USA v. Hector Castro

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13653
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HECTOR CASTRO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:12-cr-80119-DMM-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13653
Before R OSENBAUM , JILL PRYOR , and NEWSOM , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hector Castro, proceeding
pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his
sentence pursuant to Amendment 782 of the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines. After careful consideration, we affirm the de-
nial of Castro’s motion for a sentence reduction.
I.
In 2013, Castro pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with in-
tent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. In the plea
agreement, Castro and the government agreed that the offense
involved 150 kilograms or more of a mixture and substance con-
taining cocaine. Castro and the government also agreed to rec-
ommend that the district court impose a sentence of 240 months.
But in the plea agreement, Castro acknowledged that the court
had the authority to impose any sentence within and up to the
statutory maximum of life imprisonment.
Prior to Castro’s sentencing hearing, a probation officer
prepared a presentencing investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI re-
ported that Castro’s offense involved 150 kilograms or more of
cocaine and found that Castro’s base offense level was 38. After
applying adjustments because the offense involved possession of a
dangerous weapon as well as for Castro’s role as an organizer or
leader and for acceptance of responsibility, the PSI calculated Cas-
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21-13653 Opinion of the Court 3
tro’s total offense level as 41. Based on Castro’s criminal history
category of I, the PSI stated that Castro’s guidelines range was 324
to 405 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the dis-
trict court adopted the PSI’s guidelines calculations. The district
court then granted a downward variance and sentenced Castro to
240 months, finding this recommended sentence was reasonable.
While Castro was serving his sentence, the Sentencing
Commission adopted Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guide-
lines, reducing by two levels certain base offense levels in the
drug quantity tables.
See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual App. C,
Amend. 782 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2014). The amendment en-
compassed Castro’s offense. Applied retroactively, Amendment
782 lowered Castro’s total offense level to 39, changing his advi-
sory sentencing range to 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.
In November 2014, Castro, proceeding
pro se, filed a mo-
tion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on
the retroactive application of Amendment 782. The district court
denied the motion. Because Castro’s 240-month sentence was
lower than the bottom of the amended guideline range, the court
found that he was ineligible to receive a further reduction.
In August 2021, Castro filed a second
pro se motion to re-
duce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive ap-
plication of Amendment 782. He argued that the Supreme
Court’s decision in
Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765
(2018), allowed the district court to reduce his sentence.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13653
The district court denied Castro’s motion. The court again
found that Castro was ineligible for a sentence reduction. The
court also explained that even if Castro was eligible for a sentence
reduction, the court would not reduce his sentence based upon its
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.1 In addressing the § 3553(a)
factors, the district court explained that a reduction was not war-
ranted given “the seriousness of Castro’s crime and the need to
protect the public.” Doc. 362.2
Castro timely appealed to this Court.
II.
We review
de novo a defendant’s eligibility for a § 3582(c)
sentence reduction.
United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251
(11th Cir. 2021). We review a district court’s grant or denial of an
1 Under § 3553(a), the district court is required to impose a sentence “suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the
statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the
seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punish-
ment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future
criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.
Id.
§ 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sen-
tences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy state-
ments of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id.
§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries in this case.
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21-13653 Opinion of the Court 5
eligible defendant’s reduction request for abuse of discretion.
Id.
We liberally construe
pro se filings.
Carmichael v. United States,
966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).
III.
A district court may modify a defendant’s term of impris-
onment if the defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Courts undertake a two-step
inquiry in deciding whether to grant a defendant’s request to re-
duce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2).
Dillon v. United States,
560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010). At the first step, the court must consider
whether a reduction would be “consistent” with the policy state-
ment set forth at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.”
Id. at 826. At the second step,
the court must decide whether to exercise its “discretion” and
award a reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors.
Id. at 826.
Here, we affirm the district court’s decision denying Cas-
tro’s motion for a sentence reduction for two alternative reasons.
First, we conclude that the district court was not authorized to
award a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) because a reduction would
not be consistent with the policy statement set forth in § 1B1.10.
Second, even assuming the district court was authorized to award
a reduction, we cannot say that the district court abused its discre-
tion when it concluded that a reduction was not warranted under
the § 3553(a) factors.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13653
A.
We begin by explaining why a reduction was not con-
sistent with the policy statement set forth under § 1B1.10. Under
§ 1B1.10, a defendant generally is eligible for a sentence reduction
when the sentencing guideline range he was originally sentenced
under “has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amend-
ment to the Guidelines Manual.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1). Here,
there is no dispute that Amendment 782 lowered Castro’s sen-
tencing guideline range.
But not every defendant whose sentencing guideline range
is impacted by an amendment to the Guidelines Manual is eligible
for a sentence reduction. The reduction must be compatible with
§ 1B1.10 as a whole, and § 1B1.10(b)(2) places limitations on a
court’s authority to reduce a sentence. Barring special circum-
stances, which are absent in this case, a court lacks authority to
reduce a defendant’s sentence to below the bottom of the defend-
ant’s new, amended guideline range.
See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (“Except [in cases when the government has
filed a motion to reflect the defendant’s special assistance to au-
thorities], the court shall not reduce the defendant’s term of im-
prisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement
to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline
range determined under subdivision (1) of this section.”).
Because Castro’s 240-month sentence was already less than
the minimum sentence in his amended guideline range (262
months), he was not eligible for a sentence reduction. Reducing
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21-13653 Opinion of the Court 7
his sentence would be inconsistent with § 1B1.10 and thus Castro
was ineligible for a sentence reduction.
Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826.
Castro nevertheless argues that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in
Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), established
that he was eligible for a sentence reduction. But
Hughes does not
control here.
In
Hughes, the defendant pled guilty under a plea agree-
ment that required the judge to impose an agreed-upon sentence
if the judge accepted the plea.
Id. at 1773. This type of plea
agreement is described in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(c)(1)(C) and often is referred to as a “Type-C agreement.” The
issue in
Hughes was whether under § 3582(c)(2) a defendant who
pled guilty pursuant to a Type C agreement was eligible to pursue
a sentence reduction based on a retroactive amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. at 1775–77. Because § 3582(c)(2) pro-
vides that a sentence reduction is available only when a defendant
“has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sen-
tencing range that has been subsequently lowered,” the question
in
Hughes was whether a defendant’s sentence is “based” on the
Guidelines when a binding Type-C plea deal dictates the sentence
a judge must impose.
Id. at 1773 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
The Supreme Court held that a defendant with a Type-C
plea agreement is eligible for a sentence reduction. It explained
that even when a defendant has a binding Type-C plea agree-
ment, his sentence is still “based on” the Guidelines because a sen-
tence imposed pursuant to Type-C plea agreement is “no excep-
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13653
tion to the general rule that a defendant’s Guidelines range is both
the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence.”
Id. at
1776.
Castro’s argument that he is eligible for a sentence reduc-
tion under
Hughes fails for two reasons.
First, Castro did not have a Type-C plea deal. As Castro
acknowledges in his brief, the agreed-upon sentence in his plea
agreement did not bind the court and was only a recommenda-
tion from the parties. Castro cannot base his second § 3582(c)(2)
motion on
Hughes because
Hughes had no impact on Castro’s
eligibility to have his sentence reduced. Whether the Sentencing
Guidelines served as the “basis” for Castro’s sentence was never
in question; the nature of his plea agreement never prohibited the
district court from reviewing his § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sen-
tence reduction.
Second,
Hughes did not in any way alter the requirement
that sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) be “consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). And, as discussed above, the policy
statement provides that “the court shall not reduce the defend-
ant’s term of imprisonment . . . to a term that is less than the min-
imum of the amended guideline range.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).
Because Castro’s sentence was less than the minimum of
his amended guideline range, the district court was not author-
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21-13653 Opinion of the Court 9
ized to reduce his sentence further and properly denied his
§ 3582(c)(2) motion.
B.
After concluding that Castro had not shown that he was el-
igible for a sentence reduction, the district court explained that it
was denying Castro’s motion for a sentence reduction for a sec-
ond, independent reason. It determined that a sentence reduction
was not warranted under the § 3553(a) factors. The district court
found that “relief [was] precluded upon consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors[,] especially the seriousness of Castro’s crime and
the need to protect the public.” Doc. 362.
Castro argues that the district court ignored evidence of his
post-sentencing rehabilitation that would have informed its eval-
uation of several § 3553(a) factors. But Castro did not present evi-
dence of his post-sentencing rehabilitation to the district court in
his second motion for a sentence reduction. Furthermore, alt-
hough the district court did not explicitly address and analyze
each § 3553(a) factor, “[t]he weight given to any specific § 3553(a)
factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). We
cannot say that the district court abused that discretion when it
found that a sentence reduction was not warranted in light of the
seriousness of Castro’s crime and the need to protect the public.
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13653
IV.
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial
of Castro’s motion for a sentence reduction.
AFFIRMED.
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