Bobby Clayton v. Essentia Insurance Company

FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13873
____________________
BOBBY RAY CLAYTON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ESSENTIA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00441-KFP
____________________
Before B RASHER , KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
B RASHER , Circuit Judge:
This appeal is about Alabama insurance law. Alabama law
requires automobile liability policies to provide uninsured and un-
derinsured motorist coverage in the amount of at least $25,000.
ALA . CODE § 32-7-23; id. § 32-7-6(c). But Alabama law also allows
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
for its coverage requirements to be fulfilled by a combination of
policies from one or more carriers. Id. § 32-7-22(j). The Alabama
Supreme Court has held that uninsured motorist coverage must be
portable, meaning that it follows the individual covered by the pol-
icy and is not tied to a particular vehicle.
The question in this appeal is whether policy language is void
under Alabama law if it means that an automobile liability policy
does not provide $25,000 in portable uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage, even if the policy requires that the insured
maintain other insurance that provides that coverage and the in-
sured in fact maintains that separate policy. Every state court to
have addressed the question under a similar state law has answered
“no.” We predict that the Alabama Supreme Court would too. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse.
I.
Bobby Ray Clayton was injured by an uninsured motorist.
At the time of his injury, he owned two vehicles relevant to this
dispute: a motorcycle and an antique 1965 Ford F-100. Clayton was
also a named insured under two policies: a standard auto insurance
policy issued by GEICO that covered his motorcycle, and an ad-
junctive specialty auto insurance policy issued by Essentia Insur-
ance Company that covered his antique vehicle. Clayton paid an
annual policy premium of $197.52 for his standard auto insurance
policy and $117 for the adjunctive specialty policy.
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 3
At the time of the accident, Clayton was driving his motor-
cycle. GEICO’s standard policy provided uninsured motorist cov-
erage to the full extent required by Alabama law. See A LA . C ODE §
32-7-6(c). And Clayton collected $25,000 under his GEICO policy.
Because Clayton was not occupying or operating his antique 1965
Ford F-100 at the time of the accident, the Essentia policy did not
provide additional uninsured motorist coverage. The Essentia in-
surance contract limits what qualifies as a “covered auto” under the
policy to antique or classic vehicles that are “maintained primarily
for use in car club activities, exhibitions, parades, other functions
of public interest or for a private collection” and are “used only in-
frequently for other purposes.” Doc. 24-3 at 5. The Classic Auto-
mobile Policy’s section on Uninsured Motorist Coverage narrowly
defines who qualifies as an “insured” under the policy to include
only named and non-named insureds strictly “while using or occu-
pying [the] covered auto” or “while not occupying a motor vehi-
cle.” Doc 24-3 at 30 (citation modified). The Liability Coverage sec-
tion of the policy similarly defines “insured” as limited to incidents
involving the “covered auto.” Doc. 24-3 at 5–6. If a claimant does
not qualify as “insured” under these definitions, the policy states
that Essentia has “no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for
bodily injury or property damage” arising from accidents. Doc. 24-
3 at 6 (citation modified).
There are also express exclusions in the policy for vehicles
that do not qualify as a covered auto. For purposes of the Unin-
sured Motorists Coverage provided by the Classic Automobile Pol-
icy, the definition of “insured” is framed in exclusive terms, stating
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
that “insured shall NOT mean and does NOT include” any named
or non-named insureds with respect to incidents arising from occu-
pying, operating, or using vehicles that are not the “covered auto”
under the specialty policy. Doc. 24-3 at 30 (citation modified). The
Classic Automobile Policy defines the scope of its coverage, in part
by identifying what is excluded:
This policy provides the coverage(s) . . . but only for
your ownership, maintenance and use of your cov-
ered auto. In no event will this policy:
1. Provide coverage for any vehicles other than your
covered auto; or
2. Be your primary personal vehicle insurance; or
3. Provide insurance for any auto or other motor vehi-
cle, other than your covered auto, with respect to ex-
posures or legal obligations arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of that vehicle if it is owned
by or regularly used by you, a family member or any
other relative that resides with you.
Doc. 24-3 at 18–19 (citation modified).
At the same time, the Classic Automobile Policy requires
that the insured have separate coverage that satisfies Alabama’s le-
gal requirements. The policy emphasizes that coverage is issued
based on the insured’s representation that he or she will maintain
separate insurance to serve as primary coverage with respect to all
vehicles except the “covered auto.” Doc 24-3 at 33. The policy’s
Regular Use Vehicle Requirement explains that, in addition to
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 5
ownership of a regular use vehicle, the insured must maintain a
separate insurance policy that “[s]atisfies all minimum state insur-
ance requirements, including but not limited to minimum require-
ments for liability coverage, uninsured motorist coverage and un-
derinsured motorist coverage . . .” while serving as the primary pol-
icy for all auto insurance requirements except those related to the
“covered auto.” Doc. 24-3 at 19. Essentia reserved the right to re-
scind, cancel, and refuse to renew the Classic Automobile Policy if
the insured “do[es] not have a separate insurance policy in effect
with at least . . . all of the types of coverage required by law” for
the entire duration of the insurance contract. Doc. 24-3 at 19.
Despite the definitions and exclusions in the policy, Clayton
filed a claim with Essentia for uninsured motorist coverage. Clay-
ton argued that Alabama law requires Essentia to provide portable
uninsured motorist coverage. After Essentia denied the claim based
on the terms of the Classic Automobile Policy, Clayton sued.
Essentia moved for summary judgment against Clayton on
the issue of uninsured motorist benefits. First, Essentia argued that
Clayton does not qualify for uninsured motorist coverage for fail-
ure to meet the definition of “insured” under the Liability Cover-
age section because the damages resulted from an accident involv-
ing a vehicle excluded by the terms of the specialty policy. Second,
Essentia argued that the specialty policy’s limited coverage com-
plies with the requirements of Alabama’s uninsured motorist stat-
ute by operating in tandem with a separate auto insurance policy
providing portable coverage. In the alternative, Essentia argued
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
that even if liable, the court should limit the benefits to the mini-
mum amount required by Alabama’s uninsured motorist statute.
The district court denied Essentia’s motion in part with re-
spect to the issue of liability for uninsured motorist benefits but
granted the motion in part limiting Essentia’s liability to the mini-
mum amount required by Alabama’s uninsured motorist statute.
The district court entered judgment against Essentia for $25,000.
Essentia timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment or-
der, applying the same legal standard used by the district court in
the first instance. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918
(11th Cir. 1993). Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, orders granting or denying summary judgment are re-
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mize
v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). And
questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Simone
v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 156 F.4th 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2025).
Whether a specialty auto insurance policy complies with Alabama
law’s portable uninsured motorist coverage requirements involves
the construction of an insurance contract, which we also review de
novo. Tech. Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 157 F.3d
843, 844 (11th Cir. 1998).
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 7
III.
Clayton argues that the uninsured motorist coverage limita-
tion or exclusion in Essentia’s policy is void as inconsistent with
Alabama law and public policy. He argues that Alabama law re-
quires each auto liability insurance policy, including adjunctive spe-
cialty policies, to independently provide portable uninsured motor-
ist coverage.
Essentia, in response, argues that the Classic Automobile
Policy’s uninsured motorist coverage exclusion with respect to
non-covered autos is enforceable. In support, it points out that the
policy was issued based on Clayton’s promise that he had other in-
surance meeting Alabama’s legal requirements, and that Clayton
did in fact have that other insurance policy.
We apply Alabama’s substantive law to resolve the enforce-
ability of the policy language. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938). The Alabama Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
issue, so “it becomes necessary to prognosticate how [this] state
court would rule.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d
1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation modified); see also Molinos Valle
Del Cibao, C. por A v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1348 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that, when deciding a question of state law while sitting
in diversity, “we must predict how the highest court would de-
cide”). We consider any pertinent sources that may inform this in-
quiry, “including relevant state precedents, analogous decisions,
considered dicta . . . and any other reliable data tending convinc-
ingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
issue at hand.” Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian
Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation mod-
ified).
After considering these sources, we are confident the Ala-
bama Supreme Court would hold that Essentia’s policy exclusion
is enforceable against an insured that has other insurance that
meets the minimum requirements of Alabama law. This is so for
three reasons. First, the plain text of the applicable Alabama statute
says that the requirements of a “motor vehicle liability policy” may
be met by multiple policies. Second, it appears that every court to
have addressed this question under similar state laws has held that
the requirement for portable uninsured motorist coverage may be
satisfied by multiple policies. Third, Alabama’s public policy is sat-
isfied as long as the insured has the required minimum coverage,
no matter which insurance company must provide it. We address
each reason in turn.
A.
We begin with the plain text of the applicable statutes. The
Alabama Supreme Court has established that, when interpreting an
Alabama statute, “our inquiry begins with the language of the stat-
ute, and if the meaning of the statutory language is plain, our anal-
ysis ends there.” Lang v. Cabela’s Wholesale, LLC, 371 So. 3d 228, 234
(Ala. 2022) (citation omitted). The Alabama Supreme Court in-
structs us “to interpret the plain language of a statute to mean ex-
actly what it says and to engage in judicial construction only if the
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 9
language in the statute is ambiguous.” Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532,
535 (Ala. 2001).
Two provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility
Act govern this dispute: Alabama Code § 32-7-23(a) and Alabama
Code § 32-7-22(j).
The first relevant provision, Alabama Code § 32-7-23(a), re-
quires auto insurance carriers to provide uninsured motorist cov-
erage to individuals insured under their policies. It states that “[n]o
automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury
or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state . . . unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto . . . for . . . damages from owners or operators
of uninsured motor vehicles.” A LA . C ODE § 32-7-23(a). The mini-
mum coverage for one person must be “not less than twenty-five
thousand dollars . . . in any one accident.” Id.; id. § 32-7-6(c).
The Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted section 32-7-
23(a) to require that uninsured motorist coverage be portable—that
is, it applies to the insured no matter whether he or she is driving a
particular vehicle. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 462
So. 2d 346 (Ala. 1984) (answering a certified question); Jackson v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1985) (pub-
lishing the Alabama Supreme Court’s answer to the certified ques-
tion).
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
The second relevant provision, Alabama Code § 32-7-22(j),
provides that “[t]he requirements for a motor vehicle liability pol-
icy may be fulfilled by the policies of one or more insurance carriers
which policies together meet the requirements for a policy.” Under
section 32-7-22(j), the Alabama Supreme Court has upheld policy
exclusions that would otherwise not be lawful. See Royal Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Thomas, 879 So. 2d 1144, 1155 (Ala. 2003) (upholding a pol-
icy’s coverage exclusion when claimant’s garage customers had
separate insurance sufficient to meet the statutory requirements of
the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 638, 639–41 (Ala. 1976)
(upholding a policy’s coverage exclusion with respect to additional
insureds “where there existed other valid and collectible insurance”
to the extent required by the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility
Act).
Giving these statutes their ordinary meaning, we believe the
mandate for portable uninsured motorist coverage is a “require-
ment[] for a motor vehicle liability policy,” Alabama Code § 32-7-
22(j), that may be fulfilled through multiple policies. The phrase
“motor vehicle liability policy” has the same meaning in both stat-
utes. See A LA . C ODE § 32-7-22(a). And the mandate in Alabama
Code § 32-7-23(a) to provide uninsured motorist coverage is a “re-
quirement” for such policies. Although section 32-7-23(a) does not
expressly use the term “require” or “requirement,” the provision
states that no motor vehicle liability policy “shall” be issued or de-
livered unless the policy provides the uninsured motorist coverage
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 11
set forth in section 32-7-6(c). The key word is “shall,” which im-
poses an imperative command. Ex parte Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
721 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Ala. 1998) (“The word ‘shall’ is clear and un-
ambiguous and is imperative and mandatory.”). And the ordinary
meaning of the word “requirement” is “an imperative command.”
Requirement, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It follows that
section 32-7-22(j), which allows for the combined effect of multiple
policies to satisfy the “requirements for a motor vehicle liability
policy,” would permit multiple policies to satisfy the portable un-
insured motorist coverage requirement in section 32-7-23(a).
Our understanding of these statutes is consistent with how
the Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted earlier analogue stat-
utes. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Auto-Owners
Insurance Co., the Alabama Supreme Court held that “[t]he require-
ments of coverage may be fulfilled by policies of one or more car-
riers which together meet the requirements” of the Motor Vehicle
Safety-Responsibility Act. 331 So. 2d at 641 (citing an earlier ver-
sion, Code of Ala., Tit. 36, s 74(62)(j)). To that end, it enforced a
“policy intended to extend coverage to additional insureds only
when they have no other coverage available to them.” Id.
Likewise, in Royal Insurance, the Alabama Supreme Court
enforced a policy that narrowly defined “insured” to exclude cov-
erage when the claimant had a separate policy in place that met the
minimum coverage required by the Motor Vehicle Safety-Respon-
sibility Act. 879 So. 2d at 1155. The important point to the Alabama
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
Supreme Court was that an insurer was providing the minimal cov-
erage required by Alabama law, not which insurer provided it. See
id. at 1152 (quoting Auto-Owners Ins., 331 So. 2d at 640–41).
Essentia’s policy is different from the policies in Auto-Owners
Insurance and Royal Insurance in one respect. But that difference
doesn’t matter under the facts of this case. Unlike the policies in
Auto-Owners Insurance and Royal Insurance, Essentia’s policy re-
quires that the insured purchase a separate policy that meets the
minimum requirements of Alabama law and purports to deny cov-
erage even if the insured fails to do so. We do not address whether
the policy’s limiting language would be enforceable in a case where
the insured fails to purchase the separate policy. We emphasize in-
stead that Clayton did, in fact, have the other insurance that Essen-
tia’s policy required and that the other insurance policy provided
the minimal coverage that Alabama law requires. On these facts,
we believe the policy language is enforceable under the plain text
of Alabama Code § 32-7-22(j).
B.
Our understanding of Alabama law is consistent with how
other state courts have addressed the issue under comparable state
laws. When answering a question of first impression related to in-
surance coverage, “[i]n the absence of precedents . . . we may con-
sider the case law of other jurisdictions that have examined similar
policy provisions.” Steinberg, 393 F.3d at 1231. And it appears that
every state supreme court to have addressed the question under
similar state law has held that requirements for portable uninsured
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 13
motorist coverage may be satisfied by multiple policies.1 State
courts have also emphasized the uniqueness of specialty policies for
antique or classic vehicles, the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties to an insurance policy, and public policy implications.2 We
1 See, e.g., Essentia Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 545 P.3d 494, 497 (Colo. 2024) (holding
that specialty policies excluding uninsured motorist coverage are permitted
when operating in tandem with a standard policy that satisfies statutory cov-
erage requirements); Metlife Auto & Home v. Palmer, 839 A.2d 83, 88–89 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 2004) (upholding a specialty policy’s exclusion of participa-
tion in pro rata apportionment for uninsured motorist coverage with other
insurance policies because the claimant was not prevented from obtaining
maximum remedial protection from the standard policy of another insurer);
see also Grudkowski v. Foremost Ins. Co., 556 F. App’x 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2014)
(applying Pennsylvania law) (upholding an insurance policy as enforceable
when limiting uninsured motorist coverage to incidents involving antique ve-
hicles so that stacking otherwise consistent with state law was unavailable to
the insured).
2 See, e.g., Sanner v. Zurich-Am. Ins. Co. of Ill., 657 So. 2d 252, 255 (La. App. 1995)
(upholding a policy’s exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage on the basis
that the claimant did not meet the policy’s definition of “insured,” defined ex-
clusively with respect to persons occupying certain listed vehicles); Gormbard
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 198, 209 (Conn. 2006) (declining to interpret statu-
tory uninsured motorist coverage requirements as extending to specialty pol-
icies for antique vehicles given their distinct use in contrast with that of “ordi-
nary, personal use vehicles”); Turner v. St. Paul Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 676 A.2d
109, 111 (N.H. 1996) (holding that state law permits the insurer to limit unin-
sured motorist coverage to individuals strictly while occupying the covered
vehicle and explaining that the limitation “comports with the reasonable ex-
pectations of the policyholder” per the agreement’s clear and unambiguous
language); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 630 A.2d 28, 32–33 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (upholding specialty policy uninsured motorist coverage restrictions
with respect to non-antique vehicles based on the reasonable expectations of
the parties and the public policy interest in preventing increased premiums).
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
think the Alabama Supreme Court would find these precedents
persuasive.
The most recent and most persuasive state court decision is
from Colorado. There, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the
same Essentia policy at issue in this appeal. Essentia Ins. Co. v.
Hughes, 545 P.3d 494 (Colo. 2024). The insured in Hughes, as here,
held policies with two separate auto insurance carriers: a standard
policy providing portable uninsured motorist coverage to the full
extent required by state law, and Essentia’s adjunctive specialty
policy, which provided coverage strictly for the listed antique or
classic vehicles. Id. at 497. Colorado’s uninsured motorist statute,
like Alabama’s uninsured motorist statute, has been construed to
mandate that insurance carriers provide portable uninsured motor-
ist coverage. Id. at 496; DeHerrera v. Sentry Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 167, 172
(Colo. 2001) (holding that coverage as required by state law applies
to “persons and not classes of vehicles”). Despite this precedent, the
Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that an “[uninsured motorist]
limitation deserves different treatment” in the context of adjunc-
tive specialty policies for antique or classic vehicles. Hughes, 545
P.3d at 496. The Colorado Supreme Court held that Essentia’s ad-
junctive specialty policy’s uninsured motorist coverage limitation
“satisfie[d] both the language of [Colorado’s uninsured motorist
statute] and the public policy goals underpinning the statute.” Id.
at 496–97. Because the specialty policy required the insured to
maintain a separate policy, with the combined effect satisfying the
coverage requirements of Colorado’s uninsured motorist statute,
the court concluded that Essentia’s uninsured motorist coverage
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 15
restriction under the specialty policy was valid and enforceable. Id.
at 505.
We are aware of two state courts that have not permitted
specialty policies for antique cars to limit uninsured motorist cov-
erage. See Am. S. Home Ins. Co. v. Lentini, 286 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 2019);
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Zastrow, 480 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1992) (su-
perseded by statute as interpreted in Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee,
610 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. 2000)). But these decisions are based on
state laws that are materially distinguishable from the Alabama law
we must apply in this case.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that specialty insurance
policies must comply with state law requirements of uninsured
motorist coverage. Lentini, 286 So. 3d at 159–60. But the insurer in
Lentini did not argue that Florida’s uninsured motorist require-
ments could be satisfied by the combined effect of multiple policies.
There was no discussion of any Florida statute analogous to Ala-
bama’s section 32-7-22(j). Instead, the insurer argued that specialty
policies should be categorically exempt from Florida’s uninsured
motorist statute. The court disagreed. Here, of course, unlike in
Lentini, the question is not whether specialty insurance policies are
categorically exempt from the state’s uninsured motorist coverage
requirements. Instead, the question is whether a specialty insur-
ance policy may satisfy these requirements through the combined
effect of multiple policies.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Zastrow is even
farther afield. There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that every
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
insurance policy must independently satisfy all state law require-
ments. 480 N.W.2d at 13–14. It rejected the idea that an insurer
could meet the state’s requirements through a combination of pol-
icies at all. That conclusion is the opposite of Alabama Code § 32-
7-22(j), which expressly allows multiple policies to work in tandem
to satisfy statutory requirements.
We predict the Alabama Supreme Court, like the majority
of state supreme courts that have addressed the issue, would hold
that exclusions like Essentia’s are enforceable. When making an
Erie guess in the absence of precedent, we are permitted to consider
the decisions and rationales from other jurisdictions. Steinberg, 393
F.3d at 1231. And the Alabama Supreme Court has looked to other
states for guidance when facing issues of first impression. See, e.g.,
Knight v. Beverly Health Care Bay Manor Health Care Ctr., 820 So. 2d
92, 100 (Ala. 2001) (stating that “because this is an issue of first im-
pression, we consider the decisions of other jurisdictions”); Ex parte
City of Guntersville, 728 So. 2d 611, 614–15 (Ala. 1998) (noting that
the “issue is one of first impression” and then proceeding to exam-
ine what has been “considered and decided by the courts of several
other states with similar statutes”).
In examining the decisions and rationales of other jurisdic-
tions upholding uninsured motorist coverage restrictions, we note
that the Alabama Supreme Court has expressed similar reasoning
in analogous contexts. We discuss a few examples below.
Addressing questions like the one before us, state courts
have considered the reasonable expectations of the parties when
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 17
construing insurance policy exclusions. See Gormbard v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 904 A.2d 198, 209–10 (Conn. 2006) (upholding the exclusionary
clause of a specialty liability insurance policy for antique vehicles,
in part because “conclud[ing] otherwise would defeat the reasona-
ble expectations of the parties as reflected in the policy . . . and
would result in a windfall recovery by the plaintiff”); St. Paul Mer-
cury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 630 A.2d 28, 30 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1993) (upholding
a specialty insurance policy’s restricted uninsured motorist cover-
age because “an insured may not complain that his or her reasona-
ble expectations were frustrated by policy limitations which are
clear and unambiguous”). And in the broader context of interpret-
ing insurance contracts, the Alabama Supreme Court has also given
significant weight to the reasonable expectations of the insured and
insurer. See Monninger v. Grp. Ins. Serv. Ctr. Inc., 494 So. 2d 41, 43
(Ala. 1986) (“[U]nder Alabama law, where there is no ambiguity in
[the policy’s] terms . . . . [w]e cannot defeat express provisions, in-
cluding exclusions, by rewriting the contract . . . nor by judicial in-
terpretation.”); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abston Petroleum, Inc., 967
So. 2d 705, 714 (Ala. 2007) (holding that “expectations that contra-
dict [an insurance policy’s] clear exclusion are not objectively rea-
sonable.” (citation modified)).
Additionally, other state courts have emphasized that spe-
cialty adjunctive policies charge lower premiums commensurate
with reduced risk. In the context of antique and classic vehicles, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained that “[t]he very limited
use of antique automobiles does not subject them to the normal
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
exposure or danger from uninsured motorists,” and that the re-
duced risk is reflected in lower premiums for specialty policies. Cor-
bett, 630 A.2d at 32–33. The Alabama Supreme Court has also rec-
ognized the relationship between an insurer’s assumed risk and the
corresponding premium charged to compensate the insurer for in-
creased exposure to liability. See Holt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 507 So. 2d 388, 393 (Ala. 1986) (declining to strike down a
“nonowned” policy exclusion provision because doing so would
“thwart the [policy] exclusion’s purpose of prohibiting multiple
coverage under a single policy of insurance without an increase of
premium charges to compensate the insurer for the increased
risk”).
Because of the relationship between risks and premiums, en-
forcing limitations on uninsured motorist coverage for adjunctive
specialty policies makes sense when the insured has portable cov-
erage from another policy. Doing so aligns well with public policy
goals by keeping insurance premiums for antique and classic vehi-
cles affordable.
C.
Finally, to declare Essentia’s policy language void, we would
need to conclude that it violated Alabama public policy. But, in this
case, Alabama’s public policy goals are satisfied by the minimum
coverage provided to the insured by the standard auto insurance
policy.
Policy language that would leave the injured without the
uninsured motorist coverage required by law is void as contrary to
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24-13873 Opinion of the Court 19
Alabama public policy. See Jackson, 462 So. 2d at 346. “Uninsured
motorist coverage is intended to provide financial recompense to
innocent persons who are injured and to dependents of those who
are killed because of the wrongful conduct of uninsured motor-
ists.” Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gowan, 218 So. 2d 688, 691 (Ala.
1969). And as set forth in Alabama Code section 32-7-6(c), the leg-
islature determined the appropriate floor for compensation in such
cases to be $25,000 per insured person in the event of bodily injury
or property damage. “[I]f a person is insured under the liability cov-
erage provision of a motor vehicle insurance policy and uninsured
motorist coverage is not rejected, the uninsured motorist coverage
dictated by § 32-7-23 cannot be excluded from the policy as to such
an insured person.” Jackson, 462 So. 2d at 350 (citation omitted).
But Clayton has not been deprived of the uninsured motor-
ist benefits that he is entitled to under Alabama law. Under
GEICO’s standard insurance policy, Clayton collected $25,000 of
uninsured motorist benefits offered by GEICO’s regular use policy,
the full amount required by Alabama’s uninsured motorist statute.
As the Alabama Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he law is only
concerned that required coverage is provided, not by what or
which carrier.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d at 641. The specialty
policy issued by Essentia does not deny uninsured motorist cover-
age in this case—it simply allocates the required coverage to the
insured’s standard policy.
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-13873
* * *
In short, because Essentia’s adjunctive specialty auto insur-
ance policy worked in tandem with a standard auto insurance pol-
icy to provide Clayton fully portable uninsured motorist coverage,
we believe the Alabama Supreme Court would enforce the policy
limitation on uninsured motorist coverage. Alabama law expressly
allows insurers to fulfill the legal requirements of the Motor Vehi-
cle Safety-Responsibility Act through multiple policies. And we
think the Alabama Supreme Court is likely to follow other state
courts in holding that the uninsured motorist coverage restriction
in this policy is enforceable, at least when another policy does in
fact provide the minimum coverage required under Alabama law.
IV.
The district court is REVERSED, and this matter is
REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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