Eric Jones v. Georgia Ports Authority

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12844
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ERIC JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00315-RSB-BKE
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL PRYOR , and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Jones, represented by counsel, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for his employer, Georgia
Ports Authority (“GPA”), in an action alleging disability discrimi-
nation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). On appeal, he argues that the district court mis-
applied the summary judgment standard and incorrectly found that
he failed to establish pretext. He also argues that he properly raised
before the district court his argument that he presented a convinc-
ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence of disability discrimination,
and that such argument should be considered on appeal. After re-
view, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Jones was an Army veteran who had been formally diag-
nosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) that stemmed
from his time in combat.1 After serving in the military, he began
working for the GPA, where he acted as a ship-to-shore crane op-
erator for 24 years until his termination in February 2019. Starting
in 2016, Jones worked under Karl Nell, who Jones alleges created a
1 These facts, presented in a light most favorable to Jones, come from the doc-
umentary evidence the parties submitted in favor of and in opposition to sum-
mary judgment.
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22-12844 Opinion of the Court 3
“very stressful” environment in the ship-to-shore department. Ac-
cording to Jones, Nell made statements to crane operators threat-
ening their jobs and personal safety should any of the crane opera-
tors go to management with complaints. Jones believed working
with Nell exacerbated his PTSD symptoms.
This stress caused Jones to request, in August 2018, leave un-
der the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) between August
10 and November 2, 2018, to undergo intensive therapy for his
PTSD. In his request, Jones provided the GPA with a letter signed
by his treating physician, Dr. Maritza Laura from the Department
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). The GPA granted Jones’s FMLA re-
quest. Near the end of his leave, Rosa Simmons with GPA’s Hu-
man Resources (“HR”) department sent Jones a letter informing
him that his leave period was set to expire soon, and that she
needed an update on his status. In response, Jones sent GPA an-
other signed letter from Dr. Laura requesting an additional 12
weeks of leave. The GPA granted Jones’s extension request.
Under GPA policy, for an employee to return from leave
lasting longer than three days, the employee must provide GPA a
signed doctor’s note indicating that it is safe for the employee to
return to work. It is unclear whether the policy requires handwrit-
ten signatures, or if electronic signatures would suffice, but a signa-
ture is required, nonetheless. Before submitting his return-to-work
letter, Jones met with Simmons to discuss the matter. During this
meeting, Jones requested a transfer to “the less stressful environ-
ment of the container field” instead of his current position in the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
shop-to-shore area. In response, Simmons told Jones she would
need his return-to-work letter listing the accommodations he re-
quired.
On January 23, 2019, Jones provided GPA his return-to-work
letter. The letter explained that Jones “report[ed]” he was able to
return to work on January 25, 2019, and noted Jones needed to con-
tinue his psychiatric follow-up appointments and to attend individ-
ual or group therapy. Although the letter was on VA letterhead
and contained Dr. Laura’s contact information, Dr. Laura did not
sign the letter—electronically or otherwise.
Additionally, before his return-to-work date, Jones appeared
for his scheduled appointment with the GPA doctor, but he was
informed that the doctor had an unexpected emergency and he
could not see Jones that day. Jones’s appointment was rescheduled
for the following week, but that appointment was also cancelled.
Jones never saw the GPA doctor before GPA terminated his em-
ployment.
GPA concluded that Jones’s return-to-work letter did not
meet the policy requirements. Ashley Tipton, GPA’s Senior Occu-
pational Health Nurse in Employee Health Services, and Simmons
determined that the letter had two deficiencies2—it was not signed,
and the language used in the letter did not indicate that Dr. Laura
was actually releasing Jones back to work. Dr. Montgomery
2 The parties dispute whether Jones was ever informed that his letter was de-
ficient. However, this factual dispute is not material to the issue on appeal.
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22-12844 Opinion of the Court 5
Timms, GPA’s on-site physician, also found Jones’s return-to-work
letter deficient for its failure to make a clear recommendation that
Dr. Laura personally believed Jones was ready to return to work.
He also noted the lack of a handwritten or electronic signature on
the letter. He acknowledged that GPA could have attempted to
verify the return-to-work letter, such as by reaching out to Dr.
Laura personally, but explained that GPA generally did not make
attempts to verify letters that did not initially meet its policy re-
quirements.
Ultimately, on February 13, 2019, GPA terminated Jones’s
employment, citing his inability to produce an adequate return-to-
work letter. That same day, GPA’s Executive Director e-mailed
Nell to ask what was “wrong” with Jones, and Nell responded that
Jones suffered from “[a]n illness that only [Jones knew] about.”
Nell later testified that he did not know Jones had PTSD, and the
language he used in the e-mail was meant to reflect that Jones was
dealing with something that Nell knew nothing about. However,
Jones believed the e-mail demonstrated Nell’s flippant opinion
about Jones having PTSD or that Nell believed Jones was faking his
illness.
After his termination, in July 2020, Jones filed a charge of
discrimination with the Georgia Commission on Equal Oppor-
tunity and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In
September, Jones received his right to sue letter. Shortly thereaf-
ter, one of GPA’s attorneys sent Jones a letter explaining that GPA’s
position was, and had always been, that Jones could continue
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
working for GPA if he could provide an acceptable return-to-work
letter that was both signed by his doctor and indicated that the doc-
tor believed it was safe for him to return. GPA stated that if Jones
wanted his position as a crane operator back, he would have to sub-
mit an application within 60 days of receiving the letter, and that
the offer was not contingent on Jones waiving or compromising
any claims he had or planned to assert against GPA. Although the
letter stated GPA had maintained this position since Jones’s termi-
nation, Jones disputed that statement, noting he did not learn that
GPA would rehire him until after he filed his lawsuit.
In November 2020, Jones sued GPA in Georgia state court,
which the GPA then removed to federal court. In his complaint,
Jones alleged that GPA discriminated against him under the ADA
and Georgia law when GPA refused his reasonable accommoda-
tion request and subsequently terminated his employment.
Following discovery, GPA moved for summary judgment
on each of Jones’s claims. GPA contended that it terminated Jones
for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—Jones’s failure to pro-
vide an adequate return-to-work letter.
In response to GPA’s motion, Jones maintained that he pre-
sented triable issues of fact regarding GPA’s alleged basis for his
termination, specifically that the reason given was pretextual. He
asserted that his return-to-work letter established his ability to re-
turn to work in both content and form, and that GPA’s assertions
otherwise were evidence of pretext. Specifically, he pointed to his
return-to-work letter, his rescheduled health appointment with
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22-12844 Opinion of the Court 7
GPA’s physician, and Nell’s comment about Jones’s illness as suffi-
cient evidence of pretext. In making this argument, he cited to
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), argu-
ing that “a plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he
present[ed] circumstantial evidence that create[d] a triable issue
concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” However, he
made no arguments asserting that his theory of discrimination
could be established under the convincing-mosaic standard, and
when outlining the standard he believed the district court should
use in analyzing the case, he cited to McDonnell Douglass Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its burden-shifting framework.
The district court granted GPA’s motion for summary judg-
ment. To Jones’s disability discrimination claim, the court as-
sumed without making a specific factual finding that Jones estab-
lished a prima facie case. However, it determined that Jones failed
to establish that GPA’s reason for terminating him was pretextual.
With only the state law claim remaining, the court remanded the
case back to state court for resolution of that issue. Jones’s appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment, “viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable factual in-
ferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Lewis v. City of Union
City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists. Sutton v.
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 64 F.4th 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 2023). A fact
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
is “material” if it can potentially affect the outcome of the case, and
a dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
favor of the non-moving party. Victor Elias Photography, LLC v. Ice
Portal, Inc., 43 F.4th 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2022).
As noted, we “view the evidence, draw all reasonable factual
inferences, and resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-
movant.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1253 (11th Cir. 2022) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stryker v. City of Home-
wood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020)). However, we must only
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party
to the extent that the nonmoving party’s position is supported by
the record. Id. Thus, simply because some alleged factual dispute
exists between the parties does not mean summary judgment can-
not be otherwise granted. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the district court
cannot “weigh evidence or make credibility determinations.”
Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1179.
Under the ADA, covered employers are prohibited from dis-
criminating against a qualified individual based on his disability. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he “(1) is disabled, (2) is
a qualified individual, and (3) was discriminated against because of
[his] disability.” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1179.
ADA discrimination claims based on circumstantial evi-
dence are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework em-
ployed in Title VII employment discrimination cases. Wascura v.
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22-12844 Opinion of the Court 9
City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the
burden-shifting framework, once the plaintiff establishes a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination, the defendant must articulate a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.
Id. Importantly, this burden is one of production, not persuasion,
meaning the defendant does not have to persuade this Court that
it was actually motivated by the proffered reason. Id. It is sufficient
that “the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Id. at 1243. If the
defendant meets its burden,” the presumption of discrimination is
eliminated,” and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual. Id.
To establish pretext, the plaintiff must come forward with
evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the reasons given by the defendant were not the real reasons
for the adverse employment decision. Id. When the proffered rea-
son is one that would motivate a reasonable employer, the em-
ployee must take that reason and rebut it “head on,” and the plain-
tiff “cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that
reason.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 992 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc). “If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of
the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the em-
ployer is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. at 1024-25.
Notably, this Court is not concerned with whether a plain-
tiff’s termination was “prudent or fair,” and we are instead
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
concerned with “whether unlawful discriminatory animus moti-
vate[d] a challenged employment decision.” Wascura, 257 F.3d at
1247. We have repeatedly held that an employer can fire an em-
ployee for a good or bad reason, or for no reason at all, so long as
that reason was not rooted in discrimination. Nix v. WLCY Ra-
dio/Rahall Commc’n, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) abrogated
on other grounds by Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1217-18. Moreover, an em-
ployer’s honest belief that an employee violated employer policy,
even if such belief was wrong, may constitute a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for termination. Connelly v. WellStar Health
Sys., Inc., 758 F. App’x 825, 829 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (cit-
ing Smith v. PAPP Clinic, P.A., 808 F.2d 1449, 1452-53 (11th Cir.
1987)).
As an alternative to the burden-shifting framework outlined
above, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment if he presents a
convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a
jury to infer intentional discrimination. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. To
make such a showing, a plaintiff may point to evidence such as
“(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or other infor-
mation from which discriminatory intent may be inferred, (2) ‘sys-
tematically better treatment of similarly situated employees,’ and
(3) pretext.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir.
2019)).
Importantly, however, to preserve an argument for appeal,
a party must first present it to the district court in a manner that
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22-12844 Opinion of the Court 11
allows the court to recognize and rule on it. Gennusa v. Canova, 748
F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2014). Additionally, an issue is aban-
doned if it is not prominently raised on appeal. Access Now, Inc. v.
Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). We will not
consider abandoned claims or claims not first presented to the dis-
trict court. Id. at 1331.3 Nevertheless, we have said that “[p]arties
can most assuredly waive or forfeit positions and issues on appeal,
but not individual arguments.” Bourtzakis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 940
F.3d 616, 620-21 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Hi-Tech Pharm., Inc. v. HBS Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186,
1194 (11th Cir. 2018)). So long as an appellant “squarely presented”
his issue to the district court, he may “make any argument in sup-
port of” the issue on appeal, and “is not limited to the precise argu-
ments [he] made below.” Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)).
On appeal, Jones argues that GPA’s failure to verify his re-
turn-to-work letter, Nell’s e-mail, the language used in his return-
to-work letter, his assertion that he was not informed that his letter
was insufficient, and the rescheduling of his appointment with
GPA’s physician sufficiently established, for purposes of summary
judgment, that the reasons given were pretextual. Jones also ar-
gues that, by citing to Smith, which did analyze an employment
3 The district court granted GPA’s motion for summary judgment on Jones’s
failure-to-accommodate claim. On appeal, Jones does not challenge that rul-
ing. As such, we will not review these issues because Jones abandoned them.
See Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330.
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
discrimination claim under the convincing mosaic standard, he
properly raised that argument below and the district court erred by
not even addressing whether he had satisfied that standard. In re-
sponse, GPA contends that a mere citation to Smith was not
enough for Jones to have properly raised that argument and, thus,
the district court was correct in not analyzing his discrimination
claim through the convincing mosaic lens. Consequently, GPA
maintains, Jones has waived that argument on appeal.
First, Jones’s challenge against the district court’s application
of the summary judgment standards is meritless. The district court
properly weighed the evidence, did not make credibility determi-
nations, and drew all inferences in Jones’s favor, as demonstrated
in its order. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1179.
Second, assuming arguendo that Jones established a prima fa-
cie case of ADA discrimination, Jones failed to establish that GPA’s
proffered reason for his termination was pretextual. GPA’s failure
to verify Jones’s return-to-work letter does not rebut the fact that
the letter was unsigned and failed to establish that Dr. Laura herself
recommended that Jones return to work. Moreover, Dr. Timms
explained that GPA generally did not verify letters that did not ini-
tially meet GPA’s return-to-work letter policy, where letters were
unsigned or included ambiguous statements regarding an em-
ployee’s ability to return to work safely. There is no evidence to
suggest that GPA’s decision not to follow up with Dr. Laura to ver-
ify the noncompliant letter was done with discriminatory animus.
The record evidence shows that noncompliant letters are generally
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22-12844 Opinion of the Court 13
not verified, and Jones has put forth no evidence to rebut this fact.
Chapman, 992 F.3d at 1030. The same is true for GPA’s failure to
inform Jones that his letter was insufficient. While a factual dispute
remains about whether GPA informed Jones about the letter’s de-
ficiencies, viewing the evidence in Jones’s favor, such failure does
not support a finding that Jones was terminated with discrimina-
tory animus. In any event, there is no question of fact that Jones's
return-to-work letter was not signed, and the district court reason-
ably found that the letter did not articulate whether Jones could
return to work. Therefore, the record supports GPA's conclusion
that the letter was deficient. Nix, 738 F.2d at 1187.
Additionally, Nell’s e-mail does not rebut GPA’s proffered
reason for terminating Jones. Nell’s e-mail stated that Jones was ill
with something only Jones knew about, which Jones took to mean
that Nell had negative feelings about Jones’s PTSD diagnosis. Even
assuming that Nell did dislike Jones, there is no evidence showing
that Nell even played a role in Jones’s termination.
Jones also points to GPA’s rescheduling of his return-to-
work appointment as evidence of pretext, but that has no connec-
tion to his termination. GPA terminated Jones for failing to pro-
vide a signed letter from Dr. Laura showing that she professionally
believed and recommended that Jones be allowed to return to
work. Jones failed to follow GPA policy, and he was terminated as
a result. Simply put, Jones did not proffer sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether GPA’s
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-12844
articulated reason was pretextual. Chapman, 992 F.3d 1012 at 1024-
25.
Finally, to GPA’s contention that Jones waived his convinc-
ing mosaic argument on appeal by failing to raise it below, we need
not decide that issue. Even if Jones did not waive this argument,
he cannot succeed under the convincing mosaic standard. The ev-
idence Jones points to in support of his pretext argument under
McDonnell Douglas similarly fails to establish any discriminatory in-
tent on GPA’s part with respect to his termination. Smith, 644 F.3d
at 1328. The record shows that GPA required a signed return-to-
work letter containing the treating physician’s professional opinion
as to whether Jones could safely return to work, which he did not
provide. Nell’s e-mail and the rescheduling of Jones’s appointment
also do not establish that GPA decision makers terminated Jones’s
employment with discriminatory intent. As such, Jones’s convinc-
ing mosaic argument fails.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GPA.
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