Eddie Ford, Jr. v. Frank Griswald, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11774
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
EDDIE FORD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FRANK GRISWALD,
A. GARRETT,
Defendants-Appellees,
LOVELESS JOHNSON,
Defendant.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11774
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00083-MHT-SRW
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Before B RANCH, L AGOA , and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eddie Ford, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order dismissing as time-barred his complaint alleging that prison
officials violated his due process rights by removing his good-time
earning status. Specifically, Ford alleges that prison officials vio-
lated his civil rights in 1991 when the Alabama Department of Cor-
rections removed his good-time earning status. He argues that he
timely filed his complaint because he was entitled to tolling of the
two-year statute of limitations while he pursued related relief in
state court.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and ap-
plication of the applicable statute of limitations. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006).
All constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 are considered tort actions that are subject to the statute of
limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the
Section 1983 claim is filed. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th
Cir. 2008); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (holding
that state law also determines statutory tolling rules in Section 1983
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22-11774 Opinion of the Court 3
actions). In Alabama, the governing statute of limitations is two
years. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173. In general, after a limitations period
has run, the action is barred, regardless of the merits of the plain-
tiff’s claims. Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006). But,
under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations is
paused “when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently, but some
extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely
action.” Fedance v. Harris, 1 F.4th 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021) (quo-
tation marks omitted).
Assuming without deciding that pursuing relief in state
court tolls the Section 1983 statute of limitations, the district court
did not err in concluding that Ford’s complaint was time-barred.
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Construed liberally, Ford argues that he is entitled to equitable toll-
ing based on litigation in state court. But he filed this complaint
nearly 30 years after the events that triggered the statute of limita-
tions. The record also establishes that he was not pursuing any state
court remedies between 1996 and 2008. Accordingly, Ford’s state
court actions do not render the late complaint timely within Ala-
bama’s two-year statute of limitations.
AFFIRMED.
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