Patrick W. Maraist v. Hon. Howard Coates, Jr., et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11412
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PATRICK W. MARAIST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
MARAIST LAW FIRM,
Plaintiff,
versus
HON. HOWARD COATES,
JUDGE CYMONIE ROWE,
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF
PALM BEACH COUNTY,
ALAN B.ROSE,
ROBERT ABRUZZO,
TIMOTHY SCHULZ,
NANTUCKET ENTERPRISES, INC.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
PALM BEACH FLORIDA HOTEL AND
OFFICE BUILDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ASHFORD TRS LESSEE II, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-81467-AMC
____________________
Before J ORDAN, ROSENBAUM , and J ILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Florida attorney Patrick Maraist previously represented
Nantucket Enterprises, Inc. (“Nantucket”) in litigation brought by
Palm Beach Florida Hotel and Office Building Limiting Partnership
(“PB Hotel”) and Ashford TRS Lessee II, LLC (“Ashford”) in Flor-
ida state court. Nantucket prevailed on the merits in state court and
then sought to recover its attorney’s fees. In litigation over the fees,
Maraist’s law firm produced redacted billing records. Later, the
state court ordered Maraist’s law firm to remove some of the re-
dactions. When the law firm refused to comply with the order, the
state court held it in contempt and imposed a $75,000 civil fine.
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 3
Rather than comply with the state court’s order, Maraist and
his law firm filed this lawsuit in federal court. They named as de-
fendants two judges who had presided over the state court action,
the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Nantucket, the
president of Nantucket, PB Hotel, Ashford, and two attorneys in-
volved in the state court action. Maraist and the law firm brought
a variety of claims arising under federal and state law. In addition,
they sought to place a sum of money and a thumb drive in the reg-
istry of the court so that the court could determine in an inter-
pleader action to whom the money and records on the thumb drive
belonged. The district court dismissed all the claims. Maraist now
appeals. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the
record, we affirm.
I.
This case arises out of what was originally a landlord-tenant
dispute.1 PB Hotel and Ashford leased space to Nantucket. After
the landlord-tenant relationship soured, PB Hotel and Ashford
________________________
1 The facts recited in this section are taken from the amended complaint,
which is the operative complaint. See Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213,
1218 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, we accept the well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the [non-movant].”). We also consider the documents attached
to the amended complaint. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949,
959 (11th Cir. 2009). And we look to the exhibits attached to the defendants’
motions to dismiss. See Luke v. Gulley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020) (ex-
plaining that a court may consider an exhibit attached to a motion to dismiss
when it was “referred to in the complaint, central to the plaintiff’s claim, and
of undisputed authenticity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
sued Nantucket for breaching the lease, and Nantucket brought a
counterclaim for wrongful eviction.2
In the state court action, Maraist represented Nantucket.
Maraist is a solo practitioner and the president of Maraist Law
Firm. Nantucket signed a fee agreement providing that the law
firm would be paid a contingency fee if Nantucket prevailed in the
state court action.
The state court action dragged on for several years. Approx-
imately five years into the case, Nantucket retained an additional
attorney, Alan Rose of the Mrachek Law Firm, to represent it at
trial. At trial, Nantucket prevailed and ultimately recovered ap-
proximately $16 million in damages, entitling Maraist’s law firm to
a substantial contingency fee.
In the state court action, Nantucket sought to recover its at-
torney’s fees from PB Hotel and Ashford. As part of this fee litiga-
tion, PB Hotel and Ashford served a document request on Nan-
tucket requesting time records for legal work Nantucket’s attor-
neys had performed.
Maraist gathered his law firm’s billing records. These rec-
ords consisted of handwritten time sheets reflecting the work that
Maraist performed each day for all his firm’s clients. Maraist re-
dacted these time sheets to show only those entries for work
________________________
2 A more detailed description of the underlying legal dispute is set forth in Palm
Beach Florida Hotel v. Nantucket Enterprises, Inc., 211 So. 3d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016).
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 5
performed for Nantucket. The paper time sheets nearly filled a
banker’s box. Rose, Maraist’s co-counsel, then reviewed the re-
dacted handwritten records and created an Excel spreadsheet that
showed Maraist’s time entries for work performed on Nantucket’s
case. Nantucket produced both the spreadsheet and the redacted
version of Maraist’s handwritten billing records to PB Hotel and
Ashford.
When PB Hotel and Ashford reviewed Maraist’s billing rec-
ords, they uncovered “billing discrepancies.” Doc. 29-5 at 3.3 They
served a subpoena on Maraist’s law firm seeking its original, unre-
dacted billing records. In this section, we discuss the litigation over
the subpoena and how it culminated in the state court holding the
law firm in contempt and imposing a substantial fine. We then re-
view the procedural history of this lawsuit, which Maraist and his
law firm filed in federal court.
A.
When PB Hotel and Ashford served a subpoena on the law
firm, the law firm objected. Besides objecting, the law firm filed a
motion for a protective order in the state court action. The law firm
also sought to intervene in the state court action. All this state court
litigation was before Judge Cymonie Rowe.
As the parties were litigating these issues, Maraist suffered a
serious injury. On September 1, 2019, while preparing his home for
an incoming hurricane, Maraist was struck in the head by a sheet
________________________
3 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
of plywood and suffered a traumatic brain injury. Over the next
few weeks, he consulted with a neurologist, who advised him to
stop working. Although Maraist was experiencing “debilitating” ef-
fects from his brain injury, he did not heed his neurologist’s advice.
Doc. 29 at 33. He continued to work and appeared in court for
hearings on motions in several cases. Some of these hearings were
before Judge Rowe. According to Maraist, he was “confus[ed]” and
had “cognitive difficulties” at the hearings. Id.
Judge Rowe scheduled a hearing for September 26 on the
law firm’s motion to intervene in the state court action. A few days
before the hearing, on September 20, Maraist filed an emergency
motion requesting a 30-day continuance because he was disabled
due to the traumatic brain injury. Upon receiving the motion,
Judge Rowe directed Maraist to appear in court on September 25
and bring “all medical records supporting” the continuance mo-
tion. Id. at 39.
The day before the hearing, Maraist informed the court that
he could not make the hearing because of his medical condition
and because he needed to attend a medical appointment. On Sep-
tember 25, he failed to attend the hearing (or send another attorney
to appear on his behalf). Judge Rowe went forward with the hear-
ing in Maraist’s absence. She noted that she had not observed any
signs of impairment at a recent hearing in which Maraist appeared.
Judge Rowe concluded that there was “insufficient evidence to
continue this case” and denied the motion for a continuance. Id. at
40.
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 7
A few days later, Judge Rowe denied the law firm’s motion
for a protective order and directed it to produce records in response
to the subpoena. She ordered the law firm to produce the original
billing records without redacting the date and amount of time
billed on other cases so that the records would show the total
amount of time Maraist billed each day across all cases. But she
permitted the law firm to continue to redact the names of its other
clients and descriptions of the work performed for them. She also
denied the law firm’s motion to intervene.
The law firm appealed. While the appeal was pending, Judge
Rowe sua sponte recused herself from the case. The law firm then
voluntarily dismissed the appeal.4
Back in the state trial court, the case was reassigned several
times and ended up before Judge Scott Kerner. By this time, the
law firm had filed a renewed motion for a protective order and also
________________________
4 Maraist acknowledges that the law firm filed and then dismissed the state
court appeal. But he says that the firm appealed only the order denying per-
mission to intervene and not the order denying its motion for a protective
order and requiring it to produce billing records. It appears, however, that the
appeal did relate to the denial of the protective order. On appeal, the law firm
moved to stay the order denying a protective order and requiring it to produce
documents, which suggests that the appeal was not limited to the order deny-
ing the motion to intervene.
In any event, even if the law firm did not appeal Judge Rowe’s order denying
a protective order and requiring it to produce records, it could have appealed
that order. See Fla. House of Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85 So. 3d 517, 520
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that an order requiring a person who is not
a party to the lawsuit to sit for a deposition is immediately appealable).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
sought to revisit Judge Rowe’s decision to deny a continuance.
Judge Kerner denied the law firm’s renewed motion for a protec-
tive order and granted it no other relief.
Because the law firm did not produce records as Judge Rowe
had ordered, the state trial court ordered the law firm to show
cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Judge Howard
Coates, to whom the case was reassigned, held the law firm in con-
tempt for failing to produce the records as previously ordered. By
this time, more than 18 months had passed since Judge Rowe had
directed the law firm to produce the billing records with revised
redactions. Judge Coates found that the law firm had not shown
good cause for failing to produce the records as ordered and de-
scribed its actions as “willful, intentional, and in contumacious dis-
regard” of a court order. Doc. 104-1 at 3. Judge Coates gave the law
firm an additional 10 days to produce the revised billing records.
He warned that if the records were not produced by this deadline,
the court would impose a coercive civil fine of $1,000 per day until
the law firm “purge[d] its contempt” by producing the records as
described in Judge Rowe’s order. Id. at 4.
The law firm did not produce the revised records by the new
deadline. After 75 more days passed and the law firm still had not
purged its contempt, Judge Coates directed the law firm “to imme-
diately pay” $75,000 into the court’s registry, where the money
would be held pending further order from the court. Doc. 29 at 68
(emphasis in original). He warned that a $1,000 per day fine would
continue to accrue until the law firm produced billing records in
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 9
compliance with Judge Rowe’s order and that Maraist could be in-
carcerated to compel compliance. A few days later, the court en-
tered a final judgment in the amount of $75,000 against the law
firm in favor of PB Hotel, Ashford, and Nantucket.5
B.
Rather than produce revised billing records with fewer re-
dactions and pay the $75,000 fine, Maraist and the law firm filed
this action in federal court. Maraist represented himself and the
firm. In the amended complaint, they named as defendants Judge
Rowe; Judge Coates; the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of
Florida; Nantucket; PB Hotel; Ashford; Robert Abruzzo, the presi-
dent of Nantucket; Rose; and Timothy Schulz, an attorney for PB
Hotel and Ashford. The amended complaint spanned nearly 900
paragraphs and approximately 235 pages.
The amended complaint brought a variety of claims against
the defendants. The first two claims in the amended complaint
were disability discrimination claims brought against Judge Rowe,
Judge Coates, and the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit (collectively, the
“judicial defendants”). Count One was a claim that the judicial de-
fendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).6
Count Two was a claim that the judicial defendants violated the
________________________
5 The law firm appealed the judgment. A Florida appellate court recently af-
firmed. See Maraist Law Firm, P.A. v. Nantucket Enters., Inc., 364 So. 3d 1039 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2023).
6 Title II of the ADA generally prohibits state governments and agencies from
discriminating based on disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132.
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
Rehabilitation Act.7 The amended complaint alleged that Judge
Rowe engaged in disability discrimination when she denied Ma-
raist’s motion for a continuance, ordered him to appear in person
with medical records documenting his disability, and concluded
that he was not suffering from any disability. According to the
amended complaint, the disability discrimination continued when
Judge Coates later held the law firm in contempt. The amended
complaint also alleged that the judicial defendants retaliated
against Maraist after he complained of disability discrimination.
Count Three was a conspiracy to abuse process claim
brought under Florida law against Nantucket, PB Hotel, Ashford,
and Abruzzo. The amended complaint alleged that, in the course
of representing Nantucket, Maraist “uncovered a decades’ long is-
sue of public corruption and concealment of toxic containment of
groundwater, waterways[,] and soils” in Palm Beach County, and
these defendants conspired against him to continue the coverup.
Doc. 29 at 17. These defendants also allegedly conspired to sub-
poena billing records from Maraist’s law firm for the improper pur-
pose of “effect[ing] a cancel culture of [Maraist] from the practice
of law.” Id. at 166. The amended complaint alleged that the $75,000
contempt judgment was a “sham” and that any attempt to collect
the judgment was an abuse of process. Id. at 171.
________________________
7 The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination in connection with
“any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. §
794(a).
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 11
In Counts Four through Six, Maraist and the law firm
claimed that several of the defendants conspired to violate their
constitutional rights and thus were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
These claims were brought against Judge Rowe, Judge Coates,
Nantucket, PB Hotel, Ashford, and Abruzzo. According to the
amended complaint, these defendants conspired to deny Maraist
and his law firm equal protection (Count 4), substantive due pro-
cess (Count 5), and procedural due process (Count 6). The
amended complaint alleged that Maraist was a member of a pro-
tected class due to his “permanent disabilities” and that he was “in-
tentionally treated” differently than other similarly situated attor-
neys who were not disabled. Id. at 180–81. Maraist and the law firm
also claimed that Judge Rowe’s arbitrary decision to deny a contin-
uance interfered with Maraist’s liberty, including his right to make
“decisions to pursue and receive life saving urgent medical proce-
dures” to treat his brain injury and thus violated his constitutional
right to substantive due process. Id. at 191. The amended com-
plaint further alleged that the state court judges failed to afford ad-
equate procedures before depriving Maraist of liberty, violating his
right to procedural due process.
The final count in the amended complaint, Count 7, was a
claim for an “Action in Nature of Interpleader” brought under
28 U.S.C. § 1335. Id. at 214. This count was brought against
Abruzzo, Nantucket, PB Hotel, and Ashford, as well as Rose and
Schulz. With this claim, Maraist sought to deposit into the court’s
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
registry a cashier’s check for $83,500,8 and the law firm sought to
deposit a thumb drive that contained its billing records.
In the amended complaint, Maraist and the law firm de-
manded a variety of remedies. They sought damages and declara-
tory and injunctive relief. In addition, with respect to the inter-
pleader request, they asked the court to determine ownership of
the money and the thumb drive deposited into the court’s registry
and to conclude that the money belonged to Maraist and the
thumb drive to his law firm.
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.
The district court granted the motions and dismissed all claims
with prejudice. The court concluded that Judges Rowe and Coates
were entitled to judicial immunity because all the claims against
them arose from actions taken in their “judicial capacity.” Doc. 115
at 10. In addition, the district court dismissed the claims against the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, concluding that it was entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity.
The district court also dismissed the claims against the other
defendants. The district court concluded that Count Three—the
state-law claim for abuse of process—was barred by Florida’s litiga-
tion privilege, which afforded absolute immunity for acts occurring
during the course of judicial proceedings. In addition, the district
court dismissed the § 1983 claims in Counts Four through Six
________________________
8 The check was for $83,500 (as opposed to $75,000) to cover additional fines
that had accrued and some of the defendants’ attorney’s fees.
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 13
against Abruzzo, Nantucket, PB Hotel, and Ashford because Ma-
raist and the law firm failed to state a claim for relief against these
defendants. The court explained that because these defendants
were private parties, they could be held liable under § 1983 only if
their conduct was “fairly attributable to the State.” Doc. 116 at 6
(internal quotation marks omitted). And the court concluded that
the amended complaint failed to plausibly allege that these defend-
ants’ conduct could be fairly attributed to the State; thus, it failed
to state a § 1983 claim against them.
The district court also dismissed the statutory claim for in-
terpleader in Count 7.9 The court explained that it had discretion
to abstain from resolving an interpleader claim when “a state action
________________________
9 Shortly after filing the amended complaint, Maraist and the law firm filed a
motion for a restraining order, asking the district court to enjoin state court
proceedings related to the contempt fine and production of the law firm’s bill-
ing records. They sought this restraining order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2361,
which permits a district court to enter an order restraining a claimant from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in state or federal court affecting the
property in an interpleader action.
The district court denied the motion for a restraining order. The court ex-
plained that it had “extensive discretion” when deciding whether to issue an
injunction under § 2361 and declined to issue an injunction. Doc. 88 at 2 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). After the district court denied the motion for
a restraining order, Maraist and the law firm paid money into the state court
registry as ordered by Judge Coates and produced copies of the billing records
with the revised redactions as ordered by Judge Rowe. Maraist and the law
firm then filed a notice in the district court purporting to voluntarily dismiss
the interpleader count as moot. But later the same day, they withdrew the
notice.
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
commenced earlier provide[d] an adequate” forum to address own-
ership of the money or items at issue. Id. at 11 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The district court decided to abstain from resolv-
ing the interpleader claim because the state litigation provided an
adequate forum to litigate the ownership of the money and records
on the thumb drive.
After the district court dismissed all the claims, Maraist and
the law firm moved for reconsideration. They argued that the dis-
trict court should have allowed them to file a second amended
complaint to add additional allegations to support their claims.
They also argued that the district court made “factual errors” when
granting the motions to dismiss. Doc. 120 at 2; Doc. 121 at 2.
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration. It
concluded that the additional allegations that Maraist and the law
firm wanted to add by amendment were “cumulative of the allega-
tions” already contained in the amended complaint. Doc. 124 at 6.
In addition, the district court determined that Maraist and the law
firm had raised arguments that the court had already rejected, not-
ing that “[a] motion for reconsideration is not a tool for relitigating
what a court has already decided.” Id. at 7.
This is Maraist’s appeal.10
________________________
10 Maraist also has three other appeals pending before this Court. In those ap-
peals, he challenges orders that the district court entered after he filed the no-
tice appealing the dismissal of his claims. Those other appeals challenge dis-
trict court orders (1) awarding Nantucket attorney’s fees, (2) imposing
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 15
II.
Several standards of review are relevant to this appeal. We
review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288
(11th Cir. 2010). In our review, we accept the allegations in the
amended complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Although a complaint “does not need
detailed factual allegations,” the plaintiff must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of ac-
tion’s elements will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint must
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court
may properly dismiss a complaint if it rests only on conclusory al-
legations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts.” Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim based
on judicial immunity. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.
2001).
________________________
sanctions against Maraist and his law firm, and (3) denying a motion to recuse.
Those orders are not before the Court in this appeal.
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
to dismiss an interpleader action due to the pendency of parallel
state court proceedings. See NYLife Distribs., Inc. v. Adherence Grp.,
Inc., 72 F.3d 371, 372 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v.
Gwinnett Cnty., 940 F.3d 1254, 1266 (11th Cir. 2019) (reviewing ab-
stention decision for abuse of discretion).
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for
leave to amend a complaint. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys., 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
Although we ordinarily liberally construe pro se pleadings,
this rule does not apply when the pro se litigant is a lawyer. See
Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018).
III.
There are five issues pending before us in this appeal:
1. Whether the district court erred when it dismissed the
claims against the judicial defendants based on judicial or
quasi-judicial immunity.
2. Whether the district court erred when it dismissed the
state law abuse of process claim in Count Three based on
Florida’s litigation privilege.
3. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the § 1983
claims in Counts Four through Six against Abruzzo, Nan-
tucket, PB Hotel, and Ashford because the amended
complaint failed to adequately allege that these defend-
ants were state actors.
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 17
4. Whether the district court erred when it dismissed the
interpleader claim in Count Seven.
5. Whether the district court erred in denying Maraist’s re-
quest in the motion for reconsideration to file a second
amended complaint.
We conclude that none of the issues has merit.
A.
We begin by considering whether the district court erred
when it dismissed the claims against the judicial defendants.11 Ma-
raist argues that the district court erred in concluding that Judges
Rowe and Coates were entitled to judicial immunity and that the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
Judges enjoy absolute immunity from damages when acting
in a judicial capacity “unless they acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, a judge is entitled to
immunity unless she acted clearly outside the subject matter juris-
diction of her court. Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 948 (11th Cir.
1985). We have cautioned it will be a “rare circumstance” when a
judge acts outside her subject matter jurisdiction. McCullough v.
________________________
11 As a reminder, Count One (the ADA discrimination claim) and Count Two
(the Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim) were brought against all three
judicial defendants (Judge Coates, Judge Rowe, and the Fifteenth Judicial Cir-
cuit). The § 1983 claims raised in Counts Four through Six were brought
against Judges Coates and Rowe.
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2018). A judge thus enjoys
“absolute immunity for judicial acts regardless of whether [s]he
made a mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority.” Id.
at 1331.
Counts One and Two alleged that the judges were liable un-
der the Americans with Disability Act and the Rehabilitation Act
because of orders they entered in the fee dispute in the state court
action. Counts Four through Six asserted that the judges were lia-
ble under § 1983 because their decisions in the state court action
denied Maraist and his law firm equal protection under the law,
substantive due process, and procedural due process. Judges Rowe
and Coates enjoy judicial immunity from these claims for damages
because the claims challenge orders each judge entered in the state
court action, and the judges were squarely acting in a judicial ca-
pacity when they issued these orders. See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239.
Maraist nevertheless argues that judicial immunity does not
apply because the judges acted in the clear absence of authority. He
says that the judges exceeded their authority when they issued or-
ders compelling the law firm to produce documents in response to
PB Hotel and Ashford’s subpoena and later when they held the law
firm in contempt. He points out that under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.351, when a nonparty objects to a subpoena seeking
documents, the objection terminates the obligation to produce
documents. Because the law firm objected to the subpoena and PB
Hotel and Ashford never filed a motion seeking a ruling on the ob-
jections, Maraist says, the state court judges had no authority under
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 19
Florida law to order the law firm to produce documents pursuant
to the subpoena or hold it in contempt for failing to comply with
the subpoena.
This argument misses the mark. As we noted above, the rel-
evant question for judicial immunity purposes is whether the
judges acted clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of their
court. See McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1332. Even assuming that Ma-
raist’s arguments about Florida law are correct, they show, at most,
that the judges made mistakes of law in ordering the law firm to
produce documents in response to the subpoena after it had ob-
jected. But establishing a mistake of law does not mean that the
judges were not entitled to judicial immunity. See id. at 1331.
In fact, the state court had subject matter jurisdiction when
the judges entered the orders requiring the law firm to produce
documents and finding it in contempt of court. There is no dispute
that the state court had subject matter jurisdiction over the under-
lying action, which arose from a landlord-tenant dispute. See Fla.
Stat. § 34.011(1) (recognizing that a circuit court has authority to
adjudicate landlord-tenant cases). After resolving the merits of the
landlord-tenant action, the state court retained jurisdiction to re-
solve Nantucket’s claim for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party
in that litigation. See Finkelstein v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d
1241, 1243 (Fla. 1986) (recognizing state court has “continuing ju-
risdiction” to entertain prevailing party’s request for attorney’s
fees). And in resolving the attorney’s fees issue, the court had “the
inherent power to do those things necessary to enforce its orders,
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
to conduct its business in a proper manner, and to protect the court
from acts obstructing the administration of justice,” including by
exercising its contempt powers. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas,
Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608–09
(Fla. 1994). We thus cannot say that the judges acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction when they issued the challenged orders
in the state court case. See Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913, 914 (5th
Cir. 1973) (holding that state court judge enjoyed judicial immun-
ity because he did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction even
though he failed to comply with procedures set forth in the Florida
Rules for Criminal Procedure).12 It thus follows that Judges Rowe
and Coates are entitled to judicial immunity.
Maraist also argues that the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit is not
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Quasi-judicial immunity,
which derives from absolute judicial immunity, entitles non-judi-
cial officials to immunity when their official duties have an integral
relationship with the judicial process. Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552,
555 (11th Cir. 1994). Maraist admits that if the judges are entitled
to judicial immunity, then the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit is entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity. Given our conclusion that the judges
are entitled to judicial immunity, we conclude that the Fifteenth
________________________
12 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 21
Judicial Circuit is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. We thus af-
firm the dismissal of all claims against the judicial defendants.13
B.
We next consider whether the district court erred when it
dismissed Count Three, the abuse of process claim brought against
Abruzzo, Nantucket, PB Hotel, and Ashford. This claim arose out
of filings these defendants submitted in the state court action. We
agree with the district court that this claim is barred by Florida’s
litigation privilege.
________________________
13 Although judicial immunity protects judges from suits for money damages
brought against them in their individual capacities, it does not necessarily pro-
tect them from lawsuits brought against them in their official capacities or
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239.
We need not decide whether the district court erred in dismissing Counts One,
Two, Four, Five, and Six to the extent those claims were brought against the
judges in their official capacities and/or sought injunctive or declaratory relief
because Maraist has not adequately raised any issue on appeal challenging the
dismissal of these claims. To adequately raise an issue on appeal, an appellant
must “plainly and prominently” raise the issue. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Maraist’s only argument about the dismissal of these counts is that the
district court should have concluded that the judges clearly acted without ju-
risdiction and thus were not entitled to judicial immunity. Because Maraist did
not plainly and prominently raise any other challenge to the dismissal of these
counts, we conclude that he abandoned any challenge based on the claims
having been brought against the judges in their official capacities or seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief. See id.; see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th
860, 872 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
The litigation privilege affords litigants “absolute immun-
ity” for any act “occurring during the course of a judicial proceed-
ing, regardless of whether the act involves . . . tortious behavior . . .
so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.” Levin, Mid-
dlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., 639 So. 2d at 608.
Florida courts have recognized that the immunity afforded by the
litigation privilege extends to abuse of process claims. See LatAm
Invs., LLC v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 88 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011). Because the conduct that forms the basis of the abuse
of process claim occurred in the state court action, we conclude
that these defendants enjoyed the litigation privilege and the dis-
trict court properly dismissed Count Three.
C.
We now turn to whether the district court erred when it dis-
missed the § 1983 claims against Abruzzo, Nantucket, PB Hotel,
and Ashford in Counts Four through Six. The district court dis-
missed these claims because it concluded that there were no well-
pled allegations in the amended complaint establishing that these
defendants acted under the color of state law.
We conclude that Maraist failed to preserve any challenge
to the dismissal of his § 1983 claims against these defendants. The
entirety of his argument in his opening brief addressing the dismis-
sal of these claims consists of one paragraph, which states that the
amended complaint “fully allege[d]” that these defendants were
state actors, without any further elaboration. Appellant’s Br. at 30.
Because Maraist raised this issue in a “perfunctory manner” and
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 23
made only “passing reference[]” to it, he has not adequately raised
this issue on appeal and thus has abandoned it. Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
D.
We next review whether the district court abused its discre-
tion when it dismissed Count Seven, the interpleader claim. We
conclude it did not.
Interpleader is the means by which the holder of an asset can
“avoid[] multiple liability by asking the court to determine the as-
set’s rightful owner.” In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Hous. Ass’n Inc.,
21 F.3d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1994); see Zelaya/Cap. Int’l Judgment, LLC
v. Zelaya, 769 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating “[t]he core
purpose” of interpleader “is to relieve a party who holds a con-
tested fund from responsibility for disbursement of that fund
among those claiming some entitlement thereto” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Federal law gives district courts original ju-
risdiction over an interpleader action filed by a person with money
or property of $500 or more in his possession if: (1) two or more
adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship, claim or may claim enti-
tlement to the money or property; and (2) the plaintiff deposited
the disputed money or property into the registry of the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1335; see Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc. v. Nationwide
Power Corp., 106 F.3d 366, 368 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that § 1335
requires diversity among at least two of the defendants in the inter-
pleader action). Even when these two requirements are satisfied, a
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24 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
district court may choose to abstain and dismiss an interpleader ac-
tion if an earlier-commenced state court action “provides an ade-
quate remedy” to determine the ownership of the relevant assets.
5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Proce-
dure § 1704 (3d ed. April 2023); see Wasau Ins. Cos. v. Gifford, 954
F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1992) (interpleader “does not provide a
method of forum shopping for parties disappointed with the out-
come of their . . . motions in state court”); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor
& City Council of Balt., 733 F.2d 484, 486–87 (7th Cir. 1984) (explain-
ing that the federal interpleader statute should not be used for “fo-
rum shopping”).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the interpleader action because the earlier-filed state
court action provided an adequate forum to adjudicate any dis-
putes regarding the ownership of the funds and the thumb drive
placed into the court’s registry. Indeed, at the time that Maraist and
the law firm filed this action, the state court had already ordered
the law firm to produce its billing records with fewer redactions,
found it in contempt for failing to comply with that order, and di-
rected it to pay a $75,000 fine. To the extent that the law firm disa-
greed with these orders, it had the opportunity to appeal them. We
thus conclude that the state court action provided an adequate fo-
rum to litigate issues related to the production of the law firm’s
billing records and the imposition of the contempt fine.
E.
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22-11412 Opinion of the Court 25
Lastly, Maraist argues that the district court abused its dis-
cretion when it denied the motion for reconsideration in which he
and the law firm sought leave to file a second amended complaint.
A district court must freely give leave to amend when justice so
requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But a district court is not required to
give leave to amend when an amendment would be futile. See
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
that granting leave to amend is futile “when the complaint as
amended would still be properly dismissed”). Here, the district
court refused to give Maraist and the law firm another opportunity
to amend their complaint because it concluded that amendment
would be futile. Because Maraist does not raise any argument in his
opening brief on appeal challenging the district court’s futility de-
termination, we conclude that he abandoned any challenge to it.
See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.14
________________________
14 In his reply brief, Maraist argues that the district court judge should have
recused herself because her orders show that she was biased against him. But
this argument comes too late. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not address arguments raised for the first time in a . . .
reply brief.”).
Even assuming that Maraist had adequately raised the recusal issue on appeal,
the district court judge did not abuse her discretion in failing to sua sponte
recuse. A judge must recuse herself “in any proceeding in which [her] impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard for
recusal under § 455(a) is “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer
fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was
sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In general, “bias sufficient to disqualify a judge must stem
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26 Opinion of the Court 22-11412
IV.
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s judg-
ment.15
AFFIRMED.
________________________
from extrajudicial sources” unless a “judge’s remarks in a judicial context
demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it constitutes bias against
a party.” Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that
“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias . . . mo-
tion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). After reviewing the rec-
ord before us, we cannot say that an objective, disinterested, lay observer
would entertain a significant doubt about the district court judge’s impartiality
in this matter.
15 All motions currently pending before the Court are DENIED.
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