USA v. Shawnston Beaudoin

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-12324
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00119-ODE-AJB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SHAWNSTON BEAUDOIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 11, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 1 of 10

-- 1 of 10 --

2
Shawnston Beaudoin appeals his 264-month sentence, imposed below the
low-end of the advisory guideline range. Mr. Beaudoin, who pled guilty to three
counts of sexual exploitation of children for the purpose of producing a visual
depiction of such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) & (e), argues that
his sentence is substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for two main
reasons. First, Mr. Beaudoin contends that the district court failed to properly
weigh the mitigating factors under § 3553(a)(1) by ignoring his difficult
upbringing, dedication to his family, and the circumstances of his offense. Second,
he argues that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring his sentencing
disparity claims under § 3553(a)(6). After careful review, we affirm.
I
On March 5, 2014, FBI agents searched Mr. Beaudoin’s residence and
business pursuant to a federal search warrant. The agents seized several
documents and electronic items including digital cameras, cell phones, storage
devices, and laptop and desktop computers. Mr. Beaudoin was interviewed during
both of the searches, and he admitted to viewing, collecting, and trading child
pornography online. Two days later, Mr. Beaudoin “voluntarily went to the FBI
Office, waived his Miranda rights, and consented to a polygraph examination.”
PSI at ¶ 21.
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 2 of 10

-- 2 of 10 --

3
Although he denied any history of physical contact or sexual conduct with a
child under the age of sixteen, Mr. Beaudoin admitted that he had once rubbed a
nine-year-old girl’s breast area with his bare hand while she was spending the night
at his house. See PSI at ¶ 24. He also admitted that he was interested in girls from
ages six to fourteen and that he had a child pornography collection, but denied
being interested in material portraying incest or abuse of children. See id. at ¶ 19.
The seized electronics revealed Mr. Beaudoin’s large collection of child
pornography and child erotica images, but only three digital photo albums are
relevant to the three criminal charges here. All three albums contained images
taken by Mr. Beaudoin using personal electronic devices over an eight-year period.
The first album depicted digital camera images of a prepubescent female
sleeping on a bed with her legs open exposing her genitalia. This album contained
one particularly disturbing image of an adult male’s penis touching the girl’s upper
thigh. The second album contained cell phone images of another prepubescent
female sleeping on a sofa with her genitalia exposed. The FBI’s investigation
confirmed that the bedspread and sofa in the images belonged to Mr. Beaudoin and
that both girls had attended a daycare program run by Mr. Beaudoin’s mother.
The third album contained cell phone images of the nine-year-old girl that
Mr. Beaudoin admitted to touching once in the past. The images showed her
showering naked and sleeping in her underwear. Mr. Beaudoin explained that this
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 3 of 10

-- 3 of 10 --

4
girl attended his church and that she and her siblings frequently spent the night at
his house. During an interview with the FBI, the girl expressed no recollection of
any of the events associated with Mr. Beaudoin’s case and her guardian adamantly
claimed that Mr. Beaudoin had not harmed the girl.
In March of 2015, Mr. Beaudoin pled guilty to three counts of sexual
exploitation of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) & (e). Based on an
adjusted total offense level of 40 and a criminal history category of I, the probation
officer calculated Mr. Beaudoin’s advisory guideline range to be 292 to 365
months in prison. See PSI at ¶ 66; U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.1, 3D1.4. In addition, Mr.
Beaudoin’s charged offenses each carried a maximum statutory penalty of 30
years’ imprisonment and a minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years’
imprisonment.
At sentencing, the government requested the statutory maximum of 30 years,
and Mr. Beaudoin asked for a downward variance to 15 years. After considering
the statements of the parties, the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and the advisory
guideline range, the district court decided to vary downward and imposed a
sentence of 264 months’ imprisonment, or 22 years, followed by supervised release
for life with special conditions, including participation in a mental health aftercare
program that includes psychosexual evaluation and counseling if necessary. Mr.
Beaudoin now appeals.
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 4 of 10

-- 4 of 10 --

5
II
We review the reasonableness of sentences under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first
consider procedural unreasonableness and then determine whether the sentence
was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at
51.1 The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v.
Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
We will vacate a sentence only if “we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The weight given to any specific factor is committed to the discretion of
the district court. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a district court does not commit reversible error simply because it
attaches great weight to a single factor, but “[a] district court’s unjustified reliance
on a single § 3553(a) factor may be a ‘symptom’ of an unreasonable sentence.”
See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
1 Mr. Beaudoin does not argue that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable.
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 5 of 10

-- 5 of 10 --

6
A district court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a), including the need “to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant [and] to provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D).
Additional factors include “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant . . . [and] the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct.” Id. at § 3553(a)(1), (6). The provision to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities applies when “apples are being compared to
apples.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A court must consider significant distinctions and it
“should not draw comparisons to cases involving defendants who were convicted
of less serious offenses.” See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th
Cir. 2011).
A
Mr. Beaudoin first argues that the district court discounted mitigating factors
under § 3553(a)(1) concerning his difficult upbringing, dedication to his family,
and the circumstances of his offense. This argument, however, is refuted by the
record. In imposing Mr. Beaudoin’s sentence, the district court stated “this was a
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 6 of 10

-- 6 of 10 --

7
tough case” and acknowledged that the government was asking for an
exceptionally high punishment. The district court heard testimony from Mr.
Beaudoin’s mother about his difficult upbringing, including how he had to care for
her much of the time, and that his sister was raped at age fifteen. His wife testified
about his dedication to his family despite those challenges, and the court also
allowed letters from his children to be read into the record.
The district court expressly stated that “all cases involving child
pornography or sexual exploitation or children are hard, and I think they all do turn
on individual facts.” Recounting many of the individual facts in Mr. Beaudoin’s
case, the district court expressed concern over his actions and sexual inclinations,
but found that his conduct was mitigated by his mental sickness, which influenced
his conduct. The district court also credited Mr. Beaudoin for accepting
responsibility, pleading guilty, and consenting to a polygraph test. Similarly, the
court found it important that no evidence indicated that Mr. Beaudoin transmitted
the images. Even accepting that Mr. Beaudoin’s images were not circulated, the
district court agreed that the government’s emphasis on the need to protect the
public—especially young girls—was appropriate. The district court was
particularly troubled by the fact that he took the photographs himself while the
three young girls were sleeping in sexually compromising situations in his home.
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 7 of 10

-- 7 of 10 --

8
In sum, the district court clearly considered the § 3553(a) factors, decided
to vary below the advisory guideline range of 292 to 365 months, and imposed a
sentence of 264 months’ imprisonment. That downward variance is an indicator of
reasonableness; the court declined to impose only the 15-year mandatory minimum
because it believed that proclivity toward sexual abuse of minors is difficult to
overcome. The 22-year sentence was below the statutory maximum of 30 years for
each count—and that is another indicator of reasonableness. See United States v.
Winigear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005) (comparing actual prison term
imposed to twenty-year statutory maximum). Although the court did emphasize
the need to protect the public, reference to a single factor is not enough to establish
unreasonableness. See Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322. In its discussion of the prison
term, the district court pointed to the program offered for mental psychosexual
health and hoped it could help. The court was not insensitive to Mr. Beaudoin’s
circumstances; instead, it balanced Mr. Beaudoin’s history and the specific facts of
the case with the need to protect young, pre-teen girls from potential harm.
B
Mr. Beaudoin also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
ignoring his sentencing disparity claims under § 3553(a)(6). Mr. Beaudoin has not
met his burden of presenting a suitable, comparable case. As Mr. Beaudoin
outlines in his brief, without a comparable defendant—one with a similar record,
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 8 of 10

-- 8 of 10 --

9
who has been found guilty of similar criminal conduct—there cannot be a proper
comparison of sentences under § 3553(a)(6). See United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d
1227, 1241 (11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to compare sentences without “a valid
comparator”).
Mr. Beaudoin claimed at least ten defendants were sentenced to shorter
terms of imprisonment even though their crimes were the same as or worse than
his own. The most analogous case he presented involved a man who received the
minimum sentence of 15 years after taking pictures of a seven-year-old girl
engaged in sexually explicit conduct in his home. But there was an important
distinction. Mr. Beaudoin took photographs of three different girls over an eight-
year period. In addressing the other child pornography cases raised by Mr.
Beaudoin, the district court noted that some of the other cases involved defendants
who had primarily swapped images of child pornography and that conduct alone
was not as bad as the government argued. What stood out to the district court was
that Mr. Beaudoin had personally taken the photographs of the three girls—in other
words, he had manufactured the explicit material. This, in the district court’s
mind, was also a significant distinction. We agree. The district court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion in its application of § 3553(a)(6).
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 9 of 10

-- 9 of 10 --

10
III
Mr. Beaudoin has not demonstrated that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Therefore, we affirm
his 264-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Case: 15-12324 Date Filed: 03/11/2016 Page: 10 of 10

-- 10 of 10 --