April La Ree Epps v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13674
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
APRIL LA REE EPPS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01340-CLM
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13674
Before NEWSOM , ABUDU, and H ULL , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
April La Ree Epps appeals the district court’s order affirming
the denial of her application for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits. On
appeal, Epps raises several issues relating to the Administrative
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) evaluation of her treating physician’s opinion
of Epps’s physical capacities. After careful review, we find no error
in the ALJ’s handling of this evidence and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 2017 Application
On July 26, 2017, Epps applied for benefits, alleging she
became disabled on August 1, 2016. At the time of her hearing,
Epps was a 38-year-old mother of five children, ages 16, 12, 7, 4,
and 2, and lived with her boyfriend.
For a few years leading up to her application, Epps was self-
employed, buying items and reselling them online and at auctions.
Epps’s application indicated she stopped working on August 1,
2016 due to her ailments, including anxiety, panic disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, non-essential tremors, migraines,
degenerative disc disease in her neck, crooked spine, and limited
use of her arms.
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B. Medical Conditions
Epps was in a serious car accident when she was 14 years old
and has a long history of hip, back, and neck pain. In approximately
2014, Epps was in another car accident that worsened those
conditions. In 2016, Epps began suffering from what she
considered her most severe problem, constant headaches
accompanied by ringing in the ears and dizziness. Epps’s
headaches sometimes lasted for days or weeks or became so painful
that she went to the emergency room for treatment. Epps also
suffers from anxiety, panic attacks, and depression.
In July 2017, after she stopped working in 2016, Epps was
diagnosed with a Baker’s cyst behind her right knee.1 August 2018,
Epps had Baker’s cysts behind both knees. And, in the six months
leading up to her ALJ hearing, Epps began experiencing edema that
caused weight gain and joint pain.
Between 2016 and 2019, Epps’s doctors prescribed
medications for pain, migraines, inflammation, anxiety, and
depression. She was also prescribed Lasix and support stockings
for her edema and physical therapy for knee pain.
Yet, over the same period, her doctors ordered diagnostic
imaging, including CTs, MRIs, and x-rays, of Epps’s head, lumbar
1 Baker’s cysts are fluid-filled growths behind the knee causing a bulge and
tightness. Baker cyst, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/bakers-cysts/symptoms-causes/syc-20369950 (last visited Nov. 21,
2023).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13674
spine, cervical spine, and knees, that showed no abnormal results
apart from the small cysts in her knees and mild degenerative
changes in the sacroiliac joints of her lumbar spine.
C. ALJ Hearing in 2019
At an April 4, 2019 hearing before the ALJ, Epps and a
vocational expert (“VE”) testified.
Epps described her headaches as constant, rating them a 10
(on a pain scale of 0 to 10) for 15 days in a 30-day period, with only
one or two good days in a month. She had back and hip pain 20
days in a month, with her back pain staying at a 3 or 4 and her right
hip pain rising to an 8 or 9 for 10 of those 20 days. Because of her
neck pain, lifting more than 5 pounds caused neck problems, and
tightness in her neck made it difficult to move. The Baker’s cysts
behind her knees made bending over to pick things up from the
floor difficult. She had panic attacks several times in a week and
extreme fatigue and weakness caused by her medications. Her
anxiety made it difficult to interact with people or leave her home.
Epps said that because of her symptoms, she could walk only
20 or 30 steps, stand for no more than 15 minutes at a time, and sit
for no more than 30 minutes at a time. Epps also had to lie down
for 20 minutes before she could return to a seated or standing
position. As a result, she had to lie down for 4 or 5 hours each work
day. Epps said she did not take care of her personal needs, changed
her clothes only once a week, and left most of the household chores
and shopping for her boyfriend and her older children. When
alone with her two youngest children, Epps said she stayed on a
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22-13674 Opinion of the Court 5
couch in the living room, where her children watched cartoons and
played with toys. Epps denied lifting her two-year-old child.
During the VE’s testimony, the ALJ asked the VE to
presume the following non-exertional limitations:
[N]o operation of foot controls. No more than
occasional climbing stairs, never climbing ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. No kneeling, crouching, or
crawling. Avoid all exposure to extreme heat and
excessive vibration. Avoid concentrated exposure to
pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts,
gases, poorly-ventilated areas, and to chemicals.
Avoid unprotected heights and hazardous machinery.
Limited to unskilled with the ability to attend and
concentrate for two-hour periods. No more than
occasional workplace changes, and the ability to
make simple work-related decisions. No more than
occasional direct interaction with the general public,
and work that can be around coworkers throughout
the day, but with only occasional interaction with
coworkers.
In one hypothetical, the ALJ asked if unskilled jobs with these
limitations existed for an individual who had the capacity to
perform a range of medium work activity. The VE responded that
the hypothetical individual would be able to perform work as a
packer and packager, assembler, or order puller.
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D. ALJ Decision
On May 31, 2019, in a 12-page decision, the ALJ found that
Epps was not under a disability from August 1, 2016, through the
date of decision.
Specifically, applying the five-step evaluation process, the
ALJ found that: (1) Epps met insured status requirements and had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her onset date of
August 1, 2016; (2) Epps had the severe impairments of “moderate
Baker’s cysts right knee with mild degenerative changes, anxiety
and depression; (3) Epps did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of
one of the listed impairments; (4) Epps had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work with the certain
restrictions, namely the limitations the ALJ identified to the VE
during the hearing; and (5) considering Epps’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in the national economy
that she could perform.
In assessing Epps’s RFC at step four, the ALJ found Epps’s
statements about her physical and mental limitations were “not
persuasive” in light of objective medical evidence that indicated she
retained “greater functioning than alleged.” The ALJ determined
that Epps’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limited effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.”
The ALJ reviewed Epps’s medical records between April
2016 and January 2019, including treatment notes from Dr. Larry
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22-13674 Opinion of the Court 7
Scarborough, her primary care physician at Quality of Life Health
Services. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Scarborough had completed
a physical capacities evaluation as to Epps.
On that evaluation form, Dr. Scarborough opined that:
(1) Epps could sit upright in a standard chair for less than 30
minutes and stand for less than 15 minutes; (2) during an eight-hour
period, Epps would need to lie down, sleep, or sit with legs propped
up for five hours; and (3) Epps would be off task for 79%2 of a
normal workday. Dr. Scarborough identified the conditions
causing Epps’s limitations as “[h]eadache, cervicalgia, myalgia,
[and] edema.”3 Dr. Scarborough listed “drowsiness” as a side effect
of Epps’s medications.
The ALJ, however, determined that Dr. Scarborough’s
assessment of Epps’s physical capacities was “not supported and
not persuasive.” The ALJ first found that Epps did not seek
treatment for the drowsiness that Dr. Scarborough indicated was a
side effect of her medications, that Epps’s medical
“[e]xamination[s] have not shown edema,” and that “[t]reatment
examinations have shown normal attention span and
2 The ALJ determined that this handwritten figure is 79%. Epps submits that
it is 75% but acknowledges that the discrepancy is “trivial.”
3 Cervicalgia is neck pain. Neck Pain, Medical Dictionary Online,
https//www.online-medical-dictionary.org/definitions-n/neck-pain/html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2023). Myalgia is muscle pain. Myalgia, Medical
Dictionary Online, https//www.online-medical-dictionary.org/definitions-
m/myalgia.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2023).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13674
concentration and [Epps] being in no acute distress.” The ALJ cited
treatment notes from Epps’s May 23, 2018, visit to Cherokee
Health Clinic as an example.
Regarding mental impairments, the ALJ further found that
Epps had “minimal treatment for depression and/or anxiety” and
had not demonstrated any psychiatric abnormality since 2017. The
ALJ highlighted that, upon examination, Epps “was cooperative
and pleasant” and otherwise “ha[d] not exhibited any evidence of
cognitive deficits or psychosis that would preclude substantial
gainful activity.”
Regarding physical ailments, the ALJ observed that,
although Epps received treatment in emergency departments after
complaining of headaches, “she was treated and generally
discharged on the same day.” The ALJ found that Epps’s Baker’s
cysts improved with injections, imaging studies of her knees “only
showed mild degenerative changes,” and her gait and station were
consistently normal.
Further, the ALJ pointed out that imaging studies of her
neck, back, and brain were generally normal. The ALJ summarized
its finding that Epps’s “allegations are not fully consistent with the
objective findings and she retain[ed] the capacity to perform
substantial gainful activity.”
E. Appeals Council Review
The Appeals Council granted Epps’s request for review.
Ultimately, on August 15, 2020, the Appeals Council adopted the
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22-13674 Opinion of the Court 9
ALJ’s findings and conclusions as to Epps’s lack of disability,
including the ALJ’s RFC-related findings at step four.
As further background, Epps submitted new medical
evidence to the Appeals Council, but Epps does not appeal the
Appeals Council’s decision as to this new medical evidence. For
completeness though, here is what happened. The Appeals
Council initially adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusion. After
receiving Epps’s new medical evidence, however, the Appeals
Council set aside its initial decision. The Appeals Council
determined that some of the new medical evidence did not show a
reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the
decision and that the rest of the new medical evidence did not
relate to the time period at issue and therefore did not affect the
decision. The Appeals Council again adopted the ALJ’s findings
and conclusions that Epps was not disabled, including the RFC-
related findings at step four.
F. District Court Proceedings
On judicial review, Epps argued that the ALJ erred by
rejecting Dr. Scarborough’s opinion “without sufficient legal
explanation” and by failing to afford Dr. Scarborough’s opinion
proper weight as Epps’s treating physician.
Affirming the ALJ decision, the district court relied on this
Court’s decision in Harner v. Social Security Administration,
Commissioner, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022). In Harner, this Court
concluded that the Social Security Administration’s new
regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, validly abrogated the prior
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13674
treating physician rule. 38 F.4th at 894. The prior rule accorded
significant weight to a treating physician’s opinion. Id. at 896-97.
The new regulation requires ALJs to evaluate all medical opinions
for persuasiveness using the same criteria. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c. The district court concluded that the ALJ applied the
correct legal standard in evaluating Dr. Scarborough’s opinion and
adequately explained why she found Dr. Scarborough’s opinion
not persuasive and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
finding as to Dr. Scarborough’s opinion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review de novo the ALJ’s application of legal principles,
and we review the ALJ’s resulting decision to determine whether
it is supported by substantial evidence.” Buckwalter v. Acting
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation
marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d
1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). To the
extent the ALJ commits an error, we will not reverse if the error
did not affect the ALJ’s ultimate determination. See Diorio v.
Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying harmless error
review in the social security context).
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22-13674 Opinion of the Court 11
III. DISCUSSION
A. New Regulation in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c
Prior to 2017, the Courts of Appeals, including this Court,
applied a treating physician rule, which required ALJs to give the
opinion of a treating physician “substantial or considerable weight
unless ‘good cause’ [was] shown to the contrary.” Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks
omitted), superseded by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; see also Black & Decker
Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 829 (2003). In 1991 the Social
Security Administration promulgated a regulation that adopted the
court-made rule and required ALJs generally to give more weight
to treating physicians’ opinions absent a showing of good cause.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (1992); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)
(2016) (most recent version of the treating physician rule).
In 2017, however, the Commissioner issued a new
regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, that abrogated the treating
physician rule. Harner, 38 F.4th at 894. The new regulation
provides that an ALJ does not “defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s),” including a treating
physician’s opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ weighs all
medical opinions based on their persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c.
Section 404.1520c applies to all claims filed on or after March
27, 2017. Id. Epps applied for benefits on July 26, 2017. Epps does
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13674
not dispute that because she filed her application after March 27,
2017, her claim is governed by the new regulation if it is valid.
B. Validity of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c
Epps argues the § 404.1520c regulation is invalid.4
Specifically, Epps contends the new regulation is in derogation of
the text and structure of the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(B). The § 423(d)(5)(B) statute provides that ALJs must
“make every reasonable effort to obtain from the individual’s
treating physician . . . all medical evidence . . . necessary” to make
a proper disability determination. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B).5 Epps
contends: (1) the § 423(b)(5)(B) statute requires the ALJ to give
deference or special consideration to the opinion of treating
4 As a threshold matter, we reject the Commissioner’s claim that in the district
court Epps did not adequately raise an issue challenging the validity of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
5 Section 423(d)(5)(B) states in full:
(B) In making any determination with respect to whether an
individual is under a disability or continues to be under a
disability, the Commissioner of Social Security shall consider all
evidence available in such individual’s case record, and shall
develop a complete medical history of at least the preceding
twelve months for any case in which a determination is made that
the individual is not under a disability. In making any
determination the Commissioner of Social Security shall make
every reasonable effort to obtain from the individual’s treating
physician (or other treating health care provider) all medical
evidence, including diagnostic tests, necessary in order to
properly make such determination, prior to evaluating medical
evidence obtained from any other source on a consultative basis.
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22-13674 Opinion of the Court 13
physicians; and (2) thus, the § 404.1520c regulation, wherein the
ALJ weighs all medical opinions based on persuasiveness, is invalid.
We first address our decision in Harner and then Epps’s arguments
about the new regulation.
In Harner, the claimant argued that “our earlier precedents
establishing and applying the treating-physician rule [were] still
good law, notwithstanding the promulgation of [the] section
404.1520c” regulation. 38 F.4th at 896. This Court disagreed,
holding that “the new regulation validly abrogated” our court-
developed treating physician rule and applied to Harner’s claim. Id.
at 894.
In doing so, the Harner Court concluded that the § 404.1520c
regulation fell within the scope of the Commissioner’s rulemaking
authority as delegated by the Congress under the Social Security
Act. Id. at 897 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)). Our Court explained that
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B) “instructs administrative law judges to
make every reasonable effort to obtain from the individual’s
treating physician all medical evidence necessary to make a proper
disability determination.” Id. at 897 (cleaned up). But “the [Social
Security] Act does not specify how this evidence is to be weighed.”
Id. Citing Chevron, the Harner Court reasoned that because the
§ 404.1520c regulation fell within Congress’s delegation of
authority and was “not manifestly contrary to” the § 423(d)(5)(B)
statute, the regulation did not exceed the Commissioner’s
statutory authority. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-13674
The Harner Court also determined that the § 404.1520c
regulation was not arbitrary and capricious, and, importantly for
Epps’s argument here, that the treating physician rule was not
“unambiguously required by the [Social Security] Act.” Id. at 897-
98. Thus, our Court determined that the § 404.1520c regulation
“abrogate[d] our earlier precedents applying the treating-physician
rule.” Id. at 896. Because the new regulation applied to Harner’s
claim, the Court concluded that the ALJ properly declined to give
more weight to the medical opinions of Harner’s treating
physicians. Id. at 898.
Here, Epps argues that the § 404.1520c regulation is invalid
because the § 423(d)(5)(B) statute unambiguously requires a
treating physician rule that gives deference or special consideration
to the opinion of a treating physician. The problem for Epps is that
the question of whether the treating physician rule exists in the text
of the Social Security Act was explicitly answered in Harner, which
concluded that the treating physician rule was not required by the
Act. See id. And we are bound by Harner. See United States v. Archer,
531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). To the extent Epps claims her
argument is slightly different from the claimant’s argument in
Harner, this Court has categorically rejected an overlooked reason
or argument exception to our prior panel precedent rule. See
Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“[A] prior panel precedent cannot be circumvented or
ignored on the basis of arguments not made to or considered by
the prior panel.”).
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Given that Epps’s application was filed after March 27, 2017,
the ALJ was precluded by the § 404.1520c regulation from deferring
to or giving specific weight to any medical opinion, including to
Dr. Scarborough’s opinion. The ALJ’s decision contains a
statement to that effect. Accordingly, the ALJ applied the correct
legal standard for evaluating medical opinions and did not err in
declining to give Dr. Scarborough’s opinion special consideration
or weight.
C. ALJ’s Compliance with the § 404.1520c Regulation
Under § 404.1520c, the ALJ must consider any submitted
medical opinion and “articulate how persuasive” the ALJ finds the
medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b). The ALJ
determines the persuasiveness of a medical opinion using five
enumerated factors: (1) supportability, (2) consistency,
(3) relationship with claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) other
factors. Id. § 404.1520c(a), (c).
Because the “most important” factors are supportability and
consistency, the ALJ must explain how it considered those factors,
but may or may not explain the other factors. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
As to supportability, the more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations from the medical source, the
more persuasive the medical opinion will be. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1).
As to consistency, the more consistent a medical opinion is with
the evidence from other sources, the more persuasive the medical
opinion will be. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
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Here, the ALJ complied with the § 404.1520c regulation.
The ALJ explicitly considered Dr. Scarborough’s opinion about
Epps’s physical capacities. The ALJ stressed that Dr. Scarborough’s
assessment of Epps’s physical capacities—“sitting fewer than 30
minutes, standing fewer than 15 minutes, laying down or sitting
with legs propped at waist level [for] 5 hours, being off tasks 79%
of the time, and missing 15 days per month due to headache,
cervicalgia, myalgia, edema and adverse medication due to
drowsiness”—meant that Epps was “essentially disabled.” The ALJ
then stated that she found Dr. Scarborough’s opinion “not
persuasive.” See id. § 404.1520c(b) (“We will articulate in our
determination or decision how persuasive we find all of the
medical opinions . . . .”).
As to the § 404.1520c(c) factors, the ALJ explained that she
found Dr. Scarborough’s opinion was “not supported.” The ALJ
began by noting that Epps had not sought treatment for drowsiness
from medication, that examination had not shown edema but had
shown “normal attention span and concentration,” and that Epps
was “in no acute distress.” Then, over several paragraphs, the ALJ
outlined evidence of Epps’s medical treatment (and cited exhibits
that included Dr. Scarborough’s treatment notes) that indicated
Epps’s symptoms were not as severe as Dr. Scarborough’s opinion
suggested.
For example, one of the conditions Dr. Scarborough cited as
a cause of Epps’s limitations was headaches. The ALJ pointed out
that (1) Epps was treated and discharged the same day when she
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went to the emergency room for headaches, (2) her headaches did
not “frequently involve changes in vision, flashes of light, difficulty
speaking, nausea, vomiting, or lightheadedness,” and (3) imaging
of Epps’s brain had “revealed no acute abnormalities.”
As to Epps’s cervicalgia (neck pain) and myalgia (muscle
pain)—two other conditions Dr. Scarborough cited—the ALJ
noted that (1) Epps’s Baker’s cysts improved with Kenalog
injections, (2) imaging of Epps’s knees showed only “mild
degenerative changes,” (3) imaging of Epps’s neck and back was
“generally normal,” and (4) Epps had “consistently demonstrated a
normal gait and station.” And, as a general matter, the ALJ
observed that Epps “responded well to treatment when she was
compliant.”
The ALJ explained that this evidence “supported” her RFC
finding (rather than Dr. Scarborough’s opinion) and that Epps’s
claims about her capacities (through Dr. Scarborough’s opinion)
were “not fully consistent” with the objective findings. Contrary
to Epps’s claim, this explanation was sufficient to comply with the
§ 404.1520c regulation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (“[W]e will
explain how we considered the supportability and consistency
factors for a medical source’s medical opinions.”).
Epps correctly points out that one of the ALJ’s statements—
that examinations of Epps showed no edema—is not supported by
substantial evidence. While many physical examinations did not
reveal edema, Epps testified that her swelling did not begin until
mid-2018, just six months before her administrative hearing. By
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that time, some physical examinations noted swelling or edema,
particularly in her feet and ankles. But this one discrepancy does
not undermine the ALJ’s overall evaluation of Dr. Scarborough’s
opinion or the ALJ’s ultimate determination. See Diorio, 721 F.2d
at 728. Epps indicated that swelling was only her third-most-severe
ailment, behind her headaches and neck pain. Additionally,
physical examinations between May and November 2018 showed
that Epps had a normal gait and strength in her extremities despite
her edema.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s other observations are supported by
substantial evidence. As the ALJ noted, Epps did not seek
treatment for drowsiness (and did not frequently complain of
drowsiness as a side effect of her medication), and clinical findings
in her doctors’ treatment notes indicated that despite Epps’s
complaints of pain, her strength, gait, range of motion, and sensory
and motor skills were not significantly impaired, and that her
mental status was not significantly altered.6 Additionally, as the
ALJ observed, diagnostic imaging and other tests showed no
abnormalities beyond the small cysts behind her knees and mild
degenerative changes in both sacroiliac joints of her lumbar spine.
6 Epps also correctly notes that Dr. Scarborough’s opinion listed drowsiness as
a side effect rather than as a chronic condition that limited Epps’s physical
capacities. But the fact that Dr. Scarborough listed drowsiness as a side effect,
despite Dr. Scarborough’s treatment notes failing to mention this side effect,
undermines the supportability and overall persuasiveness of his opinion.
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Epps also takes issue with the ALJ’s focus on the absence of
acute distress during Epps’s physical examinations, pointing out
that her conditions were chronic, not acute, and that she has good
days and bad days. To be sure, chronic ailments are distinct from
acute ailments. But Epps’s consistent lack of acute distress over
many physical examinations by both primary care and emergency
room staff supports the ALJ’s determination that the pain from her
conditions was not so severe as to justify Dr. Scarborough’s
significant limitations.7
In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determinations that Epps’s physical capacities were not as severely
limited as Dr. Scarborough opined and that Dr. Scarborough’s
opinion was unpersuasive.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of Epps’s application for
disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits.
AFFIRMED.
7 Because Epps filed her application in July 2017, her claim is governed by the
new § 404.1520c regulation. For this reason, Epps’s reliance on this Court’s
decisions, such as Schink v. Commissioner of Social Security, 935 F.3d 1245, 1262
(11th Cir. 2019), applying the prior version of the regulations and requiring the
ALJ to identify “genuine inconsistencies” to discount a treating physician’s
opinion misses the mark. Here, unlike in those cases, the ALJ was not required
to provide substantial weight to a treating physician’s opinion absent a
showing of good cause. Cf. Schink, 935 F.3d at 1259 & n.4, 1262-63.
USCA11 Case: 22-13674 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2024 Page: 19 of 19

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