USA v. Quinton Paul Handlon

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13699
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
QUINTON PAUL HANDLON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00145-JES-MRM-1
____________________
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 2
Before ROSENBAUM, G RANT, and E D C ARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Quinton Handlon appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues
that the district court erred because his father’s poor health and
need for a caregiver constituted an extraordinary and compelling
reason to justify a sentence reduction. Because Handlon has failed
to show that he is eligible for compassionate release, we affirm.
I.
Handlon sexually abused his minor niece for years when she
was between the ages of eleven and fifteen years old. See
Presentence Report ¶¶ 13–19. He demanded that she send him
explicit pictures, pressured her into engaging in sexual activity with
him, and discussed over email a “business plan” to feature her
pictures and videos on an “Adult web site.” Id. ¶19. Upon
Handlon’s arrest, law enforcement seized more than 140
pornographic photos and three pornographic videos of his niece
from multiple devices at his residences and on his person, including
a thumb drive in his pocket containing naked pictures of his niece
when she was eleven years old. Id. ¶¶ 21–28.
After a four-day jury trial, Handlon was convicted of
producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a)
and 2251(e); coercing and enticing a minor to engage in sexual
activity for the production of child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2422(b); and possessing child pornography in violation of
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 3
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(b)(2). Id. ¶¶ 2–5. Handlon was
sentenced to life on the coercion and enticement count, and to
concurrent sentences of 360 months and 120 months on the
production and possession counts.
Now incarcerated, Handlon filed a motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), contending
that his eighty-five-year-old father had been diagnosed with lung
cancer and “need[ed] help.” Handlon requested that he be released
“to have what time [he had] left with [his] father.” The district
court denied that motion because Handlon “provided no
supporting documentation regarding his father’s condition or care,
or whether defendant is the only available caretaker.”
Handlon tried again, filing what he called a “motion to
amend” his earlier motion for compassionate release. Handlon
clarified that his father did not have lung cancer. Instead Handlon’s
father had the following medical conditions, which Handlon
documented with a letter from his father’s attending medical
provider: chronic stage 3 kidney disease, cerebral infarction to
embolism of middle cerebral artery, memory impairment, hearing
loss, and aneurysm of thoracic aorta. Handlon also purported to
“state under oath” that two of his sisters lived in the same town as
his father but that “both have children of th[eir] own and I’ve been
told they visit as much as they can but there is no one that can stay
with him around the clock.”
The district court construed Handlon’s “motion to amend”
as a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 4
compassionate release. The court denied the motion for
reconsideration, concluding that “the additional information
fail[ed] to support an extraordinary and compelling circumstance
for a reduction in sentence and release [of Handlon] to care for his
father.”
This appeal followed.
II.
A “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it
has been imposed except” in certain circumstances established by
statute or rule. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Giron, 15
F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). One of those circumstances is
known as “compassionate release,” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345, which
allows a court to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment “upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights,” where the court has “consider[ed] the
factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable,” and found that “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United
States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909–10 (11th Cir. 2021).
To award compassionate release, the court must also find
that the sentence “reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A). The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policy statement
on compassionate release requires that the defendant “not [be] a
danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.”
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 5
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13(a)(2) (Nov. 2023); see
also United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2021).1
“Because all three conditions — i.e., support in the § 3553(a)
factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to
§ 1B1.13’s policy statement — are necessary, the absence of even
one would foreclose a sentence reduction.” United States v. Tinker,
14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). The district court did not
consider the § 3553(a) factors. It did not decide whether Handlon
was a danger to the safety of other people or to the community, so
it did not have the opportunity to consider that “pedophiles who
have sexually abused children are a threat to continue doing so
. . . .” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (expressing “grave
concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex
offenders and their dangerousness as a class” and stating that “[t]he
risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is frightening and high”)
(quotation marks omitted); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1201 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As Congress has found and as we have
discussed, child sex offenders have appalling rates of recidivism . . .
.”); Irey, 612 F.3d at 1215–16 (listing “cases in which serious crimes
were committed by those on supervised release” including child
pornography and child molestation). Instead the court found that
Handlon had failed to satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling
1 The policy statement in effect when Handlon’s motion was before
the district court used the same language. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2) (Nov. 2018).
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 6
reason” condition, which was a sufficient basis to deny Handlon’s
motion. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–39.
“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Giron, 15
F.4th at 1345. “After eligibility is established, we review a district
court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of
discretion.” Id.
When Handlon filed his motion and when the district court
reviewed it, the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement had
identified only four categories of “extraordinary and compelling”
reasons that could make a movant eligible for a sentence reduction:
(1) the defendant’s medical condition, (2) the defendant’s age,
(3) the defendant’s status as the only potential caregiver for a minor
child or spouse, and (4) “other reasons” as determined by the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1249–50;
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D). That last “catch-all” category
did not “grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that
might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Bryant, 996
F.3d at 1247–48; see also id. at 1262–65.
Handlon contends that his father’s medical condition and
the limited availability of other caregivers make Handlon eligible
for compassionate release. He asserts that his father is now
receiving treatment for kidney cancer. He reasserts that his sisters
“have been helping our father as much as they can, but n[e]ither
can remain with him.” In Handlon’s view, the district court should
have recognized that his father’s “hea[l]th issue’s [sic] and living
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 7
alone should be considered an [e]xtraordinary or compelling
reason to grant Handlon home confinement so he can remain to
watch over our father when others are unable to do so.”
The government responds that Handlon is not eligible for
compassionate release because, at the time his motion was before
the district court, the need to care for an incapacitated parent did
not fit into any of the four recognized categories of extraordinary
and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. Handlon does
not deny that fact. Instead he suggests that, if the incapacitation of
a spouse or of a caregiver of a dependent child can justify
compassionate release, then the incapacitation of a parent should,
too. Handlon argues that “the best int[e]rest of the rule of law”
calls for allowing him to be released from his sentence of life
imprisonment to assist his siblings with his father’s care.
The district court did not err when it determined that
Handlon is ineligible for compassionate release because he failed to
present an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief
recognized by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement.
Congress delegated the power to “define ‘what should be
considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence
reduction’” to the Sentencing Commission, not the courts. Bryant,
996 F.3d at 1249 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). A district court is right
to reject a rationale for a sentence reduction that “does not fall
within any of the reasons that 1B1.13 identifies as ‘extraordinary
and compelling.’” Id. at 1265. Handlon’s asserted need to care for
an incapacitated parent was not included in the list of reasons the
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 8
Sentencing Commission considered to be “extraordinary and
compelling,” so his motion was properly denied. See id.
Since the parties submitted their briefs to this Court, an
amendment to the policy statement contained in the relevant
guidelines has gone into effect. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 814
(effective Nov. 1, 2023). The newest version of the policy
statement includes in its definitions of “[e]xtraordinary and
compelling reasons” a circumstance that is closer to the ground
Handlon has asserted: “The incapacitation of the defendant’s
parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver
for the parent.” Id. at 200–01 (emphasis added); see U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) (Nov. 2023). Handlon urges us to give effect to
that amendment and to accept his father’s need for him to act as a
caregiver (in addition to his sisters, depending on their availability)
as an extraordinary and compelling reason potentially justifying
relief.
But we can retroactively apply that amendment in this
appeal only if it is a “clarifying” amendment, not if it is a
“substantive” amendment. See United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d
1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011). The 2023 amendment to § 1B1.13
altered the text of the guideline itself to allow for compassionate
release in a new circumstance. That is a substantive amendment.
See id. at 1185 (“An amendment that alters the text of the Guideline
itself suggests a substantive change, while an amendment that
alters only the commentary suggests a clarification.”) (citations
omitted); United States v. Summers, 176 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.
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1999) (“[T]he alteration of actual Guideline language strongly
suggests that a substantive change was being made.”). We cannot
give it retroactive effect in this appeal.
The government suggests that Handlon could file a new
motion for compassionate release now that the amendment to the
policy statement is in effect. It appears that nothing in 18 U.S.C. §
3582 prevents Handlon from doing that. But there was no error in
the district court’s denial of the motion before the new amendment
went into effect.
The district court correctly ruled that Handlon failed to
establish that he was eligible for relief under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). We affirm the denial of Handlon’s motion for
compassionate release.2
2 Handlon also argues in his reply brief to this Court that he is
“factually innocent,” and he requests a subpoena to help challenge email
evidence used against him at trial “if it is within [this Court’s] power to grant”
that request. It is not. Handlon’s argument that he was improperly convicted
is not a recognized extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence
reduction, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b); Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1265, nor a proper basis
for seeking relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See, e.g., Antonelli v. Warden,
U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] [28 U.S.C.] § 2255
motion is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his
conviction and sentence . . . .”); see also United States v. Amato, 48 F.4th 61, 63
(2d Cir. 2022) (affirming the denial of a motion for compassionate release
where the district court refused to “consider new evidence proffered for the
purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction”); United States
v. Fine, 982 F.3d 1117, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming the denial of a motion
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) in part because the movant’s argument
“that he was actually innocent of his sentence” was properly construed as “an
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22-13699 Opinion of the Court 10
AFFIRMED.
unauthorized successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence”).
If Handlon — having already filed an unsuccessful motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 — wants to attempt to file a
second or successive § 2255 motion, then he “must first obtain authorization
from the Court of Appeals.” Telcy v. United States, 20 F.4th 735, 737 (11th Cir.
2021); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). So far his attempts to do so have been
unsuccessful. See In re Handlon, No. 23-14069 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2024) (denying
Handlon’s application to authorize the district court to consider his second or
successive § 2255 motion).
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