USA v. Christopher Tavorris Wilkins

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11115
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER TAVORRIS WILKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60037-AMC-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11115
Before J ORDAN, ROSENBAUM , and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After the partial guilty verdict was announced at his October
2019 federal jury trial on drug, gun, and witness-tampering crimes,
Christopher Wilkins threw a chair at the lead prosecutor, Assistant
United States Attorney John McMillan, and repeatedly threatened
to kill him upon release. For this conduct, Wilkins was indicted on
two new charges—assault of a federal officer with a deadly and
dangerous weapon, see 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b) (Count 1); and
threatening to assault and murder a federal law-enforcement of-
ficer in retaliation for the performance of official duties, see 18
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (Count 2)—and found guilty by a jury after a
two-day trial. The district court sentenced him to 80 months’ im-
prisonment, to run consecutively to his prior 210-month sentence.
Wilkins appeals, challenging the district court’s jury instructions
and verdict form. After careful review, we affirm Wilkins’s convic-
tions.
I.
We review de novo the legal accuracy of jury instructions and
verdict forms but “defer on questions of phrasing absent an abuse
of discretion.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2000); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1072
(11th Cir. 1996). “District courts have broad discretion in formu-
lating jury instructions provided that the charge as a whole accu-
rately reflects the law and the facts.” Prather, 205 F.3d at 1270
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22-11115 Opinion of the Court 3
(quotation marks omitted). On appeal, “we examine whether the
jury instructions and verdict form, considered as a whole, were suf-
ficient so that the jurors understood the issues and were not mis-
led.” United States v. Poirier, 321 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quotation marks omitted). Even if isolated clauses are inaccurate
or otherwise subject to criticism, we will not reverse a conviction
unless the issues of law were presented inaccurately, or the jury
was improperly guided “in such a substantial way as to violate due
process.” Prather, 205 F.3d at 1270 (quotation marks omitted).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), it is unlawful to “forcibly as-
sault[]” a federal officer “while engaged in or on account of the per-
formance of official duties.” We have noted that § 111 “creates
three separate crimes.” United States v. Siler, 734 F.3d 1290, 1295–
96 (11th Cir. 2013). First, if the offense involved a “deadly or dan-
gerous weapon,” the statutory maximum is twenty years. 18
U.S.C. § 111(b). Second, if the offense involved “physical contact
with the victim or the intent to commit another felony,” the maxi-
mum is eight years. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). And third, if the offense
conduct “constituted only simple assault,” the maximum is one
year. Id.
Section 115(a)(1)(B) makes it unlawful to “threaten[] to as-
sault, kidnap, or murder, . . . a [f]ederal law enforcement officer . .
. with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official .
. . while engaged in the performance of official duties,” or “with
intent to retaliate against such official . . . on account of the perfor-
mance of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Similar to § 111,
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11115
different statutory maximums apply based on the particular offense
conduct. See id. § 115(b)(1)(B).
II.
Before trial, the parties jointly submitted proposed jury in-
structions and a verdict form. As relevant here, the parties’ verdict
form asked the jury to check either “guilty” or “not guilty” as its
finding on the two primary offenses, Counts 1 and 2, as well as two
lesser included offenses of Count 1.1
At a charge conference before the second day of trial, the
district court supplied the parties with its own draft instructions,
including a new verdict form. Rather than giving the jury the op-
tions of “guilty” or “not guilty,” the court’s reformulated verdict
form asked whether the government proved the primary and lesser
included offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and gave the jury the
option to select “yes” or “no.” What follows is a representative
example, regarding the primary Count 1 offense:
Did the Government prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant Wilkins committed forcible as-
sault against a federal officer with a deadly or danger-
ous weapon?
YES ___ NO ___
1 The parties disagreed about whether lesser included offense instructions
were appropriate for Count 2. The district court declined to provide such in-
structions for Count 2. Wilkins does not raise any distinct issue with that rul-
ing or the instructions on Count 2.
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22-11115 Opinion of the Court 5
Wilkins objected that, “instead of the yes or no, it has to be a guilty
or not guilty” since “[t]hat’s the traditional nomenclature,” and that
the verdict from was defective for failing to include “guilty or not
guilty anywhere in [it].” Finding nothing “legally incorrect about
the manner in which the verdict form is drafted,” the district court
overruled the objection.
After the close of the evidence, the district court instructed
the jury on the law. The jury’s role, the court explained, was to
“decide whether the Government has proved the specific facts nec-
essary to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The court instructed the jury that, if the government failed to
“prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” the jury “must find the
defendant not guilty.” It also described the reasonable-doubt
standard.
Continuing its instructions, the district court explained the
nature and elements of Counts 1 and 2, stating that Wilkins could
“be found guilty . . . only if” the listed elements of each charged
offense were proven “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also
advised that, if the jury found Wilkins “not guilty of the crime
charged in Count 1, [it] must determine whether the defendant is
guilty of either of the . . . lesser-included offenses,” and it listed the
elements for those offenses. The court stressed that the jury’s role
was “to determine from the evidence in this case whether the de-
fendant is guilty or not guilty of those specific crimes,” and that its
verdict, “guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous.” The court also
read the verdict from to the jury and informed the jury that there
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11115
would be designated spaces to check off “yes” or “no” as its answers
to the form’s questions.
Then, in closing arguments, the government likewise
stressed that it was the jury’s role to “determine guilty or not
guilty.” And it asked the jury to find Wilkins “guilty” of Counts 1
and 2 because, in its view, the evidence proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that Wilkins committed the essential elements of those
crimes. In response, defense counsel argued for a “not guilty” ver-
dict on “both counts,” arguing that there was reasonable doubt
whether the chair Watkins threw and the threats he made were
targeted at AUSA McMillan, the person identified in the indict-
ment, rather than some other person, like the defense attorney.2
The jury later returned a verdict and agreed that it was unan-
imous. The jury answered “yes” to Question 1(a) under Count 1,
“Did the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Wil-
kins] committed forcible assault against a federal officer with a
deadly or dangerous weapon?,” and so skipped Questions 1(b) and
1(c) accordingly. The jury next answered “yes” to Question 2(a)
under Count 2, “Did the Government prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Wilkins] threatened a federal law enforcement officer?”
The jury continued to Question 2(b), which stated, “We, the Jury,
having found Defendant guilty of threatening a federal law enforce-
ment officer, further find that Defendant,” and listed two addi-
tional options with a corresponding line on which to place a
2 In recorded jail calls, Wilkins admitted he had targeted the prosecutor, whom
he identified by name.
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22-11115 Opinion of the Court 7
checkmark. The jury put checkmarks next to both options, finding
that Wilkins “[k]nowingly threatened to murder” and “[k]now-
ingly threatened to assault” AUSA McMillan. All jurors verified
that the verdict was their “true verdict.”
The district court determined that the jury “found [Wilkins]
guilty,” and it adjudicated him guilty on Counts 1 and 2. Neither
party objected.
III.
Wilkins claims that the verdict form was fatally flawed, re-
sulting in structural error, because it “provided no place for [the]
jury to find Defendant guilty or not guilty.” That absence, in his
view, means he was convicted and sentenced without being found
“guilty” by the jury and without the chance of being found “not
guilty,” in violation of his due-process and jury-trial rights. He fur-
ther claims that the verdict form did not conform to the jury in-
structions in this regard, repeatedly referring to “guilty” or “not
guilty” findings that were absent from the verdict form, thereby
confusing the jury and denying him a fair trial.
The Sixth Amendment includes the right of an accused “to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend.
VI. This right includes, “as its most important element, the right
to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding
of ‘guilty.’” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
While the Sixth Amendment ensures that a jury will serve as
the “ultimate arbiter[] of [the defendant’s] fate,” United States v. Rog-
ers, 94 F.3d 1519, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Amendment’s Due
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11115
Process Clause prescribes “[w]hat the factfinder must determine to
return a verdict of guilty,” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277. “The prosecu-
tion bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense
charged, and must persuade the factfinder ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements.”
Id. at 277–78 (citations omitted); see United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 510 (1995) (“[C]riminal convictions [must] rest upon a jury de-
termination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Un-
der this framework, a jury’s “constitutional responsibility is not
merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts
and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence.” Gaudin,
515 U.S. at 514.
It follows that “the jury verdict required by the Sixth
Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278; see Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511 (“[A] criminal
defendant [has] the right to demand that a jury find him guilty [be-
yond a reasonable doubt] of all the elements of the crime with
which he is charged.”). Where the jury receives a constitutionally
deficient reasonable-doubt instruction, “there has been no jury ver-
dict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.” Sullivan, 508
U.S. at 280. Such an error is not subject to harmless-error review
and is instead categorized as “structural,” requiring vacatur of the
conviction. See id. at 280–81.
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22-11115 Opinion of the Court 9
A.
Here, Wilkins has not established structural error. The jury
returned a verdict of “guilty” within the meaning of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, even if it did not use, or have the option of
using, that specific term. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277–78. The dis-
trict court instructed the jury on the essential elements of each his
charged offenses. It made clear that the jury’s role was to deter-
mine whether Wilkins was guilty or not guilty of those offenses,
and that he could be found guilty only if the government proved
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then asked the
jury, on the verdict form, whether the government had proven the
respective elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
And the jury returned its unanimous findings that the elements of
Counts 1 and 2 had been so proved. In sum, Wilkins received all
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require in this context, which
is a jury determination whether the government proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the facts necessary to establish every element of
the charged offenses. See id.; Rogers, 94 F.3d at 1524 (“[T]he
[g]overnment bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt all elements of the crime charged.”).
Wilkins makes no claim on appeal that the instructions were
defective with respect to the reasonable-doubt standard or the ele-
ments of the charged offenses. He also does not dispute that the
questions on the verdict form accurately conveyed those elements.
Instead, his essential complaint is that the verdict form asked yes-
or-no questions instead of guilty-or-not guilty questions. But there
is “nothing talismanic in the terms ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty.’” United
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11115
States v. Spann, 997 F.2d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993). And when the
jury chose “yes” instead of “no” as its answer on Counts 1 and 2, it
did not merely make subsidiary factual findings, but rather applied
the law to the facts and expressed its ultimate conclusion of guilt
or innocence as to those offenses. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 513–14.
For these reasons, we conclude that the jury made the ulti-
mate finding of guilt required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendment,
and that the district court properly adjudicated Wilkins guilty
based on the jury’s verdict.
B.
We also reject Wilkins’s arguments that “dissonance” be-
tween the district court’s instructions and the verdict form con-
fused the jury and thus denied him a fair trial. As we noted above,
the district court’s instructions made clear that Wilkins could be
found guilty only if the government proved the elements of the of-
fenses beyond a reasonable doubt, which the parties disputed in
closing, and the verdict form then asked the jury whether the gov-
ernment proved the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
We presume that the jury acted rationally, United States v.
Ohayon, 483 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2007), and that it “follow[ed]
the instructions given to it by the district judge,” United States v.
Mosquera, 886 F.3d 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks
omitted). Based on the court’s instructions and the parties’ argu-
ments, it would have been clear to a rational jury that “yes” on the
verdict form meant “guilty” and that “no” meant “not guilty.”
Thus, “the jury instructions and verdict form, considered as a
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22-11115 Opinion of the Court 11
whole, were sufficient so that the jurors understood the issues and
were not misled.” Poirier, 321 F.3d at 1032. Despite the nontradi-
tional phrasing on the verdict form, nothing suggests that the jury
was improperly guided “in such a substantial way as to violate due
process.” Prather, 205 F.3d at 1270.
IV.
In sum, Wilkins has not established a violation of his rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We affirm his convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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