not required to cite another basis for the transfer to show it was
not done to retaliate. The ultimate burden of persuasion was on
García, not SIFC. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
B. EXPUNGEMENT OF DOCUMENTS
Next, García asserts that the district court erred in
denying her request to expunge from her employee records the
documents connected to the four disciplinary incidents described
above: (1) the July 2020 screening table controversy; (2) the July
2020 hospital gown incident; (3) the July 2020 face mask incident;
and (4) the October 2022 parking dispute. See supra Parts I.B,
I.D. The district court concluded that García had not shown that
keeping record of these incidents in her employee file could cause
her irreparable harm.
In Title VII cases, permanent injunctions are common.
E.g., Brown, 597 F.3d at 1185–89 (largely affirming grant of
permanent injunction under Title VII); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d
528, 547–48 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming Title VII permanent
injunction); Ilona of Hungary, 108 F.3d at 1578–79 (collecting
cases affirming permanent injunctive relief under Title VII);
accord, Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d at 359–62 (affirming

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reinstatement of tenured professor under Title VII). See also 5
Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 90.04 (2026) ("When the
alleged discrimination takes the form of retaliation, the courts
have been generally inclined to grant claims for permanent
injunctive relief.").
Nevertheless, injunctive relief is not automatic. A
district court must exercise its equitable discretion in deciding
the matter, keeping in mind the important role that injunctive
relief may play in effective enforcement of civil rights laws.
Ultimately, our review of the district court's decision to deny
injunctive relief is for abuse of discretion, and here we find
none. NACM-New England, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Credit
Management, Inc., 927 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019).
A court may issue a permanent injunction when a plaintiff
demonstrates:
(1) that [she] has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The
first two factors are critical here. Together they mean that the
plaintiff must face "a substantial injury that is not accurately
measurable or adequately compensable by money damages." Ross–

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Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 217 F.3d 8, 13 (1st
Cir. 2000), quoting Ross–Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc.,
102 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The injury might be one that has already been inflicted
or will come about if no injunction issues. See Global NAPs, Inc.
v. Verizon New England, Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2013)
(noting that injury may be one that plaintiff "will suffer" without
an injunction in place). Before the district court, García argued
that the existence of those documents in her employee record
threatens her with future use of those records to impose future
unjustified discipline. The district court disagreed. It found
that any past harm could be remedied by the money damages award
and that it was unlikely the documents would be the basis of future
discipline against García. On appeal, García challenges the
district court's finding that no future harm is likely to flow
from the documents.
The district court had reasonable grounds for its
finding. In each of the four incidents, the Office of Labor
Relations saw no need to discipline García any further, if there
might have been any need in the first place. For example, the
Office concluded that the weight of evidence contradicted the
complaint that García used homophobic slurs against a co-worker.
The Office noted that two of the other incidents were handled
sufficiently without its involvement. In particular, a labor

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relations officer wrote that the hospital gown dispute "should
never have been referred" and "absolutely cannot be used to
establish a pattern of behavior on the part of Keila García Colón."
García argues on appeal that the court's finding was
mistaken, citing testimony that the entirety of an employee's file,
including past discipline, may still be used in connection with
disciplinary measures for future infractions. Even so, the
district judge could reasonably have concluded that, given the
outcomes of the incidents, there is little or no risk that the
documents might be used against García in the future. There was
no clearly erroneous factual finding or abuse of discretion on
this issue. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of permanent
injunctive relief.
III. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD
García next challenges the district court's award of
attorney fees as inadequate. According to García, the court erred
first by excluding certain time entries from the lodestar
calculation and second by making a broad downward adjustment of
twenty percent for her limited success in these proceedings.
We review challenges to awards of attorney fees for abuse
of discretion. Pérez-Sosa v. Garland, 22 F.4th 312, 320 (1st Cir.
2022). Under that standard, we "confine our review to whether the
district court has made a mistake of law or incorrectly weighed
(or failed to weigh) a factor in its decision." Richardson v.

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Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Gay Officers Action
League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 292–93 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Apart
from mistakes of law . . . we will set aside a fee award only if
it clearly appears that the trial court ignored a factor deserving
significant weight, relied upon an improper factor, or evaluated
all the proper factors (and no improper ones), but made a serious
mistake in weighing them.").4
A reasonable attorney fee for a prevailing party is
typically calculated using the lodestar method. The court
"multipl[ies] the number of hours productively spent by a
reasonable hourly rate to calculate a base figure." Torres-Rivera
v. O'Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 2008). In
calculating that lodestar amount, the district court may adjust
the hours billed to exclude "those hours that are 'excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at
321, quoting Central Pension Fund of the International Union of
4 The district court wrote that it was granting García
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. García won on a Title VII
claim, so the proper statute governing the fee award was
section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The slip makes little practical difference.
Like § 1988, Title VII also allows district courts to award
reasonable attorney fees to prevailing parties, and "'case law
construing what is a reasonable fee applies uniformly to all'
federal fee-shifting statutes couched in similar language."
Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 321, quoting City of Burlington v. Dague,
505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Operating Engineers & Participating Employers v. Ray Haluch Gravel
Co., 745 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014).
After calculating the lodestar amount, the district
court may adjust the amount upward or downward if circumstances
warrant, including for example to reflect "the results obtained
and the time and labor actually required for the efficacious
handling of the matter." Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336; see also
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–30 & 430 n.3 (1997)
(describing twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on
other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989), where
adjustment of lodestar amount would be appropriate).
Using the lodestar method here, the district court found
a lodestar amount of $371,660.20 and ultimately awarded García
$300,936.10 in attorney fees and costs. In making the initial
lodestar calculation, the district court set aside what it called
"generic" time entries from the total hours. After coming to the
lodestar, the district court made a further downward adjustment
based on plaintiff's limited success. We affirm. Not every
district judge might have made the same reductions on the same
record, but such variations in discretionary decisions do not show
an abuse of discretion.

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A. GENERIC TIME ENTRIES
The district court identified thirty-three "generic"
entries in the time sheets of two of García's lawyers, Juan Rafael
González-Muñoz ("González") and José Luis Rivero-Vergne
("Rivero"). The court explained that "[t]he invoices submitted by
. . . Mr. González and Mr. Rivero contained entries that are too
generic for the Court to assess whether the time spent on a given
task was appropriate." For example, the entries include
descriptions of work that read only "Telephone conference with
KGC" or "Draft letter to attorneys" without additional detail.
On Attorney González's time sheets, the district court
flagged thirty-one entries as generic. Twenty-three were
"block-billed," meaning a single time entry lumped together
multiple tasks. The remaining eight each consisted of a single
task description that the court deemed too vague. The district
court discounted each block-billed entry by twenty percent,
effectively removing 13.84 hours from his time. The district court
discounted each of the eight other entries by thirty percent,
effectively removing 0.60 hours from the fee-award calculus. On
Attorney Rivero's time sheets, two entries were flagged for being
overly vague. They both appeared as two separate time entries,
and the district court discounted each entry by thirty percent,
resulting in a reduction of 0.15 hours from his time. In total,
the district court discounted 14.59 hours.

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We find nothing remotely improper in these modest
reductions, and certainly no abuse of discretion. Parties who
intend to seek attorney fees if they prevail must maintain
contemporaneous time records. E.g., Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d
934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992); Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d
945, 952 (1st Cir. 1984). "Those records must be at least
minimally illuminating: they need not contain granular details,
but they must contain some insight into the work performed" -- for
example, "'the date [the work] occurred, the kinds of work that
were done and the percentage of time spent at each task.'"
Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 329, quoting Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland
Corp., 801 F.2d 558, 560 (1st Cir. 1986).
We have made clear that when time records are "too
generic," a court "may either discount or disallow those hours."
Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336. We have affirmed fee awards based
on similar reductions for generic entries. E.g., Pérez-Sosa, 22
F.4th at 329–31; Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 340.
García's primary response is that the district judge
should have worked harder to figure out for himself from context
and additional records what work the generic entries covered and
why that work was reasonably billed to the case. After all, García
says, the district judge acknowledged that the entries
"represent[ed] time spent working on this case."

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García's response misses the point. It is not
necessarily enough for an entry to reveal a loose connection to
the case. We assume that lawyers acting in good faith would of
course bill only case-related tasks. Some level of detail,
however, allows the losing party footing the bill to challenge
"the accuracy of the records as well as the reasonableness of the
time spent." Calhoun, 801 F.2d at 560. The detail also allows
the district court to "answer questions about excessiveness,
redundancy, and the like." Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336; see
also Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 330 (noting that "'nebulous' entries
amounting to 'gauzy generalities' threaten to frustrate a district
court's effort to fashion a fair and reasonable fee award"),
quoting Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 938.
There may be circumstances, as García insists, when
surrounding entries or the court's knowledge of the case might
supply enough details for the court to find that "generic" time
was properly billed. Judges may be capable of piecing together
for themselves the needed detail. But to be clear: judges are not
required to do that extra work for the benefit of a prevailing
party who did not maintain sufficient contemporaneous time
records. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
discounting the generic time entries rather than trying to do
counsel's work for them.

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B. LIMITED SUCCESS
After calculating the initial lodestar of $371,660.20,
the district court applied a twenty percent downward adjustment
for limited success, citing García's unsuccessful sexual
harassment claim and denial of her request for permanent injunctive
relief. It did not help, the court explained, that counsel used
block-billing to record time entries that prevented the court from
"determin[ing] whether the hours billed were reasonably expended
as a 'satisfactory basis' for a fee award." Dkt. No. 414 at 25,
quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
A court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward if
the circumstances call for it. Among relevant factors, the Supreme
Court has identified the "degree of success obtained" as the "most
critical factor." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436; see also id. at 440
("[W]here the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the
district court should award only that amount of fees that is
reasonable in relation to the results obtained.").
Analyzing the degree of success obtained is not an exact
science. In assessing fees, a court's goal "is to do rough
justice, not to achieve auditing perfection." Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Gauging a party's success might require
referring to her success "claim by claim, or to the relief actually
achieved, or to the societal importance of the right which has
been vindicated, or to all of these measures in combination."

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Coutin v. Young & Rubicam Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 338
(1st Cir. 1997).
It is relatively easy to cut out hours spent on a losing
claim that shares no common facts or law with the winning claim.
It is more difficult to decide how to handle hours spent on a
successful claim and an unsuccessful one where the two claims share
a great deal of overlapping facts and common legal issues. That
description often applies in cases like this, where a substantive
employment discrimination claim was paired with a retaliation
claim and where one succeeded and the other did not.
Reviewing courts try to ensure that a district court has
different tools to account for a party's mixed results. "The
district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should
be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for
the limited success." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37.
In this case, the twenty percent reduction was not an
abuse of discretion. García voluntarily dismissed her sexual
harassment claim, and she lost her request for permanent injunctive
relief. The district court was free to discount work on a losing
motion for relief, just as it was free to discount work on a losing
claim. See Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 328–29 (affirming fee reduction
when district court excluded time spent on unsuccessful motions);
see also Coutin, 124 F.3d at 339 (explaining that a trial court

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may "consider the skimpiness of [plaintiff's] relief," even when
plaintiff "prevail[s] on all her claims").5
The district court was careful in making this reduction.
It did not categorically exclude time spent on either claim. The
court recognized that work done on the unsuccessful sexual
harassment claim may well have also contributed to the work on the
successful retaliation claim. Counsel's block-billing made it
harder for the court to gauge how many hours to exclude. With
respect to both considerations, the district court did not abuse
its discretion. See Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 340 (finding no
abuse of discretion when district judge reduced fee request by
fifteen percent in light of block billing); see also id. ("Where
that party furnishes time records that are ill-suited for
evaluative purposes, the court is hampered in ascertaining whether
those hours were excessive, redundant, or spent on irrelevant
issues.").
5 Unusual circumstances may make it perfectly reasonable for
lawyers to spend time on unsuccessful motions. See Arelene Ocasio
v. Comisión Estatal De Elecciones, No. CV 20-1432 (PAD), 2023 WL
8889653, at *4 (D.P.R. Dec. 26, 2023 (rejecting request to exclude
plaintiff's time entries on motions that were denied where
plaintiff ultimately prevailed completely in case and time entries
were "a direct result of defendants' failure to initially respond
in a timely manner"), appeal docketed, No. 24-1822 (1st Cir. Sept.
10, 2024); see also Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 666 F. Supp.
154, 158 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (awarding fees for
time spent on several potential witnesses who were not called:
"Blind alleys are an ordinary part of litigation, as are standby
witnesses. . . . These hours are ordinary inputs into winning cases
and are fully compensable.").

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Judges are obliged to calculate fair and reasonable
fees, but they "need not, and indeed should not, become
green-eyeshade accountants" to do so. Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. The
court acted well within its discretion in calculating and then
reducing the lodestar amount here. We affirm the district court's
award of attorney fees and costs.
IV. STAY OF THE JUDGMENT AND FEE AWARD
As noted, defendant SIFC did not appeal either the
damages award or the fee award, so the sums awarded could not be
reduced on appeal. The district court, however, stayed execution
of the judgment and the award of attorney fees and costs, citing
§ 9141. On October 29, 2025, two days after oral argument, we saw
"no sound basis for staying or otherwise delaying further execution
of the undisputed sums due to plaintiff," and we vacated the stay.
We ordered SIFC to pay García her compensatory damage award of
$300,000 and the total award of $300,936.10 in attorney fees and
costs. As of November 2025, the vast majority had been paid. We
explain here why we vacated the stay and ordered immediate payment.
Before getting to this analysis, we begin again with a
clarification. The district court declined to rule on García's
motion to order payment of her money damages and attorney fees.
The district court said it was divested of jurisdiction to do so
since García filed these appeals. We appreciate the jurisdictional
caution, but this was not correct. "[T]he filing of a notice of

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appeal does not divest the district court of all authority."
United States v. Carpenter, 941 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2019). "The
restriction on district court action encompasses only the matters
that are comprehended within the appeal." 16A Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1 (5th ed.) Since García's
appeals could not reduce the damages or the fee award, the amounts
that SIFC owed without further dispute were matters not
comprehended within the appeals. The district court retained
jurisdiction to enforce the undisputed portions of its awards.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) governs the
execution of a money judgment in federal court. The rule requires
that execution of a judgment "accord with the procedure of the
state where the court is located" unless "a federal statute governs
to the extent it applies." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). In this
case, Puerto Rico law supplies the default law for collection and
execution of judgment. Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo, 564
F.3d 40, 43 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009) ("Puerto Rico is deemed the
functional equivalent of a state for the purposes of Rule 69(a).").
SIFC argued that Puerto Rico law prohibits a prevailing
party from executing a judgment against a public corporation like
SIFC without prior approval of a payment plan by the Secretary of
Justice. (The Secretary of Justice is the equivalent of a state
attorney general. See, e.g., Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55
F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1995).) Under § 9141, a public corporation

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is required to develop a payment plan before it pays the money.
"The Secretary of Justice shall evaluate the applicable payment
plan in accordance with the amount of the judgment, upon which
he/she shall request . . . a certification of funds available."
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 9141. But, among other requirements,
"[i]f there were no funds available to honor the payment plan
during a specific fiscal year, [payment] shall be postponed . . .
[and] thus said payment plan shall be automatically extended for
the number of unpaid installments." Id., § 9141(g); see also id.,
§ 9142 (stating that no public corporation "shall be compelled to
make any payment . . . when there are no funds available"). Put
all of this together, SIFC says, and the execution of judgment and
fees was required to be stayed until a payment plan was approved.
As applied here, that position is untenable under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const.
art. VI, cl. 2. The money damages and attorney fees were awarded
by a federal court under a federal statute, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. Congress has declared that "the 'ultimate authority'
to secure compliance with Title VII resides in the federal courts."
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980),
quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1974).
Congress empowered a Title VII plaintiff to serve as "a private
attorney general." Id. at 63, quoting Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978). That is why money damages in

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this context are critical. They give the private litigant an
incentive to "redress[] [her] own injury" while also
"vindicat[ing] the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45.
A similar logic explains the grants of attorney fees to prevailing
parties under Title VII. Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 321 (fee awards
under Title VII were "designed 'to make it easier for a plaintiff
of limited means to bring a meritorious suit'"), quoting New York
Gaslight Club, 447 U.S. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law controls over a
conflicting state law. In the context of federal preemption, the
Supremacy Clause "prevents the states from impinging overmuch on
federal law and policy." Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly,
883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir. 1989), citing Louisiana Public
Service Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368–69 (1986).
This case differs from typical cases under the Supremacy
Clause. The merits decisions are in the rear-view mirror. All
that is left is the enforcement of a judgment. The obstacle here
is not a general state procedural rule. It is instead a
substantive law that gives a host of favored defendants -- public
corporations, including municipal governments -- a power to delay
enforcement of federal judgments, perhaps indefinitely.
Notwithstanding the deference to state (or commonwealth)
procedures embraced by Rule 69, other courts of appeals facing

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similar state laws blocking effective enforcement of federal
judgments have recognized the need for federal supremacy to
override those state-law blocks. In Spain v. Mountanos, for
example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court order
enforcing an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 despite a
California statute that required the state legislature to
appropriate funds for the payment, which the legislature had
refused to do. 690 F.2d 742, 744–46 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth
Circuit explained that "a state cannot frustrate the intent of [42
U.S.C. §] 1988 by setting up state law barriers to block
enforcement of an attorney's fees award." Id. at 746.
Similarly in Arnold v. BLaST Intermediate Unit 17, the
Third Circuit reversed the denial of a writ of mandamus to pay a
judgment under the federal Equal Pay Act based on a state law that
prohibited "funds for non-budgeted expenditures." 843 F.2d 122,
123, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1988). As the Third Circuit explained: "State
and local entities may not frustrate the supremacy of federal law
through the adoption of immunizing procedures or vague statutory
schemes." Id. at 128.
Other courts deciding similar cases have noted the
inconsistency with the Supremacy Clause, even if they rested their
decision on slightly different reasoning. E.g., Collins v. Thomas,
649 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming execution of federal
judgment when state law provided that writ of mandamus through

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state court was exclusive method to order payment from county's
treasury); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1980)
(affirming execution of federal judgment, mainly under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 70, though state law required legislative
appropriation of funds for judgment); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 441 F.
Supp. 1121, 1125 (E.D. La. 1977) (similar), aff'd, 622 F.2d 804
(5th Cir. 1980).
We follow suit. Applying the § 9141 payment plan
requirement here would insulate one of a select class of favored
defendants (public corporations) by delaying substantially and
perhaps indefinitely enforcement of a federal court judgment. The
result would not be mere use of a state's or commonwealth's
procedures under Rule 69. It would substantively frustrate
Title VII's remedies and undermine a federal court's judgment on
a federal cause of action. Cf. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141
(1988) (holding that Wisconsin notice-of-claim requirement was
inconsistent with federal civil rights law, in part, because it is
not a "neutral and uniformly applicable rule of procedure" but a
"substantive burden imposed only upon those who seek redress for
injuries resulting from the use or misuse of governmental
authority"). SIFC's position pits the remedial policies of
Title VII against those of Puerto Rico law. See Gary W., 441 F.
Supp. at 1125 ("The issue here is not one of judicial confrontation

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with the state. It is one of implementation of a Congressional
mandate."). In that conflict, Title VII prevails.
Remember that the protocol under § 9141 is a multi-step
process. A payment plan must be approved and funds must be
certified as available before a judgment will be honored. In
essence, SIFC was telling García that even though she won a
substantial judgment and fee award in federal court, she could not
enforce them until the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico gave SIFC
permission to pay, and even then, full payment could take three
more years. That situation is not consistent with federal civil
rights law or the Supremacy Clause. See Balark v. Curtin, 655
F.2d 798, 802–03 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting application of state
law that would have caused a four-year delay in payment of a
federal judgment and could have allowed municipality to later deny
indemnification).
One final note. During oral argument, SIFC represented
that in the eleven months since the stay was imposed it had made
no efforts to obtain approval of a payment plan. Why? Because
the district court had imposed a stay that SIFC itself had sought,
ostensibly so it could seek such approval. If the case had not
come up on appeal, it is hard to tell how long this game might
have lasted. Execution of judgment and the fee award would have
been stayed until there was a payment plan, and there could not
have been a payment plan because SIFC claimed the stay prevented

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it from seeking approval of one. This kind of gamesmanship should
test the patience of a federal judge and would have invited
invocation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70. See, e.g.,
Spain, 690 F.2d at 744–45; Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804, 806
(5th Cir. 1980); see also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Markarian,
114 F.3d 346, 349 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that an equitable
remedy may be appropriate "where the judgment is against a state
which refuses to appropriate funds through the normal process
provided by state law"). We said in Gabovitch v. Lundy, 584 F.2d
559, 560 n.1 (1st Cir. 1978), that "equitable remedies, even those
permitted by Rule 70, are seldom appropriate aids to execution of
a money judgment," but this could well have been such an
exceptional case.6
6 In El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834, 838–40 (8th Cir.
2010), the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's order to
state officials to pay immediately an attorney fee award under 42
U.S.C. § 1988. The court deferred instead to a state law requiring
a legislative appropriation to pay the federal court judgment.
The Eighth Circuit rejected in essence only a facial challenge to
the state law, id. at 840 ("only issue presented in this case is
whether the Nebraska Legislature violated the Supremacy Clause
when it enacted" the laws), and it distinguished Gary W., Gates,
and Spain on the ground that the Nebraska officials before it had
not yet actually refused to pay the federal judgment. Id. & n.1.
The indefinite delay here, as attempted by SIFC's obtaining a stay
of execution and its failure to seek approval of payment, seems to
us close enough to a refusal to pay that this case presents the
problems that El-Tabech acknowledged but did not decide.

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V. CONCLUSION
The district court's denial of a permanent injunction
and its award of attorney fees and costs are AFFIRMED. Having
previously vacated the district court's stay of the execution of
judgment and fees, we REMAND this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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