Rita D. Taylor v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13686
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
RITA D. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
PAULA MCCORMACK,
Supervisor, Revenue Officer (Retired),
PRIM ESCLEONA,
US Attorney,
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13686
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00596-RDP
____________________
Before NEWSOM , L AGOA , and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rita D. Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal on the ground that her suit was time-barred. In a
nutshell, Taylor alleged that a cadre of city, state, and federal
officers committed a series of unconstitutional acts against her
during and following an arrest. Accordingly, Taylor brought
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Despite the
many allegations levied here, the issue before us on appeal is
straightforward: Do any of Taylor’s claims survive the relevant
statute of limitations? After careful review, we determine that they
do not, and thus affirm.
I
The issues presented in this appeal stem from Taylor’s arrest
and her subsequent journey through the legal system. That
journey began on December 6, 2019, when City of Huntsville
police officers arrested Taylor for resisting arrest and obstructing
government operations. She was held in custody until the next
day, December 7, 2019. In exchange for having her criminal
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22-13686 Opinion of the Court 3
charges dropped, Taylor then signed an agreement with the City
on February 20, 2020, releasing all claims against the City and its
officers arising from her arrest. More than two years later, Taylor
filed this suit on May 9, 2022, alleging that various state, local, and
federal officials violated her constitutional rights during her arrest
and detainment. The district court dismissed Taylor’s complaint
on the ground that none of Taylor’s claims survived the relevant
two-year statute of limitations.
This is Taylor’s appeal. Although her arguments are difficult
to discern, she seems to present two arguments. First, she
contends that her § 1983 and Bivens claims met the two-year statute
of limitations. Second, she asserts, for the first time on appeal, that
an FTCA claim from a previously dismissed case extends the
limitations period long enough for her current (non-FTCA) claims
to survive.
II
We review de novo both the district court’s dismissal of a
complaint for failure to satisfy the relevant statute of limitations,
see Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007), and the
district court’s interpretation and application of a statute of
limitations, see Dotson v. United States, 30 F.4th 1259, 1264 (11th Cir.
2022). In general, we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally.
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). A district
court must give a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend
her complaint before dismissing it with prejudice, unless such an
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13686
amendment would be futile. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit,
927 F.3d 1123, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2019).
III
We first consider whether Taylor filed her § 1983 and Bivens
claims before the relevant statute of limitations expired. We then
assess whether Taylor’s previously dismissed FTCA claim
somehow extends the limitations period for the § 1983 and Bivens
claims in this suit. Finally, we determine whether the district court
erred either by not allowing Taylor to amend her complaint or by
dismissing the complaint before the federal defendants responded.
A
The statute of limitations for § 1983 and Bivens claims is the
limitations period for personal-injury torts in the state where the
action is brought. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (§ 1983);
Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996) (Bivens). Although
state law determines the limitations period, federal law dictates
when the claims accrue. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir.
1996). Under federal law, the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the facts that would support a cause of action are
apparent or should be reasonably apparent. Id. at 561–62. In other
words, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff should know (1)
that she was injured and (2) who inflicted the injury. Id. at 562.
Taylor brought her claims in a federal district court in
Alabama. The relevant statute of limitations for these claims is
therefore two years, the period that applies to personal-injury torts
under Alabama law. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir.
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22-13686 Opinion of the Court 5
2008). In terms of determining the proper accrual date, there are
two relevant episodes. First, there is Taylor’s release from jail on
December 7, 2019, because her complaint alleges civil-rights
violations surrounding her arrest and detention, and these events
are the source of her alleged injuries. See Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561–62.
Second, there is Taylor’s act of signing a release agreement with
the City on February 20, 2020, in which she pledged not to bring
forward any claims related to her arrest. Because Taylor did not
file her action until more than two years past the start of either
plausible accrual date, any claim under § 1983 or Bivens is time-
barred. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387; Kelly, 87 F.3d at 1238.
B
We construe Taylor’s argument that a previously brought
FTCA claim suspends the statute of limitations for her § 1983 and
Bivens claims in this case as a request for equitable tolling. Under
the doctrine of equitable tolling, a statute of limitations is paused
“when a litigant has pursued [her] rights diligently but some
extraordinary circumstance prevents [her] from bringing a timely
action.” Fedance v. Harris, 1 F.4th 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quotation marks omitted). But, significantly, the party seeking to
toll the limitations period bears the burden of showing “(1) that
[s]he has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and prevented
timely filing.” Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971
(11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
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Taylor’s argument that her old FTCA claim tolled the statute
of limitations for the claims brought here also falls short.1 While
we must construe Taylor’s contentions liberally, these arguments—
so far as we can tell—were not raised below. As a result, they have
been forfeited. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d
1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an
issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in
an appeal will not be considered by this court.” (quotation marks
omitted)). But even assuming that she did successfully preserve
them, Taylor fails to identify any authority supporting her assertion
that her previously brought FTCA claim extends the statute of
limitations in this case. Nor did she argue that her previously
denied FTCA claim amounts to an “extraordinary circumstance”
that “stood in [her] way and prevented [a] timely filing” of her §
1983 or Bivens claims. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 971. Consequently,
equitable tolling does not apply.
C
Finally, Taylor did not challenge on appeal the district court’s
determination that it would have been futile to allow her to amend
her complaint further. Accordingly, that issue is likewise forfeited.
Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he law is by now well settled in
this Circuit that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed
1 To the extent that Taylor means to ask us to reverse a district court’s ruling
in a separate, previously dismissed case involving an FTCA claim, we lack ju-
risdiction because she did not appeal from that decision in a timely manner.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4.
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22-13686 Opinion of the Court 7
before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be
addressed.”). So, too, are any possible claims that the district court
erred because the federal defendants had not yet responded to
Taylor’s complaint and did not move to dismiss it. Id.
AFFIRMED.
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