Vision Warriors Church, Inc. v. Harry Johnston, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10773
____________________
VISION WARRIORS CHURCH, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHEROKEE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant,
HARRY JOHNSTON,
STEVE WEST,
RAY GUNNIN,
BENNY CARTER,
COREY RAGSDALE,
both individually and in their official capacities as
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 1 of 35

-- 1 of 35 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
members of the Cherokee County Board of Commissioners, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-03205-MHC
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , LAGOA , Circuit Judges, and S INGHAL ,* District
Judge.
S INGHAL , District Judge:
Vision Warriors, a residential ministry and the Plaintiff-Ap-
pellant in this case, purchased property in Cherokee County, Geor-
gia, to operate its faith-based substance abuse rehabilitation center
for men. Vision Warriors’ intended use was not entirely novel.
Prior owners of the property, the Happy Acres Mission Transit
Center (“Happy Acres”), operated a dormitory on the premises and
received assurances from the then-zoning administrator that Vi-
sion Warriors could do the same.
*Honorable Raag Singhal, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Flor-
ida, sitting by designation.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 2 of 35

-- 2 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 3
Defendants-Appellees, the Cherokee County Board of Com-
missioners and its members (“the County”), initially granted, then
revoked, authorization to house individuals on the property and
denied Vision Warriors’ requests for zoning approval. Appellant
challenges the actions of the County Board of Commissioners and
its members under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (“RLUIPA”), and on Georgia state law grounds.
As relevant to this appeal, Appellees jointly moved to dis-
miss the RLUIPA claim, and the district court ruled in their favor.
On later cross-motions for summary judgment,1 the district court
ruled in favor of the County on all remaining grounds, including
the FHA, ADA, Equal Protection, and Georgia state law claims.
Upon careful analysis, and with the benefit of oral argument, we
affirm the district court’s ruling as to all but the RLUIPA claim,
which, based on intervening precedent, we remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We begin with a review of the essential undisputed facts and
procedural history. As we are reviewing an order granting sum-
mary judgment in this appeal, we present the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, Vision Warriors, and draw all
1 Appellant moved for partial summary judgment.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 3 of 35

-- 3 of 35 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
reasonable inferences in its favor. Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 723 F.3d 1287, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2013).
A. Property at Issue
The property at issue in this case consists of two adjacent
parcels, around 6.5 acres in total, in residential zoning districts R-80
and R-20. Tom and Jewel Young, founders of Happy Acres, held
the property from 1972 until Vision Warriors’ purchase on Decem-
ber 13, 2017. Happy Acres’ mission was to “promote the recrea-
tion, health, safety, welfare, common benefit and enjoyment of
missionaries and to help further aid their religious and spiritual be-
liefs and goals.” The Youngs hosted missionaries in their home,
typically “one or two a month” for “no more than a week.” In 1982,
Tom and Jewel Young applied to rezone the property to build a
“church and facility to be able to keep missionaries in larger num-
bers” than they could host in their home. Cherokee County denied
the application and Happy Acres decided instead to build a large
church on the premises. Jewel Young testified that the initial appli-
cation was denied because some neighbors spoke out against it.
Cherokee County then approved the “church only” application and
issued a certificate of occupancy as well as mechanical, electrical,
and sewage permits.
B. Happy Acres’ Use and Transfer
Happy Acres held services, conferences, retreats, and ban-
quets in the new building, ranging from a few to fifty-five persons.
The building also housed missionaries; four families at a time “on
average” and “[t]here were months when six families” stayed on the
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 4 of 35

-- 4 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 5
property. The structure featured seven rooms, a bunk bed, and
three efficiency apartments. Though Happy Acres did not charge
rent, it suggested a daily payment of $15.
Happy Acres decided to sell the property in 2016 following
Tom Young’s death. In late 2016, Happy Acres met with the then-
Zoning Administrator, Vicki Lee.2 The Youngs (now Jewel Young
and her son Tori) submitted a zoning certification request form to
Lee, which detailed the use of the property and religious tempo-
rary housing. Tori Young facilitated Happy Acres’ discussions with
the Cherokee County Board of Zoning Administrators. Lee re-
counted that Happy Acres informed her of their use—housing mis-
sionaries for short periods of time—but she did not review the zon-
ing ordinance. Lee claimed to have no personal knowledge as to
the use of the property and assumed it to be legal.
On February 6, 2017, Lee issued Happy Acres a letter deem-
ing its temporary housing a “legal nonconforming use.” Lee ex-
plained that the property “could continue to house guests in the
dormitory for short periods of time” but could not “expand the use
to something different or increase the number of people served.”
The next day, Lee clarified in an email that “something different”
meant the property owners could not “change this to a youth hos-
tel, housing for laborers, or halfway housing.” She added, “[u]sing
the dormitory for short term stays as part of the ministry is fine,”
2 Vicky Lee’s name is now Vicky Smith. Consistent with the District Court’s
opinion, and for the sake of clarity, we refer to her as Vicky Lee.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 5 of 35

-- 5 of 35 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
but “if the previous tenants were missionaries and the new tenants
are planned to be recovering drug addicts, the[n] a different zoning
will be required.” On March 8, 2017, after an additional request
from Tori Young for clarification, Lee issued a second certification
letter and attached the North American Industrial Classification
System (NAICS) code associated with the land use. The NAICS
code associated with temporary shelters listed “Shelters, battered
women’s; Shelters, homeless; Shelters, runaway youth; Temporary
housing for families of medical patients; Temporary shelters (e.g.,
battered women’s, homeless, runaway youth),” among others.
In the summer of 2017, Vision Warriors and Happy Acres
entered into a Letter of Intent to purchase the property. In July
2017, Young emailed Lee to request an updated letter confirming
Vision Warriors’ special use. Lee assured Young that the March 8,
2017, letter was sufficient, explaining that “I am the interpreter of
land use and I assure you this meets Vision Warriors[’] use.” Lee
issued a third certification letter to the same effect and indicated
that Vision Warriors would need to seek a Tenant Occupancy
Change and noted that a fire marshal would visit the property to
verify the required life-safety items. Vision Warriors completed its
purchase of the property shortly thereafter.
C. Cherokee County Administrative Proceedings
Vision Warriors moved in and began its work in December
2017 or January 2018. In April 2018, the County fire marshal ar-
rived on the premises and left a card or letter which prompted
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 6 of 35

-- 6 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 7
Vision Warriors to meet with County employees and submit a Ten-
ant Occupancy Change (“TOC”) permit.
The County issued a TOC permit to Vision Warriors on
April 20, 2018. Shortly thereafter, the Deputy Fire Marshal for the
County, Chad Arp, contacted Vision Warriors to learn more about
its intended use. Vision Warriors replied that it was not a “recovery
or treatment center” but that it housed men formerly in recovery
centers for drug and alcohol abuse and helped them get back on
their feet.
On April 25, Arp relayed this information to Margaret
Stallings, the County’s Principal Planner, and Jeff Watkins, the
County’s Director of Planning and Zoning—both of whom served
as the then-acting zoning administrators following Lee’s retire-
ment. Stallings instructed Arp to postpone the planned inspection
of Vision Warriors’ property while she gathered additional infor-
mation.
Simultaneously, in the weeks following the issuance of the
permit, several neighbors complained to Watkins including that
“they had questions” about “[w]hat’s going on, what’s happening.”
Watkins met with the neighbors to discuss their concerns shortly
before he met with Vision Warriors. A neighborhood group called
“Cherokee Citizens for Community Preservation” circulated a pe-
tition urging neighbors to call upon the County Commissioners,
Watkins, and Stallings to enforce the zoning code against Vision
Warriors.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 7 of 35

-- 7 of 35 --

8 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
Throughout May 2018, County Officials and Vision Warri-
ors continued discussions regarding Vision Warriors’ use of the
property. On May 9, Vision Warriors submitted a letter through its
attorneys which compared its use to Happy Acres’ and explained
that Vision Warriors relied upon Lee’s assurances in purchasing the
property. On May 16, the Cherokee County Attorney advised the
county to inspect the property. Shortly thereafter, Arp, the County
Fire Marshal, conducted a visit with six other County employees.
Though the County typically conducted courtesy site visits, Arp
could not recall a site visit with as many individuals in the preced-
ing five years.
On June 12, the County revoked Vision Warriors’ TOC per-
mit. The County determined that Vision Warriors used the prop-
erty as a temporary shelter and explained “[t]emporary shelters
[were not] permitted in residential districts in the County since at
least 1969.” The County added that Lee had issued the permit in
error and instructed that all “current residents need to find alterna-
tive housing and the commercial uses of the property (to include,
without limitation, the woodworking shop, the auto shop, and the
import/export business) must be discontinued.”
On July 11, 2018, Vision Warriors filed appeals with the Zon-
ing Board of Appeals and the Cherokee County Board of Commis-
sioners. On August 9, Michael Chapman, the new Zoning Manager
for Cherokee County, determined that the permit was properly re-
voked. On September 7, 2018, Vision Warriors informed Chapman
that it appealed to the Cherokee County Board of Supervisors.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 8 of 35

-- 8 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 9
One month later, in October 2018, the County updated its defini-
tions of “parsonage,” “place of worship,” and “religious organiza-
tion” to allow religious institutions to have temporary shelters,
transitional housing, and like facilities through a special use permit
so long as the facilities were provided free of cost. In November
2018, Vision Warriors submitted special use permit applications
and, in the alternative, a request for rezoning to the Office and In-
stitutional District (“OI”). Vision Warriors requested a permit for
a dormitory “housing up to 55 residents.”
On March 5, 2019, the County Planning Commission held a
public hearing where eleven individuals spoke out against Vision
Warriors’ use of its property. The County Planning Commission
commented that Vision Warriors’ use “may not be compatible with
the surrounding area” where the existing septic tank was intended
for use by nine residents at most. The Commission conceded, how-
ever, that the planned use would be compatible with existing traffic
patterns and the natural property barriers, if properly maintained,
could mitigate any potential noise from the property.
The Commission voted on April 16, 2019, to deny the special
use permit and rezoning requests. Before doing so, on March 31,
2019, Harry Johnston, the Chairman of the Board of Commission-
ers, emailed the “Hickory Flat Folks,” a neighborhood group op-
posed to Vision Warriors’ use, and indicated that he planned to vote
against the zoning applications.
Vision Warriors appealed the Commission’s determination
that its use was a temporary shelter as opposed to a dormitory. The
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 9 of 35

-- 9 of 35 --

10 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
Board of Commissioners held a hearing on July 16, 2019, with a
“neutral officer” as its arbiter. Chapman testified at the hearing
that Vision Warriors’ use was more akin to a temporary shelter
than a dormitory where the latter is tied to educational institutions.
At the close of the hearing, the Board determined that Vision War-
riors’ use was a temporary shelter and voted unanimously to deny
Vision Warriors’ special use permit and rezoning request.
D. Procedural Posture
Vision Warriors filed suit in federal court shortly thereafter
against the County Defendants under the FHA, ADA, RLUIPA, and
Fourteenth Amendment. Though Vision Warriors initially ap-
pealed the Commission’s determination in Georgia State Court, it
dismissed the litigation and filed an amended complaint in its fed-
eral suit.
The District Court dismissed Vision Warriors’ RLUIPA
claim upon the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
granted summary judgment on all remaining claims in favor of the
County. In its order dismissing the RLUIPA claim, the district court
relied on Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214,
1227 (11th Cir. 2004), and found that decreasing the number of men
who live on the property did not constitute a substantial burden
under RLUIPA. Particularly, the district court noted that nothing
in the complaint suggested that Vision Warriors could not still pro-
vide weekly services and faith-based meetings or even host six res-
idents permanently. This appeal followed.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 10 of 35

-- 10 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 11
On January 26, 2023, the parties presented oral argument be-
fore the Eleventh Circuit. Vision Warriors conceded that it did not
require hosting up to 55 persons at a time. Rather, Vision Warriors
relayed that hosting 25–30 individuals at once would be sufficient.
They also conceded that, under its existing zoning scheme, Vision
Warriors could legally host up to eight unrelated persons at a time.
Cherokee County’s zoning ordinances permit four unrelated per-
sons to stay within each of Vision Warriors’ two parcels of land.
The County further noted that Vision Warriors could accommo-
date domestic workers in addition to the eight individuals.
We agree with the district court on nearly all grounds with
one important distinction—the district court’s dismissal of Vision
Warriors’ RLUIPA claim. The district court dismissed Vision War-
riors’ RLUIPA claim for a failure to demonstrate a substantial bur-
den on its “religious exercise” under Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at
1214. Though Midrash Sephardi established the governing standard
for determining a “substantial burden” under RLUIPA, this Court
has since clarified the substantial burden inquiry in Thai Meditation
Ass’n of Alabama, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821, 828–33 (11th
Cir. 2020). As to Vision Warriors’ RLUIPA claim, we remand to the
district court for reconsideration consistent with Thai Meditation.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s grant or denial of sum-
mary judgment, viewing all evidence and drawing all factual infer-
ences in favor of the nonmoving party. Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 1159,
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 11 of 35

-- 11 of 35 --

12 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
1165 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate where the
moving party demonstrates that no genuine dispute exists over the
material facts, and the moving party is entitled as a matter of law
to judgment. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a); Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp., 955
F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020).
III. ANALYSIS
We begin with Vision Warriors’ federal claims and then turn
to those arising under Georgia state law.
A. RLUIPA
Vision Warriors contends that the district court erroneously
applied a more exacting standard under Midrash Sephardi. Vision
Warriors argues that the substantial burden on its religious exercise
does not need to be total or complete to establish a viable claim
under RLUIPA and that the district court incorrectly assumed as
such in dismissing its RLUIPA claim.
Beginning with the text of the statute, RLUIPA provides, in
pertinent part, that:
No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial bur-
den on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution, unless the govern-
ment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person, assembly, or institution—(A) is in fur-
therance of a compelling interest; and (B) is the least
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 12 of 35

-- 12 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 13
restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a).
This Court reads RLUIPA to impose a two-part test: A plain-
tiff must demonstrate (1) that they are engaged in “religious exer-
cise;” and (2) that the land use regulation at issue imposes a “sub-
stantial burden” upon their religious exercise. See Midrash Sephardi,
366 F.3d at 1226. The burden then shifts to the government to
demonstrate that its land use satisfies strict scrutiny, meaning that
it is (3) narrowly tailored to (4) further a compelling government
interest. Thai Mediation, 980 F.3d at 833.
Neither party disputes that Vision Warriors has alleged en-
gagement in religious exercise. Religious exercise includes “any ex-
ercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a sys-
tem of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). And, “[t]he
use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of re-
ligious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the
person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that
purpose.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). Appellant has sufficiently alleged its
status as a “non-profit ministry that seeks to provide a faith-based
community for men recovering from addiction” and “help[s] men
to be better Disciples of Christ, fathers, husbands, leaders and
friends.” This is accomplished through a “residential program,
weekly services, and faith-based meetings.”
Finding no issue between the parties on Vision Warriors’ re-
ligious exercise, we turn now to the core dispute: whether Vision
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 13 of 35

-- 13 of 35 --

14 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
Warriors has demonstrated a substantial burden of its religious ex-
ercise under RLUIPA as applied by this Court.
A “substantial burden” requires “more than an incidental ef-
fect on religious exercise.” Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227. To
constitute a substantial burden, the challenged actions should evi-
dence a “significant pressure which directly coerces the religious
adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” Id. Still,
“substantial” does not mean “complete, total, or insuperable.”
Thai Meditation, 980 F.3d at 830.
Vision Warriors argues that (1) the district court failed to
consider that it is a residential ministry, such that, absent its residen-
tial program, it cannot fulfill its mission; and (2) the County did not
need to effectively bar its religious exercise on the property to con-
stitute a substantial burden. In response, the County argues that,
under this Court’s precedent in Midrash Sephardi, a “run of the mill”
zoning decision does not amount to a substantial burden. Instead,
the County contends that Vision Warriors is not entirely prohib-
ited from housing its members where up to eight unrelated mem-
bers are allowed on the property at a time, and where Vision War-
riors did not allege that overnight residence is a “religious precept”
of its mission or purpose. Vision Warriors counters that a zoning
decision could impose a substantial burden under the factors out-
lined in Thai Meditation, including: (1) whether plaintiff shows a
genuine need for more space; (2) the extent to which the zoning
policy deprives plaintiff of viable means of religious exercise; (3)
whether a ‘nexus’ between the coerced conduct and plaintiff’s
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 14 of 35

-- 14 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 15
religious exercise exists; (4) whether the decision-making process
evinces any arbitrariness; (5) whether the denial was final; and (6)
whether the burden was attributable to the government or self-im-
posed. Thai Meditation, 980 F.3d at 832.
Applying the factors to its case, Vision Warriors states that
it has alleged a substantial burden. Passing factor one as inapplica-
ble, Vision Warriors argues factors two and three support a sub-
stantial burden where Vision Warriors alleged that the County’s
actions will “effectively shut down” its ministry and a “residential
program is an integral and essential part of its care for those strug-
gling to overcome addiction.” According to Vision Warriors, fac-
tors four, five, and six underscore a substantial burden where the
unprecedented actions followed community opposition, the denial
was final—as in, Vision Warriors requested a reasonable accom-
modation and exhausted the Cherokee County appeal process—
and the burden stems from the County’s actions.
We find that the district court, in determining that Vision War-
riors failed to establish a substantial burden, applied a more exact-
ing standard than our precedent permits. Rather than adhering to
only the principles in Midrash Sephardi, the district court should
have considered Vision Warriors’ substantial burden arguments
under Midrash Sephardi as expanded by our precedent in Thai Med-
itation.
Together, Midrash Sephardi and Thai Meditation define the
contours of a “substantial burden.” In the absence of a clear defini-
tion under RLUIPA, the term “substantial burden” is given its
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 15 of 35

-- 15 of 35 --

16 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
“ordinary or natural meaning.” Thai Meditation, 980 F.3d at 829.
First, in Midrash Sephardi we explained that “a substantial burden is
akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious ad-
herent to confirm his or her behavior.” 366 F.3d at 1227 (internal
quotations omitted). In Midrash Sephardi, we determined that no
substantial burden existed where a zoning ordinance excluded
churches and synagogues from a business district. Id. at 1228. Ap-
pellants, two orthodox synagogues, argued that relocation to a per-
mitted district would require their congregants—particularly those
who are ill, young, or old—to walk farther and may prevent them
from attending services. Id. at 1227. The steep decline in attend-
ance, the synagogues argued, would require them to cease all op-
erations and substantially burden their religious exercise. Id.
Given that the synagogues could apply for a permit to operate a
few blocks from their original location, we concluded that walking
farther, though inconvenient, did not constitute a “substantial”
burden within the meaning of RLUIPA. Id. at 1228.
To better illustrate a substantial burden, we cited to clear
examples of what would and would not qualify as a substantial bur-
den on religious exercise. See id. On one end, a mere “incidental
effect” or “inconvenience” on religious exercise does not equal a
substantial burden. Id. at 1227. On the other end, a substantial
burden exists where “a regulation completely prevents the individ-
ual from engaging in religiously mandated activity, or if the regu-
lation requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion.”
Id. As we have clarified before, the latter form of conduct is
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 16 of 35

-- 16 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 17
sufficient, but not necessary to evidence a substantial burden. Thai
Meditation, 980 F.3d at 830–31.
In Thai Meditation, we vacated a district court order where it
required that a regulation “completely prevent” religious activity
to constitute a substantial burden. 980 F.3d at 830. Instead, we
determined that “modified behavior, if the result of government
coercion or pressure, can be enough.” Id. at 831. Remanding to
the district court for reconsideration, we articulated six factors for
the court to examine:
(1) whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine
need for new or more space—for instance, to accom-
modate a growing congregation or to facilitate addi-
tional services or programming;
(2) the extent to which the City’s decision, and the appli-
cation of its zoning policy more generally, effectively
deprives the plaintiffs of any viable means by which
to engage in protected religious exercise;
(3) whether there is a meaningful “nexus” between the
allegedly coerced or impeded conduct and the plain-
tiffs’ religious exercise;
(4) whether the City’s decision-making process concern-
ing the plaintiffs’ applications reflects any arbitrari-
ness of the sort that might evince animus or other-
wise suggests that the plaintiffs have been, are being,
or will be (to use a technical term of art) jerked
around;
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 17 of 35

-- 17 of 35 --

18 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
(5) whether the City’s denial of the plaintiffs’ zoning ap-
plications was final or whether, instead, the plaintiffs
had (or have) an opportunity to submit modified ap-
plications that might satisfy the City’s objections; and
(6) whether the alleged burden is properly attributable to
the government (as where, for instance, a plaintiff had
a reasonable expectation of using its property for reli-
gious exercise) or whether the burden is instead self-
imposed (as where the plaintiff had no such expecta-
tion or demonstrated an unwillingness to modify its
proposal in order to comply with applicable zoning
requirements).
Id. at 831–32.
Turning back to our case, the district court erred in its sub-
stantial burden assessment. First, in dismissing Vision Warriors’
RLUIPA claim, it determined that the challenged activity would
not “remove[] any possibility” that it could continue ministry op-
erations. Finding that Vision Warriors could continue non-residen-
tial operations, such as weekly services and faith-based meetings,
the district court determined that “the restriction on [Vision War-
riors’] use of the Property imposed by Defendants [does] not effec-
tively bar the use of the Property for religious exercise.” But our
precedents do not require a regulation to “effectively bar” or “re-
move[] any possibility” of religious exercise to qualify as a substan-
tial burden. Thai Meditation, 980 F.3d at 831. “Whatever ‘substan-
tial’ means, it most assuredly does not mean complete, total, or in-
superable.” Id. at 830 (citing Roman Cath. Bishop of Springfield v. City
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 18 of 35

-- 18 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 19
of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 96 (1st Cir. 2013)). Vision Warriors,
therefore, could allege a substantial burden without shutting its
doors.
Second, the district court erred in applying a more demand-
ing substantial burden standard from the Fourth Circuit. In a string
cite, the court introduced the Fourth Circuit standard for determin-
ing a substantial burden under Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries,
Inc. v. Baltimore Cnty., 915 F.3d 256, 260–61 (4th Cir. 2019). The
Fourth Circuit there held that a burden on religious exercise is sub-
stantial where “the use of the property would serve an unmet reli-
gious need, the restriction on religious use is absolute rather than
conditional, and the organization must acquire a different property
as a result.” Id. In rendering its decision in our case, the district
court noted, “[a]ssuming that Vision Warriors’ use of the property
would serve an unmet religious need, the restriction on its use of
the Property imposed by Defendants does not effectively bar the
use of the Property for religious exercise.” This is not the test from
our circuit, and we have never required an “effective[] bar” on the
use of property for religious exercise to find a RLUIPA violation.
The Eleventh Circuit’s substantial burden inquiry does not
require a Plaintiff to establish an “unmet” religious need in the
community and its religious exercise need not be completely ham-
strung to meet the substantial burden threshold. See Thai Medita-
tion, 980 F.3d at 833. We therefore remand to the District Court
for consideration in the first instance consistent with this opinion
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 19 of 35

-- 19 of 35 --

20 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
and our precedents, particularly Thai Meditation’s nonexhaustive
list of relevant considerations.
B. FHA and ADA Discrimination
We next consider Appellant’s FHA, ADA, Equal Protection,
and Georgia state law claims, which follow from a grant of sum-
mary judgment in the County’s favor.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Appellees where its “disabled” status
“played some role” in the challenged zoning decisions. Specifically,
Appellant argues intentional discrimination and a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations under the FHA and ADA. We take
each in turn below. The district court analyzed the two statutes as
one and we do the same for purposes of our analysis. see Sailboat
Bend Sober Living, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1275
(11th Cir. 2022) (“Although there are important differences be-
tween them, those differences are not relevant to the outcome of
this appeal.”).
i. FHA and ADA: Intentional Discrimination
“To prevail on an intentional discrimination claim, a plaintiff
must show that his disability played some role in the defendant’s
action.” Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1281. “Disparate treatment may
be proven using either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. In
support of its claims, Appellant points to the following as evidence
that its members’ status as disabled played some role in the denial
of its special use permits and rezoning request: (1) its classification
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 20 of 35

-- 20 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 21
as a temporary shelter rather than a dormitory; (2) neighborhood
opposition; (3) the revocation of its Tenancy Occupancy Change
permit; (4) the denial of the rezoning application and a special use
permit; (5) Chairman Johnston’s comments that he had already de-
cided how he would vote (that is, against Vision Warriors); and (6)
the fact that revocation of a permit was unprecedented. Appel-
lant’s points do not demonstrate either direct or circumstantial ev-
idence of discrimination and, accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s decision. We first examine whether Appellant demon-
strated intentional discrimination through direct evidence. A di-
rect showing of discriminatory animus involves “evidence, which,
if believed, proves existence of [the] fact in issue without inference
of presumption.” Id. We see no direct evidence of discrimination
where County defendants offer facially neutral reasons for each
challenged action and there is no additional evidence that the
Board of Commissioners had anti-disability animus. Perhaps if a
county official “ma[de] discriminatory comments about the disa-
bled while explaining his basis for the contested decision,” that
would suffice. See Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1281 (citing Cinnamon
Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. St. George City, 685 F.3d 917, 919 (10th
Cir. 2012)). But there are no explicitly discriminatory comments
from county defendants (or the neighbors in opposition to Vision
Warriors’ operation, for that matter) on the record.
In the absence of direct evidence, we determine whether Vi-
sion Warriors established intentional discrimination under the
FHA and ADA through circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence involves the “burden-shifting framework provided by
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 21 of 35

-- 21 of 35 --

22 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).”
Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1281. First, a plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Factors instructive for deter-
mining racially discriminatory intent include: “(1) discriminatory
or segregative effect, (2) historical background, (3) the sequence of
events leading up to the challenged actions, and (4) whether there
were any departures from normal or substantive criteria.” Hall-
mark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006).
In assessing the first factor, discriminatory or segregative ef-
fect, we must examine whether the government’s actions, though
facially neutral, might have a “disparate impact on individuals with
disabilities.” See Sailboat Bend, 46 F. 4th at 1282 (internal quotations
omitted). Appellant argues that the County’s decisions are tanta-
mount to a “complete ban on [its] operation in all residential zon-
ing districts in the County.” But that is not the case, and Appellant
has not explained how these zoning decisions and regulations dis-
proportionately impact a disabled population, anyway.
In oral argument, the government contended that Vision
Warriors could house up to eight unrelated members under the
current zoning scheme. The property in question consists of two
residential lots, and each lot allows for up to four unrelated individ-
uals, plus a number of domestic workers, or Vision Warrior staff
members. To the extent Vision Warriors argues that the zoning
limits disproportionately impact its members due to their disabil-
ity, it has not offered any statistical data or comparators in support
of this factor. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201,
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 22 of 35

-- 22 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 23
1218 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Hallmark Devs., Inc., 466 F.3d at 1286
(“Typically, a disparate impact is demonstrated by statistics.”)).
We therefore give this factor no weight.
Nor does Vision Warriors cite any background suggesting
that the county has historically discriminated against disabled indi-
viduals. It instead focuses its argument on the sequence of events.
To this end, Vision Warriors lists several events or circumstances
which, it contends, demonstrate a discriminatory motive by the
County defendants. These include neighborhood opposition, the
county’s revocation of Vision Warriors’ TOC permit, Commis-
sioner Johnston’s statements that he decided to vote against Vision
Warriors’ zoning applications before the vote took place, and the
subsequent denial of the zoning applications. If there is anti-disa-
bility animus to be found in the neighbors’ statements, it is buried
well between the lines. Indeed, in their petition, the neighbors
stated, “We believe that it is the right thing to do but in the wrong
location and th[ey are] going about it in the wrong way.” Com-
missioner Johnston’s statements, however frustrating Vision War-
riors may find them to be, are nevertheless probative of only one
member’s motives. Our case law requires more to impute an un-
constitutional motive to the Commission as a whole. See Mason v.
Vill. Of El Portal, 240 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no
municipal liability “unless all three members of the council who
voted against reappointing [p]laintiff shared the illegal motive.”).
Finally, Vision Warriors’ remaining frustrations understandably
stem from dissonance created by Zoning Administrator Lee’s mis-
takes. But both Lee and the County found that Vision Warriors
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 23 of 35

-- 23 of 35 --

24 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
was a temporary shelter. Given that temporary shelters have been
disallowed in these zones since 1969, a long track record supporting
the legitimacy of this reason for revoking the permit exists, and the
subsequent denial of the applications and permits is not probative
of anti-disability animus without something more. Therefore, we
give this factor little weight.
Finally, and as the district court acknowledged, Vision War-
riors argues that the County’s conduct was a departure from nor-
mal criteria. By “departure,” Vision Warriors is referring to the
County Fire Marshal’s phone call after the issuance of the tenant
occupancy permit, the canceled inspection ordered by the
County’s Planning and Zoning Department, and the unannounced
visit to Vision Warriors’ property from the Fire Marshal and nu-
merous County officials. Nevertheless, departure from normal cir-
cumstances could be justified here due to the unprecedented pre-
cipitating event—Lee’s erroneous certification—and nothing in the
record here allows us to conclude that that was not the case. Find-
ing insufficient direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimina-
tion, we affirm.
ii. FHA and ADA: Reasonable Accommodation
We now address Appellant’s reasonable accommodation
claim under the FHA and ADA. Vision Warriors argues that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment in Appellees’
favor where the requested accommodation was both reasonable
and necessary.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 24 of 35

-- 24 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 25
Originally enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the FHA prohibited housing discrimination “on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1212.
Congress expanded the title to include gender and, eventually, dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap and familial status. Id. Sub-
section (f ) relates to handicapped individuals and renders unlawful:
(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to other-
wise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
buyer or renter because of a handicap of—
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that
dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available;
or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwell-
ing, or in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection with such dwelling, because of a handicap
of—
(A) that person; or
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that
dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available;
or
(C) any person associated with that person.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f )(1)–(2). Also pursuant to subsection (f ), “dis-
crimination includes,” among other things, “a refusal to make rea-
sonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 25 of 35

-- 25 of 35 --

26 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such per-
son equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id.
§ 3604(f )(3)(B).
The district court examined only whether Vision Warriors’
claim was necessary. Finding that it was not, the district court did
not reach the issue of reasonableness. For the avoidance of doubt,
we examine both reasonableness and necessity below. Finding that
the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either, we affirm.
An FHA and ADA plaintiff must establish the following to
state a claim for reasonable accommodation: “(1) that he is disa-
bled, (2) that he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) that
the requested accommodation was necessary to afford him an
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and (4) that the de-
fendant refused to make the requested accommodation.” Sailboat
Bend, 46 F.4th at 1280. The parties’ dispute is limited to whether
the requested accommodation, housing up to 55 people, was nec-
essary and reasonable.
a. Reasonableness
The reasonableness of a requested accommodation is a
“highly fact-specific” inquiry. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo.
Ass'n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014). An “[a]ccommoda-
tion is not reasonable if it either [1] imposes undue financial and
administrative burdens on a grantee or [2] requires a fundamental
alteration in the nature of the program.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1220.
As to costs and administrative burdens imposed, the County admit-
ted the accommodation would not increase traffic or parking. The
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 26 of 35

-- 26 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 27
sewage system on premises, however, is only equipped to handle a
maximum of 9 people. Otherwise, the County cites to no financial
burdens.
Assessing whether the requested accommodations consti-
tute fundamental alterations, however, requires closer review. In
the zoning context, a proposed accommodation qualifies as a “fun-
damental alteration” where it would eliminate an “essential” aspect
of the zoning scheme. Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1221. Appellees argued
just that; in particular, that allowing up to 55 persons on the prop-
erty would destroy the low-density zoning scheme for the R-80 por-
tion of the parcel. In its reply, Vision Warriors cited to a planning
report which indicates that the R-80 and R-20 zones include “resi-
dential, as well as semi-public and institutional uses,” such as dor-
mitories. Appellant also argued that the requested accommodation
would not require a “fundamental alteration” on Appellees’ part
where Happy Acres used the property to host up to 55 persons al-
ready.
Ultimately, whether Vision Warriors’ request is a “funda-
mental alteration” is a closer question, but one that this Court need
not reach. As the district court determined, and we agree, Vision
Warriors’ requested accommodation fails for a lack of necessity.
b. Necessity
To establish the necessity of an accommodation, a Plaintiff
must demonstrate that the accommodation “(1) actually allevi-
ate[s] the effects of the plaintiff’s disability and (2) address[es] the
needs created by the plaintiff’s disability.” Sailboat Bend, 46 F.4th at
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 27 of 35

-- 27 of 35 --

28 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
1280. We have explained that the necessity inquiry considers
“whether the handicapped have an equal opportunity to live in the
dwellings of their choice, and not simply an opportunity to live some-
where in the City.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1225.
Vision Warriors argues that it offered sufficient evidence to
establish necessity where the requested accommodation would
“contribute in a meaningful way to residents’ recovery.” Schwarz,
544 F.3d at 1227. In support, Appellant points to the testimony of
its Founder, Kirk Driskell, where he discusses the necessary com-
ponents of the program, including: “(1) a family-like living envi-
ronment . . . ; (2) location in a residential area far from distraction
and environments that facilitate addiction. . . ; (3) affordability for
residents . . . ; and (4) on site recovery meetings and religious ser-
vices.” Driskell also noted that the program should be large
enough for its members to find their “people,” and to enable Vision
Warriors to run a cost-effective program. Although Appellant re-
quests a “suggested donation” of $600 per month from each mem-
ber, it does not screen its members for their ability to pay and does
not enforce payment.
We understand that Vision Warriors requires “large
enough” programs to meet its’ therapeutic needs. On this record,
however, we cannot say that Appellant has demonstrated that the
extra numbers will “alleviate the effects” of its disability. See Sail-
boat Bend, 46 F.4th at 1280.
In the FHA and ADA context, the question of necessity is a
limited one: whether a plaintiff has offered evidence sufficient to
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 28 of 35

-- 28 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 29
show that the requested accommodation would “affirmatively en-
hance [plaintiff’s] quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his
disability.” Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1289. In Bhogaita, we held that
plaintiff established necessity where the requested accommoda-
tion—keeping his emotional support dog within his condominium
even though the pet exceeded its weight limitation—would ame-
liorate the effects of plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”). See id. There, plaintiff introduced multiple letters from
his treating psychiatrist to support his history of PTSD and the cu-
rative impact of his emotional support pet. Id.
By contrast, Vision Warriors does not explain why the re-
quested 55 members are therapeutically more meaningful as op-
posed to the eight members it is legally permitted to house at any
time. Likewise, Appellant offered insufficient evidence to show
that the requested accommodation is crucial to its economic viabil-
ity. We do not take issue with the basic principle that more mem-
bers will likely allow Vision Warriors to collect more money, but
that doesn’t mean that Vision Warriors necessarily will not be eco-
nomically viable with eight members instead. See Smith & Lee As-
socs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996) (deter-
mining that elderly members of an adult home established neces-
sity where the evidence demonstrated that the home would not be
economically viable with any fewer than nine members); Bryant
Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 124 F.3d 597, 602 (4th Cir. 1997)
(plaintiffs “presented no evidence . . . that expansion from 8 to 15
residents would be therapeutically meaningful” where plaintiffs
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 29 of 35

-- 29 of 35 --

30 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
offered no evidence that the home would be economically viable
with eight members.).
The district court properly determined that Vision Warriors’ re-
quested accommodation was not necessary under the FHA and
ADA. Accordingly, we affirm.
C. Equal Protection
We next consider whether the district court erred in enter-
ing summary judgment in favor of the County on Vision Warriors’
equal protection claim. Appellant takes issue with the County’s
classification of Vision Warriors’ use as a temporary shelter. Spe-
cifically, Appellant argues that the County treated Vision Warriors
differently than Happy Acres and dormitories generally.
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws,” and the Clause is “essentially
a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985). Vision Warriors brings an as applied, or “class of one,” chal-
lenge, where a “plaintiff alleges not that it belongs to a protected
class, but that it is the only entity being treated differently from all
other similarly situated entities.” Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of
Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1233 (11th Cir. 2022). To prevail,
a plaintiff must show “[1] that it ‘has been intentionally treated dif-
ferently from others similarly situated[;] and [2] that there is no ra-
tional basis for the difference in treatment.’” Id.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 30 of 35

-- 30 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 31
Vision Warriors contends that the County treated Happy
Acres differently where Happy Acres “operated for approximately
thirty years (30) without objection from the County or its resi-
dents,” while Vision Warriors was banned “entirely” from operat-
ing on the property “in any capacity.” In response, the County ar-
gues that they could not have treated Vision Warriors unequally
because of one key distinction: the County knew of Vision Warri-
ors’ operations, whereas Happy Acres operated, as they claim, clan-
destinely. The County denies any knowledge of Happy Acres’ ac-
tivities and argues that the County “did not regulate Happy Acres
the way it would have, had it known about [its] operations.”
We now consider whether Vision Warriors and Happy
Acres are similarly situated. This Court requires all comparators
to be “prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” Griffin Indus.,
Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007). The County ar-
gues that Happy Acres is not similarly situated where the County
was unaware of its operation as a temporary shelter. On the other
hand, Vision Warriors cites various documents to support its argu-
ment that the County was aware of Happy Acres’ operations. This
includes building, electrical, and plumbing permits issued by the
County to Happy Acres as well as testimony from Happy Acres re-
garding regular inspections by the fire marshal. The district court
found that Vision Warriors put forth insufficient evidence to
demonstrate the County’s knowledge of Happy Acres’ operations,
and we agree.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 31 of 35

-- 31 of 35 --

32 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
Even though the County issued permits to Happy Acres
throughout the years, these permits do not show how many people
lived on the premises or for how long. As an example, the Certifi-
cate of Occupancy, dated April 23, 1989, does not even list an oc-
cupancy limit. And in any event, even if the County knew about
Happy Acres use, it is not clear the two organizations are similarly
situated anyway. After all, Vision Warriors would have 55 people
on site all the time, whereas Happy Acres usually had many fewer.
Vision Warriors has failed to establish that the County intention-
ally treated Vision Warriors differently from Happy Acres, and we
cannot agree that Happy Acres and Vision Warriors are similarly
situated.
Finally, to the extent that Vision Warriors points to dormi-
tories in general as similarly situated, this argument has not been
adequately preserved on appeal. “This Court has repeatedly held
that an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first
time in an appeal will not be considered by this [C]ourt.” Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Vision Warriors did not bring
this argument to the district court’s attention at the motion to dis-
miss or summary judgment stage and cannot raise it for the first
time on appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the County on Vision Warriors’ equal protec-
tion claim.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 32 of 35

-- 32 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 33
D. Georgia State Law Claims
We next consider whether the district court erred in issuing
summary judgment in favor of the County on Vision Warriors’
Georgia state-law based claims. Vision Warriors sought a declara-
tory judgment against the County pursuant to the Georgia state
constitution, which prohibits “the passage of retrospective laws”
that “injuriously affect the ‘vested rights’ of citizens.” S. States-
Bartow Cnty., Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Homeowners Ass’n, 797 S.E.2d
468, 471 (Ga. 2017). Vision Warriors’ arguments, however, are con-
voluted and suffer from several fatal flaws.
At the outset, Appellant argues that its use was a “legal con-
forming use at the time it began using the Property as a dormitory.”
Vision Warriors cites nothing in support of this proposition, and
the record reflects the opposite. At the time of purchase, Lee is-
sued a permit to Vision Warriors for a legal nonconforming use as
a temporary shelter. The County concedes as much, though it
stated that the permit was issued in error.
Next, Vision Warriors cites to Director Watkins’ testi-
mony—which he later recanted—that Vision Warriors’ use was
properly classified as a “dormitory” at the time of purchase. Vision
Warriors seemingly claims that it incurred a “substantial change in
position” in reliance upon Director Watkins’ “determination.” Vi-
sion Warriors does not clarify how it could have relied, at the time
of purchase, upon statements made years after the fact by Director
Watkins. The County argued as much in their response, but Vision
Warriors did not clarify its position in its reply. To the extent Vision
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 33 of 35

-- 33 of 35 --

34 Opinion of the Court 22-10773
Warriors argues that it was initially classified as a legal conforming
use, or a “dormitory,” this contention is insufficiently supported by
the record.
Alternatively, we consider whether Vision Warriors is argu-
ing that it relied upon Lee’s representations to its detriment. Lee
informed Appellant, albeit erroneously, that its operations as a tem-
porary shelter constituted a legal nonconforming use. The County
contends that the principles of estoppel can apply only to a govern-
ing body, such as a municipality, and not against an individual em-
ployee. Again, Appellant furnished no response to this argument.
Without any argument in support of Appellant’s claims, we are left
with little option but to affirm the district court’s entry of sum-
mary judgment in Appellees’ favor.
Finally, we examine whether the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment on Vision Warriors’ Georgia state Due
Process claims. Vision Warriors seeks a declaratory judgment that
the County defendants violated its rights under the Georgia Due
Process Clause by denying its requested use of the property. Under
the Georgia constitution, “[N]o person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property except by due process of law.” Ga. Const. Art. 1,
§ 1, ¶ 1. “Due process of law as guaranteed by the Federal and State
Constitutions includes notice and hearing as a matter of right
where one’s property rights are involved.” Schumacher v. City of Ro-
swell, 809 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ga. App. 2017).
Vision Warriors argues that this claim is not, as the district
court determined, a “work-around for the time bar of any appeal
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 34 of 35

-- 34 of 35 --

22-10773 Opinion of the Court 35
of the County’s decision.” Rather, Vision Warriors maintains that
it timely filed appeals for the County’s actions “each step of the
way.” The County counters that Appellant’s claims are “undisput-
edly time-barred” where the O.C.G.A imposes a 30-day deadline to
appeal, and Vision Warriors filed the instant case 90 days after the
County’s denial of its zoning applications. Vision Warriors offers
no response on this point. Even assuming Vision Warriors’ claims
were timely, we affirm the district court’s ruling. Vision Warriors
failed to assert exactly which rights it has been deprived of under
the Georgia state constitution. Accordingly, we find that the argu-
ment has been forfeited.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we affirm the district court’s ruling on all claims ex-
cept Vision Warriors’ RLUIPA claim. We remand that claim to the
district court for reconsideration consistent with this opinion and
Thai Meditation.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART.
USCA11 Case: 22-10773 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/11/2024 Page: 35 of 35

-- 35 of 35 --