USA v. Joseph Richard Robson, Sr.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-12032
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cr-00028-RV-CJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH RICHARD ROBSON, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(June 7, 2021)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Joseph Robson, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by
Section 603(b) of the First Step Act of 2018.1 After review,2 we affirm.
It is well established that a district court has no inherent authority to modify
a defendant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a statute or rule.”
United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605-06 (11th Cir. 2015). Prior to the First
Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed the district court to reduce a
prisoner’s term of imprisonment upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a), if it found
that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted such a reduction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (effective November 2, 2002, to December 20, 2018). The First
Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow the court to reduce a
defendant’s term of imprisonment also upon motion of the defendant, “after the
defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the
[BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the
receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier.” See First Step Act § 603; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court must find
1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (First Step Act).
2 We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
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that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction, consider the §
3553(a) factors, and find that a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.; United States v. Bryant, __
F.3d __, 2021 WL 1827158 at *8 (11th Cir. May 7, 2021) (explaining the policy
statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13).
Under § 3553(a), a district court’s sentence must be sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing, which are: reflecting the
seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just
punishment, deterring future criminal conduct, protecting the public, and providing
the defendant with any needed training or treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section
3553(a) also requires district courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sentences
available, the Sentencing Guidelines, any pertinent policy statement, the need to
avoid disparate sentences for defendants with similar records, and the need to
provide restitution to any victims. Id.
In situations where consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is mandatory, it is
not necessary for the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). Instead, an
acknowledgement by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) factors is
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sufficient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). A
sentence may be affirmed so long as the record indicates that the district court
considered a number of the factors. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936,
944 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming appellant’s sentence because even though the
district court did not discuss each of the sentencing factors, the record showed that
it considered several of them). Moreover, the weight given to any of the § 3553(a)
factors is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v.
Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the § 3553(a)
factors did not warrant release, specifically the seriousness of Robson’s offense
and his own history and characteristics, namely the fact Robson’s medical
conditions remained mostly unchanged since he presented them at the original
sentencing and that Robson had only served 26% of his sentence. It specifically
highlighted that Robson’s offense conduct involved the possession of graphic child
pornography and Robson engaging in sexual conduct with his own eight-year-old
granddaughter while photographing the conduct. The district court noted that it
had already considered Robson’s medical conditions and the medical report in its
original sentencing. The district court acknowledged the § 3553(a) factors and
considered them, and the court was permitted to weigh the aforementioned specific
factors heavily. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281; Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309. Further,
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given that the district court had weighed Robson’s age and medical conditions in
its previous sentencing determination, it was permitted to decide that the
circumstances had not sufficiently changed to warrant a different application of the
§ 3553(a) factors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Robson’s motion for a reduced sentence based on its consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors.
AFFIRMED.
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