Thomas Joiner v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12928
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
THOMAS EUGENE JOINER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01321-ACA
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12928
Before R OSENBAUM , GRANT, and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER C URIAM :
Thomas Joiner applied to the Social Security Administration
for supplemental security income and was denied. He appealed the
denial to the district court, which affirmed the decision. Now, he
appeals to us, and we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2019, Joiner applied for adult supplemental se-
curity income for a disability that began about ten years earlier.
Joiner listed ten medical conditions that allegedly limited his ability
to work: a back problem, degenerative disc disease, a bulging disc,
pinched nerves, arthritis in both legs, a pitting edema, no cartilage
in the right knee, hypertension, anxiety, and depression. And he
said that before he became unable to work, he had jobs as a painter
for a residential contractor and as a pipe fitter for a construction
company.
The Administration denied Joiner’s application, and Joiner
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. At the
hearing, Joiner testified about his living situation, his employment
and medical histories, the limitations allegedly caused by his medi-
cal conditions, and how he dealt with the limitations. Then, a vo-
cational expert testified about how an individual like Joiner could
hypothetically work in the national economy.
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21-12928 Opinion of the Court 3
The administrative law judge had started the hearing by ac-
cepting into evidence Joiner’s medical records from 2014 to 2019.
These records included a May 15, 2019 report in which Joiner’s con-
sultative examiner, Dr. James Temple, concluded: “With [his] dif-
ficulty with movement without pain, [Joiner] had to stop work be-
cause of his inability to carry on his job. I feel he is disabled at this
point in time.” In his closing argument, Joiner (through a non-at-
torney representative) mentioned Dr. Temple’s disability determi-
nation.
The administrative law judge denied Joiner’s request for
supplemental security income. The administrative law judge
“careful[ly] consider[ed]” all evidence—including Joiner’s “com-
plete medical history”—and concluded that Joiner “ha[d] not been
under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act
since” he applied in February 2019. The administrative law judge
followed the Administration’s “five-step sequential evaluation pro-
cess” to determine whether Joiner was disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a). The administrative law judge concluded that Joiner
was not disabled at the fifth step because Joiner was “capable of
making a successful adjustment to other work that exist[ed] in sig-
nificant numbers in the national economy.”
In reaching this conclusion, the administrative law judge
mentioned Dr. Temple’s disability determination and noted that
administrative law judges “c[ould ]not defer or give any specific ev-
identiary weight, including controlling weight, to any prior admin-
istrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s), including those
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12928
from medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). The administra-
tive law judge also stated that Dr. Temple “did not offer a function-
by-function analysis of [Joiner]’s abilities and limitations” and that
the “blanket determination[] regarding [Joiner]’s disability status
[wa]s a finding . . . reserved for the . . . Administration.”
Id.
§ 416.920b(c)(3)(i).
Joiner appealed the administrative law judge’s decision to
the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied his request
for review because the administrative law judge didn’t commit an
abuse of discretion and the Appeals Council found no other reason
to review the decision.
Joiner filed a complaint in the district court seeking review
of the administrative law judge’s decision. In his memorandum in
support of disability, Joiner argued that the administrative law
judge “wrongly rejected” Dr. Temple’s opinion that Joiner was dis-
abled, improperly substituted his own judgment for Dr. Temple’s,
“failed to accord proper weight to the opinion,” “failed to recon-
tact” Dr. Temple “to determine the basis of [the] opinion,” and
“failed to state with at least ‘some measure of clarity’ grounds for
decision in repudiating the opinion.” Joiner also cited an out-of-
circuit case—
Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1995)—and
asked the district court to apply the “higher degree of review” that
the case requires when an administrative law judge “disregards the
consultative evaluation” of a medical expert selected by the Admin-
istration.
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21-12928 Opinion of the Court 5
The district court affirmed the administrative law judge’s de-
cision. The district court said that the administrative law judge spe-
cifically explained why he rejected Dr. Temple’s opinion, was not
required to recontact Dr. Temple, and didn’t “substitute[] his opin-
ion for that of Dr. Temple.” The district court also recognized that
this court does not follow the
Wilder standard, and in any event, it
found
Wilder distinguishable. And “[s]ubstantial evidence,” the
district court explained, “support[ed] the [administrative law
judge]’s denial of . . . Joiner’s application for supplemental security
income.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In social security appeals, we review de novo whether the
correct legal standards were applied.
See Washington v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Joiner restates the arguments that he made in the
district court, contending that the administrative law judge erred
as a matter of law when he disregarded Dr. Temple’s disability de-
termination, and asking us to apply the
Wilder standard. In assert-
ing that the administrative law judge erred when he disregarded
Dr. Temple’s disability determination, Joiner cites cases decided
under the “treating-physician rule,” which required that an admin-
istrative law judge defer to a treating physician’s medical opinion
in determining whether an individual was disabled under the Social
Security Act. As we recently clarified, the regulation that the
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12928
administrative law judge applied in Joiner’s case, 20 C.F.R. sec-
tion 404.1520c, abrogated the older treating-physician rule.
See
Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 38 F.4th 892, 896 (11th Cir.
2022) (“Because section 404.1520c falls within the scope of the
Commissioner’s authority and was not arbitrary and capricious,
it abrogates our earlier precedents applying the treating-physician
rule.”).
Under the current regulations, Dr. Temple’s opinion that
Joiner was disabled was a statement on an issue reserved to the Ad-
ministration—whether Joiner was “disabled, blind, able to work,
or able to perform regular or continuing work.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.920b(c)(3)(i). Accordingly, it was “[e]vidence that [wa]s inher-
ently neither valuable nor persuasive.”
Id. § 416.920b(c). And the
administrative law judge didn’t need to “provide any analysis about
how [he] considered such evidence in [his] determination or deci-
sion.”
Id. Thus, the administrative law judge didn’t err as a matter
of law when he disregarded Dr. Temple’s disability conclusion.
Finally, we agree with the district court that
Wilder is distin-
guishable. In
Wilder, the consulting physician’s opinion was the
only medical evidence regarding the applicant’s mental health im-
pairments, so the rejection of the opinion by the administrative law
judge, the Seventh Circuit concluded, was “rank conjecture.” 64
F.3d at 338. But, where the medical evidence is conflicting, as it is
here, we’ve held that it was not error for the administrative law
judge to give less weight to the consulting physician’s opinion.
See
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir.
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21-12928 Opinion of the Court 7
2004) (“The ALJ correctly found that, because Hartig examined
Crawford on only one occasion, her opinion was not entitled to
great weight. . . . [T]he ALJ’s findings regarding Crawford’s mental
capacity were supported by the findings of Dr. Mehta, the psychia-
trist who had examined Crawford on two occasions and reported
that Crawford was cooperative clear, spontaneous, but without
any evidence of loose associations, flights of ideas, or pressure of
speech.” (cleaned up)). That’s what happened here. The adminis-
trative law judge explained why he rejected Dr. Temple’s disability
conclusion—Dr. Temple did not offer a function-by-function anal-
ysis of Joiner’s abilities and limitations and his blanket determina-
tion that Joiner was disabled was reserved for the Commissioner—
and instead credited the testimony of the medical evidence show-
ing that Joiner had residual functional capacity to perform jobs in
the national economy.
Finding no error, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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