USA v. Dominic Taddeo, Jr.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13612
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DOMINIC JOHN TADDEO, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00053-RBD-LHP-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13612
Before NEWSOM , GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dominic John Taddeo, Jr. appeals his thirty-six-month sen-
tence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of escaping
from custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). On appeal, Taddeo
argues that the District Court: (1) procedurally erred when it de-
parted upward from the sentencing guidelines, and (2) imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence.
In response, the Government asserts that the District Court
did not procedurally err. Alternatively, it argues that even if the
District Court erred, such error was harmless under United States v.
Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). Last, the Government con-
tends that the District Court imposed a substantively reasonable
sentence. We address each point in turn, and for the reasons stated
below, we affirm Taddeo’s sentence.
I.
In April 2022, a federal grand jury charged Taddeo with one
count of escaping from custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).
Taddeo pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The magistrate
judge then issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) and
recommended that the District Court accept Taddeo’s plea. With
no objections from Taddeo and the Government, the District
Court adopted the R & R and accepted Taddeo’s guilty plea.
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22-13612 Opinion of the Court 3
At Taddeo’s sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted
the factual statements and guideline applications contained in the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), as neither Taddeo nor
the Government objected to them. The PSR stated that Taddeo
had been sentenced to twenty years’ incarceration in 1992 for mul-
tiple felonies from an earlier prosecution. As to the current charge,
the PSR explained that in February 2022, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) transferred Taddeo to a residential reentry center
(“RRC”) to serve the remaining 361 days of his 1992 sentence. The
next month, the BOP granted Taddeo a community pass to attend
a medical appointment. When Taddeo did not return, an arrest
warrant was issued. Six days later, the U.S. Marshals Service appre-
hended Taddeo in Miami with around $5,000 and a fake driver’s
license in the name of a deceased person.
The PSR first assigned Taddeo a base offense level of thir-
teen per U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2P1.1 (U.S.
Sent’g Comm’n 2021). It then reduced that by four levels under
U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3) because Taddeo escaped from a nonsecure
facility. It subtracted another two levels for Taddeo’s acceptance
of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). This resulted in a total
offense level of seven.
The PSR also detailed Taddeo’s decades of mob-related fed-
eral convictions, including a conviction under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act,1 in which Taddeo murdered
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13612
multiple rival faction members. The PSR assigned Taddeo a sub-
total criminal history score of three, which it increased by two
points because he committed the instant offense while under a
prior criminal sentence per U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). This resulted in a
criminal history score of five and placed Taddeo in criminal history
category III.
With a total offense level of seven and a criminal history cat-
egory of III, the PSR calculated Taddeo’s guideline range at four to
ten months’ incarceration. And it noted that the max term of im-
prisonment for a violation of § 751(a) is five years. However, the
PSR also identified Taddeo’s underrepresented criminal history as
a factor that may warrant an upward departure or a sentence out-
side the guideline range.
Before sentencing, Taddeo objected to any upward depar-
ture based on an underrepresentation of his criminal history. The
Government did not object, but it moved for an upward departure
based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, or for an upward variance to a guideline
range of thirty-three to forty-one months’ incarceration. The Gov-
ernment argued that Taddeo’s criminal history was significantly
underrepresented because Taddeo had not received criminal his-
tory points for most of his prior convictions, either due to their age
or the consolidated nature of his various offenses. It urged the Dis-
trict Court to first depart horizontally to a criminal history category
of VI, and second, to depart vertically to an offense level of thirteen.
Taddeo opposed the Government’s motion and argued that
his criminal history was properly calculated because it was clear
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22-13612 Opinion of the Court 5
that his prior offenses had aged out of the calculation. He also as-
serted that the Government’s requested sentence was excessive
and disproportionate to sentences given to similarly situated de-
fendants based on statistical information from 2021, which re-
ported an average sentence of thirteen months for escape offend-
ers.
Following its adoption of the factual statements and guide-
line applications in the PSR, the District Court addressed the Gov-
ernment’s motion. Both parties presented arguments, and the Dis-
trict Court granted the Government’s motion for an upward de-
parture based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. The District Court found that
Taddeo’s criminal history was “grossly underrepresented” by the
guideline calculations and that Taddeo’s criminal history was
greater than the max category VI. It also agreed with the Govern-
ment’s suggested calculation method: first moving horizontally
from criminal history category III to category VI, and then moving
vertically down to an offense level of thirteen. It found that this
calculation produced a guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one
months’ incarceration. The District Court did not discuss the in-
tervening criminal history categories or offense levels, nor did it
explicitly analyze the sufficiency of the guideline ranges such de-
partures would have produced.
The District Court then discussed Taddeo’s prior criminal
activities and noted that those activities had occurred some time
ago. It emphasized that Taddeo had a chance to show that the sen-
tence had its intended effect of changing his criminal behavior,
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13612
promoting respect for the law, and giving the public comfort that
he had been redeemed or rehabilitated. Instead, the District Court
found that Taddeo wasted that chance by escaping the RRC and
remaining at large for six days.
The District Court also determined that the § 3553(a) factors
warranted a sentence of thirty-three to forty-one months because
of: (1) Taddeo’s demonstrated lack of respect for the law, (2) the
need for a just sentence and one that would adequately protect the
public, and (3) Taddeo’s criminal history and characteristics under
§ 3553. In granting the Government’s motion, the District Court
specified that “in the event the departure was not the appropriate
methodology, . . . a variance under [§] 3553 . . . [was] appropriate.
And the sentence range would have been the same.”
The District Court sentenced Taddeo to thirty-six months’
incarceration, followed by a one-year term of supervised release, to
be served consecutively to the rest of his prior sentence. The Dis-
trict Court explained that it had considered the PSR, Taddeo’s sen-
tencing memorandum, the Government’s motion, the parties’ ar-
guments, all the advisory sentencing guidelines, and all the factors
in § 3553(a)—regardless of whether it “specifically mentioned them
in [its] oral statement.” After the District Court allowed the parties
to object, Taddeo’s attorney stated: “Based on the objections that
we entered during the hearing, . . . we’d object to the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”
On October 24, 2022, the District Court entered its judg-
ment. The same day, the District Court issued a written statement
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22-13612 Opinion of the Court 7
of reasons that clarified that it would have issued the same sentence
with or without the upward departure. One day later, Taddeo ap-
pealed.
II.
“Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of
a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Normally,
“[w]e first look to whether the district court committed any signif-
icant procedural error . . . . [and t]hen, we examine whether the
sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 936 (citations omit-
ted). “Where a defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for an
objection in the district court, however, he waives the objection on
appeal and we are limited to reviewing for plain error.” United
States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).
We can avoid remanding a district court’s sentence based on
a misapplication of a guidelines provision if a district court states
that the resolution of that issue “does not matter to the sentence
imposed after the § 3553(a) factors are considered.” Keene, 470 F.3d
at 1349. When that occurs, we may decline to review the disputed
procedural issue and, instead, affirm if “the final sentence resulting
from consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would still be reasona-
ble.” Id. In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we “as-
sume that there was a guidelines error—that the guidelines issue
should have been decided in the way the defendant argued and the
advisory range reduced accordingly—and then ask whether the
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13612
final sentence resulting from consideration of the § 3553(a) factors
would still be reasonable.” Id. Our review is deferential, “and the
burden is on the defendant to prove that his sentence is unreason-
able in light of the record and § 3553(a).” Id. at 1350.
III.
A.
We first address Taddeo’s procedural error argument.2
See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 935–36. Taddeo contends that the District
Court failed to expressly consider the intermediary criminal history
categories between the original category of III and the ultimate cat-
egory of VI.
Here, it is undisputed that the District Court made a Keene
statement when it explained that it would have imposed the same
sentence even without the challenged guidelines calculation.
See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1348. So we will assume that the District
Court procedurally erred by failing to “explicitly consider the next
criminal history category and make a determination as to whether
that new range [was] appropriate.” United States v. Valdes,
500 F.3d 1291, 1292 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “The ques-
tion then is whether the [thirty-six-month] sentence the court im-
posed is reasonable, assuming exactly the same conduct and other
2 Because we decide that the District Court made a Keene statement and as-
sume that the District Court made a procedural error, it is irrelevant whether
Taddeo preserved that issue. Stated differently, whether we review the Dis-
trict Court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion or plain error results in the same
conclusion.
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22-13612 Opinion of the Court 9
factors in the case, but using an advisory guidelines range of [four]
to [ten] months.” Keene, 470 F.3d at 1350. As explained below,
Taddeo’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Thus, any pur-
ported procedural error was harmless. See id. at 1349.
B.
Next, we review the substantive reasonableness of Taddeo’s
sentence for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007); Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936.
Taddeo argues that the District Court abused its discretion and im-
posed a substantively unreasonable sentence because it (1) over-
looked relevant § 3553(a) factors—specifically the guidelines sen-
tencing range and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities—and (2) unreasonably focused on Taddeo’s prior criminal
history.
When reviewing a sentencing decision for an abuse of dis-
cretion, “we examine whether the sentence is substantively reason-
able in light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a)
factors.” Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. A district court “shall impose a
sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to com-
ply with the purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)].”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A district court “imposes a substantively un-
reasonable sentence only ‘when it (1) fails to afford consideration
to [the] relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) com-
mits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.’”
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015)
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13612
(quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010)
(en banc)).3
“The decision about how much weight to assign a particular
sentencing factor is ‘committed to the sound discretion of the dis-
trict court.’” Id. at 1254 (quoting United States v. Williams,
526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). And it may at-
tach “great weight” to one factor over others. United States v. Shaw,
560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 57,
128 S. Ct. at 600). “The district court is not required to explicitly
address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evi-
dence.” United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021)
(per curiam). Instead, “[a]n acknowledgment [that] the district
court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a)
factors will suffice.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Ultimately, we may only vacate a defendant’s sen-
tence “if we are left with the definite and firm
3 Those factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence im-
posed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to crimi-
nal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes, and pro-
vide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the
kinds of sentences available; (4) the sentencing guidelines’ recommended
range; (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and (7) the need
to provide restitution to any victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7).
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22-13612 Opinion of the Court 11
conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by
arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the
case.”
United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015) (quot-
ing United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam)).
Taddeo preserved his challenge to the substantive reasona-
bleness of the sentence by seeking a lower, within-range sentence.
See Holguin Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67,
206 L. Ed. 2d 95 (2020) (explaining that a request for a lower sen-
tence than the one received sufficiently preserves a substantive rea-
sonableness objection). Still, our review confirms that Taddeo’s
sentence was not substantively unreasonable under either the orig-
inal guideline range or the guideline range reached by the District
Court’s departure.
To begin, Taddeo’s sentence is well below the statu-
tory-maximum sentence of five years, which “is an indicator of a
reasonable sentence.” United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 636
(11th Cir. 2014). Further, contrary to Taddeo’s assertion, the Dis-
trict Court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and, in weigh-
ing those factors, arrived at a sentence within the range of reason-
able sentences dictated by the facts here. For example, the District
Court explained why certain factors—i.e., Taddeo’s serious crimi-
nal history, his lack of respect for the law, the need to protect the
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13612
public, and the need for a just sentence—merited the sentence im-
posed. To be sure, the District Court did not explicitly reference
Taddeo’s disparity argument. But it satisfied its burden by indicat-
ing that it had considered Taddeo’s arguments [id. at 27:3–5] and
all the relevant § 3553(a) factors, even if it did not specifically men-
tion them.4 See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324.
Nor can we say that the District Court unreasonably focused
on Taddeo’s criminal history. Although his criminal history is se-
rious, the sticking point for the District Court was that Taddeo
chose to escape the RRC after serving nearly twenty years in
prison. In the District Court’s view, Taddeo wasted his oppor-
tunity to show that the sentence imposed had its intended effect of
changing his criminal behavior. Instead, he proved that he could
4 Even if the District Court had not met its burden, Taddeo failed to provide
sufficient information regarding his disparity argument to determine whether
other defendants were “similarly situated.” See United States v. Duperval,
777 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015). True, Taddeo’s sentencing memoran-
dum provides statistical information showing that the average sentence for
escape offenders—with criminal history categories of III or greater—is thir-
teen months. “A well-founded claim of disparity, however, assumes that ap-
ples are being compared to apples.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091,
1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514
(1st Cir. 2005)). The defendant has the burden of showing specific facts that
establish a similar situation. See United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048
(11th Cir. 2015). Courts “need[] to have more than the crime of conviction
and the total length of the sentences to evaluate alleged disparities. The un-
derlying facts of the crime and all of the individual characteristics are relevant.”
Id. (emphasis added). Taddeo did not show whether his sentence was dispar-
ate compared to sentences given to escapees with similar extensive criminal
histories.
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22-13612 Opinion of the Court 13
not be trusted with freedom for even a few hours. Thus, the Dis-
trict Court reasonably concluded that a thirty-six-month sentence
was warranted under the § 3553(a) factors.
Taddeo may disagree with the weighing of the relevant sen-
tencing factors. But “[w]e do not reweigh relevant factors nor do
we remand for re-sentencing unless the district court committed a
clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv-
ing at a sentence outside the range of a reasonable sentence.”
United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009). That
did not occur here. After considering the advisory-guidelines
range, the PSR, Taddeo’s submitted materials and allocution, the
parties’ arguments, and the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court de-
termined that a thirty-six-month sentence was “sufficient but not
greater than necessary to achieve the statutory purposes of sen-
tencing.” We do not have a “definite and firm conviction that it
was substantively unreasonable, a clear error in judgment, [or] an
abuse of discretion, for the district court to conclude to the con-
trary.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1222.
IV.
Accordingly, even if Taddeo’s guideline departure argument
has merit and we focus only on the original guideline range of four
to ten months, we still conclude that his sentence is substantively
reasonable. Therefore, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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