Usha Jain, et al v. Donald Myers, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-11908
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
USHA JAIN,
Dr.,
MANOHAR JAIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
DONALD MYERS,
HEATHER HIGBEE,
JOHN KEST,
KEVIN WEISS,
individually and official capacity,
MR. WERT, et al.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
Defendants-Appellees,
MR. FURBUSH, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cv-01635-CEM-LRH
____________________
____________________
No. 21-11719
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
USHA JAIN,
Dr.,
MANOHAR JAIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
DONALD MYERS,
HEATHER HIGBEE,
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 3
JOHN KEST,
KEVIN WEISS,
individually and official capacity,
MR. WERT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
MR. BARKER, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket Nos. 6:19-cv-01635-CEM-LRH,
6:21-cv-00336-CEM-LRH
____________________
Before J ORDAN , L AGOA, and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Manohar and Usha Jain appeal procedural issues arising out
of their various removal actions and the associated dismissals and
remands to state court. Proceeding pro se in these consolidated ap-
peals, the Jains challenge the district court’s order dismissing their
42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint against lawyers and state
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
court judges. The Jains also challenge various post-judgment or-
ders consolidating and remanding two of their district court cases,
denying electronic filing access, and imposing a pre-filing injunc-
tion. On appeal, they argue: (1) the district court erred in dismiss-
ing their amended complaint without leave to amend, (2) the dis-
trict court did not have jurisdiction to consolidate two of the cases
or to enter an endorsed remand order after the initial order had
been appealed, (3) the district court abused its discretion in consol-
idating their two district court cases, (4) 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is un-
constitutional, (5) the district court erred in denying their motion
to remove because they were defendants and complied with 28
U.S.C. § 1443, (6) the endorsed remand order was ineffective be-
cause it was not written and formally mailed, (7) the district court
abused its discretion by denying them electronic filing access,
(8) the district court abused its discretion by issuing a pre-filing in-
junction, and (9) the district court violated their Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial by dismissing their complaint.
The Jains’ arguments fail. Therefore, we affirm the district
court. Additionally, we deny the appellees’ motion to strike por-
tions of the Jains’ reply brief and deny as moot the appellees’ alter-
native motion for leave to file a sur-reply brief about the standing
arguments. And because we hold below that the Jains forfeited
their arguments that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is unconstitutional, we
deny as moot the Jains’ motion to certify a question regarding the
constitutionality of § 1447(c) to the Attorney General of the United
States.
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 5
I.
The Jains brought claims related to their dispute with their
homeowner association in state court, suing the law firm repre-
senting their neighbors. The law firm moved for sanctions against
the Jains under state law on frivolousness grounds. A hearing about
the potential sanctions was planned, but then the Jains filed a fed-
eral complaint alleging civil rights violations and removed the state
case to federal court. The district court dismissed the case and re-
manded the case to state court on February 10, 2020. In accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the district court ordered a certified copy
of the remand order to be mailed to the state court clerk, which the
state court received and docketed on February 19, 2020. In May
2020, the Jains filed a timely notice of appeal from the February 10,
2020, order dismissing the case and numerous post-judgment or-
ders.
COVID-19 caused delays, and the state court hearing was
delayed until it was set for February 19, 2021. But before that state
court hearing could take place, the Jains tried to remove the case
to federal court two more times. On February 2, 2021, the Jains
filed a new complaint in federal court and removed the state case
for a second time. On February 10, 2021, the federal district court
remanded the plaintiffs’ case to state court because the removal
was in the wrong venue, untimely, and insufficient to invoke 28
U.S.C. § 1443’s removal provisions; and the federal district court
ordered the clerk of the federal court to send a certified copy of the
remand order by mail to the state court clerk in accordance with
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). On February 18, 2021, the state court received
that mailing in which the federal district court warned the Jains to
not baselessly remove the case to federal court again.
But on that same day, the plaintiffs filed a third complaint
and removed the case to federal court again even though nothing
had changed since the previous remand. By this date, the plaintiff
and defendants had already been litigating the substantive claims
in state court. The state court commenced a planned hearing at
9:05 A.M. on February 19, 2021, with all parties present but re-
cessed the hearing after the plaintiffs informed the state court of
the last-minute removal. Later that morning, the federal district
court consolidated the cases associated with the first and third com-
plaints, ordered the consolidated case remanded to state court (the
relevant remand order for their related claims on appeal), and in-
formed the state court of its remand order. Next, the state court
informed the plaintiffs that the case had been remanded to state
court; and, although the plaintiffs refused to participate at this point
in the day, the state court proceeded with their full knowledge. The
Jains were unsatisfied with the results. They again attempted to re-
move the case to federal court on February 22, 2021, and were
again rebuffed by the federal court. The Jains appealed, and we con-
solidated their appeals.
II.
First, we address whether the district court erred in dismiss-
ing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint without leave to amend. We
review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 7
claim. See Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.
2006) (citing Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003)). We
accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. (citing Hill,
321 F.3d at 1335). Though pro se parties are held to a less stringent
pleading standard than represented parties, they still must plead
“some factual support for a claim.” Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787
F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). When a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a viable claim, a pro se plaintiff must be given
at least one chance to amend a complaint before a district court
dismisses the action with prejudice. See Silberman v. Miami Dade
Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woldeab v.
Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)). But
a court need not grant leave to amend the complaint if further
amendment would be futile. See id. at 1133 (quoting Woldeab, 885
F.3d at 1291). “Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the com-
plaint as amended would still be properly dismissed.” Id. (quoting
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action by private citizens
against government actors for violating their constitutional rights
and other federal laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The challenged con-
duct must have (1) deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) been committed
by a person acting under color of state law. See Focus on the Family
v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276–77 (11th Cir.
2003). A private party will be viewed as a state actor for § 1983 pur-
poses only in rare circumstances. See Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v.
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8 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harvey v. Har-
vey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992)). To conclude that private
parties are state actors, a court must conclude that (1) “the [s]tate
has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged
to violate the Constitution” (the “state compulsion test”), id.;
(2) “the private parties performed a public function that was tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the [s]tate” (the “public func-
tion test”), id.; or (3) the state was in such “a position of interde-
pendence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participant in
the enterprise[]” (the nexus or joint action test), id. (alterations in
original) (quoting NBC, Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 860 F.2d
1022, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 1988)).
There are two sued parties here: lawyers and state court
judges. “[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being
an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within
the meaning of § 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318
(1981) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead
a § 1983 conspiracy claim with particularity describing the nature
of the conspiracy, not just claim that one existed. See Fullman v.
Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556–57, 561 (11th Cir. 1984). Therefore, the
lawyers sued here are not state actors; and the Jains have not come
close to pleading, and cannot plead, facts that could support a via-
ble conspiracy claim under § 1983.
Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from damages for
acts taken in their judicial capacity as long as they did not act “in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067,
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 9
1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bolin v.
Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)). Absolute judicial “im-
munity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious,
or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Bolin, 225
F.3d at 1239). Whether a judge’s actions were done in his judicial
capacity depends on whether “(1) the act complained of consti-
tuted a normal judicial function[,] (2) the events occurred in the
judge’s chambers or in open court[,] (3) the controversy involved a
case pending before the judge[,] and (4) the confrontation arose im-
mediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. (cit-
ing Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here, the
judges sued were acting in their official capacity governing a state
court case over which they had jurisdiction, giving them absolute
judicial immunity.
Thus, amendment would have been futile given that each of
the defendants was either a lawyer who was not a state actor or a
state judge entitled to judicial immunity. Therefore, the district
court did not err in dismissing the Jains’ complaint without leave
to amend.
III.
Second, we address whether the district court had jurisdic-
tion to consolidate two of the cases and to enter an endorsed re-
mand order after the initial order had been appealed. We review de
novo whether the district court had jurisdiction over a matter while
an order is pending on appeal. See United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61
F.3d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Mars v. Mounts, 895 F.2d
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10 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 1990)). The filing of a notice of appeal nor-
mally divests the district court of authority to proceed with respect
to any matters involved in the appeal. See Johnson v. 3M Co., 55 F.4th
1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). However, the district court is not
divested of jurisdiction to address matters that do not affect the
questions or claims presented on appeal. See id. Here, the argument
is that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consolidate the
case with the first complaint, which had a notice of appeal filed,
with the case associated with the third complaint or to issue the
endorsed remand order. But the consolidation did not completely
merge the two cases and did not affect the issues already on appeal
in the first case. The endorsed remand order consolidated the orig-
inal case with the removal case, which alleged new violations of
the Jains’ civil rights based on a newly assigned judge and granted
remand as to the Jains’ new request for removal in the original case
alleging new violations of discrimination in state court. These ac-
tions do not impact what was already on appeal. Therefore, the
district court had jurisdiction to consolidate the cases and issue the
endorsed remand order because the new request for removal in-
volved new allegations of discrimination unrelated to the pending
appeal.
IV.
Third, we address whether the district court abused its dis-
cretion in consolidating two of the plaintiffs’ district court cases.
We review a district court’s ruling on whether consolidation is
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 11
appropriate for an abuse of discretion. See Hargett v. Valley Fed. Sav.
Bank, 60 F.3d 754, 760 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing generally Whiteman
v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955); Dupont v. S. Pac. Co., 366 F.2d
193 (5th Cir. 1966); Alley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 767 F.2d 138 (5th
Cir. 1985)). Thus, we must affirm unless we determine that the dis-
trict court has made a clear error of judgment or has applied an
incorrect legal standard. See Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of
Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1104 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 permits a federal court to
consolidate actions before it if they involve a common question of
law or fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2). We have encouraged trial
judges to use Rule 42(a) to eliminate unnecessary repetition and
confusion. See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492,
1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Dupont, 366 F.2d at 195). This is a
discretionary decision; but in exercising its discretion, the court
must consider (1) whether the specific risks of prejudice and confu-
sion are overborne by the risk of inconsistent adjudications of com-
mon factual and legal issues; (2) the burden on parties, witnesses,
and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits; (3) the
length of time required to conclude multiple suits compared to a
single one; and (4) the relative expense of all concerned. See id.
(quoting Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
1982)).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in consol-
idating the two district court cases because they involved a
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12 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
common question of law and fact regarding removal, and consoli-
dation avoided unnecessary repetition and confusion.
V.
Fourth, we dispose of the Jains’ argument that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) is unconstitutional. We review de novo the constitutional-
ity of a statute. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1277
(11th Cir. 2001). Generally, we will not consider an issue not raised
in the district court. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d
1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). But we may exercise our discretion to
consider a forfeited issue if, among other reasons, the proper reso-
lution is beyond any doubt. See id. at 1332. Here, the Jains did not
raise a constitutional argument about 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) below,
and we see no reason to exercise our discretion to address this issue
for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we decline to address the
merits of the Jains’ argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is unconstitu-
tional because they forfeited that argument by failing to raise the
issue below.
VI.
Fifth, we dispose of the Jains’ argument that the district
court erred in denying their motion to remove because they were
defendants and complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1443. We review de novo
a decision to remand a case to state court for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prods. Inc., 953 F.3d 735,
739 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184,
1194 (11th Cir. 2007)). When an appellant fails to challenge every
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 13
stated ground for a judgment that is based on multiple independent
grounds, he is deemed to have abandoned that challenge, which
results in the judgment being affirmed. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
ridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Little v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2012)). But if an is-
sue is abandoned because it is not raised in the initial brief on ap-
peal, we deem that issue forfeited. See United States v. Campbell, 26
F.4th 860, 871–73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). It is solely within our
discretion whether we address such an issue, but “the issue may be
raised by the court sua sponte in extraordinary circumstances after
finding that one of our Access Now forfeiture exceptions applies.” Id.
at 873 (citing generally Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d
1324 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction to review an order remand-
ing a case to state court; but when a case is removed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1442 or 28 U.S.C. § 1443, we may review the remand
order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Section 1443 permits a defendant in
a state civil action to remove the action to federal court if the action
is (1) against a person who is denied or cannot enforce in the state
courts “a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens of the United States” or (2) “[f]or any act under color of
authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for
refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with such law.” Id. § 1443. A defendant must file a notice of re-
moval no later than 30 days after receipt of a copy of the initial re-
movable pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
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14 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
Here, the Jains argue that the district court erred in denying
their motion to remove because they were defendants and com-
plied with 28 U.S.C. § 1443. But the Jains did not challenge the in-
dependent ground that they had not removed the action in a timely
manner and had missed the deadline. We see no reason to resurrect
this forfeited argument. Therefore, we need not address whether
the Jains were defendants or whether removal was proper under
§ 1443 because we may—and do—affirm based on the unchal-
lenged independent ground that their removal attempts were un-
timely.
VII.
Sixth, we now turn to the Jains’ argument that the endorsed
remand order was ineffective because it was not written and for-
mally mailed. We interpret federal statutes de novo. See Burlison v.
McDonald’s Corp., 455 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004)). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) sets forth the procedure after removal and states that “[a]
certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk
to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon pro-
ceed with such case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
In Johnson v. Estelle, the district court orally remanded a crim-
inal case to state court; and two days later the defendant was con-
victed of burglary in state court. See 625 F.2d 75, 76–77 (5th Cir.
1980). The Fifth Circuit—whose decisions rendered prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1981, we have adopted as binding precedent, see Bonner v.
City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)—
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 15
stated that § 1447(c)’s mailing requirement posed a potential prob-
lem because there was no evidence the remand order had been
written until over a month later or when, if ever, it was mailed to
the state court. See Johnson, 625 F.2d at 77–78. It noted that the or-
der was backdated to the day of the announcement of remand. See
id. at 78. The Fifth Circuit concluded that “substance must control
form” and noted that both parties received notice of the remand
and tried the burglary case without objection. Id. It concluded that
the announcement in open court coupled with a backdated order
complied with the statute and vested jurisdiction in the state court,
even though there was no evidence it was ever mailed. See id.
In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Feliciano, 140 S.
Ct. 696 (2020), the Supreme Court held that a Puerto Rican court
lacked jurisdiction to issue orders during the time between the fed-
eral district court’s dismissal of the case and its remand to the
Puerto Rican court five months later. See id. at 699–700. The Su-
preme Court held that the district court’s later order making the
remand order effective as of the earlier date of the action’s dismissal
did not change the fact that nothing happened to remand the case
on that earlier date. See id. at 700–01. Moreover, it held that the
case remained in federal court until the district court reached a de-
cision about the motion to remand that was pending before it and
the state court’s actions in the interim were void. See id. at 701.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan is distinguishable from
our earlier precedent in Johnson because Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of San Juan involved a situation in which there was not any remand
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16 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
order when the Puerto Rican court acted—meaning the Puerto Ri-
can court still lacked jurisdiction. On the contrary, Johnson ad-
dressed an oral remand order—meaning there was no jurisdic-
tional problem. Here, under Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan
and Johnson, the endorsed remand order was effective for jurisdic-
tional purposes when the order was entered on the federal district
court docket—thereby vesting the state court with jurisdiction.
Having determined that the state court had jurisdiction, we
must still evaluate whether there was a statutory problem under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section 1447(c) requires that a federal clerk mail a
certified copy of the order of remand to the clerk of the state court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Our case law instructs us to place substance
over form in analyzing compliance with this statutory require-
ment. See Johnson, 625 F.2d at 78 (“[S]ubstance must control
form.”).
We will start with the sequence of events in this specific
case. The plaintiffs had baselessly removed an earlier action to fed-
eral court and were remanded to state court. Then, after a removal
in this case—the Jains’ second removal in these various legal ac-
tions—on February 10, 2021, the federal district court remanded
the plaintiffs’ case to state court and ordered the clerk of the federal
court to send a certified copy of the remand order by mail to the
state court clerk in accordance with § 1447(c). The state court re-
ceived that document on February 18, 2021. In that document, the
federal district court warned the Jains to not baselessly remove the
case to federal court again. But also on February 18, 2021, as a delay
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 17
tactic, the plaintiffs removed the case to federal court again, despite
no change in circumstances since the previous remand.
By this time, the plaintiff and defendants had already been
litigating the substantive claims in state court. The state court com-
menced its planned hearing at 9:05 A.M. on February 19, 2021, with
all parties present but recessed the hearing after the plaintiffs in-
formed the state court of the last-minute removal. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the federal district court ordered the case remanded to state
court again, vesting the state court with jurisdiction. See Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan, 140 S. Ct. at 701. Then the federal
district court informed the state court of its remand order. Next,
the state court informed the plaintiffs that the case had been re-
manded to state court and proceeded with their full knowledge, so
there was no notice problem. Moreover, because they had already
litigated the issues in state court in their filings before this point,
there was no due process problem with proceeding in their absence
after they refused to participate in the hearing after the morning
recess.
Under these facts and our binding case law requiring us to
consider substance over form with this statutory provision, the
statutory requirement was satisfied. A contrary result would be un-
tenable: it would allow plaintiffs to baselessly remove cases repeat-
edly—despite having been remanded to state court already with a
certified copy sent by mail—to avoid decisions in their state cases.
The federal court satisfied the substance of Section 1447(c) by
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18 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
giving the state court and parties notice of its second remand in this
action.
VIII.
Seventh, we review the district court’s decision to deny the
Jains from having electronic filing access. We “review a district
court’s application of local rules for an abuse of discretion.” Mann
v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009). “We give
‘great deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local
rules.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. Hous. Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 727
(11th Cir. 1992)). The appellant bears the burden of showing that
the district court made a clear error of judgment. See id. The Middle
District of Florida allows the court to prescribe by administrative
order procedures governing electronic filing. See M.D. Fla.
R. 1.01(c). The Middle District of Florida’s administrative proce-
dures governing electronic filing state that a pro se litigant is not
permitted to file documents on CM/ECF without a court order.
See M.D. Fla., “Administrative Procedures for Electronic Filing”
(rev. effective Dec. 1, 2022), at B.5. This was the rule at the time of
the district court’s actions as well. Here, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the Jains’ motions for electronic fil-
ing access because it followed its local rules prohibiting pro se liti-
gants from filing electronically and found that the plaintiffs had not
established a special circumstance to receive an exemption from
the default rule.
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 19
IX.
Eighth, we address the district court’s pre-filing injunction
against the Jains. We review a pre-filing injunction against litigants
for an abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096
(11th Cir. 2008) (citing Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d
1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004)). District courts possess the power to
issue pre-filing injunctions “to protect against abusive and vexa-
tious litigation.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th
Cir. 1993). We have explained that a “court has a responsibility to
prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the ju-
dicial machinery needed by others” and that a litigant “can be se-
verely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in
his applications for judicial relief.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d
1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc). “The only restriction . . . is
that a litigant cannot be ‘completely foreclosed from any access to
the court.’” Martin-Trigona, 986 F.2d at 1387. We have emphasized
that “[c]onsiderable discretion necessarily is reposed in the district
court” in crafting such an injunction. Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074). Before entering or modifying an
injunction, the court is required to provide a litigant with notice
and the opportunity to be heard. See Doe, 1-13 ex rel. Doe Sr. No’s 1-
13 v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1063–64 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing a pre-filing injunction because the Jains had filed numerous friv-
olous post-judgment motions and because the district court’s re-
quirement that the Jains receive approval from the magistrate
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20 Opinion of the Court 20-11908
judge to file future filings did not completely foreclose access to the
court. Additionally, the district court provided the Jains with due
process before imposing the pre-filing injunction by giving them
notice of the possibility of sanctions and the opportunity to respond
to the show cause order.
X.
Ninth, we address whether the district court violated the
Jains’ Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial by dismissing their
initial complaint. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n
[s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” U.S.
Const. amend. VII. A “district court does not intrude on the consti-
tutional role of the jury when it considers whether a complaint [or
individual claim] fails as a matter of law” before trial. Jefferson v.
Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 920 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that sum-
mary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment). Here,
the district court did not violate the Seventh Amendment by dis-
missing the Jains’ amended complaint without a jury trial because
dismissing a complaint before trial for failure to state a claim does
not violate the Seventh Amendment.
XI.
Finally, we address two procedural points.
First, the appellees moved to strike portions of the Jains’ re-
ply brief that had discussed the appellees’ standing and moved in
the alternative for leave to file a sur-reply brief. We must satisfy
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20-11908 Opinion of the Court 21
ourselves that there is standing. See Va. House of Delegates v. Be-
thune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019). Thus, although arguments
for standing that first appear in a reply brief would be forfeited, we
will not strike arguments for lack of standing even though they first
appear in a reply brief. See id. The standing issue is clear-cut. The
judicial appellees are not required to have standing to respond in
this appeal because they did not seek appellate review and are not
challenging any action taken by the district court. See id. (quoting
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)). They
are merely filing a response brief to the Jains’ arguments. Thus, alt-
hough we must address arguments about a lack of standing, the
Jains’ standing arguments fail. Consequently, we DENY the appel-
lees’ motion to strike portions of the Jains’ reply brief and DENY
as moot the appellees’ alternative motion for leave to file a sur-re-
ply brief about the standing arguments.
Second, because we hold that the Jains’ forfeited their argu-
ments that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is unconstitutional, we DENY as
moot the Jains’ motion to certify a question regarding the constitu-
tionality of § 1447(c) to the Attorney General of the United States.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we AFFIRM.
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